


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Map of the  
Country between Brussels & Paris  
(took place in the)  
CAMPAIGN OF 1815.  
Showing also the heavy water barrier in the  
WILHELM IN THE ADJACENT TOWN (1815).





trees as they appeared when it was taken, namely, with the bark destroyed by the horses.

PLATE VIII.—G. Part of the village of Mont St. Jean. Here a considerable portion of the British army bivouacked on the 17th, and here, also, the French artillery was brought after the victory.

PLATE IX.—H. The farm house of Mont St. Jean. This house being close in the rear of the action, it was much dilapidated by random shot.

PLATE X.—I. View of the cottage of Valette, with the road on the left leading to Frischermont.

PLATE XI.—J. Chateau of Frischermont. It was on this spot, that Sir T. Picton received his death.—Here, also, through the wood, the Prussians under the command of Bulow came up, towards the close of the battle.

PLATE XII.—K. The farm of La Haye Sainte. This was the front of the left centre of the British army, and the scene of a sanguinary action towards the middle of the day. The French at length succeeded in obtaining possession of it, in consequence of the detachment by which it was occupied, having expended all their ammunition, and being unable to obtain a further supply.

PLATE XIII.—L. A front view of the farm of La Haye Sainte. It was here that the second desperate attack was made by the French, in which the celebrated charge of Sir W. Ponsonby's heavy brigade did so much execution. Sir W. Ponsonby himself fell during the conflict, but the enemy were finally repulsed with the loss of two eagles, besides a great number of prisoners.

PLATE XIV.—M. La Belle Alliance, the centre of the French position.

PLATE XV.—N. }  
PLATE XVI.—O. } Two other views of La Belle Alliance.

PLATE XVII.—P. } These three Plates are illustrative of the chateau of Hougoumont and its vicinity, forming the front of our right centre, and covering the return of that flank. The first  
PLATE XVIII.—Q. }  
PLATE XIX.—R. } (P) is a view of the wood that skirted this chateau; the second (Q) shews where the dead were buried, after the battle; the third (R) is the interior of Hougoumont, reduced nearly to a heap of ruins. The action commenced, by a furious attack on this post, which was continued at intervals through the whole day. The Duke of Wellington attached the utmost importance to the maintaining our position here, which was accomplished by the unexampled bravery of the troops employed in its defence.

PLATE XX.—S. The observatory, erected by the King of the Netherlands, for the purpose of making a trigonometrical survey of the country.

PLATE XXI.—T. The village of Genappe, where Napoleon's carriage was captured by a Prussian detachment. The farm at Les Quatre Bras is seen on the top of the hill, on the right.



PLATE XXII.—V. Les Quatre Bras, where the battle was fought on the 15th, between a part of the Duke of Wellington's army, and a superior number of the French, under the command of Ney. The Duke of Brunswick was killed on the left, near the wood.

PLATE XXIII.—U. Ligny Castle, shewing the field of battle where the Prussians and French fought on the 16th June. Sombref is seen in the distance, as are also the mill, church, and heights of Brie.

PLATE XXIV.—W. The ruins of the village of Ligny.

PLATE XXV.—Y. Flight of Bonaparte from the battle of Waterloo, accompanied by his guide.

PLATE XXVI. Portraits of the Prince of Orange, Duke of Wellington, Lord Hill, Prince Blücher, Duke of Brunswick, General Picton, and the Marquis of Anglesea.

PLATE XXVII. Frontispiece.

PLATE XXVIII. The Battle of Waterloo, representing that part of the action where the French Cuirassiers are attacking the English hollow squares. At this critical moment the Marquis of Anglesea is seen leading the Horse Guards to the charge, who succeeded in driving back the enemy with great slaughter.

PLATE XXIX. Plan of the battles of Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo, arranged by the Officers who fought in that memorable conflict; shewing the attacks and situations of the armies, and marking the spots where distinguished Officers fell.

PLATE XXX. A Map from Brussels to Paris.



## EXPLANATION OF THE FIGURES WHICH ARE MARKED IN THE PLAN.

No.

1. WHERE the British bivouacked on the night of the 17th and 18th of June.
2. English light artillery.
3. Position of the Belgian troops.
4. The division of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton.
5. .... Major-General Sir George Cooke.
6. .... Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Alten.
7. .... Major-General Sir James Kempt.
8. .... Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton.
9. English cavalry, commanded by General the Marquis of Anglesea.
10. The infantry of Nassau Usingen.
11. The troops of the Duke of Brunswick.
12. Position of the Duke of Wellington, during part of the action.
13. First point of attack by the French.
14. Second point of attack by the French.
15. Third point of attack by the French.
16. Where the Prince of Orange was wounded.
17. The ravine in which a great part of Napoleon's Guard was destroyed by the British artillery, which was masked by the hedge leading from La Haye Sainte to Frischermont.

No.

18. Chateau of Hougomont. The battle commenced by an attack upon this position.
19. Head-quarters of Bonaparte, and where he slept on the 17th of June.
20. Sir William Ponsonby was killed here.
21. Where Sir Thomas Picton was killed.
22. Planchenoit, the principal point of the Prussian attack on the 18th.
23. Position of Napoleon during a considerable part of the battle.
24. Where the Marquis of Anglesea was wounded, while pursuing the French in their retreat.
25. The Duke of Brunswick was killed here.
26. Position of the Life Guards, when led by the Marquis of Anglesea in person, to a furious attack upon the Cuirassiers. (See BATTLE PIECE.)
27. Position of the Cuirassiers when charging the English infantry.
28. French Cuirassiers in reserve.
29. Where Bonaparte had his guide from.
30. A brilliant affair in the afternoon of the 17th of June, by the English cavalry, when covering the retreat of the army upon Waterloo.





## ERRATA.

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- Page 37, l. 21, for *solicitations* read *visitations*.  
..... 73, l. 11, for *leg* read *legs*.  
..... 86, l. 19, (note) for *Bertrand* read *Marchand*.  
..... 96, an asterisk should be placed at the word *force*, line 10.  
..... 109, l. 22, for *horses* read *foals*.  
..... 134, l. 13, (note) for *childness* read *childish*.  
..... 150, l. 10 from the bottom, place a colon after the word *duties*.  
..... 158, l. 2, (note) for *Havre* read *Wavre*.  
..... 171, the note, for *du royaume* read *son royaume*.  
..... 198, l. 4, for *recalled* read *recal*.  
..... 204, the note, in l. 2, supply the word *in*.  
..... 251, l. 14, supply the word *when*.  
..... 258, l. 12, for "flank of rear," read "flank or rear."
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## DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.


Frontispiece.....	}	To be placed facing each other before the Title.
Portraits of the Prince of Orange, &c...		
Battle Piece.....	}	To face page 1.
Plan of the Battles .....		
Map.....		

The remaining Plates to be bound up in alphabetical order, at the end of the Volume.



M. 82

Delhi



Presented by Captain  
Rogal  
May. 1862.

United Service Institution  
of India.

## PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

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THE lapse of centuries, in any period of profane history, does not present a succession of such stupendous events as have diversified the last five-and-twenty years. Within that little period, mighty and ancient thrones were subverted; royal dynasties became wanderers on the face of the earth; obscure adventurers carved their passage to dominion with their swords; the religion of centuries was abolished, to be succeeded by the vain fooleries of sophistry, and the frantic impiety of atheism; the moral decencies of social and civilised life were laughed to scorn; the solemnity of public faith prostituted to feed a measureless ambition; virtuous and noble blood shed in torrents to satiate the sanguinary rage of successive tyrants; wide-sweeping proscriptions drove into banishment all who disdained to be the instruments, or feared to become the victims of anarchy and rebellion; while the holy name of liberty and the sacred vows of patriotism were equally made the panders to domestic treason and foreign despotism.

This flood of desolation, which for so many years overspread the face of Europe, burying beneath its tumultuous waters all the ancient landmarks by which nations had, through succeeding ages, navigated the great ocean of time, was first let loose upon the astonished world by the French revolution. Whatever of good and useful may have ultimately resulted from that tremendous explosion (and something of both the unprejudiced observer will acknowledge to remain) was dearly purchased. The awful and disastrous scenes which a phrenzied licentiousness perpetrated; the massacres, the rapine, the devastation, the unmi-



gated horrors, even of its infancy, fill the mind that contemplates them with dismay and abhorrence. Its savage and ferocious acts seemed the work of demons rather than of men. Butchery was a pastime: he who shed most blood was a hero; but he who shed the most of innocent blood laid claim to immortality, and demanded to be enrolled in the pantheon of democracy as a patriot, and a benefactor to mankind. France was indeed stained with many vices. Her government was oppressive; her morals debauched; her princes dissolute; her nobles corrupted; her priesthood servilely intent on temporal benefits; her people debased. But through what an ordeal was she purified! By what calamities was she cleansed of her infections! What suffering, what humiliation has she endured! And how little has she gained, compared to the magnitude of her sacrifices!

When this torrent of unimaginable evil and affliction first rushed forth, and while yet France alone lay prostrate under the fatal deluge, Europe cast a prophetic glance upon the future, and found in her own just fears more than any tongue could express, or any pen describe. It was not a solitary and insulated transaction, happening in a neighbouring state, which might be curbed by existing laws, remedied by wise concessions, or wholly subdued by the vigorous interposition of government. Concession had but kindled enthusiasm into madness; and the laws, the government, and the throne, fell before its fury. Vulgar demagogues usurped the sovereignty; the calm and fearless voice of reason could not be heard; religion spoke in vain; justice sheathed her sword, while revenge and malice drew the insidious dagger; and honour, virtue, and dignity, fled from the polluted orgies of traitorous conspirators. The land was filled with mourning and tears; with the sorrows of helpless and suffering loyalty, or with the unavailing lamentations of expiring innocence. Clemency was exerted only to reward infamy; vengeance, exile, or death, awaited the guiltless and unoffending. Despot succeeded to despot; each had his reign of terror and his scaffold. The people groaned beneath a merciless and universal persecution, while their grim tyrants smiled to see the havoc which they made, the wide and general devastation which they inflicted.

This was the condition of France, and to this condition she would have brought every other nation. An open and undisguised crusade was preached by her apostles of revolution against all the monarchies of Europe. The whole world was to be regenerated, and she was to be the model and exemplar by which other countries were to fashion themselves. Kings were to be extirpated from



the face of the earth, for all kings were tyrants; hierarchies abolished, for religion itself was but a solemn plausibility invented to curb the nobler flights of reason, and priests the crafty tools of spiritual slavery; nobility extinguished, for equality was man's birthright; laws annulled, for they were the devices of the rich and powerful to keep the poor and feeble in subjection; property confiscated, for by what privilege could any one pretend to have more than his neighbour? The whole human race was to be linked together in one common bond of fraternal love; the monarch and the subject, the master and the servant, the father and the son, blended in undistinguishing equality; and mere nature, triumphing over all the safeguards which divine and human wisdom had established for the happiness of all, to elicit by her own unassisted energies a system of things fraught with philanthropy, peace, and unutterable felicity.

Against this atrocious combination, of which it is difficult to determine whether its folly or its wickedness were the greater, Europe armed as by one common impulse. But for a period (a melancholy, a disheartening, an eventful period!) she armed in vain. France, animated by a frantic enthusiasm, bore down all opposition with resistless ardour. Political zeal was inflamed into frenzy; the cause of the country became the cause of every individual; to be capable of wielding a sword, and to wield one, were synonymous expressions. They first repelled invasion; they afterwards invaded. They fought and preached. They subdued by their impetuous and ferocious valour, and having subdued, they propagated their doctrines of equality with pernicious activity. Those who yielded to their arms were next to become proselytes to their revolutionary creed. They too often succeeded in both; and too often their emissaries of sedition prepared the triumph for their lawless and exterminating hordes. Even in England, whose constitution is at once the hope and envy of the world, where excess of freedom makes men wanton in its abuse, and where liberty is practically enjoyed because thoroughly understood—even in England the contagion was felt. Some who loved innovation from the hope that change might elevate them into importance, some whose restless and unquiet natures found their element only in political storms and convulsions, and some who innocently clamoured from a simplicity of mind that could not comprehend why they should be quiet when others made a noise, loudly extolled the benefits which *we* should derive from a participation in French principles, and ambitiously sought to engraft their spurious and unwholesome fruit upon the vigorous stock of native, British independence. Happily the good sense of the better part of the nation saved us from the degradation of Gallic fraternity, while the valour of our fleets and



but fierce, rapacious, and profligate soldiery. The armies of the Republic were no less renowned for their valour than detested for their cruelty. The humanity which graces conquest and mitigates defeat ; the manly and generous spirit which deplores the evil it inflicts ; the chivalrous and exalted heroism which is proud to triumph, but blushes to destroy ; and all those peaceful, temperate virtues, that chasten while they adorn the stern duties of the warrior, were banished alike from the chiefs and soldiers of those devastating hordes. Pillage and rapine were promised and permitted, as the incentive and reward of victory. Provinces and cities were half subdued by terror before a battle was fought ; and dreadful as the alternative seemed between their enmity or alliance, the latter was sometimes accepted in despair. As the friends of the Republic, they might hope only to be plundered and oppressed ; as its enemies, they were exposed to war, banishment, captivity, and death. It would require the bold and energetic pen of a Tacitus to describe the multiplied horrors which tracked the progress of the French armies wherever they trod : unfortunately for mankind they are written in the annals of every nation of Europe, that one alone excepted whom most it was sought to injure.

With these willing and formidable instruments of tyranny, Napoleon fenced round his imperial throne, overawed the public voice, and dictated his will to a pliant and degraded senate. The friends of his person and the associates of his fortune were rewarded and secured by splendid titles and munificent donatives. From the dregs of democracy arose princes, and marshals, and dukes, and dignitaries of all gradations, who vainly strove to conceal or eradicate the plebeian vices of their ignoble origin. The tenure by which they held their rank and wealth, was the continuance of his prosperity who had bestowed them ; and thus their mutual interests were indissolubly blended together. By this stroke of policy he incautiously believed that he had laid a foundation for his dynasty, which succeeding years would confirm beyond the power of chance or design to subvert. A new order of things was progressively formed under his auspices, and for a time, indeed, so unerring seemed his plans, and so inevitable his success, that even those who most dreaded the fatal truth, almost confessed that his greatness was unassailable. Its consummation appeared to be wrought, when, at last, a daughter of the house of Austria,—of that ancient and illustrious house, whose blood had already been offered up, a guiltless sacrifice, at the unhallowed altar of jacobinism by degenerate Frenchmen,—was doomed to fill the place of a repudiated wife, and to partake of his throne and bed, who had curtailed the inheritance, humbled the dignity, and dimmed the lustre of her royal race. If



Maria Louisa was a reluctant victim of state policy, and purchased by that inglorious alliance a pause in the spoliations which the inexorable victor meditated, her filial devotion would sanctify the deep debasement, and elevate her to a high rank of moral heroism ; but, if she yielded from a mingled motive ; if the petty failing of her sex blinded her judgment ; if the frivolous and unmeaning clamour of vanity silenced the loud remonstrances of lofty and imperial honour, and she exulted in the fascinating illusion of subduing him who had subdued the world, posterity will pronounce that sentence upon her which I forbear to name. A degree of mystery yet involves the whole transaction, and it is pleasing to hope that it may conceal the unblemished and irreproachable feelings by which she was actuated.

In the exercise of his sovereignty, Bonaparte acknowledged no guide but his passions, which were at once furious and puerile ; so furious, that they impelled him to violate the common decencies and decorum of life, and so puerile, that nothing was too insignificant for his vengeance. In their intemperate sallies, he equally insulted the dignity of foreign embassies at his court, and exposed to derision and contempt the public functionaries of his own government. They approached his person with suspicious caution, and if the fit was on him, bore his coarse rebukes with passive servility, or retired from the torrent with silent terror and confusion. His ministers were the submissive instruments of his will, not the advisers of his council. What he commanded they performed. To question or dispute his orders was the certain prelude of dismissal, and perhaps of imprisonment. He wanted agents of despotism, political machines, who would do their appointed service, and be still ; not inquirers into liberty, and advocates for freedom. He found what he wanted, and France lay prostrate at his feet.

Tyranny is a jealous and a dastardly vice. The consciousness of wrong conjures up a thousand forms of punishment and revenge ready to strike their guilty victim ; and the imaginary blow is too often averted by preventive murders.— Thus it was that Pichegru and Georges, that Palm and Wright were sacrificed ; thus the virtuous and lamented D'Enghien cemented with his blood the tottering fabric of the tyrant's power ; and thus too Moreau had fallen, but that a stronger fear withheld the fatal mandate. The sword of Damocles must have met the eye of Bonaparte in every chamber of his palace, and haunted him in his unquiet slumbers. So timorous and shrinking indeed were his pretensions, how proudly soever he might urge them in speeches, manifestoes, and proclamations, that he dreaded all scrutiny into their nature and character. The veil



that shrouded them no hand was permitted to uplift, unless to expatiate upon the soothing fiction of his magnanimity, his greatness and clemency in war, his justice, moderation, and fidelity, in peace. These themes of courtly adulation were open to every parasite, and the venal panegyrist found his praises substantially rewarded. But to expostulate, to hint a modest doubt, or pronounce a fearless censure, was sure to exasperate the feelings of a man whose morbid sensibility of mind proclaimed the secret conflicts he endured. The press, that great moral tribunal, before which, in the intrepid exercise of its functions, kings as well as subjects may be arraigned, was the peculiar object of his vigilance, for it spoke with ten thousand tongues in every corner of the world. In France, the sacred fire of truth that should guide and illuminate its course, was utterly extinguished: the most monstrous falsehoods were unblushingly told; and told with such an air of confident veracity, that the least credulous scepticism was sometimes betrayed into belief. Never, in any age or country, have there been exhibited scenes of such systematic and comprehensive imposture as were employed by Napoleon to delude the people. Invention, imagination, and all the fertile combinations of fancy, were no longer the excellence of poets: they were transferred into cabinets and council-chambers; they spoke in public, official documents; they embellished the dull formalities of diplomacy; they were displayed in camps and senates; they converted disgrace into honour, and won victories before battles were fought. Napoleon, in fact, became the arch-juggler of Europe, and not even the metamorphoses of mythology, or the dreams of alchemy, could boast of more transformations and transmutations, than his fabulous decrees, discourses, and *bulletins*. By successive efforts he had brought this curiously wrought machine to a degree of pernicious perfection, and there were few countries where he did not, by menace, by violence, or by corruption, either pollute the majestic tide of truth, or wholly check its current. Even in England he began to exert his fatal ascendancy, and in an unguarded moment a British minister condescended to become his instrument. The trial of Peltier bespoke at once the intemperate arrogance of Bonaparte, and the imbecile pliancy of a pacific government, willing to compromise national dignity and honour for the preservation of its own crude workmanship. This momentary stain, however, was soon obliterated; and the free press of England contributed, with signal efficacy, towards the downfall of a system which threatened to efface every vestige of good faith, honesty, and virtue, among nations.



If any proof were needed of the inestimable blessings which flow from that

“ ——— True liberty, when freeborn men

“ Having to advise the public, may speak free,”

it might be found in the melancholy contrast and disastrous consequences which France, and the greater part of Europe, presented under the dominion of Bonaparte. When, by the destruction of that dominion, men were emancipated from the odious thralldom, with what a zeal, with what rejoicing and alacrity, did they hasten to re-assume their long suppressed prerogatives! What dismal truths were then disclosed, for the first time! What iniquities were unfolded! The exulting ardour with which the oppressed states and empires rushed to assert their recovered rights, recalled that glorious burst of enthusiasm which the love of liberty awakened in the mind of Milton, when pleading for an unlicensed press to the parliament of England.—“ Methinks,” he exclaimed, in the language of inspiration, “ I see a noble and puissant nation, rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam; purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means.\*”—Such seemed the condition of Europe, (I except England with grateful pride,) when Napoleon was banished to Elba, and reason, and truth, and justice, were once more heard among men.

The despotism which weighed down the French people, and sunk them into such a state of sullen apathy, that they were little else than breathing machines, alike reckless of good or ill, so utterly forlorn and hopeless was their condition, by securing Buonaparte from all inquietude as to domestic rebellion, gave him ampler leisure for enlarging his ambitious designs abroad. His plans, indeed, had enough of revolutionary grandeur in them to captivate the thoughtless, and to dismay the reflecting. All existing forms of government, whether founded upon ancient, hereditary rights, or upon particular and specific convention, were to be abolished or changed, to admit the spurious royalty of Napoleon’s own family, or the august persons of his military associates. Thus it was that Holland, Westphalia, Naples, the Italian and Germanic states,

\* Areopagitica.



received from his hands their kings and princes : and so numerous happened to be the unprovided (I had almost said mendicant) branches of the imperial dynasty, that even Spain was at last admitted to the honour of exchanging a Bourbon for a Bonaparte. In this case, however, had it been merely a question of relative worth and dignity, between the bigot Ferdinand and the upstart Joseph, it might have perplexed the acutest observer to determine which could most have disgraced the Spanish throne : but the people pronounced a plain and energetic decision, which placed the matter on its true and intelligible basis. They saw in it only a most perfidious, a most treacherous, and a most infamous attempt to force upon them a monarch, to violate their liberty, and to insult and dishonour them by every species of outrage. Their self-exiled and captive king was their watchword and rallying sign ; but indignant patriotism animated the zeal of loyalty, and beneath their united banners, led on by Wellington, they fought for freedom and they won it. They won it for the soil which they drenched with their own blood and that of their invaders ; but they lost it for themselves. It is melancholy to reflect how many noble spirits bled in the field, or toiled in the senate, to preserve a throne for him who would have disgraced by his bigotry, his cruelties, his injustice, and his pusillanimity, the darkest ages of ignorance and superstition. What Englishman can read, without horror, that detestable list of proscriptions which consigned to death, or the lingering torments of exile in a pestilential climate, all who had dared to think and act for liberty ? The feeble zealot, whom nature designed for a cowl rather than a crown, imagined he was glorifying God, by persecuting those who had temerity enough to cast off some of the spiritual fetters of a crafty and infatuated priesthood. It would have been well, for his unhappy subjects, had he never possessed the power of glorifying God less innocently, than by embroidering a satten petticoat for the Virgin.

The whole of Napoleon's criminal career does not present a fouler blot than the invasion of Spain. It was the offspring of ambition acting by crafty, insidious, and despicable means ; it presented no feature of a noble, daring, or magnificent character : subtlety and menace began, what oppression, violence, and cruelty in vain attempted to conclude. It was a tissue of unmingled baseness from first to last ; and the baffled tyrant, who saw legion after legion devoted to destruction, was forced to acknowledge the splendid, the consoling truth, that a people unanimously leagued, heart and hand, in defence of their liberty, may be exterminated, but can never be subdued. It seemed, too, as if Providence had determined, that a great moral lesson should be inculcated through its means, for this execrable scheme called forth the genius of Wellington, and the valour of British troops ;



that genius and that valour which finally humbled the glory and sealed the doom of Napoleon, by rendering him a fugitive upon the earth, reducing him to the hard necessity of supplicating our protection, and placing his future destiny at our disposal. In his pride of power, when tributary thrones and vassal states bowed submissively before him, with what scorn, and contumely, and invective, (the littleness of ineffectual rage,) he strove to gall and wound us ! In the disastrous crisis of his fate, when all the world fell from him, and he stood alone, like a mighty ruin that had survived the shock, with what an abject spirit, with what fawning courtesy, with what dissembled rancour, with what a grovelling adulation, he extolled our greatness, our magnanimity, our virtues, our protecting generosity ! A truly energetic and heroic mind would have courted death in any shape, rather than abasement in so many ; or, if that were denied, it would at least have found the means to shed splendour even upon captivity and exile.

Until the victories of Wellington in Spain, France knew not what it was to sustain defeat ; and even these were so studiously disguised or denied, that the mass of her population still dreamed of invincible legions, and a territory sacred from the pollution of a hostile foot. Bonaparte himself shared in the delusion, though he knew the truth, because he believed that he could, at any time, retrieve the disasters which his arms had endured. Elevated by this vain confidence, he did not hesitate to project, and execute, the most gigantic enterprize that modern history can tell. While one part of his troops was fighting on the shores of the Tagus, he marched a stupendous force to the banks of the Borysthenes : but his star of glory, which rose at Lodi, and had so long dazzled the nations of Europe with its flaming lustre, turned pale at Moscow, where a sublime act of patriotism left him master only of a heap of smoking ruins. There he had leisure to contemplate the mighty elements, of hatred and revenge, which such a reverse would unite into one common league of enmity to France, and there he might have foreseen his destiny, if timely prudence did not avert it. His haughty and imperious nature, however, could not brook submission, while there was yet a hope of triumph. He fled to Paris, and was the first who told the portentous tidings. France shrunk back aghast, and awaited in mournful silence his future decisions. Widowed as she was of her children, she found herself compelled to yield fresh victims to the insatiate ambition of her tyrant. A new army was created, and a second wreck survived to tell the bloody day of Leipsic, so fatal to France, so auspicious to Europe. Her confederated troops, animated by the inspiring voice of freedom, and goaded by the deep sense of long and multiplied sufferings, now beleaguered the confines of that France,



whose vanquished Emperor had so often repelled, with scorn, the possibility of invasion, and with arms in their hands demanded only security for the future.— Tempting his fate, Napoleon still maintained a stern defiance, and preferred rather to see her fine and fertile provinces devastated by war, than abate one particle of his lofty and unjust pretensions. He strove, indeed, to obtain a profitable delay by the artifices of an insincere negociation; but these were now too familiar to be useful, and the allies continued to fight, while their ministers discussed the fraudulent propositions of Napoleon. Victories were mutually gained in many a stubborn conflict, but a prompt and masterly manœuvre at length placed the allies in possession of the capital. Here they dictated peace, and here they for ever excluded from the throne of France, Napoleon and his family. The banished Bourbons were recalled, and Louis XVIII. resumed the sceptre of his ancestors, if not with the unanimous concurrence of the French people, at least with the best wishes of the better part.


Napoleon was permitted to select his own place of retreat, and having ineffectually solicited permission to retire to England, he fixed upon the island of Elba. Decorated with the shadow of his fallen greatness, retaining the title of Emperor, but receiving the sovereignty only of that barren rock, he departed from Fontainbleau, accompanied by the execration of millions. Europe rang with undissembled joy at his overthrow. She had groaned beneath his oppression; she rejoiced at her redemption. Even in France, so little was he beloved, when opinion could manifest itself without danger, so little was he respected, when no longer to be feared, that he found himself reduced to the most humiliating and paltry evasions to escape the fury of popular indignation. The former master of the world, wept and trembled for his life. Pale and haggard, the affrighted Emperor courted indignities from his attendants, that he might not be recognised by external ceremony. He, who had so heroically marshalled others to death, now sought to elude it, by changing his attire, by concealment, and by every ingenuity of subterfuge.\* Thus degraded, thus insulted, and thus contemptible, by the endurance of such degradation and such insult, he reached his new kingdom. Had his destiny closed here, it would have afforded pregnant matter for the page of history: but his restless ambition tempted him again to provoke and encounter the hatred of the world; and it is now reserved for future ages, who shall read with wonder the tale of his exploits, to learn that a British Parliament, which had for years been occupied with devising means to curb his gigantic enterprises, was at length employed, in calm and undisturbed discussion, upon the best mode of securing his person amid the waves of the Atlantic.

\* See the interesting narrative of Count Truchses-Waldbourg.



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M. 8



AN

**HISTORICAL ACCOUNT**

OF

**(THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.)**









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### CHAPTER I.

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**WHEN** Napoleon was driven from his imperial throne, and the long-exiled Bourbons resumed their ancient dominion, the unexpected but auspicious event was regarded, by Europe, as a joyful harbinger of times whose return might obliterate the deep traces of those calamities with which she had, for so many years, been visited. The lust of a vast and insatiate ambition had accomplished its own downfall, and the memorable lesson, taught by that solemn catastrophe, would not, it was believed, be wholly lost upon the potentates who were then united, in one common league, to restore the principles and the practice of true liberty, of justice, and humanity. Their conduct, indeed, sanctioned this inference, and from what they had done, a liberal anticipation was indulged of what they would do. In the hour of victory, in the moment of splendid and decisive triumph, when the frailty of passion was most likely to abuse the judgment, when they had at their feet a vaunting, faithless, and cruel enemy, who had always stained the military glory of conquest by sanguinary and atrocious excesses, and when the impulse of individual resentment might have been supposed active in stimulating to a severe retaliation, they buried at once all memory of past wrongs in generous oblivion, and vouchsafed that mercy to the prostrate foe, which clemency might grant, but which justice could never have exacted. Not a province of the French empire was dismembered ; not a spoil was removed which could serve as a trophy to record her subjugation. She was even left in possession of all that she had amassed from other states during years of plunder, extortion, and tyranny. Kingdoms and territories, indeed, which she had brought under her yoke, were



wrested from her grasp, and restored to their independence ; but even this act of retribution was marked by that spirit of magnanimous forbearance which characterized all the proceedings of her victors, for they conceded, to her vanity, an extension of boundary greater than she had before the revolution.

To those who look for all motives in the selfish propensities of our nature, who believe that virtue is only the creature of circumstance, and especially to those who nourish a splenetic and habitual distrust of royalty, because they cannot conceive how the power to do ill may subsist with the inclination to do good, or how a legitimate king can differ from a tyrant, it will be an easy task to ascribe this moderation to a reluctant policy which necessity enforced. They will not discover in it the offspring of a free and liberal choice, emanating from noble and disinterested views, but only a cautious and constrained system, dictated by fear, and necessary to secure the precarious triumphs obtained. To this conclusion, indeed, the friends and admirers of Napoleon must inevitably come, for that great and faultless being never betrayed such puerile weakness. Where he warred, he ravaged ; where he conquered, he despoiled ; and when he spared, he insulted : yet, in the estimation of his worshippers, he never erred. The allied sovereigns, therefore, who abstained from imitating his example, could not act from superior elevation of soul, but only from a compulsion which they were unable to resist.

Certainly, the history of the world does not furnish many examples of such temperate exultation. It is not often that the tide of victory, in its full sweep of desolation, calmly pours back its reflux waves, and silently subsides into gentleness and peace ; and still more rare is it, that the sword, unsheathed to punish aggression and not to inflict it, suspends its avenging blow, at the very moment it has the power to strike. This sublime and exalted spectacle was exhibited by Europe, when France lay crouching beneath her. The uplifted arm was averted, and that lesson of mercy, which she had never learned in the days of her own prosperity, was now taught her by those who had most reason to despise or neglect it. The buoyant and vivacious levity of a Frenchman, however, can always find lenitives to soothe the fretfulness of mortified vanity ; and this happy art of self-delusion was abundantly exercised on an occasion, when nothing but delusion could avail to hide an odious truth. While the rest of the world extolled the magnanimity of the allies, and pronounced it the noblest feature of their conduct, France extracted from it consolation for the past, and hope for the future. She congratulated herself upon those virtues, which still made her

an object of reverence even to her victors, and rejoiced in the possession of the power, which was still formidable enough to intimidate the insolence and enthusiasm of conquest. Sustained by the one, and elated by the other, she secretly cherished the idea that the day could not be far distant, when she should again shine forth in all the lustre of amiable tyranny, and again decorate her present oppressors with the interesting badges of imperial ascendancy. The fascinating experiment was soon tried indeed, but the result differed a little from what was expected, perhaps hoped, by the enlightened advocates of that benignant system which Napoleon invented and matured, for the safety of personal liberty, the freedom of public opinion, and the general happiness and independence of nations.

When the allies permitted the restoration of the Bourbons, they contemplated that act as a service done to France, and a security obtained for Europe. That France would derive benefit from the transaction, in its ultimate influence upon her political condition, there could be little reason to doubt, though it was obvious that the immediate effect could not be productive of general tranquillity or cordial satisfaction among all classes of society. They who had acquired fortunes from the common wreck of property, during the most convulsed and disastrous periods of the revolution, would naturally feel some alarm, lest the dangerous pretensions of the ancient possessors should disturb their claims: they, also who justly rejoiced at the extinction of many feudal and ecclesiastical privileges which circumscribed or destroyed the rights of the citizen, would look with anxious forebodings at the return of a dynasty, under whose sway those privileges had been conceded and maintained; while they, in whom all sense of morals was annihilated by the profligate maxims, and equally profligate practice, which sprung from the rank soil of democracy, who regarded the dictates of virtue and decorum as a restraint, and restraint as oppression, could not anticipate, with much delight the restoration of a sovereign, who ventured to respect not only the forms but the precepts of religion, and whose example was likely to enforce the observance of piety.\* If, however, the apprehensions of the first and second class were

\* Ben Jonson has accurately described the influence which courts and sovereigns ought to have upon the morals of the people:—

“ Princes that would their people should do well,  
 “ Must at themselves begin, as at the head;  
 “ For men, by their example, pattern out,  
 “ Their imitations, and regard of laws:  
 “ A virtuous court a world to virtue draws.”

Was France to be the only country denied the possibility of such a blessing?



removed, no one will think that those of the third were entitled to much consideration, or that a mild, beneficent, and virtuous monarch should not regain the sceptre of his ancestors, because vice would be less triumphant, and morality less openly and less flagitiously violated.

But there was another portion of the French people, a very numerous and a very important portion, whose interests were to be conciliated, and whose prejudices were to be removed. This was the army of France, a powerful and dangerous body in every state, but peculiarly so here, from the nature of its composition, the exclusive honours and privileges it enjoyed, and its separate and independent existence. They had no identity with the civil prosperity of France; no community of feeling with those whose hopes of happiness and ease were centered in the peaceful pursuits of industry. They could not disunite their destiny and pursuits from the warlike glory of the country, that vain image of imperial greatness, which so long a series of splendid exploits had contributed to erect, and which so brief a current of adversity had overthrown. The delusive phantom of the Great Nation, which was to impose its own arbitrary decrees upon the universe, and hold the whole continent of Europe in vassalage, which the fantastic arrogance of Napoleon had consecrated as a temporal domination, assimilated in its attributes almost to divine government, acting every where by its own comprehensive energies, but accessible no where to the designs or machinations of its foes, still maintained its influence over the army, and still fed ambitious hopes, that the sacred territory, which had been stained by the pollution of invasion, would yet rise from its fallen posture, and re-assume its station as the universal enemy of liberty.

These sentiments were so intimately blended with every feeling of their political and moral existence, that it was impossible they should be eradicated by the sudden reverses which the nation had sustained; and equally impossible was it, that they should permit the growth and expansion of opinions more friendly to the felicity of the world, by establishing that felicity upon the mild and tranquil occupations of life. No body of men, indeed, acting upon separate views of greatness, can at once be reconciled to a state of things, which consigns them to the comparative obscurity of privacy and retirement. They who have run through the career of renown, still languish for occasion to court the public eye, or, the long habitude of active employment unfits them for the indolence of seclusion; while they, whom the seductive prospect of distant honour and emolument stimulates to all the arduous duties and all the dangers of the field, reluctantly

behold the brilliant scene eclipsed. These various motives, which animated the military of France, would naturally indispose them to view, with much complacency, the accession of a monarch, whose character not only precluded the hope of war, but whose very restoration was rather to be regarded as the condition and security of peace. Though, however, the pacific Louis could not encourage the martial and licentious zeal of his soldiers, there was one, lingering in exile, to whom they turned with fond anticipation, whose re-appearance they expected with confidence, and who himself probably solaced his hours of impatient solitude, with the soothing dream of again subverting thrones, and again leading armies to slaughter and to conquest.

The difficulty and danger which encompassed Louis XVIII. in any course which he might adopt towards the army, were sufficiently obvious.\* If he affected

\* Louis XVIII., upon his return, issued the following energetic proclamation to the army:—

“ Soldiers,

“ You no longer belong to Napoleon, but you will always belong to your country: your first oath was to be faithful to her. That oath is irrevocable and sacred.

“ The new constitution assures you your honours, your rank, and your pensions. The senate and the provisional government have recognized your rights. They are confident that you will not forget your duty. From this moment your fatigues and your sufferings terminate. Your glory remains entire. Peace will guarantee to you the reward of your labours.

“ What was your fate under the government which is now no more? Dragged from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Danube, and from the Nile to the Dnieper; scorched in the burning sands of the south, or frozen in the icy regions of the north, you contributed to erect a colossal grandeur, foreign to the true interests of France, and which, reversed from its very foundations, has crushed you, and the rest of the world with its enormous weight. How many thousand brave fellows have been the instruments and the victims of a lawless and insatiable ambition! How many have died unknown, to augment the fame of one man! Victims of cold, famine, or disease, they were deprived even of the consolation of dying on the field of glory; and their families, while they fondly recal them to memory, are unable to soothe their sorrows by recounting the deeds of bravery which graced their fall.

“ All is now changed. No longer will you perish five hundred leagues from home, in a cause which is not your own. Princes, Frenchmen-born, will be sparing of your blood, for their blood is yours. Their ancestors governed your ancestors. Time has perpetuated between them and you a long inheritance of pleasing recollections, mutual interests, and reciprocal services. That ancient race has produced many kings, whom historians have named the Fathers of their people. It has given us Henry IV., whom the soldiers call the Brave King, but whom the peasants will ever venerate as the Good King.



to rely upon their fidelity, and entrusted himself entirely to their protection, was it not at least probable he would become the victim of their discontent and jealousy, that he would either be betrayed or expelled? If he withdrew from them all shew of confidence, if he dismissed the marshals from his presence, and disbanded the troops, as men in whose honour he could repose no trust, so undisguised a stigma upon their past conduct, and so unequivocal a proof of their future fate, would have roused a spirit of hostility and revenge, an indignant feeling of contempt and abhorrence, which not even the presence of the allied armies could have prevented, perhaps, from exploding into active rebellion, and plunging the country into civil war. A more resolute prince would have acted with decision; a prince, less enfeebled by infirmities, would have been prepared to encounter difficulties; he might have prevented them by his activity, or quelled them by his energy: but the mind of Louis XVIII. partook only of mildness and benevolence. War had opened for him a passage to his throne, but he ascended it with the olive branch in his hand. His heart beat only with the sentiments of mercy; his lips uttered nothing but the language of pardon. In calling all Frenchmen his children, he seemed to feel something more than is commonly inspired by that technical phrase of kings. Compassion for their sufferings, and an affectionate anxiety for their happiness, were the meek and unoffending companions of his progress. He neither recriminated nor threatened. The guilty were left to endure the silent pangs which remorse might inflict, or to pine, in hopeless discontent, at the destruction of all their projects for bestowing

“ To the descendants of these monarchs your destiny is now committed. What can you fear? While they were in a foreign land, they dwelt with fond admiration on the prodigies of French valour. They admired and they loved you, even when their return was delayed by so many brilliant but useless exploits. These princes are now among you. They have been unfortunate, like Henry IV., and they will reign like him. They are not ignorant that the army composes the most distinguished part of their great family, and they will watch over your comforts and your interests, as their best-beloved children.

“ Some of you are young in age, but veterans in glory. Their wounds have doubled their years. They, if they please, may retire with honourable recompences, and grow old in the place of their nativity and the bosom of their family. Others will continue to pursue the career of arms, with all the hopes of advancement and reward which their King can offer.

“ Soldiers of France! Let the sentiments of true Frenchmen animate you. Return from foreign, and murderous, and unjust wars, to live with your fathers, your brothers, your friends. Preserve that bravery by which you have ever been distinguished, but let not ambition or the false love of glory render it again the subject of inquietude to Europe, fatal to France, and fatal to yourselves!”

liberty upon mankind by the perfection of tyranny. The long and severe misfortunes of Louis XVIII. had probably mitigated that obduracy of resentment which, at an earlier period, when the sense of injuries was fresh and recent in his recollection, might have tempted him to indulge in punishments. It must be remembered, also, that only a few, a very few, of the actors in that bloody tragedy which opened with the massacre of his martyred brother, had survived the dismal horrors which their infuriate passions evoked. They raised the storm, and they perished in it. From those that succeeded, who strove to perpetuate the reign of anarchy, and nourish rebellious zeal, it would have been at least imprudent to select victims of revenge. With them the whole nation were accomplices; but an entire people cannot be sacrificed to the vengeance of an individual.

It would have been better, however, for the royal cause, and contributed to its ultimate security, if some selections had been made, and some signal punishments inflicted. The extremes of good and evil approach very nearly, and mercy, not directed by wisdom, may do more harm than the most inexorable justice. Enough of blood was already shed, and Louis prudently abstained from sending the regicides to the scaffold. But he might have enforced other modes of penal rigour. The eminently guilty might have been banished from France, the less offending forbidden the royal presence, or deprived of the honours and emoluments which they possessed as the reward of their vices. This wholesome severity would have confounded the bold and audacious, while, at the same time it would have intimidated the fearful and the scrupulous. The resolution to act is sometimes taken for the power; and such a vigorous exercise of prerogative though it might have provoked some ineffectual clamour, could hardly have failed to excite that persuasion of energy, which would probably have prevented those perfidious machinations of treachery which afterwards brought so many disaster upon France. The King, instead of adopting this course, listened to the suggestions of his own benevolent mind, or to the cautious counsel of his advisers, and proclaimed a general oblivion of the past. Perhaps he confided in the venial delusion of French honour and French fidelity; perhaps he believed, that those whom he forbore to reproach or punish, would acknowledge the voluntary grace and if they accepted, would disdain to betray. Alas! he knew not the men over whom he was called to reign. They possessed not that lofty, high-minded and noble virtue which cannot descend to the paltry evasions of seeming submission, while the basest and most detestable perfidy was smothering in their bosoms.



He wished to be beloved ; but he forgot the salutary maxim that he should also make himself feared. A king must abate no jot of his just authority, if he would overawe the presumption of bold and licentious encroachment.

With the army it was a different point for consideration. They were a formidable and associated body, separated from the political one, and in a condition to terminate or prolong the contest. To have provoked their resentment would have been most injudicious, because they might have afforded a powerful and efficient aid to the factious and discontented in other parts of the kingdom. It became the policy, therefore, of the King, to conciliate and attach those whom he could not safely offend or remove, and nothing was omitted that might gratify their vanity, lull their suspicions, or secure their fidelity. The only exception was the substitution of the white flag for the national colours ; and when we consider how many fond recollections must have connected the imperial eagle and the tri-coloured standard with the honourable prejudices of the soldiers, it is difficult to approve of the determination by which they were inflexibly proscribed. Perhaps had they been retained, the veteran warriors of France would have rallied under them with enthusiasm, and scarcely reflected whether they fought for a Bourbon or a Napoleon. There are some predilections which, when they operate powerfully upon large communities, it is neither prudent nor desirable to eradicate, because if we can succeed in giving them a propitious direction, they have all the abstract energy of virtue. The warm devotion and attachment of the French soldiers for the banners under which they had so often conquered were of this description ; and the King might so have identified his own personal glory with the military renown of France, that the tri-coloured flag would have ceased to recal merely the splendid triumphs of revolutionary or imperial ambition, by becoming the emblem of national greatness.

To the marshals of the French army, as the powerful organs of its sentiments, Louis XVIII. manifested the most marked and flattering attentions. Their first interview at Compeigne, on the 1st of May, 1814, was full of condescension on the one part, and of transitory ardour on the other. Surrounded by these warlike chiefs, whose fame and titles could not but remind the good old King how much of his own sufferings their skill and valour had concurred to produce, he addressed them in language which might have awakened in the bosoms of all, those sentiments which only a few had the magnanimity to feel, or the courage to express, when the royal cause seemed again likely to fall. Marshal

Berthier, in the name of his associates, conveyed to the Sovereign the impression which his courtesy and confidence excited. The speech, which was probably not the spontaneous effusion of the moment, breathed nothing but gratitude, veneration, and loyalty. "I feel myself," said he, at its conclusion, "incompetent to describe the emotions with which the army was penetrated, when they learned with what touching interest your Majesty, forgetful of your own misfortunes, occupied yourself in alleviating the sufferings of the French prisoners. 'It concerns not me,' you said to the magnanimous Alexander,\* 'under what standard these one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners have served. They are unfortunate. They are my children!' In these memorable words, which the soldiers eagerly repeated to each other, who could fail to recognise the true son of the great Henry, who relieved the necessities of Paris while he besieged it! Like him, his illustrious descendant comes to unite all Frenchmen in one affectionate family. Your armies, Sire, of whom your Marshals are to-day the organs, will esteem themselves happy if, by their ardent devotion and fidelity, they can contribute to the success of your generous efforts."

To these protestations of zeal and devotion, the King replied with frankness and sincerity. He accepted the assurances of their loyalty, with unreserved and conciliating promptitude. Every thing, in fact, which he either said or did during this interview, was calculated to inspire confidence and esteem. He did not affect to conceal the importance or the value of their attachment, for as he rose from his seat to salute them, some of his household approached to afford him that assistance which his infirmities required; but the King, with dignified affability, supporting himself on those of the Marshals who were nearest to his person, exclaimed, "It is on you, Marshals, that I must always lean. Approach and encircle me." This happy and most refined compliment, by which even the personal debility of the sovereign was converted into a bond of union between him and his army, would have produced a magical effect upon the lofty and chivalrous sensibility of a Bayard, a Trimouilles, a Foix, or a Turenne; but such men as Ney, Soult, and Massena, were endowed with none of those elevated

\* To understand this allusion, it is necessary to remind the reader of the following extract from a letter which Louis XVIII. wrote to the Emperor Alexander:—"The fate of arms has caused more than one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners to fall into the hands of your Imperial Majesty. Most of them are French. It matters not under what banners they have fought. They are unfortunate; they are my children. I recommend them to the benevolent regard of your Imperial Majesty; and entreat you to consider how much many of them have already suffered, and to soften the rigour of their fate. Let them learn that their conqueror is the friend of their father. Your Majesty cannot give me a more touching proof of your friendship for me."



sentiments. They listened, and silently rejoiced, because they believed they could more easily betray.\*

The premeditated treachery of these Marshals was doubtless stimulated by feelings which they could neither conceal nor subdue. The meanness of their origin, the vulgarity of their manners, and the ferocious turbulence of their dispositions, must have ill qualified them to mingle in the society of a court which would henceforth be distinguished for its polished elegance, and to which the urbanity and accomplishments of the Sovereign would impart all that could embellish or endear the intercourse of social life. Contrasted with the military audiences of Napoleon, whose abrupt and coarse demeanour better suited a camp than a presence-chamber, the court of Louis XVIII. could have but few attractions for those titled and decorated soldiers of fortune. Besides, though the acclamations of a victorious army, and the fraudulently-obtained suffrages of an enslaved people, had elevated Bonaparte to the imperial throne, yet every Marshal felt that he was his comrade, and that the same chance which bestowed the diadem upon him, might have conferred it upon them. Their obedience was exacted and obtained for the function with which he was invested, and any attempt to transfer it from the sovereign to the man, would only have provoked those recollections of his early life, which not even the splendour of his station could secure from associations of contempt. Between Napoleon and his Marshals, there was a reciprocity of interest which could not exist between them and Louis. He had made them what they were, and they kept him what he was. A circumstance which was disclosed in the evidence upon Ney's trial, proved that these sources of irritation and disgust were not merely speculative. He could not brook that his wife should return from court bathed in tears, because of the real or fancied neglect with which she was received: and that petty vexation, which rankled in his bosom, probably disturbed the felicity of some other of those august personages. The hostility of little minds is never so implacable as when their own self-importance is wounded. They feel that they have no inherent claims to respect or esteem, and when they are deprived of the plausible and specious blandishments of external homage, they sink at once into that cold and comfort-

\* The following anecdote is eminently characteristic of the frivolity of a modern Frenchman.—“The king,” said an Englishman to a Frenchman, “is a man of most excellent dispositions.”—“*Sans doute.*” “Well read, and well informed.”—“*Mais oui.*” “A gentleman in his feelings and manners.”—“*Assurement, Monsieur, il est né François.*” “Placable, merciful, moral, religious.”—“*Ah! d'accord mais après tout il faut avouer qu'un roi qui ne peut monter à cheval est un bien chetif animal.*”—Admirable and profound sagacity!

less inanity of being, which represents the whole creation as a blank, where no link or bond knits them with its multiplied concerns.

The feeling of disappointment and regret upon the abdication of Napoleon and the return of Louis, which was common to the whole army, sprung from very natural causes. Was it, indeed, to be expected that they should rejoice at what deprived them of the means to live? Would a subaltern officer, trained up in military devotion to a system which he believed to be permanent, and therefore eligible, who never perhaps heard of the Bourbons but as a rejected race, and never presumed to question the legitimate authority of Bonaparte, feel no repugnance at a course of events which, however delightful to others, was fatal to him? Could philanthropy or patriotism so far predominate in his nature, that the repose of Europe, and the prosperity of his native country, would fill him with joy as he received his reduced stipend, which barely rescued him from destitution? Would the soldier, after five and twenty years perhaps of active service, feel any gratification at being turned loose upon society, for the general benefit and happiness of mankind? Would he, as he prowled about from city to city, or from village to village, solicitous, perhaps, but incompetent, to labour, exult to think that though he starved, the world, that abstract nothing in his comprehension, was prosperous and rejoicing?

These are the consequences that make long wars dreadful. They beget habits, which at last settle into principles, destructive of all those social and civil relations, upon which the real welfare of states can alone be founded. The soldier, in his individual function, ceases to be a citizen; while the army, in its aggregate capacity, is a potent engine always ready to be employed, at the will of its leader, against the general liberties of the people. The longer those causes, which enforce the necessity of such a formidable and distinct body, continue to operate, the greater is the peril. Each succeeding year obliterates some affection that entwines the future with the past, some hope that dwells upon the recollection of domestic endearments, or some sentiment which reverts to a time of peace as a period when the warrior may sheathe his sword and talk of the battles he has fought, while his aged sire, his wife, his children, or his neighbours, listen to the appalling tale. Whatever strips a man of these feelings, whatever deprives him of the desire to mingle in the placid but useful occupations of life, whatever creates in him a disrelish of social duties, will soon, by an inevitable tendency, disqualify him for the discharge of them. That condition of society in which he has no interest, or in whose privileges and enjoyments he cannot participate, will



have but few claims upon his protection or regard. Its subversion would affect him no more than the subversion of a distant and hostile monarchy. Even the plunder and devastation of his native village, though it should involve the destruction of all those whom he once loved as friends and kindred, would appear to him only an act of obedience to the commands of his officer, the paramount excellence of a soldier. These stern and unrelenting maxims of submission, these cold calculations of a frightful duty, these mechanical impulses by which the shedding of blood, and the infliction of extreme misery, are reduced to the simple character of military subordination, are thus made to supplant all that is mild, and generous, and humane; all that emanates from the reciprocal charities of civilised life; all that is engrafted upon the heart by the benignant precepts of religion; and all that is fostered there by education or early example.

These are some of the many evils which follow in the train of long-protracted wars. But there is another, which survives even when war itself has ceased. How are you to inspire those who are enamoured of camps, and battles, and pillage, with pacific sentiments? How are you to extinguish the propensity to warlike enterprise, and convert the licensed robber into the peaceful husbandman and patient artisan? How are you to eradicate that disciplined ferocity which exults in massacre as the path to conquest, and hunts for conquest as the badge of honour? How are you to dispel that fatal illusion which incessantly prompts the soldier to look beyond his country, which animates him with the hope of conflict in foreign fields, and which identifies his little span of action with the proud sophistry of subjugating empires, and dictating laws to suppliant kings? How, in short, are you to succeed in repressing that wild and lawless enthusiasm, and in giving to it a direction compatible with civil liberty, with moderate desires, and with domestic habits? These are political problems whose solution has baffled, for a time, the wisdom and energy of the most established governments. Can we then wonder that they distracted the councils and eluded the grasp of one so feeble and hesitating as that of Louis XVIII. in the first months of its restoration? The monarch did all he could, but he was not endowed with the faculty of working miracles. He could not accomplish, as if by some magical agency, that which demanded time, and prudent legislation, and the customary course of internal policy for its performance. When he ascended the throne he found himself surrounded by the army of Bonaparte. He could not disperse them by a breath. He was compelled to employ them, and he hoped to gain their fidelity by manifesting his own confidence in them. By a noble fiction he blended their exploits with the glory of France, and united the laurels they had won with the

crown which he had recovered. But he could not gratify the soldiers with pillage, nor reward the generals with estates wrested from the territories of a vanquished enemy.\* They therefore despised and betrayed him.

There were other collateral causes, accessory to the formation of the foul conspiracy, which produced the usurpation of Bonaparte and his second abdication. These causes shall be briefly indicated, and with as much accuracy as can be attained, where the sources of intelligence are not yet purified from the wilful or inevitable perversions of political and party prejudices. We are too near the epoch of these memorable transactions, to be able to view them in their just proportions, but their great outline may be traced with fidelity, and perhaps without subjecting us to the severe truth uttered by the great Condé to Cardinal de Retz, when speaking of contemporary historians: "*Ces coquins nous font parler et agir comme ils auroient fait eux-mêmes à notre place.*"

Whatever murmurs of discontent might be heard in particular classes of the community, it seems to be unanimously allowed, that the general effect of the King's restoration, aided by the remarkable clemency and forbearance which he exercised, was to restore a degree of confidence, repose, and felicity throughout the great mass of the population, far exceeding any which it had been permitted to enjoy since the Revolution. The personal cause and character of the King, were regarded as a secure bond of amity between France and other nations, and tranquillity abroad was justly considered as the surest foundation for prosperity at home. But that which was the beacon of hope, and the omen of better times, to the moderate and reflecting, presented only a dreary void to the distempered imaginations of those, who still execrated any sovereignty but that of the people, and still abhorred the principle of legitimate government. They had embarked in a war of proscription against those rights by which, in point of fact, every throne in Europe was supported; for even in England, though the abstract privilege of cashiering an unworthy prince and electing another is justly maintained with undiminished authority, yet the practical operation is established upon hereditary and legitimate succession. The restoration of Louis XVIII., therefore, which gave peace to Europe, lighted up anew the flame of civil dis-

\* This was the constant practice of Bonaparte. Most of his Marshals derived not only their titles, but their property, from possessions which they held in foreign countries. The infamous Davoust had a considerable *dotation* in Poland. By the hope of these spoiliations he attached them to his person, and his system.



cord in their bosoms, who viewed it as the disastrous triumph over an enterprise for the successful termination of which they had encountered all the perils of a long series of revolutions. They hated the King, not merely because he was a Bourbon, but, because he was King, as a Bourbon; because he ascended the throne to resume the sceptre of his ancestors, and because he recovered, and did not receive, his crown. Even the conditions imposed by the constitutional charter were not sufficient to satisfy their notions of a limited monarchy. They wished to have him at their own feet, before they could consent to place themselves at his. They would have had him on his knees before the revolutionary phantom of the majesty of the people; and then, perhaps, the savage rights of equality being propitiated, they would have condescended to crown him in mockery of regal power.

These men, jacobins in all the essential qualities of that ferocious sect, but now calling themselves patriots,—the common mask of rebellion or sedition,—were more formidable from their zeal, their activity, and their principles, than from their numbers. They availed themselves with fatal dexterity of every thing that could prosper their views. Their emissaries were incessantly employed in fabricating the most alarming rumours of the intentions of the King, or in insinuating doctrines hostile to his security. It must be confessed that his situation was such as exposed him, but too obviously, to those secret machinations. Banished from the French soil for five and twenty years, unknown to two-thirds of his people, and calumniated during his exile with the most industrious malice, it was easy to pervert the affections and loyalty of a generation which had grown up under a different order of things. This opportunity was not neglected, nor were the most trivial occurrences, which could, by any ingenuity of misrepresentation, be made contributory to the general system of degrading the monarch in the estimation of his subjects. The jacobin cabal seized, with avidity, even the petty squabble that arose upon the interment of a celebrated French actress, Mademoiselle Raucour. By the ordinances of the Romish faith, if rigorously enforced, actors and actresses are considered in a state of excommunication, and therefore denied the rites of Christian burial. A foolish priest, with more bigotry in his heart than discretion in his head, ventured to revive this obsolete persecution, and absolutely refused her the privilege of sepulture in the church of St. Roch. This unexpected act of spiritual tyranny excited some commotion among the spectators, who were assembled to witness the interment of a favourite actress. The ferment, however, was allayed, by a positive order from the King to receive the corpse and read the funeral service over it; but though it was evident that

the refusal was only an ebullition of the infatuated and superstitious zeal of the priest, it was immediately magnified into an affair of state, and represented as indicative of the religious principles which animated the Bourbon dynasty. Had the jacobins forgotten a similar event, under the mild and tolerant sway of Napoleon, when this same clergyman refused to bury an opera-dancer of the name of Chameroi, and when Bonaparte, not only peremptorily ordered her interment, but imprisoned the refractory priest? Where then was the difference between the two sovereigns, except that Louis XVIII. forbore to commit an arbitrary act of despotism, by consigning the conscientious offender to a dungeon?

Among the most natural sources of inquietude and apprehension were the probable pretensions of the emigrant nobility, and other proprietors of estates, who might be supposed to indulge the venial hope of recovering their confiscated possessions upon the restoration of the family in whose behalf they had forfeited them. It does not indeed, appear, even from the exaggerated calumnies of the jacobins themselves, that such a project ever entered into the most remote contemplation of the King, or was ever seriously countenanced by his ministers; but obscure reports to that effect were sedulously circulated, and they were readily believed by those who trusted to their fears rather than their conviction. Some pamphlets also were written which recommended, in no very measured terms, the restitution of what was called national property, while the indiscreet zeal of the royalists, who talked loudly of their hopes, tended to confirm the general alarm. The King, it is true, was surrounded by the faithful and impoverished companions of his exile, men whose loyalty had been proved in the worst extremities of fortune, and whose fidelity had hitherto found its reward only in its own conscious integrity; but, did it therefore follow, he would violate a fundamental article of the constitutional charter, and put into jeopardy his own crown, and the inheritance of his family, to restore his adherents to their wealth and dignity? It was a plausible inference, however, that he would attempt this, and as the supposition affected the interests of so large a body of the existing population of France, it was too useful to be neglected by the secret enemies of the King. They propagated the most malignant falsehoods upon the subject, and insinuated that he only waited till his throne was secured, to invest his followers with the patrimony of their ancestors.

The same delusive arts were practised with respect to the restoration of tythes and feudal rights. Amid the many spurious reforms which emanated from the Revolution, the peasantry of France at least enjoyed a real benefit in the



exemption from tythes, and in the abolition of various seignorial privileges, under the heavy yoke of which they had been bowed down to the dust. The value of these exemptions was daily and hourly felt, and nothing could be better calculated to indispose them towards the reigning family, than to make it believed that they intended to restore all those grievances. The bare anticipation of such a scheme was quite enough, if not to stimulate the peasantry into active revolt, at least to neutralize them in the event of a counter-revolution, which had already become the secret object of the conspirators. The public journals were no contemptible auxiliaries in the prosecution of this detestable project. Their editors, either from perfidy or weakness, were the supple tools of the faction. They did not, indeed, openly avow the ends which they laboured to accomplish, because, upon either of the suppositions, whether they were fools or traitors, such a course would have been equally impolitic. In the one case, disclosure might have defeated their object, or, in the other, it would have exposed them to the penalties of the law. While, however, they abstained from any explicit declaration, they indulged in every species of co-operation which could substantially promote the common cause. They incessantly laboured to pervert all the measures of the King, by the most insidious comments and arguments; with undissembled zeal they attacked the principles of monarchy, though they professed to revere and esteem the monarch; and with premeditated artifice they strove to excite jealousy and discord, not only among the purchasers of national property, but among the royalists themselves. Those various stratagems were carried on with so much perseverance and subtlety, that though known, the government could neither counteract nor suppress them.

A modern French writer (M. Gallais, who has written the History of the Revolution of the 20th March) affords some curious indications of the character of French journalists, and of the principles, if they may be so called, upon which they conduct their several publications:—

“ Our proprietors of journals are, for the greater part, men without fortune, without knowledge, and without any sentiment of regard for their country; mere speculators and traders in opinion; they purchase the property of a journal as they would purchase the good will and stock of a shop, and they give to their *prospectus* that colour which they think will attract the most subscribers, as the dealer puts up a sign which he imagines will catch the eye of the passenger and draw customers to his shop.

“ What do they care for Louis XVI. or Robespierre, Bonaparte or Louis XVIII., France or Turkey, atheism or religion? All that concerns them is to cry, louder than any one else, according to the interest of the moment, *Vive la Roi! Vive la Ligue!* What they want is plenty of purchasers, and plenty of money; and to give the least possible reward to those who write, from their orders, sometimes virulent declamations against patriots, and sometimes base lampoons against royalists\*.

“ Of all the French journals the jacobin ones alone have preserved a fixed and invariable character; that character is the character of the sect, but it is so atrocious that it has ceased to be dangerous, and it no longer makes proselytes.

“ All the others have varied according to circumstances, of which they have alternately been the forerunners, the zealous apostles, and the most ardent calumniators.

“ It is they who have falsified all political ideas, corrupted all moral principles, and wholly destroyed the taste for literature and the arts: but they have maintained an empire over the minds of the multitude, which can be accounted for only by the extreme ignorance of the readers.

“ Workmen, lacqueys, porters, who eagerly peruse the papers each morning, imbibe only whatever is dangerous in them, believe all their falsehoods, admire the style in proportion as it is violent and defamatory, embrace all their opinions, and reason only according to their arguments.

“ One morning they learn, from their journal, that Bonaparte is an *ogre*, who has devoured four millions of men in less than ten years, and all the rest of the day they repeat, with terror, that *Bonaparte is an ogre*.

“ The next morning, the same journal tells them that Bonaparte is a great man, who has arrived expressly from the island of Elba to save them from the barbarous hands of Louis XVIII., and all the rest of the day they repeat, with admiration, that *Bonaparte is a great man*.

\* “ Among the sixty writers who are connected with the twelve Parisian journals, there are not more than seven who deserve the title of men of letters, and I know of only five who have not prostituted their pens latterly.”



“ On the 20th of March all the newspapers of Paris proclaimed, with justice, the tender goodness of the King, his courage and his wisdom ; and the few enlightened individuals who read that eulogy certainly did not require it in order to be convinced of the wisdom, the courage, or the goodness of the King.

“ On the 21st of March the same journals, precisely the same, laboured to prove that the King wished to surrender his people to the fanaticism of the clergy, to the despotism of his ministers, and to the ignorance of the fourteenth century ; and the foolish crowd who read that nonsense, declared that the King had neither goodness, courage, nor wisdom.

“ From this instability of opinion, perpetuated by the daily journals which are the tools of power, the slaves of fear, and debased by cupidity, what must necessarily result ? A very simple and a very obvious consequence ; namely, that the people, tossed about by these contradictory versions, and tired of this incessant fluctuation, wish only to repose in a sort of incredulity, and conclude by believing that the heads of government are only the heads of a party, who caress them as long as they need their support, and crush them when they are strong enough to do without it.”

A venal and prostituted press, thus pandering to the base designs of every faction and cabal, thus operating upon the minds of a people proverbially fickle, unreflecting, and volatile, is surely the greatest curse that can befall a nation. To restrain the liberty of such a press, is only fixing limits to the career of evil, the paramount duty and interest of every government. To leave it unshackled, to give it all the scope and energy which may be safely granted in states, where something like integrity and principle are found in public writers, or where the people have a manliness of character and a solidity of judgment, which secure them from becoming the sport of every idle rumour or deliberate malignity, would be the height of folly. It would be to arm the passions of the mob against the throne, to invest sedition with authority, to fan the embers of vulgar discontent, and to proclaim, with singular absurdity, a sort of amnesty in favour of disloyalty and rebellion. Every government must regulate its municipal institutions, upon principles compatible with that particular condition of society which it has to protect and guide. It is idle to imagine that what constitutes the happiness of one country would necessarily constitute the happiness of another. The felicity of empires, like that of individuals, depends upon a variety of local causes, of casual habits, of temporary prejudices, and of early associations.

There is no general, no universal standard, by which all men can be made happy ; no specific, no panacea, which can diffuse tranquillity and comfort equally over the frozen deserts of the north, and the torrid plains of the south. Political empiricism may promise these things, but it would argue a profound ignorance of human nature to believe them. All nations must be alike before they can all be happy from the same causes. It is not a free press that makes a free people. Invert the proposition, and an eternal truth is established. A free people must and will have a free press. A popular form of government begets those feelings and ideas which cannot subsist without it : but a free press, where liberty is imperfectly enjoyed, or where declamation upon the theory of it is mistaken for the practice, can only tend to foment discords, to increase disaffection, to multiply petty sources of vexation, and to perpetuate a fruitless struggle between the indefinite force of prerogative, and the vaguely understood rights of the people. The empire of the laws must precede that of individual freedom. Men must be taught how to employ liberty, before it can be entrusted to them. Liberty, like the oak of the forest, requires the lapse of many years to arrive at maturity. It cannot be transplanted from one soil to another, complete in the full developement of all its properties. When it has once taken root, it is sure to thrive, unless eradicated by some great political convulsion. But we cannot anticipate its natural growth ; we cannot force it on, by artificial expedients. Such processes may give an apparent luxuriance of foliage, while the stem will be unsound, and exhibit early symptoms of decay. When left to itself, its silent and unmarked growth gradually proceeds, till at last it towers in stately grandeur, its roots deeply struck in all the moral and political institutions of the land, and its ample shade affording shelter and protection from every storm of tyranny and injustice. Then it begins to bear goodly fruit ; then it is that we see produced all those separate securities for the maintenance of the whole ; and then it is that the liberty of the press, itself a giant, comes forth, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, armed at all points, to defend her parent.

State physicians are too apt to mistake the disease for the remedy. Nothing, however, can be more unquestionable, than that before we attempt to cure a violent local affection, we ought to know the general condition of the body. Without this previous knowledge, our applications will probably rather inflame than abate the evil : but political doctors commonly have temerity enough to despise such precautions. They tamper with the life and health of a nation, as an unskilful surgeon does with the leg of an hospital patient. If the man survives, he loses his limb, and if he dies, he does not want it. In either case the ignorance of the



operator is not likely to be detected. So it is with a whole people struggling for liberty. A few vain and arrogant sophisters prescribe, and mostly recommend that which is least calculated to be efficacious. The experiment may, indeed, sometimes have a partial success, as was the case in the French Revolution ; but when the good which is done is compared with the evil, or when the mass of infection that is left untouched, is contrasted with the little that has been purified, it is like cutting off the head, to check a mortification in the finger.

Whatever may be the opinion of some enthusiastic theorists, with respect to France, it seems undeniable that she is not yet in a condition to enjoy that plenitude of freedom which our happier country possesses. She would abuse the mighty gift, and therefore it is wise to circumscribe it. The impatient desire to obtain, must not be mistaken for the capacity to exercise with discretion. Phaeton aspired to guide the chariot of the sun, and perished for his presumption. France would imitate all the venerable splendour of the British constitution ; but the British constitution is like the enigma of the sphinx, which seems to be propounded to Europe with the penalty of death if not unravelled. It requires something more than edicts, decrees, and votes of legislative assemblies, to confer a real participation in that magnificent legacy of our forefathers. There must be congenial elements with which it may blend and sympathise ; the hearts and minds of the people must be prepared for its reception, or it will be only a vain and unsubstantial pageant. Without those congruities, other nations may, indeed, have the formulary of our constitution, deposited in the archives of their public bodies, but the vestiges of its practical influence, will never be traced through every gradation of society, from the palace of the noble to the cottage of the peasant.

Are we then to wonder that the ministers of Louis XVIII. who probably felt this important truth, endeavoured to steer a middle course between the wild licentiousness of democracy, and the arbitrary prerogative of the ancient monarchy ? They did not venture wholly to dissolve the bonds of government, nor so to strengthen them as to annihilate popular freedom. The one, indeed, was impracticable, and the other dangerous ; but they saw the wisdom and necessity of imposing moderate restraint. The press was permitted to be free, so long as it did not degenerate into sedition, nor were its transient aberrations even towards that extreme, punished with inexorable severity. Much was permitted which distinctly endangered the throne, and lenity was, in many cases, pushed to an extent of culpable weakness. Some restrictions were declared, but even when

they were transgressed, the hand of justice did not always reach the offender. When, indeed, we consider the difficulties and perils which encircle a newly restored government, the slender accidents which may bring it into hazard, the many turbulent spirits incessantly at work to compass its destruction, and the potency of a periodical press as an auxiliary to such designs, we shall not, if we judge with fairness and liberality, condemn those precautions which prudence dictated, and which necessity justified. To the factious adherents of Napoleon, they were sources of malignant joy, because, though they might partially obstruct the success of their stratagems, they at the same time afforded a plausible ground for vehement and inflammatory declamation. It was, however, somewhat ludicrous to hear it urged as a ground of just suspicion and jealousy of Louis XVIII., that his ministers presumed to limit the independence of public writers, as if the nation could possibly forget that what they only restrained, Bonaparte had utterly destroyed.

Among the many grave offences which the King is alleged to have committed, there is one which deserves to be remarked. During the long period of his exile, he looked for consolation, where alone it is to be found, in the exercise of religious duties; and that piety which had sustained him in misfortune, he permitted to be the companion of his prosperity. A necessary consequence of this was that the ministers of religion partook of his grace and bounty, and its external practices became an object of his solicitude. Here, again, he was doomed to be contrasted with his predecessor; and the Christian monarch appeared only an imbecile devotee, compared with the Imperial Proselyte to every system of faith, which could promote his views of personal ambition. Even atheism itself was hardly excluded from the comprehensive creed of Napoleon. But Napoleon was a soldier and a conqueror, and too sublime a character to beguile himself with the antiquated follies of religion, while Louis XVIII. was only a Bourbon, and therefore could not embrace its sacred duties without becoming a gloomy fanatic. Impiety and immorality were considered as the unalienable property of France. To reverence the precepts of the Deity, to set an example of respect for morals, to chasten majesty by the humble adoration of divine goodness, were inexpiable crimes. The seclusion of his private hours was infringed by the scrutinizing eye of malice, and it was proclaimed, with wonder and abhorrence, that the pious monarch was sometimes found upon his knees in silent devotion to God. He did more. He dared to enforce the commands of God himself, by ordering a due observance of the sabbath, and the Parisians were in despair. Some regarded this decree as a tax upon their industry, by depriving them of one day out of



seven to carry on their traffic; others, and they were the more numerous, lamented it as a check upon the low and vulgar debaucheries in which they freely indulged under the tolerant sway of Bonaparte.\* This moral sensibility, however, was confined almost exclusively to the capital. In the provinces, the peasantry and the farmers, less contaminated by the vices of the revolution, felt no repugnance at having once more a church, a pastor, and a sabbath.

In these jarring and discordant elements, conspirators less active and less daring than those who combined against the royal authority, might have found the materials for rebellion. The throne of the monarch was seated on a volcano, ready, every moment, to explode beneath him. The duty he had to perform was severe, but urgent. He has been charged with many errors: one he certainly committed: he confided where he should have watched. It was a generous error, no doubt; but the personal virtues of a sovereign may sometimes produce afflicting consequences to his subjects. If a more strict and rigorous scrutiny had been carried into the actions and expressions of the disaffected, the revolution

\* The extent to which the French carried their scorn and ridicule of every thing connected with religion, is almost incredible. "Ladies," observes a modern tourist, "assail you in a crowded room, where there is waltzing going on, to put you seriously to your proofs of the existence of a God. Children stop in the streets to laugh at the priests, as mountebanks that are at once dishonest and ridiculous. A Madame la Portiere, of an hotel, threw herself into a convulsion of rage because a priest came to invite her daughter to confession. One day, observing a centinel on guard near a church, the name of which I wished to know, I addressed him for the information I wanted: the reply was—'Monsieur, I am a soldier—I know nothing of churches.'—In the tragedy of *Œdipus*, by Voltaire, Jocaste says to her wretched husband—

' Nos prêtres ne sont point ce qu'un vaine peuple pense,  
' Notre crédulité fait toute leur science.'

These lines, on the night I saw the piece performed, were scarcely out of the actress's mouth, before the house shook to its foundations with the thunders of applause. It was a tumultuous roar, proceeding from tradesmen, soldiers, men, women, and children; the thoughtless as well as the thinking, all uniting to testify an abhorrence of religion and its ministers."

A French general, quartered in the house of a respectable gentleman in Amsterdam, inquired the reason, the first Sunday he was there, of the family going out in their best clothes; and being told they were going to church, he expressed his surprise, observing, "Now that you are a part of the great nation, it is time for you to have done with that nonsense."

What must be the condition of a country where such sentiments prevail? And who can forbear to venerate the virtuous zeal of that monarch, who endeavours to restore the influence of religion and morals over such a people?

of the 20th of March would never perhaps have taken place. The lenity and benevolence of the King, caused a corresponding laxity and supineness in the subordinate agents of government, and that which was intended to conciliate all parties, proved the only means of enabling the worst party to concert its measures with security and success. It has been positively asserted, and never satisfactorily denied, that communications from different prefects in the south of France, (among others from M. Bouthilliers, prefect of the Var,) were transmitted to the Abbé Montesquiou, Minister of the Interior, detailing various circumstances indicative of some approaching enterprise in favour of Bonaparte. These cautions, however, had the fate of Cassandra's prophecies. They were listened to and neglected. Nay, it is even affirmed, that many of the letters, so addressed to the minister, were found unopened upon his table, after the entrance of Napoleon into Paris. If this be true, it proves not merely a want of ordinary vigilance in those to whom was entrusted the safety of the state, but an actual degree of culpable negligence. So gross and palpable, indeed, was the deliberate inattention of the police to all that was transacting around them, that a Frenchman, finding his friend ignorant of some well known fact, exclaimed, in derision, "*Vous etes apparemment de la police.*" Such inactivity could not fail to strike the Parisians with astonishment, who remembered the exemplary discharge of its functions under Bonaparte, when the fire-side and the bed-chamber, were no better protection against unwelcome solicitations, than the public coffee-house or the open street; and the emissaries of Bonaparte did not hesitate to avail themselves of this convenient relaxation, in such a way as best suited the object they had in view.

It must not be concealed, in this general statement of the causes, both immediate and remote, which led to the successful usurpation of Napoleon, that there were some which originated, almost exclusively, with the King's ministers; some, which common discretion might have obviated. They could not be insensible to facts that struck the most careless observer of public events; or, if they were, it can only follow that their stupidity was greater than their guilt. France was distracted with the conflicting projects of three distinct parties. There were the jacobins, who still dreamed of a pure republic, and whose hatred of the Bourbons was so great, that they still flattered themselves with the delusive hope of erecting a republic even under the auspices of Napoleon: there was the constitutional party, who sought to circumscribe the power of the monarch within the narrow and jealous limits of a charter; and there was the army, who impatiently endured that state of peace, under a pacific reign, which precluded them from the hope of



pillage, and *dotations* in foreign countries. These three parties, though divided by their individual interests, were united in the common object of weakening or subverting the foundations of the throne; and each of them had its secret committees, its apostles, and its writers.

The conduct of the King and his family, with respect to the constitutional charter, was almost one of the first things that excited suspicion and alarm. Louis XVIII. accepted at Hartwell those terms which he disputed at St. Ouen. He entered France, and placed the crown upon his head, not as the free gift of the French people, but as the hereditary property which his ancestors had bequeathed. It might, perhaps, be thought necessary, thus to consecrate the doctrine of legitimate succession and divine right; but it would certainly have been better, distinctly to have rejected the condition upon which the throne was offered, than by a compromise of honour, seemingly to recognise and yet substantially to violate it. When his partizans afterwards endeavoured to inculcate the notion, that he had conferred upon the French nation the benefit of that constitution, mutilated as it was of one of its essential qualities, the ready answer from every mouth was, that they owed it, not to the free grace of the monarch, but to the integrity and wisdom of the two chambers and the provisional government; while the reluctance of the King, to embrace all its provisions, only gave additional confirmation to the sentiment of Carnot, in his celebrated Memorial, that the "*Etat social, tel que nous le voyons, n'est, à proprement parler, qu'une lutte continuelle entre l'envie de dominer, et le désir de se soustraire à la domination.*"

It is true, that when the provisional government placed the royal authority temporarily in the hands of the Count D'Artois, under the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, *until* Louis Stanislaus Xavier de France accepted the constitutional charter, that prince, in his reply to the senate, did not enter into any guarantee for the conduct of his brother. He told them he had received no power from him to accept the constitution, but from the knowledge he possessed of his sentiments and principles, he felt no apprehensions of any disavowal on the part of the King, when he declared, in his name, that he would admit the bases upon which the charter was founded. A somewhat affected distinction was also made, by the Count D'Artois, in the formulary by which Louis XVIII. was to be designated. The Provisional Government styled him King of the French, a phrase which though a little tinged with revolutionary doctrine, was yet expressive of a connection between the throne and the nation, which even a Bourbon ought not to reject in these times. The Count D'Artois, however, talked of his

brother being recalled to the throne of France, thus imprudently obtruding a dogma of kings which is rapidly becoming obsolete. Certainly, a sovereign who reigns by the choice, as well as for the good, of his people, has a more unexceptionable and a more enviable title, than he who holds the sceptre simply as a sort of family heir-loom. In the customary course of events, where a monarchy is not elective, the mere fact of succession must be regarded as an indication of the popular choice ; but here was an occasion, arising from a series of great and complicated transactions, in which the restoration of a particular dynasty ought, perhaps, to have been entirely considered as the exclusive act of the nation, and not as the ordinary resumption of an authority, which had been suspended only by the accidental occurrence of internal commotions. The question involved a speculative and abstract pretension on the part of Louis XVIII. which was surely pressed at an ungracious moment, when the people of France were just emerging from a tumultuous sea of difficulties and dangers, many of which had been incurred and endured, precisely for the practical establishment of that very principle which was now implicitly controverted. The King himself, indeed, in that declaration issued from St. Ouen, in which he refused the charter, because it " bore marks of the precipitation with which it had been drawn up," ventured to admit that he was recalled " to the throne of his fathers" by " the love of his people ;" but this verbal recognition amounted to nothing, when contrasted with the acts of his government and the language of his followers, which soon disclosed the real sentiments of the monarch.

With respect to the constitutional charter, whoever reflects upon its concluding article, must be satisfied that there was a positive departure from its spirit and intent, in the manner of its reception by Louis XVIII. That article declares, " Louis Stanislaus Xavier of France, shall be proclaimed King of the French, as soon as he shall have signed the constitutional charter, and sworn to it in the following terms : " I accept the constitution, I swear to observe it, and cause it to be observed." The very condition, therefore, of his restoration, or rather of his accession to the monarchy, was that he should sign the charter, swear to observe it himself, and cause it to be observed by others. Instead, however, of performing this preliminary act, he entered France, approached the capital, and there receiving the senate, told them, " After having read with attention the plan of the constitution proposed by the senate, in the sitting of the 6th of April last, we have recognised that the bases were good, but that a great number of articles, bearing the marks of the precipitation with which they have been drawn up, cannot, in their present form, become fundamental laws of the state.—



Resolved to adopt a liberal constitution, we wish that it should be wisely combined, and not being able to accept one which it is indispensably necessary to correct, we convoke for the 10th of June of the present year, the senate and legislative body, engaging to lay before them the result of our labours, with a commission chosen from those two bodies, and to give that constitution the following guarantees."—These guarantees were the security of personal liberty, the inviolability of national property, freedom of worship, liberty of the press, &c. &c.

The most ingenious sophistry would be perplexed to shew, that this mode of receiving the charter, was not a violation of the principle upon which it was drawn up, and of the principle also upon which the crown of France was offered to Louis XVIII. Either he was recalled to the throne by the act of a competent public body, or he obtained it through the medium of conquest. The latter supposition, though perhaps partly true in fact, is rejected by all his advocates. It follows then, that he was invited to it; but he was invited upon certain conditions; those conditions covenanted, by various stipulations, for the safety and liberties of the people, and the fundamental one upon which, not only they all rested for the security of their execution, but Louis was to have the throne at all, was his solemn and deliberate acceptance of them. That act of recognition, however, he abstained from giving, but promised, in its stead, something which he assured the nation would be quite as good. That might be true, because it is admitted that this charter was susceptible of revision; but that was not the bargain, and therefore, so far, he unquestionably violated the proposed arrangement between himself and the provisional government. It is another question whether he would have been justified in refusing any terms: precedents might have been found, perhaps, for such a policy, and arguments to vindicate it; but the fault he committed was, in not explicitly rejecting all conditions, instead of availing himself of an apparent concurrence. It was of the utmost importance, even in a prudential point of view, not to afford so serious a ground of accusation to his enemies as that of violating his faith with the people; and it would have been a more dignified course of procedure, if he had frankly and promptly accepted the charter, such as it was presented to him, and reserved, to the legislative authorities of the kingdom, constitutionally assembled, the task of introducing those alterations which might seem expedient upon mature and deliberate investigation.

The charter which was subsequently submitted to the Chambers, in the month of June, as a special concession on the part of the sovereign towards his subjects,

contained many fundamental principles of national liberty, and considered in relation to its positive effects upon the happiness of the people, could not be unacceptable, whatever displeasure might be felt at the ostentatious assumption of its being an *octroi* of the King, rather than a covenant exacted from him. It was observed, however, that this charter was not acceded to by the Count d'Artois, the next in immediate succession to the throne, nor by the other branches of the royal family. A suspicion hence arose, that Louis XVIII. meant to bind only himself, and that his successors would seize the pretext, of never having formally recognised the charter, in order to absolve themselves from its obligations. There was no evidence, indeed, of any such intention, but there is always a presumption, that what has been unwillingly given, will be recalled the first favourable opportunity; and that presumption became much stronger, in reference to a family whose progenitors had governed by the maxims of an arbitrary and despotic authority, than in such a case as William the Third, who was called to the throne for a specific purpose, and had no pretensions to plead except the completion of that purpose. In the one case, tyranny would only be a resumption of suspended rights; those innate, indefeasible, and mysterious rights, by which kings are so prone to imagine they hold an irrevocable commission from heaven to rule unjustly; in the other, it would be a direct violation of a great, original compact, between the sovereign and the people; the parties who mutually contracted would be the parties at issue; and as there could be no appeal to antecedent practice, no plea of prescription set up, the struggle would lie between the good faith of the monarch, pledged to the discharge of a plain and simple duty, and the undeniable claim of the nation, demanding a full and unqualified performance of that duty. The alarm, therefore, entertained by France, or rather by those few in France who probably wished for the establishment of constitutional liberty under the Bourbons, at the suspicious reservation of the Count d'Artois, was just and proper; and it is to be regretted that the King, even if it did not occur to him in the first instance, refrained from insisting upon the formal recognition of the charter, by all the branches of his family, when he knew, as he must have known, that the omission of that ceremony had excited such a feeling as to the future.

Trivial causes often operate powerfully in the production of great events. The arrogance of a minister, the caprice of a mistress, or the temporary ebullition of passion in a sovereign, have been sufficient to "let slip the dogs of war," or rouse a people into rebellion. Louis XVIII. committed one of those minor, perhaps venial, errors, which mean nothing at the time, and become dangerous



only from their subsequent application. When he made his triumphal entry into London, after his recal to the French throne, while his heart was yet warm with gratitude and joy at the unexpected felicity, and while the feelings of the man predominated over the policy of the monarch, he ventured to accept his crown from the Prince Regent of England. During that scene of reciprocal courtesies, which took place between the restored and the restoring sovereign, Louis XVIII. exclaimed,—“It is to your Royal Highness’s councils—to this great country, and to the constancy of its people, that I shall always ascribe, under Providence, the restoration of our house to the throne of our ancestors.\*”

No one will deny that the subversion of Napoleon’s power, and the opportunity for the Bourbons to re-ascend the throne, were the results of that unshaken perseverance on the part of England, which no peril, no sacrifice, no temptation, could relax or overcome. England successively bought and lost the co-operation of every state in Europe; and when she could neither create a confederacy, nor purchase neutrality, she fearlessly stood alone, and defied the world in arms against her. This intrepid example, not only taught other nations how they might save themselves, but presented a bulwark and defence, round which they might rally in the common cause, whenever they had spirit and patriotism enough to rouse from their lethargy. Had England been the ally of France; had she wrapped herself in that narrow, selfish policy, which her insular situation so obviously suggested; had she been an unconcerned spectator of all those monstrous aggressions and usurpations, which shook the political fabric of the continent to its very centre, and had she idly fancied, that her own prosperity was compatible with the ruin of all other independent governments, that she alone was privileged to flourish amid general desolation, France would have been the uncontrouled and uncontroulable despot of Europe. With that stupendous engine to wield at will against us, what a wretched fallacy, to imagine we could have long survived as a free state! As a province, indeed, of the universal empire,

\* Carnot, with the natural pride, and allowable vanity of a Frenchman, condemns this declaration, and recalls, to the recollection of his countrymen, a remote period of history, when the kings of England did homage to the kings of France as their liege lords:—

“Autrefois les Rois d’Angleterre venaient rendre foi et hommage aux Rois de France, comme à leurs Suzerains: mais Louis XVIII., au contraire, a déclaré au Prince Régent d’Angleterre que c’était à lui, et à sa nation, qu’il attribuait, après la Divine Providence, la rétablissement de sa maison sur le trône de ses ancêtres; et lorsque ses compatriotes volaient à sa rencontre pour lui décerner la couronne, d’un vœu unanime, on lui a fait répondre qu’il ne voulait pas le recevoir de leurs mains, qu’elle était l’héritage de ses pères; alors nos cœurs se sont resserrés, ils se sont tus.” *Memoire*, p. 10.

we might have been permitted to drag on an ignominious existence, subservient to, not co-ordinate with, the Great Nation. But a convenient moment would have ultimately arrived, when Napoleon, tempted by cupidity or insolence, would have plundered our opulent cities, cut off the springs and sources of our industry, laid waste our cultivated fields, trampled upon our laws, our constitution, and our liberties, and left us a melancholy record to future ages, of a high-minded and potent kingdom, falling an unpitied victim to its own little, paltry, and irrational hope of thriving by the destruction of its neighbours.

Happily for ourselves and for Europe we adopted a more wise and magnanimous system, and in reference to the effects of that system Louis XVIII. was right, in ascribing his restoration to the people and the government of England. But he should have whispered his gratitude in the private ear of his benefactor. It was a personal benefit conferred upon himself, his family, and adherents: it remained to be tried whether France would consider it as one. At all events, she could not be expected to rejoice in the mode, for it involved her disgrace and humiliation. It could not fail to irritate the pride, and provoke the discontent, of a gallant, spirited people, who were about to receive a dynasty which they had long proscribed, to hear the head of that dynasty solemnly proclaim that he resumed his authority by the sword of an enemy. The ungracious truth ought not thus to have been the herald of the King's return, but rather veiled from the inquisitive glance of national vanity.

There were other proceedings of Louis XVIII. which his enemies magnified into crimes, and his friends deplored as weaknesses. Some of them, however, were neither the one nor the other, for among them was the regulated liberty of the press, and the abolition of the licensed profanation of the sabbath. The first, necessity justified; the second, religion enjoined and morality required. There might be something of superstition in the principle; the practice could not be otherwise than beneficial. The transition, indeed, was violent; but the thoughtless only could deem it absurd, or the factious condemn it as tyrannical. There were, besides, occasional deviations from the letter of the constitutional charter, and infractions of the penal code. Was that either wonderful or criminal? Speculative legislation is an amusing dream for the philosopher in his closet, who builds systems, and forgets they are for men: nothing can be more beautiful to the fancy, or more applicable to the affairs of life, if human passions did not saucily interpose themselves. A fairy world, and a theoretical legislator, are correlative ideas, and can never be separated. It is doubtful whether any



abstract political doctrine, however specious as an abstract doctrine, was ever yet capable of becoming, without modification, a constituent and operative part of the polity of a kingdom. Elemental truths are, in that respect, like the crude ore of precious metals; valuable every where, but requiring the legal stamp of coinage, before it can possess the quality of currency, and be made subservient to mutual advantage in a particular state.

The constitutional charter, excellent as it was in many of its provisions, and calculated as it was in all, to advance the general welfare of the people, was, however, like every thing which mere man produces, susceptible of amelioration.—There is a bigotry in politics as well as in religion, and it is the worst of all bigotry, to reject change as something which is inherently bad. Laws, to be permanently useful, must vary with the varying condition of man. Virtue and vice are in perpetual fluctuation. Crimes of one description become obsolete, and are succeeded by others of a different character. Particular modes of thinking, particular habits, particular luxuries, particular concurrences of great events, have a tendency to generate corresponding offences; and any system of legislation, which has not pliancy enough to bend to those mutations, becomes a sort of Procrustean bed, which fits the criminal to the law, instead of adapting the law to the criminal. The constitution of England has long been our boast and glory, yet innovations have been made upon it, which experience has proved to be no contravention of its fundamental objects and principles. When the charter was given to France, it was given as a general security to the people against the encroachments of the throne. It included all the great and universal maxims of liberty, which were to be considered as a foundation upon which the superstructure was to be raised: but the form, the extent, and the proportions of that superstructure, were to be regulated by the exigencies of the time, and the purposes to which it was to be adapted. The King and his ministers felt that; and the most malignant enemy of either, could not point out any violation of the charter which seriously compromised its practical benefits.

The same may be said of those frivolous accusations (exaggerated into tremendous delinquencies) respecting the infringements upon sundry articles of the penal code. What was there, in that famous pandect of revolutionary and imperial wisdom, which made it sacred from repeal or alteration? What token or character of infallibility did it possess? What veneration could it claim from its antiquity, or what confidence from its long-tried and approved excellence? So far from inheriting any of those qualifications, which might deter the presumptuous spirit

of innovation, was it not rather to be suspected of embracing principles of legislation, better adapted to a republican than a monarchical form of government? But, even admitting that the Code Napoleon was framed with the most cautious deliberation, that it was a masterpiece of civil and penal jurisprudence, and that it contained every thing, which a large and comprehensive view of society could anticipate, as necessary for its wants and well being, yet, as it was the work of man, so it was capable of improvement by man. And here again we might refer to the practice of our own country, in justification of Louis XVIII. and his ministers. Does not almost every session of parliament present instances of repeal, alteration, or amendment, in the statute laws of the realm, those laws, which at the time they were enacted, were doubtless thought the perfection of legislative wisdom? It would, indeed, be a monstrous absurdity to affirm, of any nation, that its laws, once decreed, could never afterwards be modified or annulled. In fact, the slight deviations from the established code, which the ministers of Louis XVIII. permitted to themselves, were so insignificant, even had they been unnecessary, that nothing but the petulance of malice, or the impudence of faction, could venture to class them among the causes of constitutional alarm. Clamour, however, supplied the place of truth, and it was insidiously promulgated that a settled system existed, for the avowed object of effacing every memorial of the Revolution.

These vague rumours were unfortunately strengthened by the intemperate zeal of the royalists, who indulged in the expression of sentiments calculated to rouse jealousy and discontent. If the charter was mentioned in their presence, they either openly scoffed at the idea of its continuance, or their countenance at least testified their incredulity. The priests talked loudly of the restoration of church lands, and the recovery of ecclesiastical privileges, while, in some cases, they even went so far as to refuse absolution to those who were in possession of any part of that property. Sermons were preached, in which the congregation were told, from the pulpit, that they who did not return "their own" to the nobles and the *curés*, should have the lot of Jezebel, and *should be devoured by dogs*. M. Ferrand, the minister, who proposed a law, for the restoration of *unsold* property to the ancient proprietors, incautiously dwelt upon "the sacred, inviolable rights which those who had followed the proper course, must have on the properties, of which, by the revolutionary storms, they had been despoiled."—This law was referred to a committee, in which an amendment was proposed, declaring, that "at no time, under any pretext, should there be granted any indem-



nity to the ancient proprietors ;” to which amendment the president, Laisné, imprudently observed, he could not assent, “ because he would not shut the door against hope.” These, and many similar circumstances, were eagerly seized, not only by the French people, (for it is to be recollected that, at least, six millions of Frenchmen were interested in the question of national property,) but by those who vigilantly watched for every occasion to inspire alarm, and they were regarded as indications of some secret plan, which would be developed when ripe for execution. It is true, the fidelity and honourable intentions of the monarch, were not implicated by the indiscretion of his adherents : but the vulgar are not apt to make very nice distinctions, and the seditious are interested in neglecting them. They, therefore, would say, in the language of Shakspeare,—

“ Upon the King ! let us our lives, our souls,  
 “ Our debts, our careful wives, our children, and  
 “ Our sins, lay on the King :—he must bear all.”

And in answer to this doctrine, at once so compendious and so consoling, because it saves us the trouble and awkwardness of finding less palatable reasons for our own misfortunes, the King himself might have exclaimed, in the sentiments of the same poet,—

“ Oh hard condition ! twin-born with greatness  
 “ Subjected to the breath of every fool,  
 “ Whose sense no more can feel but his own wringing.  
 “ What infinite heart's-ease must kings neglect,  
 “ That private men enjoy ?”——

The principal causes which were supposed to occasion and facilitate the enterprize of Bonaparte, have thus been briefly traced. There are others, of a minor character, which have also been marshalled into the formidable list ; but if every individual supposition of grievance and offence be received as a national ground for disquietude, where would the enumeration stop ? Upon the most impartial review of all these alleged causes, it is difficult to single out one which compromises the personal character of the sovereign ; and the philosophical observer of human events, will probably be more inclined to ascribe the successful usurpation of Napoleon, to the natural course of political events in such a crisis, than to the operation of any particular measures adopted by the King. It was impossible that so sudden and unexpected a change should leave no seeds for future discord : it was impossible that so many jarring elements, huddled into one

common mass, should produce no explosion: it was impossible that the King, by the mere fact of his restoration, should hush every tumult, soothe every alarm, gratify every hope, remove every complaint, and disarm every evil passion. Such miracles suit the fabulous ages of history: they do not belong to the page of truth. If Louis XVIII. committed some acts which would have been better avoided; if his lenity degenerated into weakness; if his ministers counselled him badly, or acted rashly; if his followers, the companions of his exile, and of all his sufferings, indulged hopes which were incompatible with the existing state of society in France; and if the zeal of virtue sometimes outstepped the sober march of political discretion; let it at least be remembered in extenuation, that the wisdom which emanates from completed transactions, must always have a suspicious character, for it is easy to be sagacious, when all that can be known lies before us; that the King, when he erred in mercy, justly offended neither God nor man; that his situation was one of unparalleled difficulty and danger; and that the most presumptuous love of prophecy will hardly venture to predict, he could have averted from France, the miseries which ensued, by any course of conduct, however wise and vigorous.—Certainly, to use the words of a French writer, who has taken an accurate view of this great event, “it was much easier for the allies not to have sent Bonaparte to Elba, than it was for Louis XVIII. to prevent his progress from Elba to Paris.”



## CHAPTER II.

IT will probably be one of the many burthens which each succeeding generation is willing to cast upon posterity, to ascertain whether the enterprise of Napoleon was the result of any concerted plot, or the mere creature of his own daring and intrepid genius. At the present moment it is enveloped in mystery, and conjectures, more or less plausible, are all that can be urged in support of either hypothesis. That there existed in France a powerful party, hostile to the Bourbons, is incontestible; but that Napoleon had any direct communication with that party, that he stimulated their machinations, or devoted himself to their purpose, has never yet been satisfactorily demonstrated. All the vigilance of the royal government has not been able to detect any correspondence, between him and the conspirators, or to trace any positive connection which can prove a premeditated scheme for accomplishing his return. It seems reasonable to conclude, that if such a scheme were actually matured, some vestiges of it would have been discovered, either by the voluntary confession of accomplices, or by the diligent zeal of the royalists. Twelve months, however, have now elapsed since that memorable transaction occurred, many of the most distinguished partizans of Napoleon have been prosecuted and punished, others are still upon their trial, and yet not a single fact has transpired which substantiates the accusation, so often made, and so willingly believed, of a regularly organised conspiracy between the traitors at home, and Napoleon in Elba.

If we may credit what has been related of Bonaparte by others, or, rather, if we may credit any thing which Bonaparte himself might say upon the subject, we must then believe, that the only merit he assumed was that of having "made a good guess as to the actual situation of France;" and upon that

fortuitous judgment he founded his hope of success in the hazardous enterprise. Suspicious as this declaration must be, because emanating from one who had every motive and every disposition to deceive, it is not without some plausible appearances of truth. He might consider his retreat in the island of Elba as a sort of observatory, from which he could extend his view over Italy and France, watch the political movements in each country, and hold himself prepared to appear in either, according as circumstances should suggest. The local advantages of his retreat would naturally awaken such designs, and at the same time facilitate their execution. In Italy, he might calculate upon the co-operation of Murat, who already began to suspect the sincerity of his allies, and felt his throne totter under him, as the fervour for restoration and legitimacy increased. The deliberations, at the Congress of Vienna, were not very favourable to the pretensions of new dynasties, and Murat, who had betrayed and abandoned Napoleon, for the security of that crown which he had received from him, might now be willing to revive the connection from motives precisely similar. The fidelity of Murat had no existence beyond his interest, and he would have leagued himself with any power that seemed capable of promoting or securing that interest. Having tried, in vain, to cajole Austria with a participation in the spoils of Italy, by proposing to surrender to her the northern states, and viewing with inquietude and distrust, the policy of England, his next hope was, to profit by the feeling which then animated all the Italian states, in favour of their independence and political union. By connecting his individual cause with that general one, he flattered himself he might succeed in retaining the Neapolitan throne as the founder and bulwark of Italian liberty. What secret relation may have subsisted between Napoleon and Murat, or how far the conduct of the latter was influenced by the projects of the former, can only be matter of surmise. It is said, that Bonaparte too much despised him for his perfidy, ever to entrust confidentially to him the intention of so momentous an enterprise; and that even had he not been thus incensed, his conviction of his want of energy and decision, would have precluded all idea of making him a principal agent. He did not, however, discountenance the idea, either of their reconciliation, or of their mutual co-operation, because it contributed in some degree to strengthen his cause.

Among the many motives which have been imputed to Napoleon for returning to France, one is, the alleged design of Congress to remove him from Elba. Of that design it is affirmed he received information, and immediately resolved to frustrate it by a prompt departure. It is not improbable that the allies, conscious of the danger of his proximity to France, might be anxious to avert its



possible consequences ; and though, according to the declaration of Lord Castlereagh in the House of Commons, they could not dictate his place of retreat at Fontainebleau, they might deem it practicable to alter it at Vienna, for he was no longer surrounded by an armed force, capable of disputing the palm of superiority with his enemies. At Fontainebleau he was still a sovereign,\* and negotiated as one : at Elba he had the name without the power, and must have acquiesced in conditions which he could not reject. If, however, it was in contemplation to transfer him to some more secure place of banishment, and if he was aware of the intention, it is not very surprizing that he should endeavour to counteract it.

The total absence of all positive proof of any conspiracy with which Napoleon was connected, though it justifies a degree of scepticism, does not wholly exclude the possibility of such a conspiracy having existed. There are, indeed, circumstances which tend strongly to countenance the latter supposition. In the first place it may be remarked, that Napoleon would hardly have ventured to trust himself in the south of France, upon the hazardous speculation of finding supporters, when he remembered what imminent perils he had encountered, only ten months before, in that very district. It can scarcely be supposed that, unsured of any active and immediate co-operation, he would have thrown himself, at once, into the hands of the Provençals, that "disgraceful race," which had never "furnished him with a single regiment he could be satisfied with.†" In journeying to the place of his exile during the preceding year, it was with difficulty he saved himself from the indignant rage of those Provençals, though he was under the protection of the Commissioners appointed, by his conquerors, to escort him : and yet, with the recollection of all that hatred, with their execrations still ringing in his ears, we are to imagine he now appeared among them, secure in their zeal, their loyalty, and their attachment. Whatever proofs of rashness Bonaparte may have exhibited where he had only to command, and others had to obey, it cannot be denied, that he has always shewn a laudable affection for his own person, when brought into absolute jeopardy, by contriving various ingenious modes of escape, which vulgar minds would be apt to consider

\* When he arrived at Fontainebleau, after the capitulation of Paris, and found that his deposition was determined upon, he resorted to one of those theatrical tricks of state which so eminently characterised him : "*Abdiquons*," said he, "*c'est un acte de souveraineté.*"

† See, in the Narrative of Count Truchses-Waldburg, the petulant Address of Napoleon to the Sub-Prefect of Aix.

as incompatible with the hero and the soldier. Is it, then, quite probable, that he who had shrunk from the angry and vindictive menaces of the Provençals in 1814, with so much pusillanimity, who descended to so many petty shifts for safety, who testified so much undisguised terror at their wrath, should, in 1815, commit himself, with fearless and unsuspecting confidence, to their fidelity and love, and trusting only to the fortuitous interest which he might be able to excite in favour of his enterprize? Would he not rather have selected some point on the coast of Languedoc for his descent, where he might have anticipated perhaps a less decided hostility, and where, at all events, he had not actually experienced the indignation of the inhabitants. This seems to be one of those contradictions which can be explained only by more authentic documents than are yet before the world. If Napoleon should execute his promise, and write his own memoirs, he may probably disclose the reason why, in this solitary instance of his life, he courted the danger he could avoid.

That the military of France should be eagerly disposed to rally round the usurper's standard, was an event which apparently admitted of a very simple cause, without recurring to the hypothesis of a preconcerted conspiracy. A French writer,\* however, who has discussed this question, finds a different solution for the prompt and general defection of the army, than merely their devotion to their former leader. His arguments, which are not wholly inconclusive, derive an additional weight from circumstances which he adduces as facts. The following is an extract from his work.

“ The army, as we have already observed, conspired against the nation. We think it unnecessary to insist upon a fact so well authenticated, that it is already regarded as matter of history. The point is, whether the King could have prevented that conspiracy. No : the King could not have prevented it, which we flatter ourselves we can demonstrate.

“ The King, when he ascended the throne, found himself surrounded by the army of Bonaparte ; he had no choice ; he was compelled to accept their service ; to render that service useful, he must gain their attachment ; and to gain their attachment he must give them his own confidence. Such being the case, it may easily be comprehended that it was almost impossible to exercise a due vigi-

\* See “ De la Conspiration qui a obligé Louis XVIII. de quitter son Royaume, &c. par un Ancien Membre de L'Assemblée Constituante.”



lance over the different corps which, passing in an instant from the service of Bonaparte to the service of the King, belonged, strictly speaking, to neither, but only to themselves. Oaths and kindness having no influence upon them, they were, in fact, inaccessible. Undoubtedly there were symptoms, nay even proofs, of the bad disposition which prevailed in several regiments; but, being sustained by the whole body, it was difficult to punish them. Even if it could have been done, partial examples, without remedying the evil, would have been like plucking out a few hairs, when the head ought to be cut off.

“ The conspiracy, therefore, gradually proceeded throughout this body, as secretly and as securely, as the thoughts which pass through the mind. It consisted in maintaining the remembrance of Bonaparte in the recollection of the soldiers, in order that they might be ready to follow him the moment he returned. This was accomplished with very little expence, and without any danger.\* The guard-houses, the caserns, the regiments, the government of the provinces, all belonged to the army; hence, as every thing which ought to be punished was committed by those who were to denounce the offence, either the offences were never made known, or, if communicated, always excused. Under the protection of such circumstances, which arose from the nature of the case, and not from any conduct on the part of government, the conspirators plotted, and corrupted the army with impunity.

“ At the same time, however, there were some corps more studiously corrupted than others, and the conspirators took care to place them, according to their several degrees of corruption, along the road which Bonaparte was to take.† They calculated with so much accuracy and precision, that the regiments which stood highest on the list of traitors should set the example to those below them, and these last were to be the models for others, who were in a less degree pre-

\* The mystical adoption of the violet, which is now universally believed, seems to be a strong indication of a premeditated plot for his return.

† “ It was according to this scale of proportion that they placed at Grenoble, in the first line, the regiment of Labédoyère, to give the example to three other regiments which were also stationed there, but which were not arrived at a sufficient height of perfection. This gentleman (he was one at least before his treason,) no sooner saw Bonaparte appear, than he rode towards him at full gallop, placed the colours of his regiment under his horse's feet, and thus afforded him the satisfaction of trampling upon the *fleurs de lys*: it is said that Bonaparte exclaimed, ‘ What! M. Labédoyère, a gentleman! I did not think myself so powerful!’ This regiment followed the example of their Colonel, and the other regiments its example.”

pared. In this manner, the conspirators were enabled to comprehend all the troops, even those for whom no expence had been incurred. The great point of importance in an army is to have heads of columns which do their duty; the rest are sure to follow and do the same.

“ Thus the defection of the regiments of Grenoble, occasioned that of the regiments at Lyon; the regiments of Lyon produced the defection of those of Burgundy; the regiments of Burgundy the defection of those of Paris; and the regiments of Paris those of Bourdeaux, of the south, and, in fact, of the whole army.\*

“ It was upon the wings of this conspiracy that Bonaparte arrived with thirty thousand men at Paris, without drawing a single sword: the veriest freebooter could have done just as much, for when, from the first station to the last, he found all those armed for him who had been sent against him, it was only necessary to mount on horseback and pursue his journey. This was precisely what the usurper did, and if we attentively consider all the facts, the marvellous disappears, and no prodigy remains.

“ But, it may be asked, why did the population, why did the national guards of the provinces and of Paris, present no opposition to his progress? As well might it be demanded why a man, armed at all points, can drive before him another who is naked from head to foot? I do not know of any instance recorded where a people, surprised without arms,† ever yet precipitated themselves upon a

\* “ The government discovered, though too late, the thread of the conspiracy; but it at least proves the caution with which it was conducted, and the impossibility of resisting it. The letters were seized which Bonaparte wrote, at his departure from the island of Elba, to the Generals and Colonels of the regiments which were placed along his route, and which, he of course, concluded were to be employed against him. These letters contained orders, given by the *Emperor*, to his various officers, enjoining them, upon their responsibility, to be at certain fixed places of *rendezvous*, which he pointed out, in Burgundy. After the capture of Grenoble, those regiments having been put in motion to march upon Lyons, Bonaparte was immediately informed of it, and anticipating that his first letters of instruction might have reached too late, he addressed fresh ones to them, and in order that they might not miss their destination, the places where the several regiments then on their march, would be found, were exactly indicated. There was not a single error in those indications, though relating to the movements of so many different regiments: and from that circumstance alone we may judge of the degree of fidelity which the traitors observed towards each other.”

† “ In the provinces through which Bonaparte passed, a distance of about four hundred miles, it would not have been possible with every effort, and with all the requisite time, to collect together six thousand muskets; of other warlike ammunition there was none. Bonaparte, on the contrary, arrived at each position, along that extensive line, with a compact force, effectively armed.”



disciplined and well-appointed army : and Bonaparte knew that he should find the people in that condition : he knew that the national guards of the provinces were almost wholly disarmed, and the conspirators had so effectually provided for the rapidity of his march, that there was no time to organise resistance in any part.

“ Paris alone appeared capable of opposing a check to the overwhelming torrent. The King would doubtless have been there covered with a rampart of steel ; we can attest those unanimous transports which unceasingly pervaded the capital, during the continuance of the danger : those mournful regrets, and those agonising adieus which accompanied the departure of the King. Yes, the blood of every Parisian was at his disposal, and he might, in a horrible struggle, have found an illustrious tomb, or a memorable triumph : but the King did not think himself justified in making the attempt. Was that a fault, or was it an eminent proof of wisdom ?

“ The national guard of Paris included in its ranks about thirty thousand men : the household troops amounted to about five thousand ; a multitude of volunteers, from the different provinces, constituted an unformed and undisciplined mass : organised, they would have fought like heroes ; but time was wanting : and without organization they were rather embarrassing than useful. The household troops were in their infancy : one half of them wanted arms and horses : the national guard, animated with the best spirit, were only imperfectly acquainted with military manœuvres, and could have no warlike habits, from never having been in actual combat ; consisting chiefly of housekeepers and tradesmen, and the greater part of them fathers of families, though there might be good reasons for relying on their bravery, there were also good reasons for suspecting that they would not be insensible to their domestic interests.

“ Such was the composition of the army which the King had to oppose to Bonaparte, who had already *mitraillé* the national guard of Paris ; and to his army of freebooters, who saw behind them the scaffold, and before them, the pillage of the finest city in the world.

“ Bonaparte, in fact, surprised Paris as an armed robber surprises a peaceful family ; hence, he arrived there, solitary ; not a peasant, not a national guard followed him : not one public body nor any constituted authority approached to meet him ; he received neither addresses nor congratulations, except when he reached a place where he inspired terror by the roaring of his ferocious soldiers.”

If this statement be founded upon facts, it would amount to a satisfactory proof of conspiracy ; but the impartiality of truth must allow, that nothing has yet been developed which confers upon it so high an authority. One circumstance, however, may be mentioned, as a further corroboration of the hypothesis, and which possesses some weight as a collateral evidence. The advance of Bonaparte upon Grenoble, was manifestly a deviation from the direct road to Paris, and seems to admit of explanation only upon the supposition, that he knew a force was stationed there ready to join his standard. Had his object been, exclusively, to march to Paris with the greatest celerity, he certainly would never have entered that city.

Among those who have been suspected of materially facilitating the progress of the usurper, is Marshal Soult, who had recently been appointed Minister of War. Throughout Europe, his connivance has been generally believed ; but the opinion in Paris was, that he had some scheme in contemplation for his own personal aggrandisement, and that, in consequence, he made no effort to diminish the discontent which prevailed in the army, because he calculated upon the probability of becoming their choice in the event of any great commotion. His fidelity may probably have been doubted, on account of his known attachment to Napoleon ; an attachment which made him the last, to credit the intelligence of his abdication, and nearly the last, who sent in his *adhesion* to the provisional government. That he was doubted is indisputable, for he resigned his office in consequence, and was succeeded by the Duke de Feltre.

It was confidently stated, by those who entertained no doubt of a conspiracy, that cabals assembled every night, sometimes at Neuilly, sometimes at St. Leu, and sometimes in one of the streets of the faubourg St. Marceau ; but whether the traitors plotted together, merely to subvert the restored government, or whether to devise the means of Napoleon's return, still remains a matter of mere conjecture, and must continue so, till better information shall withdraw the veil. Having, therefore, related the various opinions which different individuals, and different parties, have adopted with respect to this great transaction, and having represented the principal grounds upon which those opinions have been established, it now remains to exhibit a faithful and comprehensive narrative of the transaction itself, with the splendid and stupendous results which emanated from it.

When Napoleon had finally determined upon an attempt to recover his impe-



rial crown, he did not suffer a single hour to elapse unprofitably. Whatever his projects might have been for some time preceding, he concealed them carefully even from the most intimate of those associates who had accompanied him into exile, and General Bertrand himself, according to the declaration of Lord Castlereagh, was unacquainted with his intentions, the very evening before he resolved to execute them. He had previously purchased some small feluccas and some ammunition at Genoa, and a few arms at Algiers.\* The absence of Sir Neil Campbell, the English commissioner at Elba, has been supposed one of the motives which induced Bonaparte to fix upon that particular period for his departure; but, in the first place, Colonel Campbell was invested with no authority to controul his actions, and even if he had, what could a single individual have effected against an armed force of several hundred men? The probability is, that had he been upon the island at the time, he would have enjoyed the infinite satisfaction of meditating in confinement, while Napoleon was sailing for the shores of France.

On the 25th of February, he gave an entertainment to his little court, and during the evening he appeared more than ordinarily tranquil and affable. He imparted nothing; and that cheerfulness which his followers believed to be the result of resignation, sprung from the consciousness which then animated him, of the fast-approaching moment, when he should escape from banishment, and once more plunge into all the active scenes of a great and daring enterprize. If fear agitated his bosom, it was soon supplanted by hope, and the smile that diffused itself over his countenance, was reflected from the visionary crown and sceptre which already played before his imagination. On the 26th he reviewed his troops, and at one o'clock they received orders to prepare for their departure. But whither? No one could tell. Was it to Italy or France? The Emperor preserved a studied silence, while joy, astonishment, and doubt, perplexed those who were impatient to obey, that they might learn their destination. A few hours dispelled the mystery, and every heart beat with exultation, as every tongue pronounced with enthusiasm, *Paris or death!*†

\* Histoire de la Revolution du 20 Mars 1815, par M. Gallais.

† The reader will be amused with the following account from the pen of one whose idolatrous admiration of Napoleon may justify a gentle suspicion of his accuracy:—

“ Some circumstances relative to the expedition were related in my presence, the other evening, to General Kosciusko, by Baron the Colonel Termanouski, commandant of the Polish lancers of the guard who accompanied the Emperor to Elba, and as they tally with the accounts circulated here, both in print

By four o'clock in the afternoon they were all on board. The fleet which was destined to convey this band of desperate adventurers, with their perfidious leader, to the shores of France, was neither numerous nor formidable. It consisted of only seven small vessels, one of which was a brig, (*L'Inconstant*,)

and conversation, as well as with the famous bulletin of the *Moniteur*, I shall venture to give you a short detail of his information. The Colonel commanded at Porto Longone, and had, besides his lancers, about three hundred soldiers in his garrison. Six days before the embarkation the Emperor had sent for him, and enquiring what number of vessels were in his harbour, desired him to hire and provision them on his return, and to prevent all boats from leaving the port. He followed his instructions, and was speedily visited by an Englishman who was detained by this measure, and who represented to him, in the most violent terms, that his detention was unjust, and might cause a war between Elba and Great Britain. The Colonel smiled, represented the inequality of the powers, but still obeyed his instructions. The day before the embarkation he received orders to disburse three or four thousand francs, for making a road, and had almost forgotten the embargo, when, on the 26th of February, whilst he was working in his little garden, an aide-de-camp from the Emperor directed him to embark all his men by six o'clock in the evening, and repair to the flotilla off Porto Ferrajo, at a given time the same night. It was so late, that he could not put his soldiers on board before half-past seven, at which time he got into a boat, and rowing to the station, arrived at the imperial brig the *Inconstant*, which was under sail. On mounting the deck, the Emperor accosted him with '*comment ce va-t-il? où est votre monde?*' and, on receiving the answer, said no more. The Colonel learned that the little garrison of Porto Ferrajo had not received orders to embark until one o'clock the same day, that they had got on board at four, and that the Emperor, with Bertrand, Drouet, and his staff, arrived at eight, when a single gun gave the signal, and they set sail. The flotilla consisted of the *Inconstant* of twenty-six guns, *L'Etoile*, and *La Caroline*, bombarded, and four feluccas. The soldiers on board the *Inconstant* were four hundred of the old guard. The Colonel knew not, and no one appeared to know, whither they were going, but the guard, when drawn out on the beach, had shouted '*Paris, ou la mort*,' as if by a presentiment of their destination. The wind blew from the south, and at first rather strong, but subsided into a calm, so that by day-light they had made no more than six leagues, and were between Elba and Capraia, in sight of the English and French cruisers. The night, however, had not been totally lost, for during the darkness the soldiers and crew had been let over the sides of the brig, and had entirely changed her painting from yellow and grey to black and white, in order to escape the observation of those who were acquainted with the vessel.

"It was proposed to return to Porto Ferrajo, but Napoleon ordered the flotilla to continue its route, determining, in case of necessity, to attack the French cruisers, two frigates and a brig, which however it was thought would join rather than oppose them. At twelve the same day the wind freshened, and the flotilla, at four o'clock, was off the headland of Leghorn. Three men of war were in sight, and one of them, a brig, bearing down on the *Inconstant*, the ports were taken up, and some preparations made for action. The guard, however, were ordered to take off their caps and lie down on the deck, Napoleon intending to board the vessel only as a last resource, and in case the *Inconstant* should not be permitted to pass without a visit. But the *Zephyr*, so she was called, only passed alongside the brig, and her captain, Andrieux, being hailed by Lieutenant Taillade, who was known to him, only asked whither the *Inconstant* was bound—Taillade answered "to Genoa," and wished to know if he could execute any commission for the captain of the *Zephyr*—Andrieux said no, and at parting cried



mounting twenty-six guns. The number of troops has been stated at eleven hundred and forty, viz. four hundred of the Old Guard, two hundred infantry, one hundred of the Polish light horse, and two hundred of the battalion *des flaqueurs*\*. The remainder was composed of Corsicans and Elbeans. With such an arma-

out 'how's the Emperor?' Napoleon himself exclaimed—'wonderfully well,' and the ships dropped away from each other. The wind increased during the night of the 27th, and at day-light of the 28th the coasts of Provence were in sight. A seventy-four gun ship was seen steering apparently for Sardinia. The Colonel said, that before this time it was generally thought on board that the flotilla was going to Naples. Many questions were put to the officers by the men, and by the officers even to the Emperor, who smiled, and said nothing: at last, however, he exclaimed—'*éh bien! c'est la France.*' Immediately every body was in activity, and crowded round the Emperor, to hear his intentions. The first step he took was to order two or three of the commissaries of his little army to prepare their pens and paper, which they accordingly got in order, and, resting on the companion, took down, from the Emperor's mouth, the proclamations to the army and to the French. When these compositions were written they were read aloud; Napoleon disliked some portions of them, and made alterations; they were again read, and again altered, until after at least ten revisions, he said, '*that will do, now copy them.*' At the word, all the soldiers and sailors who could write laid themselves down on the deck, with their paper and implements, and completed a sufficient number for immediate dispersion on landing. The next object was the preparation of the tri-coloured cockades, which was easily managed, by ripping off one of the circles of the Elbese cockade, which had, at their first arrival on the island, been even more like the French national colours, but had been changed by the Emperor, who thought it might be the cause of suspicion. During these occupations and for the latter part of the voyage, the officers, soldiers, and sailors surrounded Napoleon, who took very little sleep, and was generally on deck. Lying down, sitting, standing, and strolling about him, familiarly, they asked him unceasing questions, to which he as unreservedly and without one sign of anger or impatience replied, although some were not a little indiscreet, for they required his opinions on many living characters, kings, marshals, and ministers, and discussed notorious passages of his own campaigns, and even of his domestic policy. After satisfying or eluding their curiosity, he would himself enter into details of his own conduct, of that of his rivals, or of his friends; and then, from the examination of contemporary merit, touched upon such historical topics as related more particularly to the military events of modern up to ancient times. All this he did with an easy persuasive eloquence which delighted and instructed his hearers, and, as our Colonel added, rendered every word worthy a perpetual record. He talked without disguise of his present attempt, of its difficulties, of his means, and of his hopes. He said, 'In a case like this, one must think slowly, but act promptly. I have long weighed and most maturely considered the project. The glory, the advantages we shall gain, if we succeed, I need not enlarge upon. If we fail—to military men, who have from their infancy faced death in so many shapes, the fate which awaits us is not terrific: we know, and we despise, for we have a thousand times faced the worst which a reverse can bring.'

"These were nearly the last words which he spoke before his little fleet came to an anchor in the gulf of Juan, and they were delivered with a more set phrase, as a sort of final address to the companions of his great enterprise. Antibes had been in sight since mid-day on the 28th, and on the 1st of March,

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\* Cinq Mois de L'Histoire de France par M. Warin.

ment, Napoleon ventured to risk an encounter with the cruisers of England and France, which might possibly intercept his passage; and with such a military force, he committed his destiny to the hazards of war, by invading a populous kingdom, which his own policy had trained to martial habits. If we are to sup-

at three o'clock in the afternoon, the flotilla anchored in the bay. A captain and five-and-twenty men were dispatched to make themselves masters of any battery which might command the landing-place, and the officer finding none, marched without orders to Antibes, which he entered, but was made prisoner by the officer commanding the garrison. The troops were disembarked by five in the evening, on the beach at Cannes; the Emperor was the last to leave the brig. Napoleon took some refreshment and repose in a bivouac, which was prepared for him in a meadow surrounded by olive trees, near the shore, where there is now a small column raised to commemorate the event, and where they shew the table on which he was served. The Emperor previously calling Termanouski, asked him if he knew what cavalry horses had been embarked at Elba? the Colonel told him, he knew nothing of the matter, and that he himself had not brought one. 'Well,' replied Napoleon, 'I have brought four horses; let us divide them. I fear I must have one: as you command my cavalry, you must have another. Bertrand, Drouet, and Cambrone must settle about the other two as well as they can.' The horses had been landed some way farther down, so that the bivouac being broken up, Napoleon and his staff proceeded to the spot on foot. The Emperor walked alone, interrogating some peasants whom he met. Termanouski and the Generals followed, carrying their own saddles. When they found the horses, Bertrand, the Grand Marshal, refused to take one; he said he would walk. Drouet followed his example. Cambrone and Molat were the other two mounted officers. The Emperor then gave Colonel Termanouski a handful of Napoleons, and ordered him to procure some horses for immediate use. The Colonel bought fifteen, giving any thing the peasants asked. These were harnessed to three pieces of cannon which were brought from Elba, and to a coach, given to her brother by the Princess Pauline. News came of the failure at Antibes. 'We have made a bad beginning,' said the Emperor; 'but we have nothing to do but to march as fast as we can, and get to the passes before the news of our arrival.' The moon rose, and Napoleon, with his invading army, moved forwards at eleven o'clock. They marched all night: the peasants of the villages through which they passed said nothing—they stared, shrugged up their shoulders, and shook their heads, when they were told the Emperor was returned. At Grasse, a town of six thousand inhabitants, where there was a report that pirates had landed, every thing was in a state of alarm. Shops and windows were shut, and the crowds in the street, notwithstanding the national cockade, and the shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, suffered the troops to march without a word or sign either of disapprobation or approval. They halted for an hour on a hill above the town, and the soldiers began to look at each other with an air of doubt and dissatisfaction; when on a sudden a body of the towns-people were seen coming towards them with provisions, and crying, *Vive l'Empereur!* From this moment the people of the country seemed satisfied that the Emperor had landed, and his march was rather a triumph than an invasion. The cannons and the carriage were left at Grasse; and, as the roads were steep and bad in the course of this first march, which was twenty leagues, (for they reached the village of Cérénon in the evening of the 2d,) the Emperor frequently walked on foot with his grenadiers, whom, when they complained of their hardships, he called his GRUMBLERS, and who laughed at him when he stumbled and fell. The familiar appellations by which he was known to his soldiers at this time were *Notre petit tondu*, and *Jean de l'épée*; and he frequently heard these names repeated in a half whisper, as he was scrambling up the ascents amidst his veterans. He slept at Barême on the 3d, and dined at Digne on the 4th; it was either here or at Castellan, as the Colonel said, that Napoleon endeavoured to persuade the landlord of



pose he embarked in so perilous and arduous an enterprise, from no motive but self-willed ambition, trusting to accident alone for the means of success, then his exulting boast, on board the Bellerophon, that he made a descent upon France with a handful of men, and drove the King from his throne, may be received as

the inn at which he stopped to cry *Vive l'Empereur!* and when the man positively refused, and exclaimed, on the contrary, *Vive le Roi!* so far from being angry, praised his loyalty, and only asked him to drink his health, to which mine host acceded.

“ At Digne the proclamations to the army and to the French people were printed, and circulated with such rapidity throughout Dauphiny, that, on his route, Napoleon found the towns and villages ready to receive him. As yet, however, only one soldier had joined him, a grenadier, whom Colonel Termanouski met on the road; and, informing him of the attempt in which he was engaged, endeavoured to persuade into the service. The soldier being told that the Emperor was advancing, laughed heartily, and said, ‘ Good! I shall have something to tell at home to-night.’ He was with some difficulty convinced that the Colonel was not in jest; but when he believed him, consented readily to enlist. ‘ Where shall you sleep to-night?’ said he to the officer; and on being told, rejoined, ‘ My mother lives three leagues hence; I must take leave of her; but will be with you to-night.’ Termanouski was accosted some time after arriving in his quarters that evening, by his recruit, who tapped him on the shoulder, and would not be satisfied until promised that the Emperor should be instantly informed that Melon the grenadier had kept his word, and had joined fortunes with his ancient master. Napoleon slept at Gap on the 5th, attended only by ten cavalry soldiers and forty grenadiers. The fortresses and bridge of Sisteron were the same day occupied by General Cambrone, at the head of forty grenadiers. But Melon was the only recruit; so that the inhabitants of the towns and villages, particularly at St. Bonnet, wished to sound the tocsin, and rise in mass to accompany the little army; and notwithstanding they were refused, almost blocked up the roads, and impeded the march by pressing round the Emperor, who sometimes walked on foot. On the 6th, Napoleon slept at Gap, and General Cambrone, with his forty, at Mure, towards which place the advanced guard of the garrison of Grenoble of six thousand men had marched to stop their further progress, and refused to parley with the General. Colonel Termanouski being on the advance, saw a body of troops with a white flag drawn up in a defile near Vizille. He attempted to parley, but an officer advancing towards him, cried out, ‘ Retire, I can have no communication with you: keep your distance; my men will fire.’ The Colonel tried to pacify him, telling him, it was with the Emperor Napoleon that he would have to speak, not with himself. But the officer still threatened, and gave the same answer to Raoul, an aide-de-camp of the staff, so that the Colonel returned to the Emperor, and reported his failure. Napoleon said to Termanouski, smiling, ‘ If that is the case, I must try what I can do myself.’ He dismounted; and ordering about fifty of his grenadiers to advance, with arms reversed, walked quietly towards the defile, where he found a battalion of the 5th of the line, a company of sappers, and another of miners, amounting in all to seven or eight hundred men, drawn up to oppose him. The officer commanding continued to vociferate, sometimes against the Emperor, calling out, *it is an impostor, it is not he*; and sometimes against his troops, ordering them to fire. The troops were silent and motionless; for an instant it appeared they were about to raise their muskets, when Napoleon, halting his grenadiers, walked calmly up to the battalion, and, when close to the line, stopped short in the front, looked steadfastly at them, and throwing open his outer coat, exclaimed, ‘ *It is I, recognise me!*’ If there be amongst you one soldier who would kill his Emperor, now is *his time*.’ They were vanquished at once; and with repeated shouts of ‘ *long live the Emperor*,’ rushed forward to embrace the guard.”—*Letters written by an Englishman resident at Paris during the last Reign of the Emperor Napoleon*; Vol. I. p. 109—121.

the conscious triumph of a bold and adventurous spirit: but if he merely obeyed the call of his devoted legions, if he raised his standard of rebellion as the concerted signal for treason to manifest itself, then his declaration was not only false in what it affirmed, but it sunk into one of those common tricks, by which, throughout his whole career, he had succeeded in diffusing a meretricious glare over his actions.

Napoleon and his officers were the last who quitted Elba. Being informed that all his men were on board, he immediately followed, accompanied by Count Bertrand, Count Drouot, the Generals Cambronne, Molet, Raoul, and some others of less note. It was now evening, and the weather unusually calm and serene. The very elements seemed to be propitious, and as Bonaparte did not "defy auguries," he probably contemplated, with peculiar complacency, even that fortuitous circumstance. A gentle and favourable breeze sprung up, just as every thing was ready for sailing. The people, meanwhile, crowded to the beach, and gazed in silence upon the portentous departure of the imperial exile. A thousand rumours passed from mouth to mouth; anxious doubts and fears agitated the bosoms of many; curiosity and amazement distracted the minds of all. The mighty disturber of the world, that fearful being, whose restless genius had so long afflicted the nations of the earth, and against whom Europe had pronounced her solemn ban of interdiction, was now about to burst from his captivity, to precipitate himself once more upon society, to kindle the horrors of war and desolation, and to blight that fair prosperity of peace, which his downfall alone had conferred upon mankind, and which his fatal presence could alone destroy. Every evil, every calamity, which fancy could pourtray in her darkest mood, might have presented itself to the foreboding fears of the spectators, as they beheld the sails unfurled, as they heard the anchors slowly heaving from their oozy beds, as the echoes of the signal gun reverberated along the shore, and as they listened to the tumultuous cries of the soldiers, who, while the vessels gently glided over the bosom of the ocean, made the air resound with their terrific and triumphant shouts of *Paris, ou la mort!*

The vociferous exultation of the soldiers, bespoke only their confidence in their chief, who was conducting them to some great exploit, and their joy at escaping from a voluntary fidelity, which had already become irksome. They would naturally prefer any undertaking, however dangerous and chimerical, (the more dangerous and the more chimerical, the better suited to their ardent enthusiasm for Napoleon,) rather than continue in the sluggish inactivity of banishment.



But far different must have been the feelings of Napoleon himself. Whatever hopes of success he might entertain, whether founded upon the knowledge of certain co-operation, or springing only from the presumption, that the political dissensions which convulsed France, would create a seditious host prepared to ally at the call of any daring traitor, he could not disguise, from his secret thoughts, the appalling reflections, that he was now about to place his after-fate upon the issue of one tremendous struggle. He might, probably, anticipate with confidence his successful march to Paris, in either alternative: but unless we deny to him the faculty of common sense, or believe that the remembrance of the past and present was wholly absorbed and obliterated by the splendid visions of the future, it is impossible to suppose that even he contemplated anything, so wild and extravagant, as the peaceful possession of that authority he might be able to usurp. Europe, which had shed so much blood, and expended so much treasure, to dethrone him, would not tamely stand by, and see the restoration of that same monstrous system, that same military despotism, that same abhorred tyranny, which a long and melancholy experience had proved to be so fatal to the liberties, the happiness, and the independence of the world. The dictates of pride, even, in the absence of all nobler impulse, would be sufficient to rouse the confederated sovereigns, and conduct their armies once more to the frontiers of France. Having conquered the conqueror, having vanquished him who had vanquished all, (England,—England excepted!) having scattered his mighty power before them, despoiled him of his crown, and banished him from that land he had so sorely galled and oppressed, was it likely, they would now suffer the faithless and ambitious rebel, their fierce and relentless foe, to insult them by violating the compact he had made, to laugh in scorn at their vain efforts, and from the throne of imperial France, again to fulminate his edicts against every state and people of Christendom?

If he meditated at all upon the consequences of his enterprise, if he cast but one prophetic glance beyond the walls of Paris, he must surely have considered this as the certain result which he would have to encounter. But he might safely have imagined others. He might suppose that the allies, renouncing every sentiment, merely personal, would not endure that the blessings of peace and security which their triumphs in the field, and their deliberations in Congress, had bestowed upon Europe, should be at once destroyed, and all their plans of a sound and comprehensive policy, for the establishment of a just balance of power, baffled by his perfidious aggressions. What then must have been the conflicting feelings of his mind, as he beheld the rocks of Elba receding from his sight, and as he

reflected upon that scene of strife and bloodshed which he was about to perpetrate ! He might affect serenity and cheerfulness ; he might assume an air of confidence which his followers would regard as the presage of success : but he must have been the most insensible or the most infatuated of men, if, in the moments of lonely meditation, he did not sometimes tremble at the prospect, if despair did not sometimes seize upon his heart, if his imagination did not recoil with horror from its own forebodings. The time for deliberation, however, was past ; he had taken the fatal step, and nothing now remained but to arm his mind with fortitude and energy to confront the perils which his iniquity had created.

Fraught with the great purpose of his undertaking, and anxiously solicitous about the means of ensuring its success, his diminutive fleet, meanwhile, continued prosperously to pursue its course. The wind, indeed, which had at first blown so favourably, died away during the night, and at day-break they were becalmed between the islands of Elba and Capraja. There was some danger in this position, because it exposed them to the observation of the French and English vessels which were cruising about, and more than once it was proposed to Napoleon that they should return to Porto Ferrajo. Timid counsels at such a moment would, of course, be promptly rejected, for every thing depended upon rapid and decisive movements. He determined, therefore, to proceed, and intimated his intention, if they should be intercepted by the French cruisers, to try the effect of his name upon their commanders and crews. He believed they would immediately hoist the tri-coloured flag : but should they happen to have some respect for the oath of fidelity they had taken to Louis, then he was resolved to board them, and trust to the valour of his soldiers. Chance decided, however, that he should not be reduced to this alternative. Towards noon the wind freshened again, and the vessels continued their progress. At four o'clock, on the 27th of February, they were off the coast of Leghorn, and a ship of war was seen approaching. Some necessary precautions were taken in this doubtful emergency. The soldiers concealed themselves between the decks, that they might not be recognised, and the two vessels came along side each other. The cruiser proved to be the *Zephyr*, commanded by a Captain Andrieux. A passing salutation ensued between them. The Lieutenant of the *Inconstant*, happened to know Captain Andrieux, and he knew also that his loyalty was unquestionable. When the *Zephyr* approached within hearing, he hailed her, and inquired, with seeming indifference, whither she was bound. "To Leghorn," replied Captain Andrieux ; and, in return, asked the destination of the *Inconstant*. "To Genoa," answered Taillade ; "have you any commission there which I can execute for



you ?” This apparently polite offer, and an invitation from Taillade to Captain Andrieux to come on board, and pass a few hours with an old messmate, being declined, the alarming conference ended, and the two vessels pursued their several courses.

This was the only serious danger of discovery which Napoleon experienced ; for though they discerned, early on the morning of the 28th, a seventy-four gun ship, bearing towards the island of Sardinia, the temporary consternation which it produced was soon dissipated, when they found that it proceeded onwards without manifesting the slightest disposition to intercept them. At noon, the city of Antibes was in sight ; and on the 1st of March, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the rebel chieftain and his band entered the gulf of San Juan, a short distance from Frejus, in the department of the Var. Previously to disembarking his troops, Bonaparte summoned them all into his presence, and addressing them in a brief but energetic speech, ordered that they should cast the cockade of Elba into the sea, and assume the tri-coloured one. That badge of treason he distributed with his own hands, and it was received by the soldiers with loud and enthusiastic shouts of *Vive l'Empereur !*

Every thing being duly prepared, the first measure adopted was to land twenty-five men, under the command of a captain, for the purpose of taking possession of a small battery. To their equal surprise and joy, this battery was found unoccupied, and as no impediment therefore could be offered, instructions were immediately issued for the troops to quit their vessels, and muster on the shore. The order was soon obeyed ; and Bonaparte, as he was the last who quitted Elba, so he was now the last who abandoned the ship. Having ascertained that all his soldiers were landed, he followed himself, and as his foot once more touched the soil of France, he exclaimed with exultation, *Voila le Congrès dissous !* Yes ! the Congress was dissolved ; but it was dissolved, or rather suspended, only in its political functions and capacity. The members composing that august body, animated by one common feeling of interest and indignation, united themselves still more closely for warlike purposes, and all the little bickerings which had embroiled their deliberations, about patches of territory to be parcelled out to this or that potentate, were buried in the magnitude of the occasion which now called upon them to arm for the independence and honour of Europe.

It has been reckoned unlucky to stumble on the threshold of any undertaking ; and Napoleon, who believed or affected to believe in omens, probably felt

some dismay at the failure of his first proceeding. An officer, with a small number of troops, not exceeding twenty-five, was dispatched to Antibes, and having succeeded in throwing himself into the place by surprise, he hoped the garrison would immediately hoist the national colours, when they heard of Napoleon's return. But the commander, General Corsin,\* entertained somewhat different notions, with respect to the import of the word fidelity, and the character and pretensions of Bonaparte. Instead of rushing with enthusiasm to embrace the officer, and express his devotion to the Emperor, he very unceremoniously committed both him and his soldiers to prison, and immediately prepared for vigorous resistance against any attack which the audacious rebel might meditate.—When the intelligence of this preliminary disaster was communicated to Bonaparte, his consternation and rage knew no bounds. Another officer was instantly sent, to summon the garrison in the name of the Emperor Napoleon. He was thrown into prison. A third followed, to demand the liberation of the prisoners, and to menace the intrepid and virtuous Corsin with the most signal punishment, if he did not directly repair to the Gulf of Juan, and proffer his submission. He shared the same fate.

Napoleon, having no superfluity either of officers or men, did not think it exactly prudent to continue this piece-meal system of losing them; and as he doubted whether his collective force would be sufficient to reduce the garrison by attack, he resolved to leave the obstinate Corsin to himself, and pursue his march. If, indeed, he lingered before Antibes, he would miss the opportunity of producing an effect by a sudden and rapid irruption into the country; and besides, time would be afforded for the contagion of example, and other governors might unluckily determine to imitate the noble conduct of General Corsin. He broke up his *bivouack*, therefore, on the sea-shore, and at one o'clock in the morning, on the 2d of March, advanced towards Cannes, leaving Antibes unmolested.

General Cambronne arrived in this town with an advanced guard of eighty men. These he stationed at the *Porte de France*, with strict orders to admit the entrance of any strangers who might arrive, but to suffer the departure of none.

\* According to another account, upon which, perhaps, as much reliance may be placed as upon the authorities consulted for the text, it was not General Corsin who so peremptorily disposed of Napoleon's emissaries. It is said he was absent at the time, and that the major, left in command of the place, aided by the zeal of the inhabitants, who were more loyal than the garrison, opposed that first, though ineffectual check, to the progress of Bonaparte's enterprise.



The mayor of the place was desired to provide rations for 3,600 men. With this requisition he complied: but he refused to visit Napoleon, and declare his allegiance. General Cambronne, during the interview which he had with the mayor, questioned him with much anxiety as to the disposition of the inhabitants in the south of France, and his own sentiments with regard to Napoleon's return. The mayor gave no answer. Being still urged to explain himself, he at length replied, "I think I have taken an oath to the King, and I will not betray him." "But you took an oath also to the Emperor," rejoined Cambronne, quickly. "I did so, and was faithful to it till his abdication: now, I behold in him only a man who wishes to inflict misery upon France. I repeat it, my oath to the King is sacred, you may do with me what you please." General Cambronne was silent. The loyalty of the town was no less exemplary than that of its chief magistrate. Unprovided with arms, without any means whatever of defence, and ignorant of the number of troops which the usurper had, the inhabitants maintained a steady and inflexible fidelity. Not a single voice was raised to hail the appearance of Napoleon. It is related even, (and if the anecdote be true, it ought to find a conspicuous place in the page of history,) that a young peasant, armed with a musquet, approached the *bivouack* of Bonaparte, with an intent to kill him. When he was dissuaded from the attempt, by those who feared that it might subject the town to all the vindictive horrors of being sacked, he replied, with exalted firmness, "What though Cannes should perish, Europe will be saved."

Moreau, who well understood the real nature of his rival and persecutor, once said, when asked his opinion of him, "The great characteristics of this man, are falsehood, and a love of life." He added, (for it was just before his departure for Dresden,) what seemed to have been dictated by the spirit of prophecy, except so far as related to himself, "I am going to attack him; I shall beat him; and shall see him at my feet begging for life." The triumph of such a spectacle was, unfortunately, not reserved for Moreau. He did not survive to behold the disgraceful fugitive from Leipsic and Waterloo, the humbled exile in Elba, the fawning suppliant for safety on board the *Bellerophon*, or the inglorious captive at St. Helena. But he knew the man, and could pronounce, therefore, how he would act. Imposture, bold and undisguised imposture, was the great instrument of success to which Napoleon trusted throughout his whole career. In the official account which he published of his progress from the bay of Juan to Paris, he ventured to insert this sentence:—"The people of Cannes received the Emperor with those sentiments which were the first presage of the

success of his enterprise." The connivance of England at his escape, the sanction of Austria to his attempt, and the return of the Empress and her son, all of which he affirmed with equal confidence, had exactly as much truth in them, as the devotion and zeal of the people of Cannes.

It would be difficult to describe the mingled sensations of astonishment, alarm, and curiosity, excited among the inhabitants, as they learned that Napoleon had returned to France, and was proceeding to Paris. Nothing was precisely known; every thing was believed. It was a phenomenon which, in the first moment of disclosure, confounded the faculties, and left no room but for panic-struck credulity. How, or why, he came, no one had leisure to inquire. The peasants flocked, in idle terror and amazement, to gaze upon the prodigy, while the usurper and his band moved along with mysterious rapidity. Sometimes they supplied the necessaries which were required, and sometimes they fled in consternation, leaving their fields and cottages deserted. The latter was the case when he arrived at Grasse. He found the town nearly empty. All was silence and desolation. This was partly occasioned, indeed, by the rumour that a troop of Corsairs had landed, who were ravaging the country in every direction. When it was known that instead of pirates, it was only the Emperor approaching, at the head of a few hundred soldiers, many who fled from their homes returned again. Others, however, continued in the concealment where their first fears had sought refuge, believing the troops of Napoleon to be little less formidable than an Algerine banditti.

Grasse contains a population of about twelve thousand individuals. The mayor of the town was devoted to the King, and when he heard of the landing of Bonaparte, and of his advance upon Grasse, he immediately assembled the municipal council, to determine what measures should be taken. General Gazan, a native of the place, happened to be there, and assisted at the deliberations. They rejoiced at this circumstance, because they thought he would animate and direct the zeal and courage of the citizens, who were collected round the Hotel de Ville, and impatiently demanding arms, that they might march against the enemy. But he repressed their ardour, and timidly or traitorously advised that they should not risk the safety of the city by resistance. He objected, also, to the proposition for sounding the *tocsin* in the different villages. "Where," he asked, "will you find arms or ammunition in so short a time? Besides, how could we venture to attack, with a few citizens, or a few peasants, the warlike and veteran troops



of Bonaparte? Is it not evident, that one thousand of those disciplined soldiers will be sufficient to disperse a tenfold number of national guards?"

No doubt it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to oppose an effectual obstacle to the progress of Napoleon, by such levies as could have been suddenly called together. But did it not occur to General Gazan, that a temporary check would have afforded time to organise more powerful resistance, that the influence of example might have produced the happiest results, or that Napoleon and his followers, finding the outset of their career so little prosperous, would have lost somewhat of that ardour and confidence which they must derive from an unobstructed march? If the voice of prudence is to be listened to with so much reverence, it should sometimes be for our country as well as for ourselves. A patriot, or even a faithful subject of the King, would not have forgotten that his duty consisted in doing what he could, leaving others to do the same.

While General Gazan and the municipal council were talking, a body of young men, eager to act, armed themselves, and advanced along the road to Cannes, where they took up a position. About four o'clock in the morning a soldier arrived, who appeared to be going from Cannes to Grasse upon some mission. He exclaimed to this intrepid little band, "Return to the city, they are going to sound the *tocsin*." They returned accordingly, and reached the Hotel de Ville. There, one of the public functionaries, who perceived their astonishment and disappointment at not hearing the *tocsin*, addressed them. "Retire," said he, "or your zeal will destroy us." Two hours afterwards General Cambronne arrived. He saw General Gazan, and repairing to the Hotel de Ville, demanded four thousand rations. The order was complied with, and General Cambronne returned to Napoleon, who was slowly advancing towards the town. He halted at the position which the young men of Grasse had abandoned in the morning. As he arrived near a village called Mouan, he heard the pealing of bells, and believing it to be the *tocsin*, gave himself up for lost. A carrier passing by at the moment, he inquired the reason why the bells were ringing, who answered that it was for a funeral. This information diminished his alarm, but he did not venture to enter Grasse. He took a circuitous path, and encamped at the distance of about half a mile, upon the brow of a hill which commanded the city.

Napoleon intended to print at Grasse those proclamations which he dictated,

according to some,\* while on board the brig, to such soldiers as could write, or which, according to others,† he prepared during those nights of labour at Elba, when he was meditating how to effect his enterprise. The printer, however, from terror or policy, took to flight, and Bonaparte had no time to await his return. Having rested about an hour, he proceeded onwards, leaving six pieces of cannon behind him, which it would have been difficult to transport over the mountains, with that celerity he required. He put all the horses and mules, however, into requisition, and continued his march along the most rugged and unfrequented roads, preceded and followed by his soldiers, whose numbers now began to diminish, from the desertion of stragglers. The only accession of strength which he had hitherto gained, was a tanner of Grasse, called Isnard, a man who had been punished for crimes, but who thought himself not the less worthy of accompanying Napoleon to Paris. In the evening he arrived at the village of Cérénon, having traversed nearly sixty miles in the first day's march, and a great part of that almost incredible distance on foot.‡ At Cérénon he took up his abode at the *château* of the mayor of Grasse, who had the keys carried to him, not out of respect, but to save it from being forcibly entered. It was not very likely that he who had evaded the necessity of receiving Bonaparte in the town, would have sought the opportunity of lodging him at his country house.

The prefect of the Var, M. de Bouthillier, was not an inactive spectator of these events. The moment he heard of the landing of Bonaparte, he despatched couriers to Paris, and to the different prefects and generals who were placed along

\* See "Une Année de la Vie de L'Empereur Napoleon, par A. D. B. M——, Lieutenant de Grenadiers," p. 113; and the "Letters from an Englishman resident at Paris," already quoted, (p. 58) the author of which seems to have been at least as much indebted to the above work, as to the oral communications of Colonel Termanouski.

† See "Histoire de la Revolution du 20 Mars 1815, par M. Gallais," p. 37.

‡ "They marched very quick. The Emperor frequently fell, but without receiving any injury. The grenadiers of the Great Frederic used to call him, in fondness, *their hero Fritz*: the grenadiers of Napoleon gave him the appellation, among themselves, of *Jean de l'épée*. One of them, seeing him gaily recover himself after a fall, exclaimed, 'Well done—*Jean de l'épée* must not tumble to-day: he must be *Jean de Paris* first.'—They all laughed at this droll and unreserved remark. 'What are the grumblers laughing at?' said the Emperor, while he laughed himself, for doubtless he heard the observation. The Emperor called his soldiers *grumblers*, because in fact they often grumbled when they saw themselves constrained to execute such long marches; but when they once halted, they exclaimed, '*Jean de l'épée* does more than we: the road which we have travelled we have not got to travel!' "—*Une Année de la Vie de L'Empereur Napoleon*, p. 109.



the two roads which it was likely he would take; namely, to Marshal Massena, who was at Marseilles, and to the prefects of Avignon, Valence, Lyon, and in a direction parallel with those of Digne, Gap, and Grenoble. He himself, at the head of some national guards, took the first of those roads, because it was the only one by which Bonaparte could pass with his cannon. That inference, however, was the very thing which misled him, for Bonaparte abandoned his cannon at Grasse, and proceeded across the mountains.—It has been asked, why he did not occupy the bridge of Sisteron: but could he suppose that his colleague, the prefect of the Lower Alps, who was only a few leagues from that bridge, would neglect to adopt every necessary precaution for securing it? Napoleon, also, who doubtless anticipated the probable proceedings of M. de Bouthillier, practised a stratagem well calculated to embarrass and delude him. When he quitted Cannes he took the road to Frejus, as if intending to proceed thither, but after he had advanced a short distance, he changed his course, and marched towards Grasse and Digne.

On Friday, the 3d of March, he quitted Cérénon,\* and breakfasted at Castellane, where he received the public authorities. He ordered the mayor (M. St. Martin) to give him three blank passports, with strict injunctions not to inform the prefect till after the lapse of three days. He demanded the *gendarmérie* also, but they had quitted the city. Having halted a few hours, he continued his progress, and that night slept at Barreme. His approach had been announced by an express from Castellane, which reached Barreme about four o'clock in the afternoon. One hour afterwards Cambronne arrived, with some officers. He stopped at the best house in the town, which happened to be that of M. Tartanson, a justice of the peace. He was employed in examining it, in fixing upon a room for Bonaparte, and in taking every necessary precaution, when Bonaparte himself arrived. "Are you the proprietor of this house?" said he, addressing M. Tartanson.—"Yes—sire." "What's your name?"—"Tartanson." "And who is this young man?"—"He is my son." "What is he?"—"A receiver of the registries."—Entering the chamber which had been prepared for him, he found there the wife of M. Tartanson, whom he saluted very graciously. The lady

\* The curious and minute details of Bonaparte's progress and conduct, during the first days of his enterprise, that period of which hitherto the least was known, have been chiefly derived from a work just published in Paris, entitled, "*Itinéraire de Bonaparte, de l'Île d'Elbe, à l'Île Saint Hélène.*" The author states that his information was "obtained from ocular witnesses of what they related." It has indeed, all the appearance of authenticity, and such familiar anecdotes, are not among the least interesting, when relating to such a man as Napoleon.

replied, "Sir, I have the honour to bid you welcome." General Cambronne took her by the arm, and said, in a tone of reproach, "Madam, it is the Emperor you are addressing."—The lady appeared somewhat disconcerted by the reproof.

While Bonaparte was occupied in taking comfortable possession of his room, the rest of the house became filled with officers, and the lower apartments were encumbered with baggage. He immediately sent for the mayor, M. Beraud, and questioned him earnestly respecting the road to Sisteron. He expressed a strong desire to sleep there on the following day, but was told it would be impossible for the foot soldiers to reach it in that time. He called for some maps of Provence, which he carefully examined, though he had with him that of Cassini. He made a requisition of two hundred carriages with two horses, distinctly specifying the villages which were to supply them, and selecting, by preference, those that lay along the route which his troops would take, in order that they might not venture to refuse them. Faithful to his system of imposture, he talked of many debarkations which would be simultaneously made in Provence. After the mayor was dismissed the *gendarmes* were summoned, but there were only one brigadier and one *gendarme*, who were placed at the door of the house. The town, meanwhile, filled with troops, and their arrival was observed with silence and astonishment. Detachments of them were placed at every avenue: the rest took up their quarters among the inhabitants, whom they compelled to illuminate their houses. While these preparations were making, Bonaparte desired the attendance of M. Tartanson, and during a vague and desultory conversation with him, some expressions escaped connected with his enterprise and his hopes of success.

"If the soldiers are for me," said he, "as I am told they are, the Bourbons cannot maintain themselves; but they need fear nothing as to their fate."—"If the soldiers are for you," replied M. Tartanson, "the people, in this province at least, are not." Bonaparte either did not hear, or affected not to hear, this answer, but continued his incoherent colloquy, during which he said, "The day after to-morrow, in the evening, the Bourbons will hear of my arrival." Then, addressing himself abruptly to the son of Tartanson, he observed, "You will come with us; you will be one of us, will you not?"—"Sire," replied M. Tartanson, "I am an only son; I have a wife and children; it would be too painful for me to separate from them." "I will promote you," rejoined Bonaparte, without noticing the objections which had been urged. M. Tartanson persisted, however, in his refusal, alleging that he could be more useful by remaining in



his present occupation. General Bertrand afterwards tried his persuasive powers, to make a convert of M. Tartanson, but his solicitations were no less ineffectual than those of Napoleon. So little, indeed, was he beguiled by the splendid offers of the usurper, that three days afterwards he joined a detachment of royal volunteers in pursuit of him.

While Bonaparte and Bertrand, the major-general of the grand army, were thus industriously beating up for recruits, Cambronne was occupied in the no less interesting details of the table. He performed all the functions of a *maître d'hôtel*, and descending into the kitchen, inquired for some soup. The mistress of the house very innocently replied, that it was a *jour maigre*, and that they had not put a pot upon the fire. "Madame," said General Cambronne, elevating his voice, "we must, notwithstanding, have something for the Emperor's supper." He was then told that there was some soup which had been prepared for the servants, who were returning from their labour in the field, but that she did not dare offer it to the Emperor. "Let us see," replied Cambronne, uncovering the boiler, "what sort of soup it is." He tasted it, and finding it very palatable, ordered that it should be immediately served up. This was accordingly done, and with the addition of a quarter of a kid, and some other dishes, Napoleon condescended to partake of the repast. He demanded some wines, fruits, and sweetmeats. Immediately after, he took coffee, which he carried with him, ready prepared, in a bottle. The officers in his train were, meanwhile, busily employed in laying violent hands upon every eatable commodity which they could find. After supper, all the beds and mattresses were put in requisition, and spread in every part of the house, even upon the stairs. Bonaparte had an iron bedstead, which was put up in five minutes. The house supplied him only with sheets and mattresses; he had his own coverlet, which was exquisitely manufactured of fine wool.\* While he slept, his chamber door was guarded by two Mamelukes. The staircase was literally strewed with officers lying on mattresses or straw.

There were some of his followers, however, who, instead of sleeping, passed the night in writing, and sending off emissaries in different directions. Many of those messengers had been despatched upon the first arrival of Bonaparte. He was heard to inquire of Bertrand, "Is that man gone?"—"Whom, sire?"

\* These, together with other articles of domestic furniture belonging to Napoleon, have since been exhibited in London for a shilling. Strange vicissitude of greatness!

“The agent at Grenoble.”—“Yes, sire.” “And those of the North?”—“They are gone also.” The brigadier who was stationed at the door in the street, instigated by the son of M. Tartanson, found means to send off an express to Digne. It contained only these words, addressed to the prefect:—“The Emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, has arrived at Barreme with a great many followers.” M. Tartanson contrived to insert a correction, by putting the word *ex* before that of Emperor. The baggage of Bonaparte arrived in the course of the night. At three o'clock in the morning he asked for coffee, which was immediately served. Two hours after he breakfasted. At seven o'clock he again summoned M. Tartanson and his son into his presence. They found him seated in an arm chair, his leg stretched out upon another, in the attitude of a man in armour, his limbs were so stiff from fatigue. He had on a blue uniform, and was ready booted and spurred. His head was uncovered. “Is there any national property here?” said he, addressing himself to M. Tartanson.—“No, sire.” “What do those fellows do?” M. Tartanson hesitating to reply, Bonaparte continued—“I mean those nobles, those emigrants—what do they say?”—“They are very peaceable.” “Is there any church property?”—“Yes, that which belongs to the bishopric of Senez.” “Has it been sold at a just price?”—“Nearly so.” “Has any other kind of property been sold in this neighbourhood?”—“Yes, that belonging to M. Moriez.” “Is that the man who was formerly a *chef d'escadre*?”—“Yes.” “Is he dead?”—“Yes.” These questions were frequently intermingled with others of an idle and desultory character. Recurring again to his enterprise, and the means of accomplishing it, he said, among other things, “The Empress and the King of Rome have set off for Paris; they will soon arrive, together with the troops appointed to escort them by the Emperor.” He inquired respecting the public authorities at Digne, and when they mentioned Duval, the prefect, Bertrand exclaimed, “Ah! the brave Duval!” Bonaparte never pronounced the name of King: he always said, *The Bourbons*. Neither was the word *royalist* ever used by himself or his followers.

At seven o'clock Bonaparte mounted his horse, or rather he was carried and placed upon it by his attendants, so unable was he to move, from the excessive fatigue of the preceding day. The soldiers were under arms, and made the air ring with cries of *Vive L'Empereur*, which were repeated by the populace assembled to witness his departure, and by the peasants who had arrived, to the number of two hundred, with their mules, upon which the baggage was placed. The passage of the troops through the town continued the whole day. Preceded by a part of these, and fifty lancers on horseback, Bonaparte commenced his march



towards Digne. He halted at Bedejun, where a large fire was kindled in the middle of a field, and there, with a quarter of a chicken in his hand, and a piece of bread under his arm, he feasted like a philosopher. Meanwhile, his advanced-guard, which proceeded onwards for Digne, met a poor abbé, (M. Allegre) who was going to Senez. They immediately possessed themselves of his horse, and the unfortunate abbé was obliged to accompany them to Digne, in order to obtain the value of the beast, which did not belong to him. A similar lot befell M. Isnard, the ex-collector of revenues at Barreme. He was quietly travelling along, mounted upon an ass, when the soldiers overtook him. His ass was forthwith put into requisition, and M. Isnard had to return to Digne. He walked by the side of Bonaparte, who asked him a variety of questions relative to the disposition of the people, whether the Bourbons were liked, and the extent of the national property in that district.

Digne was the first place where the enterprise of Napoleon experienced any decided indications of support. M. Duval, the prefect, had received the dispatch from his colleague of the Var, at three o'clock in the afternoon, announcing the landing of Bonaparte with sixteen hundred men, and the measures which had been taken to intercept his progress. He abstained, however, from communicating the intelligence to any one. The "brave Duval," had the honour of being the first of those passive traitors whose perfidy smoothed the usurper's progress to the capital. In the evening he entertained company at his house: he was unusually cheerful and serene; the knowledge of a fact which was calculated to convulse France to her centre, did not for a moment disturb the calm hypocrisy of the "brave Duval;" his intrepid treachery emulated the honest firmness of loyalty and virtue; if one transient feeling of doubt or terror agitated him, it was only a traitorous anxiety for the successful issue of the rebel's enterprise. Towards night-fall, several of Napoleon's soldiers entered Digne unperceived. At four o'clock in the morning, the brief but portentous express from Barreme arrived, and diffused the information that Bonaparte himself would be at Digne in the course of that day. It was not till then, that the "brave Duval" communicated to M. de Loverdo, the commandant of the department of the Lower Alps, the dispatch which had been sent the evening before, by the prefect of the Var, and the express which he had received from Barreme. M. de Loverdo immediately repaired to the guard-house, where there were about one hundred and fifty men; but the troops received their general with the seditious cry of *Vive l'Empereur*. He returned to the prefect, and telling him that he could not rely upon the fidelity of a single man, conjured him to assemble the national

guards. M. Duval declined the adoption of such unavailing advice. The engineer of bridges and roads hastened to the prefect, at six o'clock in the morning, and offered to destroy the bridges and break up the roads. M. Duval thanked him, and bade him to take care of his wife and mother-in-law. What became of this active and zealous prefect, after the return of Louis? Ney and Labedoyere were sacrificed, if he escaped punishment. Perhaps, indeed, had he been faithful, they would have had no opportunity to become traitors.

The inhabitants of Digne did not participate in the apathy and disloyalty of their prefect. When the news of Bonaparte's approach was generally known, a crowd of virtuous citizens assembled round the mayor's house, and demanded arms, with which they might march and oppose the progress of the usurper. They were anxious to take up a position at the pass of Bains, which is described as impregnable, and where a handful of men would be sufficient to arrest the march of an army. The mayor, applauding the zeal of those brave men, could not, however, take upon himself the responsibility of arming them without referring to the prefect, who, so far from seconding their ardour, forbade them to adopt any means of defence, magnanimously avowing, that he would incur all the hazard of the prohibition. During this conflict between the generous enthusiasm of the citizens and the perfidious scruples of the magistrate, Bonaparte was advancing rapidly towards the town. He had already been preceded by many of his emissaries, and the prefect sent M. Julien, a lieutenant of the *gendarmerie*, to wait, in the road from Barreme, his approach, that he might have the earliest intimation of it. Meanwhile an order from Napoleon arrived at Digne, demanding rations for five thousand men; a prudent stratagem, to inspire terror by the supposed magnitude of his force. About eleven o'clock, on the 4th of March, Bonaparte entered the city, and the prefect left it. His horses were in readiness, and with a timid duplicity worthy of his character, he retired to his country-house, accompanied by his chief secretary and some other public functionaries. By this paltry equivocation, of not actively promoting the designs of the usurper, though his criminal supineness had negatively contributed to their success, he hoped to evade the penalty of his guilt, thus manifesting to the world that with baseness enough to be a traitor, he wanted courage to dare a traitor's peril. Bold and intrepid vice sometimes commands our sympathy, and we are tempted to pity the abuse of what would be virtue in a good cause: but mean and pusillanimous delinquency, a mischievous head with a coward's heart, provokes only scorn and indignation.



M. de Loverdo also quitted the city upon the entrance of Bonaparte; but his departure sprung from a more honourable motive. He took with him his soldiers, in order that they, at least, should not swell the number of the usurper's followers. When, therefore, he entered Digne, with drums beating, and with all the pomp and parade which his little army could exhibit,—

“ —————A prince as great within his thoughts,  
“ As when the whole state did adorn his person ;”

he found his reception in the silence and consternation of the people, in their closed dwellings, and in their nearly deserted streets. Some children, it is said, assembled from youthful curiosity to witness the procession, and General Bertrand was forced to address them, in order to obtain a feeble shout of triumph, which might diversify the dull and solemn stillness of the scene. By the aid of a few pieces of money which were distributed, and the indefatigable annunciation of *Here is the Emperor,—This is the Emperor*, he succeeded in extracting a few shrill cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* This exhilarating sound was mingled, however, with the less grateful exclamations of *Vive le Roi*, uttered from the windows by those who ventured to appear at them.—Such precisely was the entrance of Napoleon into Digne.

He alighted at the inn called *Petit Paris*, where he remained some hours, and during his stay he summoned, as usual, many of the principal inhabitants into his presence. With some of them he talked a considerable time, and in the course of conversation observed, “that his fate depended altogether upon the army.” This confession, which the course of events sufficiently corroborated, developed at once the nature of his enterprise, and proved that it was nothing more than a military usurpation, in which the legitimate voice of the people was stifled by the din of arms. At Digne, General Drouot was entrusted with the task of getting the proclamations printed, which hitherto had been circulated only in manuscript. With the assistance of some soldiers, that important object was accomplished. Bonaparte did not remain long here. At three o'clock in the afternoon he again mounted his horse, with the aid of three or four of his attendants. He appeared so stiff and constrained in his movements, (probably resulting from fatigue,) that many persons believed he wore armour under his clothes.—His further progress was directed towards Sisteron, but he did not proceed that night beyond Maligeai, a small village, about five leagues distant, where he slept. The advanced guard, meanwhile, conducted by Cambronne, marched to Sisteron,

which they entered at two o'clock in the morning. On the preceding evening the sub-prefect of Sisteron (M. Bignon) received the following intelligence from the prefect :—" The news of the Emperor Napoleon's landing is confirmed. He disembarked on the 1st of March in the gulf of Juan. The same day he slept at Cannes ; on the 2d at Cérénon, on the 3d at Barreme. He will probably be here to-day. He is preceded by an order to furnish five thousand rations.\* All resistance will be useless. Secure the stores and ammunition, and wait for further orders."—The stores were accordingly secured, and the ammunition was sent to Manosque, a place on the right bank of the Durance. It is, however, deeply to be regretted, that no effort was made to oppose the march of Napoleon. His soldiers, harassed with fatigue, and following him in detached bodies, without any order or discipline, would probably have been so disheartened by repeated obstacles, that they would have laid down their arms, and left him to seek his own safety in flight. This result was the more likely to ensue, because he had declared to them, both during their passage, and after their landing, that he undertook the enterprise in concert with the principal allied powers, and they firmly believed that they had only to march to Paris, without the necessity of fighting. The fatal apathy of some of the prefects, and the disloyalty of others, unhappily verified this opinion : but had they experienced, instead, a succession of impediments, who will be bold enough to say that the usurper would ever have reached Paris ?

On Sunday, the 5th of March, the sub-prefect of Sisteron assembled, at the Hotel de Ville, the mayor and the commander of the national guard. They were deliberating upon the letter of the prefect, and perplexing themselves with various comments upon its contents, when they suddenly beheld General Cambronne enter. He told them that the Emperor was already arrived at the bridge ; and, seeing them hesitate, he added, there was no time to think, for if they did not go with him he was prepared to conduct them by force. That argument carried its own conviction along with it, and they therefore followed the General, by whom they were introduced to Napoleon. He alighted from his horse, and entered the town between them, carrying on at the same time a rapid conversation. He observed the *fleur de lis* which the mayor wore, and asked what it was. " It is the order of the lily," he replied. " How did you obtain it ?"—" When I went to offer the homage of the city to the King." " You had better take it off," rejoined Bonaparte, " while my troops are here, or they may perhaps insult you."

\* Bonaparte's rations multiplied something like Falstaff's men in buckram.



He inquired for an inn. They conducted him to the *Bras d'Or*. He dismissed the two functionaries, ordering them to come again in an hour, and to bring with them all the half-pay officers who happened to be in the town. There were about a dozen, and being assembled by sound of trumpet, they were directed to repair immediately to the Emperor. Some of them went; but they all resisted his offers, and refused to follow him. He found, however, five individuals, devoted to his cause, and willing to embrace his enterprise. They were presented by the sub-prefect to Bonaparte, who ordered them to go to Bertrand. When they had departed, he asked M. Bignon what was thought of his re-appearance in France. He replied, "that every one was much surprised, and that the sensation of astonishment absorbed every other feeling." "But do you think they will be glad to see me again upon the throne?"—"I believe they would, if they did not fear that with you will return the conscription, and all its horrors." "I know," answered Bonaparte, "that numerous follies were committed. I come to rectify them all."—"But you will certainly find many obstacles before you reach Paris."—"No. I have troops at Gap and at Corps. The garrison at Grenoble expect me. I have ten thousand men at Lyon. There will not be a drop of blood shed. Every thing has been arranged with the allied powers. I know that many follies were committed. I come to rectify them all. My people shall henceforth be happy."—With these promises of future good behaviour he quitted the inn, and walked through the town on foot, followed by a "hired populace,\*" who diligently vociferated *Vive l'Empereur!* He reached the bridge of Buech, (a small river that falls into the Durance, at the foot of the citadel,) which being very narrow, and the crowd great, Bonaparte found himself entangled with them, and exhibited symptoms of alarm. He offered his hand to a baker's son, who happened to be near him, and whom he overwhelmed with courtesies. When he had extricated himself from the throng, he mounted his horse, and pursued his way to Gap.

He now began to express some degree of apprehension, because he knew he was advancing towards the principal town of a department, at the head of which was a prefect, (M. Harmand,) whose fidelity and attachment to the King were well known. He hesitated, for a moment, whether he should proceed to Gap, or turn off to the left, and throw himself into the department of the Drome, the prefect of which was not so decided a royalist. He inquired, with visible anxiety, of the mayor and curé of La Poët, a village through which he passed, if there

\* Itinéraire de Bonaparte, p. 43.

were any roads which led directly to Valence, but being answered in the negative, he found himself obliged to march upon Gap. As he proceeded, however, his fears, instead of diminishing, rapidly increased. A few miles beyond Poët, he met a *gendarme*, who was carrying the proclamation issued against him by the prefect, and which was couched in very strong terms. It was addressed to all the different mayors, ordering them to sound the *tocsin*, to arm the inhabitants, and to conduct them to certain places along the road, which were indicated. Bonaparte was described as an adventurer, and his followers denounced as rebels.—It may easily be supposed that the *gendarme* was arrested, and the distribution of the proclamation, in that quarter, at least, suspended. But it was widely circulated in other directions, and Bonaparte, therefore, continued to advance with caution.—Finding, however, that no actual opposition was made, he gradually assumed his former confidence, and when he arrived at a place called *La Tour Ronde*, about one league from Gap, he received intelligence which completely dissipated all his fears. His emissaries, who had, as usual, preceded him, removed such intervening difficulties as existed, and informed him that he might safely enter Gap.\*

\* It was here that he began to issue the following proclamations to the army and the French people, which were printed at Digne. The originals will be found in the Appendix (No. I.) They contain much apposite declamation, well calculated to rouse and mislead the disaffected. They contain, also, no inconsiderable portion of those brilliant and seducing falsehoods which flattered the vanity of the French. M. Gallais, (*Histoire de la Revolution du 20 Mars, 1815, p. 37, et seq.*) and M. Warin, (*Cinq Mois de l'Histoire de France, p. 108, et seq.*) have commented, with much force and ingenuity, upon the text of these proclamations. Marmont, who was alluded to in the first sentence, as having "betrayed his country" by surrendering Paris, addressed an exculpatory letter to Caulincourt, which satisfactorily repelled the imputation. Augereau, who was coupled with Marmont, for having betrayed Lyon to the allies, disdained to make any replication. M. Gallais urges some very pertinent observations upon the "&c. &c. &c." appended to Bonaparte's assumption of the title of Emperor of the French. "These *et cæteras*," he remarks, "which are copied literally from the text, were not introduced from any vain economy of time or paper, on the part of the writer; they constituted an artful and perfidious reservation, by which the usurper forbore wholly to abandon the titles which he conceived belonged to him, but which he did not then venture publicly to avow, for fear of alarming those powers who had resumed them, and whom he was willing to conciliate so long as he feared them."

" Gulf of Juan, March 1, 1815.

" Napoleon by the Grace of God, and the Constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French,  
&c. &c. &c.

" TO THE ARMY.

" Soldiers!

" We were not conquered: two men risen from our ranks betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor.

" They whom, during twenty-five years, we have seen traversing all Europe to raise up enemies against us; who have passed their lives in fighting against us, in the ranks of foreign armies, and in



which he accordingly did at nine o'clock in the evening, on the 5th of March, while his soldiers *bivouacked* in the market place. He alighted at the principal inn, supped, and indulged in a few hours repose. The prefect and the commander of the national guards were absent. The sub-prefect was employed in the different

cursing our fine France, shall they pretend to command and controul our eagles, on which they have not ever dared to look? Shall we suffer them to inherit the fruits of our glorious labours—to clothe themselves with our honours, with our wealth,—to calumniate our glory? If their reign should continue, all would be lost, even the memory of those immortal days. With what fury do they seek to pervert them! They strive to poison what the world admires; and if there still remain any defenders of our glory, it is among those very enemies whom we have fought on the field of battle.

“Soldiers! in my exile I heard your voice. I have arrived through all obstacles and all perils.—Your General, called to the throne by the choice of the people, and borne upon your shield, is restored to you. Come and join him.

“Tear down those colours which the nation has proscribed, and which for twenty-five years served as a rallying signal to all the enemies of France. Mount the tri-coloured cockade. You bore it in the days of our greatness.

“We must forget that we have been masters of nations; but we must not suffer any to intermeddle in our affairs.

“Who shall presume to be master over us? Who would have the power? Recover those eagles which you had at Ulm, at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Eylau, at Friedland, at Tudela, at Eckmuhl, at Essling, at Wagram, at Smolensko, at Moscow, at Lutzen, at Wurtzen, at Montmirail. Do you think that the handful of Frenchmen who are now so arrogant, will endure to look on them? They shall return whence they came, and there, if they please, they shall reign, as they pretend to have reigned, during nineteen years.

“Your possessions, your rank, your glory, the possessions, the rank, and the glory of your children, have no greater enemies than those Princes whom foreigners have imposed on us. They are the enemies of our glory, because the recital of so many heroic actions, which have dignified the French people, fighting against them to escape their yoke, is their condemnation.

“The veterans of the armies of the Sambre and the Meuse, of the Rhine, of Italy, of Egypt, of the West, and of the Grand Army, are all humiliated; their honourable wounds are disgraced; their successes will be their crimes; those heroes will be rebels, if, as the enemies of the people assert, legitimate sovereigns are to be found in the midst of foreign armies.

“Honours, rewards, affection, are bestowed on those who have served against the country and us.

“Soldiers! come and range yourselves under the standard of your chief. His existence is composed only of yours. His rights are those only of the people, and of yourselves. His interest, his honour, his glory, are no other than your interest, your honour, and your glory. Victory shall march at the charge-step. The eagle, with the national colours, shall fly from steeple to steeple, even to the towers of Notre Dame. Then you will be able to shew your scars with honour. Then you will be able to glory in what you have done. You will be the deliverers of your country. In your old age, surrounded and esteemed by your fellow-citizens, they will hear you with respect while you recount your

divisions of his jurisdiction, striving to assemble all the faithful and loyal citizens. Bonaparte, however, did not wait to witness the result of his exertions, but hastily quitted Gap at two o'clock in the morning. Upon his departure he issued a proclamation to "the inhabitants of the Upper and Lower Alps,\*" stuffed

high deeds. You will then be able to say, with pride:—"And I, too, was part of that grand army, which twice entered the walls of Vienna, those of Rome, of Berlin, of Madrid, of Moscow; and which delivered Paris from the foul blot which treason and the presence of the enemy imprinted on it."

"Honoured be those brave soldiers, the glory of their country! and eternal shame on those guilty Frenchmen, in whatever rank fortune caused them to be born, who fought for twenty-five years with the foreigner, to tear the bosom of their country.

"By the Emperor. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

"The Grand Marshal performing the functions of Major-General of the grand army. BERTRAND."

"Gulf of Juan, March 1, 1816.

"Napoleon, by the Grace of God, and the Constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French,  
&c. &c. &c.

"TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

"Frenchmen!

"The defection of the Duke of Castiglione delivered up Lyon, without defence, to our enemies. The army of which I confided to him the command, was, by the number of its battalions, and the bravery and patriotism of the troops which composed it, fully able to beat the Austrian corps opposed to it, and to get into the rear of the left wing of the enemy's army, which threatened Paris.

"The victories of Champ-Aubert, of Montmirail, of Chateau-Thierry, of Vauchamp, of Mormans, of Montereau, of Craone, of Rheims, of Arcis-sur-Aube, and of St. Dizier; the rising of the brave peasants of Lorraine, of Champagne, of Alsace, of Franche Comté, and of Burgundy, and the position which I had taken on the rear of the enemy's army, by separating it from its magazines, its parks of reserve, its convoys, and all its equipages, had placed it in a desperate situation. The French were never on the point of being more powerful, and the flower of the enemy's army was lost without resource. It would have found its grave in those vast countries which it had so mercilessly ravaged, when the treason of the Duke of Ragusa gave up the capital, and disorganised the army. The unexpected conduct of these two Generals, who betrayed at once their country, their prince, and their benefactor, changed the destiny of the war. The disastrous situation of the enemy was such, that at the conclusion of the affair which took place before Paris, they were without ammunition, on account of being separated from their parks of reserve.

"Under these new and important circumstances my heart was rent, but my soul remained unshaken. I consulted only the interest of the country. I exiled myself to a rock in the middle of the sea. My

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\* The author of the *Itinéraire* says that this proclamation was issued at Grenoble, though dated from Gap. Bonaparte had not time to acknowledge the love of his subjects till he was secure in the protection of his soldiers.



with the customary phrases of "national glory" and "national triumph," and full of the most tender protestations of affection for France, which had alone tempted him to his enterprise. His parental joy and solicitude were so vehement, indeed, that he seemed to forget he had ever been a tyrant, and with no common effort of effrontery told the people, "they were right in calling him *their father*." We may suppose, that this was only one of those gratuitous assumptions which he generally substituted for facts; and the inhabitants of the Upper and Lower Alps, probably felt some degree of astonishment, at finding themselves praised for sentiments of filial veneration, of which they never suspected themselves to be guilty.

life was, and ought to be still, useful to you. I did not permit the great number of citizens, who wished to accompany me, to partake my lot. I thought their presence useful to France; and I took with me only a handful of brave men, necessary for my guard.

"Raised to the throne by your choice, all that has been done without you is illegitimate. For twenty-five years France has had new interests, new institutions, and a new glory, which could only be secured by a national government, and by a dynasty created under those new circumstances. A prince who should reign over you; who should be seated on my throne by the power of those very armies which ravaged our territory, would in vain attempt to support himself with the principles of feudal law. He would be able to maintain the honour and the rights of only a small number of individuals, enemies of the people, by whom, for twenty-five years, they have been condemned in all our national assemblies. Your tranquillity at home, and your consequence abroad, would be lost for ever.

"Frenchmen!—In my exile I heard your complaints and your wishes. You demanded that government of your choice which alone was legitimate. You accused my long slumber; you reproached me for sacrificing to my repose the great interests of the country.

"I have crossed the seas in the midst of dangers of every kind. I arrive amongst you to resume my rights, which are yours. All that individuals have done, written, or said, since the capture of Paris, I will be for ever ignorant of. It shall not at all influence the recollections which I preserve of the important services they have performed. There are circumstances of such a nature as to be above human organization.

"Frenchmen!—There is no nation, however small it may be, which does not possess the right, and which has not exercised that right, of escaping the disgrace of obeying a prince imposed on it by an enemy momentarily victorious. When Charles VII. re-entered Paris, and overthrew the ephemeral throne of Henry V., he acknowledged that he held his throne from the valour of his heroes, and not from a Prince-Regent of England.

"It is, therefore, to you alone, and to the brave men of the army, that I now attribute, and shall always attribute, the glory of owing every thing.

"By the Emperor. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

"The Grand Marshal performing the functions of Major-General of the grand army. BERTRAND."

Napoleon slept that night at Corps, the first village in the department of the Isere. Passing through St. Bonnet, one of the soldiers of his guard, who was born in the place, went in search of his father, a blind old man, whom he introduced to Bonaparte. He permitted himself to be felt by the sightless veteran, and afterwards bestowed his purse upon him. While here, the mayor and people proposed to sound the *tocsin*, in order to collect the inhabitants of the different villages, that they might accompany him. Bonaparte, who saw at once the folly or the treachery of the proposal, declined it. "Your conduct," said he, "convinces me that I am not deceived, and I regard it as a certain presage of that of my soldiers: those whom I may meet, may follow me; the more numerous they are, the more certain will be my success: do you, therefore, remain tranquil at home."—General Cambronne, meanwhile, proceeded with the advanced guard as far as Mure, a small town, about half way between Gap and Grenoble. Here he found a detachment of the troops of the line, which had come from Grenoble to oppose his march. He signified his desire to parley with them, but he was informed that all intercourse was forbidden.

Hitherto the enterprise of Napoleon seemed like an experiment, rather than a preconcerted system of operations; a search after treason, rather than a journey to meet it. We have seen him advancing from town to town, doubtful of his reception, and cautiously guarding against surprise. His little band of adventurers obtained no augmentation which could exalt or confirm his hopes of success. The casual indications of popular triumph which accompanied his progress, sprung from individual and petty traitors, or were the mere transient ebullitions of rustic ignorance. If no vigorous resistance was made, at least no powerful or spontaneous aid was afforded. Wandering among the mountains of the Var, he secured such facilities as stratagem or force could snatch, without knowing whether the morrow would diminish or increase his difficulties. But, as he approached towards the capital of ancient Dauphiny, a new scene of things opened upon him, and his undertaking was converted at once from an ambiguous trial, into the positive triumph of sedition. At Grenoble commenced that series of military treasons, which conducted Napoleon to Paris. Here it was that he and his soldiers first came in contact with the troops of Louis XVIII., and the fatal truth was disclosed of the undiminished zeal of the army in his behalf. It will be necessary to pause, therefore, at this point of the transaction, and examine with some minuteness of detail, the circumstances as they arose. By their analysis, much of what afterwards occurred will be explained, and some aid afforded, per-



haps, towards solving the still disputed problem, whether any previous conspiracy existed. Many contradictory accounts have been given. Except those, however, which emanated from the suspicious authority of Napoleon's adherents, none have wholly excluded that evidence which indicates the high degree of probability, at least, of preconcerted treason.

Towards the end of February,\* some emissaries of Bonaparte circulated at Grenoble various letters, which were pretended to be received from Paris, and which announced, for the 1st of March, "the expulsion of the Bourbons, the formation of a provisional government, and the return of Bonaparte.†" The police of Grenoble, emulous, it may be supposed, of the memorable supineness of their brethren at Paris, paid no attention to these reports, nor did they occupy one moment's serious thought till Bonaparte actually landed.‡ Then they were remembered, and then it was too late to make them useful. The prefect of Grenoble, (M. Fourrier,) was informed of this event on the 4th of March, when Bonaparte was at Barreme, by the prefect of the Var, who despatched a messenger with the intelligence, and stating that the usurper had taken the road towards that city. He immediately communicated it to General Marchand, to the inspector of the national guards of the department of the Isere, and to the colonel of the *gendarmerie*. Knowing the activity of Bonaparte, he urged General Marchand not to lose a moment in sending off troops to oppose his progress, and to occupy *Ponteau*, an important position beyond the town of Mure, which might be the more easily defended, because it was certain that Bonaparte must abandon his cannon before he arrived at Gap. The General replied that he would assemble the superior officers of the garrison on the following morning, and concert with them what measures it would be best to adopt. It was in vain the

\* *Itinéraire de Bonaparte*, p. 47, et seq..

† It may be remembered, that even before this period, General Excelmans carried on a correspondence with Murat, then King of Naples, and that he was acquitted, on the 23d of January, by a council of war, at which Drouet, Count D'Erlon, presided, who had himself maintained a similar correspondence, and spread rumours in the north of France, like those which were prevalent at Grenoble, and throughout the south.

‡ The place where the partisans and secret agents of Napoleon used to meet, at Grenoble, was at the inn of the *Trois Dauphins*, kept by a man of the name of Labarre, who was formerly one of his guides. General Bertrand, disguised as a carrier or waggoner, arrived at this man's house in the month of January, gave him his instructions, rewarded him with gold, and flattered him with magnificent promises.—*Histoire de la Revolution du 20 Mars*, p. 36.

prefect exhorted him to be more prompt. Neither his entreaties, nor his assurance that the staff of a marshal of France awaited his zeal and diligence, could induce him to alter his resolution.

When the morning arrived, General Marchand communicated, to the principal officers in garrison at Grenoble, the intelligence of Bonaparte's return. What was ultimately determined in that conference, has never transpired. The only apparent result was, that General Marchand sent to General Devillers, who commanded in the department of Mont Blanc, desiring him immediately to repair to Grenoble, with the garrison of Chambéry, composed of the seventh and eleventh regiments of the line. It is worthy of remark, that Labedoyere was colonel of the seventh, and that he had arrived from Paris since the 1st of March.—M. Durand was colonel of the eleventh. Other circumstances also occurred which then excited surprise, and may now justify suspicion. M. de Rostaing, the inspector of reviews, an officer of acknowledged ability, of energetic character, and of solid judgment, was not invited to attend the conference. Was it feared that his firmness and virtue would defeat the object of their deliberations? When he was excluded, holding as he did an important military office, why was General Mouton-Duvernet admitted to a secret interview with General Marchand? He commanded the departments of the Drome and the Upper Alps, forming a portion of the seventh military division. Passing through Grenoble during the night, he solicited and obtained a brief conference with General Marchand, after which he proceeded toward Gap, to devise means, according to his own declaration, of opposing Bonaparte.\* How he resisted him is sufficiently known.—At Mure he met one of Napoleon's most active emissaries (Emmery). Having conversed with him, he wrote to General Marchand, stating the circumstance, and advising him to arrest Emmery the moment he entered Grenoble. If it were

\* During the night of the 5th of March, a letter from Marshal Massena, dated Marseilles the 4th, reached General Marchand. The Marshal stated that he had sent General Miollis in pursuit of Bonaparte, and he hoped General Marchand would adopt, on his part, every requisite precaution.—General Miollis was very indefatigable. He arrived at Sisteron the same day that Napoleon entered Grenoble. It really requires more than ordinary credulity to believe that every attempt to intercept the usurper failed merely by accident. From whatever quarter troops proceeded, the result was uniform. They never did what they had to do. Extraordinary coincidences certainly occur sometimes, but he must be a stubborn sceptic who can maintain that chance alone produced these. Massena has been loudly blamed for his conduct in repressing the enthusiasm of the Marseillois. They were eager to rush in numerous bodies, and oppose the march of Napoleon: but he permitted only a small number to depart, and that even not till after a fatal delay of three days. To those whose vehement entreaties he could not otherwise resist, he replied, with idle levity, "My friends, be quiet; he is already in the mouse-trap."



of any importance, however, that this man should be stopped, why did not General Duvernet himself do it, when he had it in his power, instead of recommending the task to General Bertrand, into whose hands it was possible he might not fall?

The fluctuating and undecided conduct of General Marchand must have been the result either of weakness or treachery.\* At first, he determined that the fifth regiment of the line should march during the night, the fourth regiment of artillery on Monday, the 6th, and the third regiment of sappers on Tuesday, the 7th. Suddenly, however, he altered his plan, no one knew why, and it was not till two o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, that he despatched an advanced guard, of

\* I state the alternative, because the one involves the misfortune, the other the guilt, of this officer, and because respectable testimonies have affirmed his fidelity. That which is related in the text, has been derived from the *Itinéraire de Bonaparte*, the author of which seems to have consulted the most authentic sources for the many curious facts he discloses. The apparently superior accuracy of his information, is certainly less favourable to the honour of General Marchand, than the vague details of other writers, who appear to have relied upon the premature intelligence of the public journals, or the casual assertions of conversation. Miss Williams, a convert from political follies, (it is the gentlest reproof to say she erred, because she did not understand,) which wiser persons have lived long enough to renounce, and whose admiration of Bonaparte was sublimed to ecstasy, when she heard that he read Ossian, describes the conduct of General Marchand with theatrical effect. "Being invited by Bonaparte to retake his command, he answered that during his reign as Emperor he had served him with fidelity; that, released from his duty by his abdication, he had sworn allegiance to the existing government; and, presenting his sword, surrendered himself as a prisoner, declaring that he would never be a traitor.—'General,' said Bonaparte, 'I acknowledge your services; I have always looked on you as a true soldier; I see your position, and do not wish you to act contrary to your conscience. Take back your sword, go to Paris, and tell your King, that I shall soon visit him in the capital, and will treat him with all the consideration due to his virtues and his rank'."—*Narrative of the Events*, &c. p. 21. If we had to decide which of the two, in this conversation, displayed the greater magnanimity, he who exhibited so much virtue, or he who so nobly revered it, there might be some perplexity; but as General Bertrand never happened to see Bonaparte at Grenoble, the inquiry would be useless. The reader will find that he quitted the city upon the entrance of Napoleon, and took with him the keys of it.

M. Gallais, (*Hist. de la Revolution du 20 Mars*, p. 66,) speaking of the conduct of General Marchand, says, that "faithful to his duty, he was resolved to defend Grenoble. He adopted, therefore, every precaution which depended upon himself. But what could he do? The population of the city was already in a state of insurrection, and the garrison, composed of the seventh and the eleventh regiments of the line, and of the fourth regiment of hussars, only waited for the occasion to become the same."—It will hardly be thought that the fabulous incident of Miss Williams, and the ambiguous assertion of M. Gallais, are sufficient to controvert the positive and distinct statements made by the author of the *Itinéraire*.—General Marchand may, perhaps, be exculpated from the charge of deliberate and premeditated treachery; but he seems justly obnoxious to the imputation of having neglected to do all he could.

two hundred and sixty men, with a company of engineers, under the command of M. Lassart. While they were marching towards Mure, General Marchand issued an order of the day, remarkable only for its freezing apathy of composition. It was in vain that M. de Rostaing submitted to him and to the prefect, an address to the army and the citizens, couched in the most enthusiastic language. It was in vain that the prefect urged the adoption of this address. General Marchand postponed till Tuesday, what he thought too warm and energetic for Monday.—Meanwhile, the advanced guard continued its march upon Mure, where it arrived about eleven o'clock at night. When the subaltern officers entered the Hotel de Ville, to prepare quarters for the troops, they were surprised to meet with the same description of persons, despatched from the army of Napoleon, for a similar purpose. On the following morning, (Tuesday, March the 7th,) this advanced guard retired upon Grenoble, in order to join the forces which were expected to arrive from hence, but General Marchand seemed more disposed to await the enemy's approach, than to resist it. He limited his zeal to the order for placing a few cannon upon the ramparts. The execution of this order was slowly and unwillingly performed by the artillerymen and sappers, to whom its execution was entrusted. Some of them openly manifested their disloyalty, which indeed was no secret, for M. de Rostaing communicated it to General Marchand, and entreated him to remove the regiment. At eleven o'clock the garrison of Chambéry arrived, and shortly after the fourth regiment of hussars from Vienne. It was remarked that Colonel Labodeyere, instead of distributing billets to his soldiers, according to the usual practice, demanded that they should be posted near the gate of Bonne, on the road to Gap. He took up his own abode at the house of an opulent individual, (M. Gagnon,) who was known to be a zealous royalist. But this misguided officer was not therefore deterred from expressing his attachment to Bonaparte, or his intention of displaying it.

The advanced guard continued to retreat from Mure, as the troops of Napoleon pressed upon them. They rejected many proposals for uniting with the enemy. M. Lassart, who commanded them, acted also with unshaken fidelity. An officer brought him a letter from General Bertrand, inviting him to repair to Mure. The letter was refused, and the bearer informed that he would be immediately fired upon, if he did not retire. When Bonaparte heard this, he quickened his movements, to prevent the possibility of such an example operating upon others. He ordered his lancers to advance, without any hostile appearance, and to mingle with the royal troops. The order was obeyed. They approached, with every demonstration of kindness, rushed with enthusiasm to embrace their



brethren, and, by their exuberant fondness, at least succeeded in retarding their retrograde march. These assiduous, crafty, and oppressive marks of kindness, enabled Bonaparte himself to arrive, and perform his part in this theatrical scene. He galloped towards the seemingly reluctant soldiers;\* when within pistol shot, he alighted, and walking calmly onwards, suddenly bared his bosom, and exclaimed, "Behold me: if there be one among you who would kill his Emperor, let him fire." At these words every musket dropped, and the appeal was answered by loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* Transported with joy at the success of this stratagem, he immediately harangued the troops.—"Soldiers! I come with a handful of brave men, because I rely upon the people, and upon you. I come to deliver you from the Bourbons, from tythes, from privileged classes, from feudal oppression, and from all the abuses which they have brought with them. The throne of the Bourbons is illegitimate, because it has not been erected by the nation. It is contrary to the national will, because it is contrary to the interests of the country, and exists only in the interests of a few families. Is not this the truth?"—"Yes, sire;" replied a grenadier; "they would unite us with the soil: but you come, like the angel of the Lord, to save us. You shall be our Emperor: we will march with you to victory or death." It was impossible to confute the logic of Napoleon and his grenadier.

If Bonaparte's pretensions to the crown of France had rested merely upon the suffrages of the army, no one could dispute their legitimacy. He was, indeed, their Emperor in the most rigid sense of the word. He had created them, and was alone qualified to fulfil the purposes of their creation. But France reckoned citizens among her population, and had civil liberties to cherish. Europe, too, had public rights to vindicate. The licentious enthusiasm of Napoleon's soldiers was to be considered, therefore, in the same light as the lawless energies of a ruffian band of freebooters, valuable to the chief who swayed them, but terrible to those against whom they were directed. Every effort, however, was employed to unite the military in one common feeling with the usurper and his adventurers.

\* M. Gallais asserts, (p. 63,) that this intrepid action of Napoleon was previously arranged by General Cambronne, in order that his master might be very heroic without any danger. Bonaparte shewed on many occasions that he was capable of such bravery. When he was travelling to Elba, in the preceding year, and public vengeance hunted him through a considerable part of his journey, we do not find it recorded that he then bared his bosom to the indignant people, and exclaimed, "I am your Emperor! If any one among you would kill me, strike!"—No. His Imperial Majesty thought the injunction might be obeyed, and did not wish to exact superfluous proofs of fidelity from his subjects. He exhibited the same modest forbearance when he fled from Paris, after the battle of Waterloo.

Not only did Napoleon himself issue proclamations to the army; his example was followed by the principal officers who accompanied him, and a declamatory address to their comrades was circulated, composed in the same style of turgid inanity.\* The white banner, under which a Bayard, a Turenne, a Conde, a

\* The following is an exact translation of this pompous tissue of inflammatory nonsense:—

“ The Generals, Officers, and Soldiers of the Imperial Guard, to the Generals, Officers, and Soldiers of the Army.

“ Soldiers and comrades,

“ We have preserved for you your Emperor, in spite of the many snares that were laid for him: we have brought him back to you across seas, and in the midst of a thousand dangers. We have landed on the sacred soil of our country with the national cockade and the imperial eagle. Cast at your feet the white cockade: it is the emblem of shame, and of the yoke imposed upon you by foreigners, and by treason. We should have shed our blood in vain, if we suffered the vanquished to give us laws.

“ During the short period the Bourbons have reigned, they have convinced you that they *have forgotten nothing, and that they have learned nothing*.† They are incessantly influenced by prejudices which are hostile to our rights, and those of the people. They who have borne arms against their country, and against us, are heroes! You, are rebels, to be pardoned only till they are sufficiently confirmed in their power by the formation of an emigrant corps, by the introduction of a Swiss guard at Paris, and by the successive substitution of new officers in your places. Then, the title to honours and rewards will be the having borne arms against the country; to become an officer, you must have the claim of birth, conformably to their prejudices. The soldier must always remain a soldier: the people will bear the burden; they will reap the honours.

“ A Viomesnil insults the conqueror of Zurich by becoming a naturalised Frenchman; he, who was compelled to seek pardon and amnesty in the clemency of the law. A Brulart, the *Chouan sicaire* of Georges, commands our legions. While waiting for the moment when they may dare to annihilate the Legion of Honour, they have bestowed it upon every traitor, and profligately lavished, in order to degrade, it. They have deprived us of all our political prerogatives which we purchased at the expense of our blood. The four hundred millions of extraordinary domains upon which our *dotations* were assigned, which were the patrimony of the army and the reward of our success, have been transferred to England.

“ Soldiers of the great nation, soldiers of the great Napoleon, will you continue to be the soldiers of a monarch, who for twenty years was the enemy of France, and who boasts of owing his throne to a Prince Regent of England? Every thing which has been done without the consent of the people, without our consent, and without having consulted us, is illegitimate.

“ Soldiers! the *generale* beats, and we march: fly to arms: come and join us; join your Emperor and our tri-coloured eagles; and if these men, now so arrogant, who have always fled at the sight of our arms, dare to wait for us, what nobler opportunity can we have for shedding our blood, and singing the hymn of victory?

† This emphatic, but false sentiment, is copied literally from the Memoir of M. Montgaillard.



Catinat, a Montmorenci, and a Fabert, had fought with glory and with honour, was stigmatised as the emblem of disgrace, because such men as Drouot, Bertrand, Cambronne, and Raoul had rallied beneath the revolutionary standard; the degradation of the legion of honour was lamented, because it had been bestowed upon Frenchmen who were true to their King, when the reward of loyalty was poverty and exile; the faith of treaties and the solemn acts of legislative bodies, were pronounced null and void, because the army had not been consulted; and the prospect of a civil war was dwelt upon with rapture, as the noblest opportunity for shedding patriotic blood, and chaunting hymns of victory. Such were the foolish and detestable motives urged by these heroes and statesmen, for plunging France into anarchy and rebellion, for inducing the army to apostatise, for expelling a Bourbon, and for restoring a Napoleon. Weak and atrocious, however, as they must appear in the sober estimation of reason, they too fatally captivated those who were deluded by their passions, and thousands were doomed to perish, because the sophistry of treason prevailed over the dictates of virtue.

While Napoleon was swelling his ranks with those who were sent to resist him, Colonel Labedoyere devoted himself to the ignominious task, of seducing his own regiment from their allegiance to the King. At three o'clock in the afternoon he ordered them to march, and scarcely had they quitted the city, when he broke open a drum, and drew forth an imperial eagle, which he exhibited, and at the same time proclaimed his intention of joining the Emperor. This declaration was received as he anticipated. The soldiers shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* and indignantly cast away their white cockades, to receive the tri-coloured ones from the hands of their degenerate colonel. When General Marchand heard of this defection, he hastened to the spot with the generals and other officers who were in the garrison. General Devilliers, also, mounted his horse, and immediately repaired thither. He used every persuasion which friendship or the honest zeal of loyalty could inspire, to alter the fatal resolution of Labedoyere. He pleaded

“Soldiers of the 7th, 8th, and 9th military divisions, garrisons of Antibes, of Toulon, of Marseilles, officers on half-pay, veterans, you are summoned to the honour of giving the first example. Come along with us, conquer that throne the palladium of our rights, and let posterity hereafter say, ‘Foreigners aided by traitors, imposed a shameful yoke upon France; brave men arose, and the enemies of the people and of the army disappeared, and sunk into their original nothingness.’—Signed, Cambronne, Malet, Cornuel, Raoul, Lanoue, Demont, Lamouret, Loubers, Mompez, Combe, Dequeux, Thibaut. Chaumet, Malet, Jermanouski, Balinski, Shultz. Signed also by the officers, sub-officers, and soldiers of the Guard, and by the general of division, and aide-de-camp to the Emperor, Count Drouot.”

in vain. Firm and unshaken in his purpose, he replied, "I know what I am doing: learn likewise, yourself, that all this is the result of a regular combination; I only act in pursuance of a concerted plan, and at this moment Count d'Erlon is marching with forty thousand men to second this movement. Follow me, therefore, and do not return to Grenoble."

General Devilliers was as inflexible to the voice of treason, as Labedoyere had been to that of honour. He quitted his infatuated friend, and in his way back to the city met a hundred men of the seventh regiment who were proceeding to join it. These he persuaded to return: but it was only deferring the moment of desertion. When Bonaparte entered Grenoble, they joined their comrades with exultation. To Labedoyere, therefore, belongs the pre-eminent infamy of having been the first to betray his sovereign, with all the baseness of premeditated treachery. Whatever sympathy may be felt for others, who yielded to strong temptation, none can be extended to him. He was not hurried along by the seditious vehemence of his soldiers; he was himself their leader and instigator. He was no reluctant instrument in the hands of an armed body, whom he had fruitlessly sought to restrain, whose fidelity he had endeavoured to preserve, and whose guilt he lamented. He ushered them the way to dishonour, hoisted the signal for rebellion, and though he knew them apt, still thought they might be too tardy in manifesting their devotion to the usurper. The colours of his regiment were found, cut to pieces, in his chamber, which must have been done before he quitted Grenoble. As he thus courted disgrace, with spontaneous ardour, when living, no one can regret that his memory has been branded by an ignominious death. Bonaparte heard of his treason at Vizille, a small town about three leagues from Grenoble. This place distinguished itself by its enthusiasm for the usurper, and recalling its conduct in the early periods of the French revolution, exulted to think that another opportunity had occurred of espousing the cause of tyranny for the sake of liberty.

Napoleon now advanced towards Grenoble, confident of his reception, and anxious to avail himself of the resources which awaited him. The inhabitants were in the greatest consternation, for it was evident that no reliance could be placed upon the fidelity of the soldiers. At eight o'clock in the evening, the lancers of Bonaparte were perceived. An officer, to whom was entrusted the command of the ramparts, near the gate of Bonne, despatched a messenger to General Marchand, who remained quietly in his house, to inform him of this, and to receive his orders. "Shut the gates," was his reply. "Shall we fire upon



them, General?"—"No." M. de Rostaing, who heard this answer, prudently observed, "If you forbid them to fire, the soldiers will be enabled to converse with the enemy; Bonaparte will harangue them; and that will happen which has already happened to the battalion of the fifth regiment."—"We must not give an order," rejoined General Marchand, "which may not perhaps be obeyed." The decisive and peremptory tone with which this was uttered, seemed to preclude all further observation, or it might have been suggested, that at least he should exonerate his own responsibility, by proving the disobedience. Had General Marchand done so, there is some reason to believe, he would have found a different result from what he appeared to anticipate. Instead, however, of attempting every thing for the safety of France, he was solicitous only for his own. Between eight and nine o'clock, he quitted the city, and retired to his country house with so much privacy, that it was thought he still remained in the garrison. He left no instructions, and each individual being abandoned to his own discretion, a fixed and general plan of operations became impossible. Some of the officers remained with their regiments, while others departed, in order that their troops might not be ready to join the enemy.—Bonaparte, at length, made his entry at ten o'clock, by the gate of Bonne, which was hewn down by his soldiers without the slightest opposition. He traversed the city by the glare of torches, which the impatient multitude carried in their hands, to gaze upon him and his followers, while the lowest of the populace mingled their shouts with those of the soldiers, and nothing was heard but acclamations of triumph, the clashing of arms, the deafening sound of military music, and the incessant cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* In the phrenzy of the moment prudence slumbered; the guilt of a few, became the infatuation of all; they whose treason had been till then but speculative, now tore off the white cockade, and trampled it beneath their feet; the uproar of sedition allowed no interval for reason, and the deluded wretches, who discarded their allegiance to their sovereign at the bidding of a rebel, never paused to inquire what reckoning a future day would bring.

It was proposed to Bonaparte that he should dwell, during his stay in the city, at the hotel of the prefecture, but this he declined, observing that he would fix his residence at the inn of the *Trois Dauphins*. It has already been stated that this inn (kept by a man of the name of Labarre, formerly one of Napoleon's guides) was the place where the emissaries of Bonaparte assembled while he was at Elba, and his selection of it for his abode, proved that he had more confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Labarre, than of any other of the citizens. Here

he accordingly alighted, and immediately summoned the mayor into his presence, with whom he had a short conversation. During its continuance, some of the rabble brought the shattered remains of the gate of Bonne under his window, amid the noise of trumpets, exclaiming, "We could not offer you the keys of your good city of Grenoble, but here are its gates."—Napoleon rewarded this mark of affection by a donative which they thought too little for their labour, independently of their zeal, for which they also expected to be paid. If they were dissatisfied, however, with his liberality, he was equally so with their enthusiasm, and he peevishly ordered the mayor to disperse them. They were not quite respectable enough to gratify the pride, or encourage the hopes, of the usurper.\*

On the following morning, (Wednesday, the 8th,) he received the public authorities of the city, the bishop and one of his grand vicars, the mayor and the municipal council, the faculty of advocates, &c. They all approached his presence with awe and trembling, for they all remembered what the imperial tyrant had been, in the days of his grandeur and prosperity; they were astonished to find him, now, full of the most affable and condescending courtesy. He conversed with every one, and spoke upon every subject, to shew how comprehensive and universal was his genius. They departed from the audience, delighted and surprised. The lawyers, in particular, repeated with ecstasy many of his replies, concerning some articles of the civic code. They told, with wonder, how he had asked their opinion upon the subject of divorce, and expressed his own, that it was "a sublime institution."

Having finished this profound disquisition, his next proceeding was to review the troops of the national guard, which he converted into a personal examination of each soldier, for there was scarcely one to whom he did not address some question. The ceremony lasted nearly five hours, and it was accompanied with the occasional exclamations of *Vive l'Empereur!* and *Vive la liberté!* Some revolutionary airs were also played; but these indications of republican sentiments

\* Soon after the arrival of Bonaparte, the Colonel of the *gendarmerie*, (M. Jubé) was sent for, and General Bertrand gave him a letter, addressed to the Emperor of Austria, ordering him to set off with it immediately to Turin. The Colonel, astonished at such a mission, hesitated for a moment, but a second command, more imperatively enforced, made him hasten out of the room. Descending the stairs precipitately, he fell with some violence, and severely hurt himself. General Bertrand, hearing the noise, came to the spot, snatched the letter out of his hand, reproached him with his want of zeal for the Emperor, and ordered him to be immediately deprived of his commission.



were not very agreeable to Napoleon. Liberty was a thing which he comprehended, only as existing in himself, and its operations, only as they emanated from his will, to forbid the enjoyment of it to all others. Neither did he feel much satisfaction at hearing the long-proscribed airs, which consecrated the doctrines of the revolution, for he had returned in the hope of resuming his former absolute dominion, which was as incompatible with revolutionary notions, as the government of the Bourbons could be. He immediately, therefore, through the mayor, ordered them to cease. After the review, the troops were directed to march for Lyon, with the exception of the corps from Elba, whose fatigues had been so great, that they were not in a condition to advance.

At Grenoble,\* Bonaparte first assumed the authority of Emperor. He dismissed M. de Rostaing, (who had quitted the city, after the most honourable,

\* He received from the mayor, in the name of the inhabitants, the following fulsome address :—

“ Sire,

“ The inhabitants of Grenoble, proud to possess within their walls the conqueror of Europe, the prince with whose name so many glorious recollections are associated, come to lay at your Majesty's feet the tribute of their respect and their love. United to your fame and that of the army, they have mourned, with your brave soldiers, over those fatal events which for a time veiled your eagles. They knew that treason having surrendered our country to foreign troops, your Majesty, yielding to necessity, preferred a momentary exile to those terrible wounds of civil war with which we were menaced. Like the great Camillus, the dictatorship had not swollen your courage, nor could exile depress it.

“ Every thing is now changed. The cypress disappears, the laurel blooms again; the French people, for a moment subdued, resume all their wonted energy. The hero of Europe will replace them in their proper rank; the great nation is immortal. Sire! issue your commands. Your children are ready to obey. The voice of honour is what alone they will follow. No more foreign troops in France. We renounce the empire of the world, but let us be our own masters. Sire! your magnanimous heart will pardon weaknesses; it will pardon error; traitors alone shall be removed; and the felicity of the rest shall be their punishment. May every thing return into its former order, and obey the voice of your Majesty! May you, after having provided for our safety against external enemies, give to the French people protecting and liberal laws, worthy of their love towards the sovereign whom they cherish. Such, Sire, are the sentiments of the inhabitants of your good city of Grenoble. Deign to accept our homage.”

This address exhibits every mark of Napoleon's manufacture, and it has been asserted to be such. It would be some consolation to believe, that only Napoleon or his parasites, could frame any thing so disgustingly servile and so impudently false. Bonaparte replied in the following terms :—

“ Citizens,

“ When, in my exile, I heard of all the calamities which weighed upon the nation; when I heard that all the rights of the people were despised, and that I was reproached for the retirement in which I

though ineffectual, efforts of loyalty,) from his situation, and he bestowed the command of the seventh military division upon the *marechal de camp*, Salcette, who was shortly after promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. He frequently demanded to see General Marchand, but when he learned, from his wife, whom he summoned into his presence, that the General had retired to his country-house, he made no further inquiries. He suspended the functions of the prefect, and ordering him to quit the seventh military division within four and twenty hours, nominated another individual as his successor. The same penalty was imposed upon the prefect of Gap. He also elevated, to the rank of an *officier d'ordonnance*, an opulent glover of the city, named Dumoulin. As this young man had never been in the service, the promotion could be regarded only as a reward for his ardent devotion to the cause of Bonaparte.

The next day, Napoleon pursued his march in the direction of Lyon, but he no longer employed the same precautions, nor urged on his troops with the same harrassing rapidity. The defection of the garrison of Grenoble, had placed him at the head of nearly ten thousand men, fully equipped, and accompanied by a considerable train of artillery. It had, besides, invigorated his hopes, because he had little reason to doubt, that all the troops which might be sent against him would imitate its example. Compared with his forlorn and ambiguous condition, at the outset of his enterprise, he might now be considered as a general leading a disciplined army, which was to receive reinforcements at every step. Each succeeding hour, widened the basis of that edifice, which his ambition was labouring to erect, and developed its dimensions in proportion. Like a landscape which gradually breaks upon the sight, as the

remained, I lost not a moment. I embarked on board a frail vessel; I crossed the seas in the midst of ships of war of different nations; I landed on the soil of your country, and I aimed only to arrive, with the rapidity of an eagle, in this good city of Grenoble, whose patriotism and attachment to my person were well known to me.—Men of Dauphiny, you have fulfilled my expectations. I bore, not without sorrow, but without despair, the misfortunes of which I have, for a year, been the victim. What I have seen of the people during my progress has powerfully touched me. If some passing clouds have obscured the opinion which I always had of the French people, recent experience has convinced me, that they were always worthy of the name of *Great People*, with which I saluted them more than twenty years ago.

“Men of Dauphiny! About to quit your country in order to proceed to my good city of Lyon, I felt a desire to express to you all the esteem with which your elevated sentiments have inspired me. My heart is full of the emotions you have excited, and I shall always retain the remembrance of them.”

Thus the solemn farce ended.



mists of morning recede before the rising sun, and hills, and vallies, streams, and cities, and glittering spires, successively appear, so the plans of Napoleon became more and more distinct, as their success became more and more certain. All those anxious fears which so naturally beset him and his adherents, while yet the issue of their undertaking was involved in doubt, were now exchanged for the ardour of confidence, and their progress from Grenoble to Paris was little else than a military triumph. The army was tainted with disloyalty throughout its entire mass; no part was whole, no part was sound; and Napoleon had only to hear that a corps was marching against him, to know that it was so many men added to his force. Before, however, we proceed to follow him through the remainder of his journey, it will be necessary to pause, and relate what effect his perfidious aggression produced in the capital, and what measures were pursued by the government, to counteract his designs, and to save France, if to save her had been possible, from the impending calamity.

\* So perfectly was this comprehended by his partisans, that a few days before the departure of Louis from Paris, the following sarcasm appeared on one of the gates of the Tuileries: "The Emperor requests the King not to send him any more soldiers, as he has enough already."

## CHAPTER III.

THE intelligence of Napoleon's landing reached the Tuileries on the 5th of March, but it was not publicly announced until the 7th. It produced no great sensation upon the Parisians, with the exception of those who expected the event, or if they did not expect it, rejoiced when it occurred, as the signal for civil commotion. Some, who passed for profound politicians, expressed their contempt at its apparent folly, and very confidently prophesied that the rebel force would be immediately dispersed. Others, were fertile in their speculations upon motives, and soon discovered that Napoleon only intended to pass through Piedmont into Italy, and unite with Murat; but it never occurred that he might have gone a nearer and much less dangerous way to Rome. A third of class of reasoners, not so sagacious in exploring causes, contented themselves with wondering why he came at all, what he meant to do, who were his allies, and what were his resources. No one felt any alarm, for Napoleon was three hundred miles off, and there were twenty-six millions of loyal subjects, all prepared to drive him back, if he should dare to advance. His Elbese battalion of the guard, was transformed into a desperate gang collected from the gallies, and himself considered only as the captain of a lawless banditti. These points being settled, the Parisians laughed, and danced, and sung, as before, and when they met a friend in the street, asked him if he knew what had become of Bonaparte, with the same unreflecting levity as they would have inquired about the last new song or novel.

This dream of thoughtless security, however, soon passed away. Every post brought with it news, more and more calculated to excite alarm, and no sooner was the danger believed to be real, than fiction began to multiply its terrors. The



freebooter and his crew, who were derided as idiots dooming themselves to destruction, were now dreaded as invaders, whose projects threatened ruin and convulsion to the state. That speck in the political horizon, which scarcely attracted notice at its first appearance, was now deepening into gloom and tempest, and collecting those elements of wrath whose explosion would ravage the land. Incredible marches had been performed by this band of daring adventurers, through a rugged and mountainous country : cities and towns had opened their gates to them ; treason or dismay had paralysed every arm that should oppose them ; whole regiments, emulous as it were of infamy and dishonour, had forsaken their standards, and united with them ; while the proclamations of the usurper, in bold and explicit language, announced an enterprise, whose completion could be accomplished only by the subversion of the government.

As these gradations progressively unfolded themselves, the utmost terror was inspired. The inhabitants of the capital saw the mighty mischief rolling onwards, gathering strength and magnitude at every motion. They knew destruction was in its course, but they knew not how to arrest its fatal progress. The factious alone rejoiced at the coming storm, because they alone could hope to benefit from its devastation. The peaceful citizen, who had survived so many fierce vicissitudes, so many changes of political condition, and who hoped, at last, to find repose beneath the benignant sway of his native prince, trembled to think what new disasters might await him. The mechanic and the artisan, who saw their means of industry revive with returning peace, lamented the restoration of a system which threatened to destroy that peace. Parents and kindred beheld, with consternation, a catastrophe, which would restore the horrors of the conscription, and drag their children and their relatives to slaughter, for the criminal ambition of a tyrant and a conqueror. Those unhappy men, too, who had been so long and so pitilessly proscribed, who for five and twenty years had never dared to visit their native country, who for their monarch's sake had been scattered over the face of the earth, fugitives in every foreign land, stripped of their ancient patrimony, and subsisting upon precarious bounty, what were their emotions ? They had returned with their sovereign, after a series of calamities, unexampled, perhaps, in the history of human suffering ; many of them, tottering beneath the infirmities of age, wished but to die in that France which had seen their happier days ; others, whose passions were schooled by severe affliction, abandoned all hope of former affluence, and found a solace, even in the hard consolation, of earning a scanty pittance upon those estates they heretofore possessed :

all, exulted in the thought, that whatever their future misfortunes might be, one comfort would remain, they trod their native land ; but now, they saw themselves again exposed to his vengeance who had been their most relentless persecutor, and again driven forth to hopeless and unmerited banishment. Cold calculators of political ambition, men who contemplate, with stoical apathy, the dexterity with which crowns are won and lost, who find, in revolutions, only a question upon which to exercise their ingenuity or display their prejudices, may regard these evils as nothing more than the customary consequences of a great national convulsion, and therefore not to be too curiously considered. From their existence, however, are derived consequences which usurpers cannot always control, and Napoleon discovered a formidable difference, between recovering his authority through the expulsion of the Bourbons, and originally obtaining it by their exclusion.

The politicians of Paris, when they found that Bonaparte was advancing with giant strides, and that he was neither going to Italy, nor had been put into a cage by Ney, began to fashion a variety of ingenious reasons for his enterprise and its success. A favourite opinion, and the more a favourite because exquisitely absurd, was the connivance of England. We had such a superfluity of wealth, our opulence was so inconvenient to us, and we were so fearful of growing richer, by the active speculations of peace, that we had let loose Napoleon merely for the opportunity of paying subsidies to catch him again. Money and wit are presumed not often to go together, and therefore the politicians of Paris found another notable reason for our conduct. We were jealous of the prosperity of France, sorely afflicted at the prospect of a commercial rivalry, and in order to get rid of the danger, we permitted Bonaparte to land, because a civil war is generally unfavourable to industry, and if a foreign war should follow, we might have a pretext for rectifying the inconsiderate magnanimity of the peace of Paris. Uninstructed by the past, unsatisfied with fourteen years of a direct struggle with his ambition, prodigal even to folly of our blood and treasure, it now appeared that we had knocked the monster down, for the pleasure of setting him up again. We were afraid lest France should enter into a competition with us in the European market, by which a part of our gains might be diminished ; therefore, with admirable sagacity, we invited Napoleon to return, whose settled system it had been to shut us out from that market altogether. We thought it a very hard case to lose a little of our profits ; but to lose them all was so evidently better, that we were quite delighted with the scheme. It is difficult to imagine that any notion so preposterous could, for a moment, occupy the brain even of a politician



of Paris. The fact, however, is incontestible, and one of the writers\* who have described this period, states that the belief of our connivance daily strengthened. It is some consolation to think that even modern whigs did not venture to arraign ministers upon this accusation. What greater proof can be required of its extraordinary folly?

Another and more plausible hypothesis was indulged, which may probably be ascribed to the fabrications of Napoleon himself. Austria was considered friendly to the views of Bonaparte, not as regarded his resumption of the imperial authority, but as that authority was to subsist in the son of the Empress Louisa. There was nothing positively absurd in this supposition, because the interests of Austria might be consulted by such a project. It would not, indeed, bear the scrutiny of common sense, but that was no impediment in the dialectics of a Frenchman. Reduced to the necessity of finding a cause somewhere, fancy was more flexible than reason, and it was not difficult to imagine a case, in which the Emperor of Austria would be willing to secure the only benefit that could arise from his alliance with Bonaparte. The sacrifice he made, freely or compulsorily, when he waved the claims of his daughter and grandson, was no trivial boon to Europe. The temptation to cancel that boon was at least strong enough to overcome political virtue, if stronger and opposite temptation did not provide a counterpoise. The time, however, and the mode, selected by the Parisian speculators, were equally unfortunate. Austria would scarcely be disposed to provoke the hostility of a formidable confederacy, with her own treasury impoverished, and their armies not disbanded. Neither was it very probable she would choose Napoleon as the instrument, unless she wished to work her own destruction, for had he ever been in a condition to lead an army into Germany, revenge would have pointed out the House of Hapsburg.

The problem, upon which so many idle conjectures were wasted, admitted of a very simple solution. But they who will look in the clouds, must not be surprised if they miss what lies at their feet. Ambition instigated Napoleon to the attempt, and perfidy removed the only obstacle which could embarrass an honourable mind. His primary resources were audacity and falsehood; his secondary ones, treason and rebellion. His auxiliaries, stupor, timidity, and terror. A crown, which he defiled with blood, had been torn from off his head. He made

\* *Histoire de Napoleon Bonaparte*; p. 256. See also the note at p. 74 of the *Hist. de la Revol. du 20 Mars*.

a desperate effort to regain it. The faith he pledged, when he renounced all future pretensions to dominion, was but mockery in his code of ethics. He laughed at those who thought him bound by solemn obligations, and shook them off. He landed in France, and the meanest artifices which fraud could weave, contributed to accelerate his progress. A lie was virtue, if a lie could prosper. The army received their former chief with acclamations which denounced them traitors. He cast himself upon their fidelity, which he knew must increase in proportion to their guilt. They opened his passage to the throne, and the triumph of the usurper was complete. The rapidity of his advance, defeated whatever the zeal of loyalty might meditate, while the boldness of his purpose inspired dismay. France is not the only country, in which an armed force has erected a military despotism upon the ruins of civil liberty. The soldier draws his sword; the citizen submits. Had the struggle, in the present instance, been between the people of France and the army of France, the people, as in every other instance, must have yielded, or if they ultimately prevailed, it would have been after a long and disastrous series of intestine conflicts. Happily, however, their cause was the cause of Europe, and Europe raised that mighty arm which struck the proud usurper to the earth.

The government of Louis XVIII. did not dissipate its energies in frivolous cavils about the motives of Napoleon's enterprise. They had other and arduous duties to perform. When the intelligence reached Paris, prompt and decisive measures were adopted, commensurate to the magnitude of the occasion. The princes of his Majesty's family shewed an alacrity and zeal, worthy of the stake they had at issue. The Duke of Bourbon departed for the west, though it is said the King positively refused to raise La Vendée. The Duke of Orleans was entrusted with a mission to Peronne, where an army of reserve was to act under Marshal Mortier, and full powers of enrolment were transmitted to the Duke D'Angouleme in the south. The Duke de Berri \* was named general of the army

\* Of this prince little can be said that is favourable. His petulant irascibility impels him to the grossest violations of decorum, and renders him peculiarly obnoxious. It is said he wished to join the army instead of remaining in Paris, but that Marshal Macdonald dissuaded him from it, observing, "that his interference would be the death-warrant of his family." His contumelious conduct towards the generals and officers, on various occasions, had made him much disliked. When he was appointed to the command mentioned above, he told Marshal Macdonald that he should place him on his staff. Macdonald answered, that he was ready to serve under His Royal Highness, but that his rank would not allow him to take a staff appointment. The prince hinted, that he would not have dared to give such an answer to Bonaparte. "Perhaps not;" was the reply, "but your Royal Highness is not Bonaparte." It has



appointed for the defence of Paris, having under him Marshal Macdonald, who exhibited the noblest fidelity. The Count d'Artois proceeded to Lyon. Registers were opened, in the different districts of Paris, for volunteers to enter their names. In a few days, forty thousand signatures were obtained, but the signatures were all. Very few were actually incorporated, and none were found at their post, when the hour of trial came. Marshal Soult, the minister at war, published an address to the army. What effect it was intended to have, cannot be ascertained ; what effect it really had, is but too well known. Falling under suspicion, he soon after resigned his office, and was succeeded by the Duke of Feltre, another of those marshals whose honourable conduct, amid the general baseness and desertion of the troops, will dignify his memory. The soldiers and officers on half pay, or on leave, were ordered to join their regiments, and every precaution was taken, to assemble such a force as would be sufficient to repel the usurper. It was not then known, however much it might be suspected, that no reliance could be placed on any part of the army. General Dessolles, indeed, and Marshal Macdonald, strenuously advised that the royal volunteers, and the national guards, should be mainly relied upon, for they feared that the regular regiments would never be induced to fire against their old general ; but the King publicly avowed that he trusted to the old guard, under the command of Oudinot, with the most implicit confidence. That confidence was fatally betrayed.

The civil authorities of the kingdom were not neglected. On the 6th of March, the Chambers of Peers and of Deputies, which had been prorogued on the 31st of December till the 1st of May, were suddenly convoked. On the same day a proclamation was issued, denouncing "Napoleon Bonaparte as a traitor and a rebel, for having introduced himself, by force of arms, into the department of the Var, and enjoining all civil and military governors, and even private citizens, to lay hands upon him, (*de lui courir sus*) to drag him before a court martial, to identify his person, and to put the law in force against him." All military persons, of whatever rank, who accompanied or followed Bonaparte, were subjected to the same penalties, unless they submitted within the term of eight days. This extension of the royal clemency, however, was calculated to do much harm, for it allowed sufficient time to the rebels to organise their plans, so that they would be in a condition to reject the terms of pardon, by the increased probability of

been said that he carried his silly arrogance so far, as to denominate the Duke of Wellington (*after the battle of Waterloo,*) a *parvenu*. If this be true, we can only pity the imbecile insolence of a man, who lives in this age, and yet has not learned, that conduct, not blood, ennobles the human character.

that success, which would render them the subjects of Napoleon and not of Louis. The proclamation further included, in the list of traitors, all who should directly or indirectly afford assistance to the usurper, or who should endeavour, by their speeches in public places, by writings, or by any other means, to provoke civil war, and bring the government into danger.

Expressions of loyalty, which cost so little to a Frenchman, (perhaps because he knows their real value,) were prodigally lavished upon the King. It was impossible to say more; it was equally impossible to do less. The municipal body of Paris approached the throne, and proclaimed its zeal for the cause, and its admiration of the virtues, of the monarch. The Court of Cassation rioted in the most chivalrous sentiments.\* They regretted that the foolish and daring enterprise of the usurper, did not present sufficient danger for their ardour to manifest itself. They longed for greater perils, that they might shew how fiercely they would encounter them.

“ ————— The blood more stirs  
“ To rouse a lion than to start a hare.”

When the hare proved to be a lion, these gentlemen were not found in the chase. But it is a common remark, that covetous persons are never satisfied. All the other public bodies of Paris hastened to declare their fidelity, and strove, with generous emulation, to outdo their competitors. Nor was this kind of patriotism limited to the metropolis. The *Moniteur* was daily crowded with addresses from the provinces, and if it were possible to judge how a Frenchman would act, from what he says, thousands of honest hearts were ready to bleed for Louis XVIII. Never was a monarch so beloved in print; never was a monarch so deserted in the field. Could Napoleon and his soldiers have been scattered, by these “paper bullets of the brain,” the allies might have remained at home, and Louis XVIII. in Paris. The mayors, prefects, and municipal councils of France, were tongue-valiant to a miracle. The people, in the capital at least, participated in this “cheap defence of nations.” Every hour teemed with increasing demonstrations of loyalty. The courts, the terraces, the gardens, of the Tuileries were thronged with individuals, whose throats were as patriotic as the pens of their superiors.—When the King appeared at a window, he was deafened with their tumultuous shouts. “Long live the King!” and “The King for ever!” were heard from a thousand mouths at once. Deceived by this seeming affection and enthusiasm,

\* See *Hist. de la Rev. du 20 Mars*, p. 82—89.



(the credulity was amiable,) he gave utterance to the natural feelings which they excited. "I am delighted," said the unsuspecting Louis, "to behold my children thus surround me. My heart overflows with joy, that my people testify so much love."—A few days after, the same love was prostituted to Napoleon.

Among those who approached the person of the sovereign, in this disastrous crisis of his fortunes, the Chambers of Peers and Deputies ought, perhaps, to be regarded as sincere. Their interest and duty were more closely allied, and the latter was probably regulated by the former. The prosperity of many, to a certain degree, was linked with that of the King. The subversion of his power would precipitate them into comparative ruin. They might, perhaps, wish to be relieved from the responsibility of advising, or permitting, such measures of severity as the occasion demanded; but being assembled, they could not hesitate to express their fidelity. In the address of the Peers, an allusion was made which ought to be remembered, by those, who are fond of comparing the constitutional conduct of Louis XVIII. with that of Napoleon. "The nation," they observed, "has not forgotten, that before your auspicious return, the madness of pride dared to dissolve us, and compel us into silence, when our sincerity was dreaded. Such is the difference between legitimate power and the dominion of a tyrant." They concluded with the following sentiments:—"Sire, your knowledge has taught you that the constitutional charter, that monument of your wisdom, will secure the stability of your throne, and the security of your subjects. A grateful nation is collected round you. Our brave armies, and the illustrious chiefs who command them, have pledged their glory, that so wild and criminal an enterprise shall produce no danger. The national guards, who maintain, with so much energy, order in our cities and throughout the provinces, will not suffer it to be disturbed. They who have made disgraceful calculations upon our perfidy, to plunge us into civil war, will find every where union and fidelity, and a boundless devotion to your sacred person. Hitherto, all the acts of your government have been marked by paternal goodness. If it should be *necessary for the laws to become more rigorous*, you will, no doubt, deeply lament it: but the two Chambers, animated with one common spirit, will eagerly concur in every measure which the safety of the state, and the greatness of the danger, may require."

The reply of the King was firm and explicit. "I am much affected," said his Majesty, "by the sentiments which the Chamber of Peers have expressed. The tranquillity I have maintained, I derive from the certainty of the love of my

people, the fidelity of the army, and the support of the two chambers. As to my constancy, I shall always be able to find that in the consciousness of my duty.\*" These temperate expressions were remarkably contrasted with the tumid phrases of those recreants, who were flatterers and apostates with equal impartiality. The moderation of the King sprung, perhaps, from his suspicion. A deputation from the Chamber of Representatives, with their President, M. Lainé, at their head, echoed the sentiments of the Peers. " Upon reading the royal proclamation which convoked the chambers, the deputies immediately assembled, and the first impulse of their hearts, powerfully moved by this new proof of your Majesty's confidence, was that of gratitude. They have been cheered, Sire, by the measures you have adopted against a banished foreigner ; and by their unanimous votes, expressive of their fidelity and devotion, they have directed the President of the Chamber to carry to your Majesty, the earliest declaration of that devotion and fidelity." The King, in his reply, thanked them for their attachment, and repeated his firm reliance upon the affection and zeal of his subjects.

While the French government were employed in devising such means of defence as the exigency of the case seemed to require, arrangements of stupendous magnitude were adopted in another part of Europe. The Congress at Vienna were quietly deliberating upon the interests of the world, submitted to their decision by the splendid triumphs of war, when they heard, with astonishment, that the man whose ambition had so long endangered those interests, was once more seeking their destruction. It was on the evening of the 11th of March, that

\* M. Gallais (*Hist. de Rev. du 20 Mars*) remarks, upon this reply of the King, that it was an answer to every thing contained in the address of the Peers, except the most important point, " the insinuation of a dictatorship, if he should judge it necessary in that conjuncture of affairs."—" The French parliament, having implicit confidence in the probity of Louis XVIII. offered this power to him. Louis understood, perfectly well, the insinuation, but passed it over in silence. A direct refusal might have had serious consequences. They who form their opinions according to the success or failure of events, have blamed his Majesty for this refusal. A dictatorial power, according to them, would have saved the kingdom. I do not think so. At least it was proposed too late to be useful. At the moment when it was offered to the King, the conspirators were masters of the state. No human power could then prevent what happened, and whatever measures the King might have adopted, whether of grace or severity, they would have defeated his intentions." It is not very evident that any assumption of such a power is implied in the expression used by the Peers. If it were, however, the King probably felt that it was not a moment, when he could safely resort to any experiment which might render his constitutional principles liable to additional suspicion.



a messenger, despatched from Paris, conveyed the portentous tidings to Talleyrand, the diplomatic representative of France at the Congress. He immediately communicated them to the other ministers of the allied powers, and on the 13th, that celebrated declaration\* was issued, which so much excited the sympathy of Napoleon's friends in this country and in France. At that moment they only knew that he had escaped from Elba, and had effected a landing in France. With the result of his enterprise they were unacquainted, and the motive which prompted the declaration, was merely to promulgate the unanimous feelings of abhorrence and indignation with which they contemplated it, and their determination to pursue the rebel with united vengeance. They renewed, in its fullest extent, the memorable alliance of 1814, and proclaimed their determination to afford any aid, which might be required, to defeat his perfidious projects. They expressed their conviction, at the same time, that the loyalty of the French people would prove sufficient to repel the daring invader. By quitting Elba, and re-appearing in France, with projects of rebellion and treason, they insisted that he had placed himself beyond the protection of the laws, and manifested to the world, that he was a being with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded. They therefore declared, that he had placed himself out of the pale of civil and social relations, and rendered himself liable to public vengeance.

This political excommunication was loudly arraigned by those, who never arraigned the many flagitious deeds of the despot himself. When he fulminated his decrees against every sovereign of Europe, when he violated public law, when he aggravated that violation by murder, when he broke down the independence of foreign states by conquest, they beheld nothing but the great achievements of a great man, or if they condemned, the reproof was gentle as a parent's anger who rebukes a favourite child. But now, when the principle of retaliation came into play, when, having the power, the allies had the will, also, to "commend the poison'd chalice to his own lips," the distress and consternation of his proselytes were disgustingly ridiculous. No martyred saint, ever called forth such propitiatory lamentations from the pious lips of expiring votaries, as he received from the flaming zeal of his worshippers. The walls of a British senate, even, were polluted by the puling sympathy of Englishmen, who deplored, or affected to deplore, the persecution of the mild, the magnanimous, the injured Napoleon. Had the intrepid and manly councils of the allied sovereigns, been guided by those whining

\* See Appendix, No. II.

and infatuated politicians, Europe might still have enjoyed the inestimable blessing of gathering up her chains at the footstool of the tyrant. We too, among the rest, should have been admitted to the honour of placing him on our list of friends, provided we had not the temerity to dispute his pleasure. At present, we have only the less enviable honour of securing a retreat for the interesting criminal.

The Declaration of the 13th of March was signed by the respective ministers of Austria, Russia, France, England, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The Duke of Wellington, who had arrived at Vienna in the early part of February, to supply the place of Lord Castlereagh, whose parliamentary duties required his presence in England, was one who signed this celebrated instrument. His Grace soon had the opportunity of signing a different one, with his sword, on the plains of Waterloo.

Bonaparte was yet unacquainted with the resolution taken by the allies. That he anticipated it, cannot be doubted, for his repeated assertions, of having undertaken the enterprise with the sanction of England and Austria, were merely in the spirit of that shameless imposture, which he never disdained as an auxiliary. He might perhaps hope that so formidable a coalition would not be formed, and that if he could succeed in rallying the French people round him, he should be able to wage a successful war against a minor confederacy. He was aware that the army of France could do no more than conduct him to Paris. If he had to take the field, that army must be recruited from the people, and hence the indefatigable hypocrisy with which he laboured to acquire popularity for his cause. Had he been prosperous in this, a doubtful struggle would probably have ensued. Victory or defeat would equally have stimulated the French: the one, to preserve what they had gained, the other, to recover what they had lost, and the ardour of their opponents might have diminished in proportion. The object of the war, indeed, as avowed by the allies, was merely personal; they armed to subdue Napoleon Bonaparte, and whatever co-operation he might receive from the people of France, it could not alter the principle of the contest. A murderer is not less amenable to the laws, because some of his associates assemble to protect him from the officers of justice. It is not improbable, however, that if the usurpation of Napoleon had assumed a national character, if the public voice had echoed the sentiments of the military, if it had appeared that France wished to have, and was prepared to defend, him, a very different issue would have attended



the allied operations. Many, would have questioned the expediency of resisting the will of a whole people: more, would have doubted the possibility. There would have been room for sophistry to interfere. Those legitimate rights of revolution, which had captivated the unthinking and misled the reflecting, for so many years, would have been again bandied among politicians. The energy of action would have wasted away, while statesmen were quibbling in their closets about abstract points of policy. Happily for the world, the question with Napoleon and his antagonists was reduced to one of simple calculation. It lay between the army of France, and the armies of Europe. The former, in full numerical maturity, without the power of renovation, a stagnant, putrid, and unwholesome mass; the latter, gushing from ten thousand salient springs, sweeping onward with majestic flow, reproduced at every interval, teeming with life, and fresh and sparkling through all the tributary streams.

Undismayed, however, by a confederacy, of which though he did not at first know the extent, he could not flatter himself would be very limited, Napoleon continued to urge on his desperate enterprise. A simultaneous movement in his favour was made, at this period, in the north of France. Marshal Mortier, who commanded the troops in that quarter, had left Paris to return to Lille. He met, on the road, a body of soldiers, amounting to about ten thousand. They were marching to Paris. The astonished Marshal demanded wherefore? "To save the city from pillage, and to rescue the King from the populace," was the answer. He examined their orders, and discovering that they were forgeries, desired them to return immediately to their quarters. It is said, these troops were confidently expected at Paris, and that many persons assembled round the gate, by which they were to enter, in order to welcome their arrival. General Lefebvre Desnouettes, attempted also to seduce the men under his command. He was colonel of the regiment of royal chasseurs, whom he marched from Cambray into the town of La Fere, a military depot in Picardy, of which he hoped to gain possession by this stratagem. His treasonable intentions were defeated, partly by the loyalty of Baron Lions, the major of his own regiment, and partly by the sagacity of M. d'Aboville, the Commandant of La Fere. General Desnouettes, finding that he could not suborn the officers, hastily fled, and joined Napoleon. He was accompanied by General Lallemand and his brother, but they were afterwards pursued and taken. These solitary instances of fidelity were not unrewarded by the government. The King, in a proclamation to the army, dated the 12th of March, alluded to them with honour. The legislature voted its thanks to the

garrisons of Lille, Cambray, and La Fere. The garrison of Antibes was also included. The same distinction was conferred upon Marshals Mortier and Macdonald. The latter declined this public tribute of applause, in a letter\* which he addressed to the president Lainé, because, in the frank judgment of a soldier, he had then done nothing to deserve it.

Napoleon, meanwhile, though he no longer considered it necessary to advance with the same expedition, after the defection of the garrison of Grenoble, suffered no time to elapse fruitlessly. On Thursday, the 9th of March, he quitted that city, and proceeded towards Lyon. At night-fall he halted at a village called Rives, where he dined. His success had inspired him with gaiety, for he condescended to be coarsely merry with the mayor, who was a notary. He inquired if he was married, and being answered in the affirmative, asked how many children he had. "None, sire." The great Napoleon was jocose, and observed, that "M. le Maire occupied himself more with making deeds, than in making children." Royal wit is always fascinating, and no doubt the attendants of Bonaparte laughed immoderately at this delicate touch of humour. Reverting to other subjects, he talked about peace and war, but he seems to have been so much delighted with his own jocularly, that he indulged it a second time. Alluding to the treaty of Paris, he observed, how ridiculous it was to pass through the territory of Piedmont to reach Grenoble and Chambéry. "But we shall settle all that," he continued, turning towards his officers. "It only requires a rest of four years for women to have children, and mares to have horses." There is, probably, something very facetious in this observation, though not immediately obvious. But the jest was perfectly characteristic of the man who, with a brutal witticism, designated the conscripts, *flesh for cannon*.

From Rives, Bonaparte proceeded to Bourgoin, where he arrived at mid-

\* The "Englishman," whose Letters from Paris have been before referred to, calls this an "angry letter," and accuses Lainé of an attempt to keep it back, but was obliged to produce it on the following day. Why Marshal Macdonald should have been angry, at finding his loyalty acknowledged, even though no occasion had yet presented itself for signally displaying that loyalty, the "Englishman" must explain. In his opinion, probably, the only thing that ought to have made Macdonald angry was that he remained faithful. The "Englishman," however, does justice to the virtue of Macdonald, and seems half inclined to believe that he was the "only honest man in France." (Vol. I. p. 157.) What! an honest man, and not a traitor to a Bourbon! This "Englishman" is hardly consistent, for he afterwards laments, that Marshal Mortier suppressed an order, for the arrest of the King and Princes at Lille, until they had quitted the town, (p. 159) and in the simplicity of his veneration thinks they would have been quite safe in Napoleon's hands.



night. Here he waited for news from Lyon, whither he had been preceded by his numerous emissaries. The intelligence of his landing had reached Lyon on the 4th of March, the same day that it was known at Grenoble. On the 5th, it was kept a profound secret. On the 6th, it began to circulate in whispers and rumours throughout the city. On the 7th, it was officially announced by proclamations from the prefect and the mayor. Lyon was not only unprovided with cannon, arms, and ammunition, but it was destitute of a governor. The Count de Damas had unfortunately absented himself, though from the most honourable motives. Having ineffectually solicited, during the last two or three months, a supply of arms and other warlike stores, he resolved to ascertain, in person, the cause of the delay. He accordingly went to Paris, and a few hours after his arrival came the news of Bonaparte's invasion. He immediately received orders to return, and reached Lyon again on the 7th of March. On the following morning the Count d'Artois arrived. He instantly assembled the troops of the garrison, which consisted of the twenty-fourth regiment of the infantry of the line, the thirteenth dragoons, and the twentieth of the line, whom General Brayer, the commandant of the division, had brought from Montbrison. These soldiers his royal highness reviewed, and some slight feelings of enthusiasm, momentarily inspired by the presence of the prince, seemed to animate them. These indications, however, were at once feeble and illusory. The extent, the character, the success of Napoleon's enterprise were not yet known, and while there was safety in negative virtue, the traitors were virtuous. When they heard that the usurper was advancing, and that the garrison of Grenoble had joined his standard, they threw off the mask.

The Count d'Artois used every exertion to inspire the soldiers with fidelity. He harangued them, with an energy and eloquence, which would have been persuasive, if his hearers had not extinguished every sentiment of honour and virtue. But neither the solemnity of a studied oration, nor the insinuating grace of a familiar appeal, could touch those hearts which treason had corrupted.\* He

\* The Count d'Artois addressed the colonel of the thirteenth dragoons, and asked him what were the feelings, what the intentions of his regiment? "Interrogate them," said the officer; "they will frankly reply to you." He addressed a soldier nearest to him. "Are you well paid?"—"Yes." "Will you fight for the King?"—"No." "For whom then will you fight?"—"For Napoleon." He accosted a veteran, covered with scars, and decorated with three medals, "Well, comrade, a brave soldier like you cannot hesitate to cry, The King for ever!"—"You deceive yourself," answered the dragoon, roughly. "No soldier will fight against his father. My cry will be, The Emperor for ever!" Thus stubborn and inflexible in their guilt, what hope was there that any entreaty, however impassioned, would turn them from their purpose?

spoke of peace ; they panted for war : he painted the mild and unassuming virtues of Louis ; they gazed with fierce delight upon the stern attractions of their martial chief : he talked of honour ; they burned for military glory : he pointed to the spotless banner ; they demanded the bloody standard which had waved, so many years, the terror of the world, the symbol and the instrument of despotism. When the prince reviewed the national guard, he said, " Give me, my friends, but a thousand well-disposed men, and I will answer for the safety of the city." Had he limited his demand to a tenth part of that number, it is doubtful whether he would have found a tenth. It is true, many young men of family voluntarily formed themselves into a guard of honour for his protection, but they were not numerous. A register also was opened at Paris, for those persons to enter their names, who called themselves faithful subjects. Many names were inscribed. Overawed, however, by the threatening disaffection of the military, and confounded by the rapid approach of Napoleon, there was scarcely time or means to render their fidelity availing.

The Count d'Artois proposed to set off that night, and to proceed to Grenoble, which he imagined to be still in the hands of the King's troops ; but, returning to the archiepiscopal palace after the review, he found there the inspector of the national guards of the Isere, who solicited a private interview, which was immediately granted. This officer had arrived from Grenoble, which he quitted on the preceding evening, after the entrance of Bonaparte. He informed the prince of that calamitous event, who, deeply affected, summoned into his presence several general officers, as well as the prefect, and communicated the alarming intelligence. The tidings spread rapidly through the city, and converted, into sudden despondency and gloom, that joy which the arrival of the Count d'Artois had excited. The emissaries of Napoleon, despatched from Grenoble, sedulously promulgated the usurper's success, and were careful to aggravate what had really happened, by the addition of many fictitious occurrences, each more terrible than the other. Sometimes they magnified the number of Bonaparte's army to twenty thousand men ; sometimes they affirmed that his return was a thing preconcerted with Austria ; and sometimes they confidently declared, that the King had already quitted Paris. These rumours were not unavailing. They intimidated the faithful, and inspired the disaffected, in proportion, with bolder hopes. They tended, also, to augment the general confusion and perplexity. The defection of the troops was no longer conducted with secrecy and hesitation, but openly and publicly proclaimed. To counteract, if possible, the rapid diffusion of this treachery,



the Count d'Artois issued a proclamation to the army,\* temperate, firm, and dignified. There was no idle parade of pompous phraseology, big words with little meaning, dazzling sentences to cover wretched falsehoods, such as commonly disfigured the paltry inventions of Napoleon. The prince, in plain and unaffected language, unfolded the dangers which threatened France, denounced the guilt of the usurper, and endeavoured to rouse the honour of the soldiers.

\* " Charles-Philip of France, Son of France, Count d'Artois, to the Army.

" Soldiers,

" France, proud of your long victories, enjoyed in security the delights of peace. The King, my brother, knew that with such an army there was no enemy he need fear; but he did not think that he should have to turn his arms against a man who, after having long been your chief, had compromised your glory by reverses, arising only from his own mad ambition, and who, forced to yield to the just decrees of Providence, seemed as if he wished to dignify his fall, by appearing to sacrifice his authority for the welfare of France. He solemnly disengaged you from the oath which you had taken to him.—On our side all the engagements entered into with him were faithfully executed, and the generous confidence of the King respected his misfortunes in the asylum which he had chosen.

" Meanwhile, soldiers, France began to repair her losses, and to re-organise the army. The King had maintained it upon as large an establishment as the state of the finances would permit. All those who could not be employed, enjoyed a competent pension, until they could be put again upon active service. You swore, with transport, fidelity and devotion to the descendants of those Kings, under whom your forefathers founded that military glory of France, which you have elevated to so high a pitch. Suddenly, a cry was heard, *Bonaparte has landed on our territory*.—He brings with him a handful of men, the associates of his disasters, and it is with those feeble means that he hopes again to impose his yoke upon a great nation, which he has himself abandoned, after having precipitated it to the very brink of ruin. Soldiers, he calumniates you! He avows that he relies upon your defection; he uses every effort to seduce you. Is it because he had betrayed his engagements, that he dares to think you will betray yours? Is it to French soldiers that he presumes to propose they should violate their oaths, lacerate the bosom of their country, and separate their interests from those of the citizens? Has there not been enough of your blood shed? His cruel fury, which has inundated all the plains of Europe, does it now wish to drench even the soil of France by our own hands? Soldiers, you shudder—they would arm you against your brethren, and while you aimed, with sorrow, those guilty blows, our dear France, deprived of her defenders, would become the easy prey of foreigners, ready to profit by our civil discords.

" Soldiers! you will disappoint these criminal projects: we will march together against the enemy; you will see around me those brave generals, the veteran companions of your glory, under whom you have been accustomed to conquer. Son of the good Henry the Fourth, that valiant King, that father of his people and of his soldiers, I address to you, with confidence, those words, which were, to him, the happy prelude of victory:—*'Wherever you see my white plume, follow it; it is the road to honour.'*

" Long live the King!

" CHARLES-PHILIP."

" Lyon, March 9, 1815."

He roused only their scorn and mockery. They scoffed at an appeal to feelings which they did not comprehend, and evinced, by their conduct, that so far from offering hostility to Napoleon, they impatiently awaited the moment when they might become his auxiliaries. It was even feared they would hoist the standard of rebellion, before the rebel himself arrived to consecrate it. Every thing which perfidy could attempt, or daring villany execute, was anticipated. The few who trembled for the royal cause communicated their fears to the Count d'Artois; but they found the prince inaccessible to personal alarm. "So long," said he, "as I behold knights of St. Louis at the head of regiments, I cannot believe in the possibility of treason." If his single arm could have saved France from the dreadful catastrophe that awaited her, France would have been saved. Yielding, at length, to reiterated persuasion, he determined to quit the city, and give his final orders to the mayor, when the Duke of Tarentum arrived, who urged him to remain another night, and try the effect of another appeal to the soldiers. A council of war was then held, to deliberate upon the best means of defending Lyon. The Duke of Tarentum proposed the promotion of the subaltern officers to a higher rank, because being more familiar with the soldiers, they might perhaps have a greater influence over them. Some suggested that the troops should be sent back to their respective quarters, and the defence of the city entrusted to the national guard; while others saw no means of providing for its safety, but by the destruction of the bridges over the Rhone. Preparations were accordingly made for blowing them up, but the murmurs of the populace prevented the execution of this design, and the only precaution ultimately taken was the erection of some barricadoes. It need scarcely be added, that the voice of treason insinuated itself even into the councils of the prince. General Brayer, who was admitted to them, opposed various measures, upon the pretence of wanting artillery and ammunition. It was on one of those occasions that his Royal Highness exclaimed, with animation, "The war of La Vendée commenced with forks and pickaxes. We have bayonets. I will be the first to march."

Early in the morning of the 10th of March, the Duke of Tarentum assembled the troops, and the Count d'Artois reviewed them. Another and a fruitless effort was made, to subdue their inflexible and rebellious spirit. They were as regardless of that voice which they had so often obeyed in battle, as they were of the example they had so often followed. To all his exhortations they replied only by silence, or by cries of sedition, which partially burst forth. After the review, the prince proceeded to the bridges and quays of the Rhone, which he



found crowded with a desperate rabble, anxiously and tumultuously awaiting the approach of the usurper. He returned to the palace of the archbishop, and in the afternoon departed in his carriage, escorted by a detachment of dragoons,\* which he sent back when he arrived at the first post. The Duke of Tarentum was the last to abandon the city. He remained there, while he thought there was even a possibility that his presence could be useful. He headed two battalions, whom he conducted to the bridge of La Guillotiere. The advanced guard of the rebels was already in possession of the suburbs. Scarcely had he arrived, when they approached, preceded by a mob, composed of peasants and others, waving their handkerchiefs, which were fastened to long poles, and exclaiming, *Long live the Emperor!—Liberty for ever!* These cries were suddenly echoed by the troops of the Duke of Tarentum, who immediately joined those of Bonaparte, while the populace cast the temporary defences which had been erected, into the river. The Marshal, abandoned by his own soldiers, and pursued by those of the usurper, owed his safety to the fleetness of his horse. Arriving at the mountain of Tarare, he there found the Count d'Artois, who made him enter his carriage, and to whom he communicated the disastrous, though not unexpected, intelligence.

Napoleon, meanwhile, awaited at Bourgoins, for such news as might justify his entry into Lyon, and his emissaries quickly despatched the joyful information. When he heard that the Count d'Artois and the Duke of Tarentum had quitted the city, he instantly prepared to advance, and at nine o'clock in the evening alighted at the archiepiscopal palace. Immediately after, the Count de Fargues presented himself. "You are very young," said Napoleon, on perceiving him, "to be a mayor. How old are you?"—"Thirty-six, sire." "That is very young. How came you to be appointed mayor?"—"I believe, for my devotion to the King?" "You are much devoted to him, then?"—"Yes, sire: I always have been: I imbibed that sentiment from my earliest years." "Very good; you are a brave man. You have served the King faithfully; you will serve me the same. You will introduce the authorities, whom I shall receive to-morrow. I recommend the city to your care." There was some prudence in this direction, for the commotion excited by his arrival threatened its safety in no ordinary degree. The populace, consisting of the lowest wretches collected from every

\* The author of *Une Année de la Vie de l'Empereur Napoleon*, who always finds "immense multitudes," to accompany Bonaparte during his progress, says, (p. 155,) that only "one dragoon of the national guard escorted the Count d'Artois."

quarter, partly composed of freebooters,\* who descended from the mountains of Dauphiné, with sacks and carts to carry off the anticipated plunder, and partly of a drunken, furious soldiery, inspired consternation and dismay. The affrighted citizens retired within their dwellings, while they roamed through every street, and, in the madness of the moment, mingled blasphemy with treason, as the appropriate offering to their divinity. Of the delirious nonsense which they uttered, the following may be received as a specimen:—*Vive la mort!*—*A l'échafaud les Bourbons!*—*A bas le ciel!*—*A bas la vertu!*—*A mort les royalistes!*—*Vive l'Enfer!* The most atrocious excesses accompanied these infernal cries. Houses were destroyed or pillaged: and with lighted torches in their hands they ran howling through the city, threatening to fire the abodes of the royalists. The scene of anarchy was so terrific, that even the officers of Bonaparte recoiled from it, and observed, on the following morning, that they thought all the prisons of France had poured forth their malefactors.

The next day, Napoleon sent for M. de Fargues, who had been indefatigable, during the night, in his endeavours to avert from the city the horrible catastrophe with which it was menaced. "I wish," said he, "that you should remain mayor. Whatever may be your opinions, retain your office. You are a Frenchman: that is every thing. You ought to feel that it is only I who can secure the welfare of your country. You may all esteem yourselves happy, (and especially the nobility, who have committed so many faults,) that I have arrived. You would have experienced a dreadful revolution in the course of six weeks." M. de Fargues replied, "that he had accepted the place only from his zeal, not being destined to the magistracy." Napoleon asked, "what had been his destination?"—"I have been in the service." "In what corps?"—"In the army of the Prince de Condé." "No matter. You shall remain. I have read your two proclamations.†" This conversation was interrupted by the cries of the populace, who were assembled in front of the archbishop's palace. Bonaparte went to the window, and not being accompanied by the mayor, who remained behind, he desired him to approach. When the people saw them together, they began to exclaim, *Vive l'Empereur!*—*Vive le Maire!* Bonaparte inquired why he perceived none but

\* Itinéraire de Bonaparte, p. 81.

† M. de Fargues continued to be mayor until the arrival of M. Rœderer, one of the extraordinary commissioners, who, at the close of a conversation which he had with him, appointed another in his place. It was not until *after* his removal, that the city of Lyon sent an address to Bonaparte at Paris. M. de Fargues resisted every solicitation for that purpose.



persons in jackets among the crowd. "Because," replied the mayor, "it is only that class of individuals who love revolutions. Always ready to applaud every change, upon which alone their hopes are founded, they would equally rejoice in your fall and in your triumph." "I know it," said Bonaparte, making a motion with his hand, "and I will keep them under." He then turned his discourse to other topics. Speaking of one of the uncles of M. de Fargues, (M. de Sathonay,) and of a quarrel which he had with Cardinal Fesch, he said that he had blamed the latter, for he was in the wrong. "The Cardinal is very sanguine," added Bonaparte. Alluding to political affairs, especially to the treaty of Paris, he condemned the King for having concluded it. Yet he proposed to observe it himself: or, rather, he promised to do so, in order that he might gain time to violate it.

This conversation lasted an hour and a half, when Bonaparte broke it off, to review the troops. After the review, which continued two hours, he ordered the garrison of Lyon to march for Paris, under the command of General Brayer. It was during this review that a singular instance of baseness, (I forget that I am speaking of Frenchmen,) occurred, and an equally singular instance of dignified feeling on the part of Napoleon. Those young men, who had voluntarily formed themselves into a guard of honour, for the protection of the Count d'Artois, came and offered their services to Bonaparte, soliciting the same post about his person, which they had spontaneously selected about that of the Prince. "Your conduct towards the Count d'Artois," said Napoleon, "convinces me of what I should have to expect, if I sustained a reverse of fortune. I shall not accept your offer." Duplicity is a despicable vice. Men who fawn only to betray, cannot be trusted even by betrayers; and though Bonaparte might feel that when he rejected their offer, he renounced that which was worth nothing, yet it is not impossible he also felt a thorough contempt and abhorrence, at the gratuitous deceit which characterised one or both of their proceedings.

Having disposed of the military, always his primary object, Napoleon next received the civil authorities of Lyon. He discoursed freely with them upon a variety of topics as usual. The nobles participated largely in his abuse. Reverting to his enterprise, he indulged in a copious commentary upon the text of his proclamation. The mayor of La Croix Rousse, (M. Chevalier,) sometimes called him *Sir*, and sometimes *Sire*. "Call me what you please," said Bonaparte, observing it, and tapping him on the cheek, "even *Consul*, if you like."—This lucky man, whose cheek was so honoured, became the envy of M. Vouty, President of the Royal Court. "Ah," said he, with infinite grimace, embracing

M. Chevalier, as he quitted the presence of Napoleon, "let me kiss, a thousand times, that fortunate cheek, which has been touched by the hand of my saviour.\*" Poor idiot! How would he have contained his joy if Bonaparte had deigned to bestow the same manual distinction upon himself?—On Sunday, the 12th, Napoleon held a court, which was principally attended by officers on half pay. He despatched, likewise, secret emissaries to Paris, into Burgundy, Franche Comte, Lorraine, Alsace, and other military divisions. Hence the scenes at Dijon, where the populace, hired by those emissaries, forced the mayor and prefect to abandon their jurisdictions;—of Chalons, where the cannon, destined for the defence of the city, were cast into the Saone; and of Bourg, where the garrison rebelled. Hence, also, the catastrophe at Lons-le-Saulnier, where Marshal Ney tarnished a long life of military glory, by an act of treason which consigned him to an infamous death.†

\* Itinéraire, p. 85.

† Of the guilt of Ney, no one has presumed to doubt; but some sympathising casuists have affected to discover, that his punishment was a "political murder." This doctrine rests upon the interpretation of the military convention of Paris, concluded by the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher, with Davoust, the commander in chief of the rebel army. If men may be allowed to know their own intentions when they contract an obligation, then the question is reduced to a very simple character. It is not extraordinary, indeed, that Ney, after having tried every other means of saving his life, should at last resort, (for it was his *last* resource, instead of being the *first*, which it would have been, had he originally conceived his case to come within the guarantee of that convention,) to stipulations which affected only the military occupation of Paris. Desperate remedies are allowable in desperate extremities. But there is an official document upon record, which satisfactorily establishes the meaning attached to the convention of Paris, by one of the parties who concluded it, when he could not anticipate that its application would ever be questioned. The Duke of Wellington, in his despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Gonassee, July 4, 1815, enclosing the convention, thus described its nature and object. "This convention," says his Grace, "decides all the military questions at this moment existing here, *and touches nothing political.*" Can language be more explicit? All political considerations were wholly excluded, in the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, and that opinion constituted his intention. The military fate of the capital was alone defined and secured. Now what might have been that military fate, if no convention had been signed? The armies of the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher had advanced to Paris, as conquerors, and by the rights of conquest, might have entered it sword in hand. Instead of that, they accepted its surrender upon certain stipulated conditions. What were the evils which the convention of Paris obviated? Slaughter and pillage. What were the civil obligations contracted by this convention? The tenth article explains their extent. "The Commanders in Chief of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect, and to make those under their command respect, the actual authorities, *so long as they shall exist.*" Was Marshal Ney one of the "actual authorities?" If he was, the moment he was divested of his command, by the return of Louis XVIII., he ceased to be in a condition to claim the protection of this convention. If he was not, then he never was in a condition to claim that protection.



On the 9th of March, Marshal Ney hastened from his country house, where the intelligence of Bonaparte's enterprise first reached him, to the Tuileries. There he solicited an interview with the King, who had eminently distinguished

But the twelfth article was the one on which the advocates of Ney relied. This article stipulates "That private persons and property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and, in general, all individuals who shall be in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disturbed, or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold, or may have held, or as to their conduct or political opinions." Let us examine this article. There is no occasion to cavil about words, or it would not be difficult to shew, that it applied to the inhabitants of Paris, and the civil functionaries of government, rather than to the military. But what does it stipulate? It stipulates that the contracting parties will not do, what they otherwise might have done, by the laws of war, assume an authority to punish. It binds no one else. They (the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher,) engage not to exercise any penal rigour towards the guilty, in their several capacities, as conquerors of Paris. They bound themselves by this solemn obligation; and be it remembered, that if they had not so bound themselves, there was no principle of public law, to prevent them from arresting the principal traitors, and transferring them into the hands of that sovereign authority against which they had rebelled. It is not certain, whether they might not even have subjected them to a summary military trial, for the avowed object of the war was to bring Napoleon Bonaparte, *and his adherents*, to punishment. It was not a war, undertaken for merely political purposes; it was a personal contest, having the exclusive design to put down a treasonable combination of individuals, who had united themselves to maintain, by force of arms, a breach of treaty committed by another. Under those circumstances, the conquerors acquired rights which could not belong to belligerents in the ordinary course of hostilities, and they waved those rights by the convention of Paris. It seems, indeed, impossible to consider this convention in any other point of view, than as an agreement, entered into by the contracting parties, for the regulation of their own conduct. The fourteenth article expressly covenants that it "shall be observed" until "the conclusion of a peace." Does not this prove that it was only a conditional arrangement, subject to be annulled or reversed by an ulterior one? Suppose a treaty of peace had been immediately concluded between Louis XVIII. and his allies, as it was afterwards concluded, on the 20th of November, without renewing and confirming the stipulations of this convention, where would then have been the right of Marshal Ney to claim its protection? By the sixteenth article the "convention is declared common to all the allied armies, provided it be ratified by the powers on which these armies are dependent." It was a prudent policy, on the part of the vanquished, to obtain the insertion of this article, because, as the allies were confederated for one common purpose, the punishment of Napoleon Bonaparte and his adherents, the Austrians, or the Russians, might have acted upon their separate views towards the stipulators, in defiance of that security which they had covenanted with the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher. The convention, however, was tacitly or expressly acceded to, by the allies: but, if they had conceived it to be a fundamental part of any arrangement made between themselves and the rebel army, it would have been incorporated into the treaty of peace subsequently signed by them. It was not so incorporated, and if all other proof were wanting, that alone would shew that they considered it merely as a specific agreement, determined upon to meet a specific emergency, and not as a part of the general engagements afterwards to be contracted with France.

Whether, therefore, we consider the expression of the Duke of Wellington, in his letter to Lord Bathurst, declaratory of his opinion of the convention, at the moment of signing it, the articles of the

him by favours, and after renewing his protestations of fidelity, he earnestly entreated to be employed "in the impious war, which the freebooter from Elba had dared to wage against his Majesty." Drawing his sword half out of its scabbard, he promised, upon the forfeit of his head, "to bring him to Paris, dead or alive." It is added, by some, that he threatened to convey him "in an iron cage." The King received these unsolicited offers of service with confidence and condescension, and entrusted to him the command of the army, which was concentrated at Lons-le-Saulnier. As the Marshal retired, he exclaimed, "that it would be the happiest day of his life, when he should be able to convince his Majesty of his most profound attachment." Whatever excuse may be urged in

convention itself, or the conduct of the allies, subsequently to its signature, it seems to be an extraordinary perversion of mind, which can set up the desperate construction of a rebel, struggling for life on any terms, against the deliberate interpretation of men, at least as honourable, as high-minded, as just, and as sagacious, as Marshal Ney. If the Duke of Wellington had conceived that the twelfth article could fairly apply to the case of that wretched traitor, whatever might have been his abhorrence of the crime, he would have disdained a subterfuge which consigned a warrior to an ignominious death, and fixed an indelible blot upon his own unsullied glory. Let the tongue of calumny name, let the finger of malice point, at that single act of his Grace's public life, which can justify so detestable a suspicion. If this cannot be done by those, whose maudlin tears bedew the rebel's grave, if this surpasses the industrious malignity of those, whose little angry petulance can find a "political murder," in the sentence which doomed the traitor to condign punishment, it may be hoped they will believe it possible, that a hero who had a spotless fame to guard, would be as able to maintain, as he had been to win, it. If they can spare any part of that sensibility, for a countryman, which they never withhold from a foreigner, perhaps they will learn to think that the Duke of Wellington would not be base enough to falsify his judgment; if they can, for a moment, abate their egotism, they may suppose that he is capable of interpreting the language of a military convention: and if they can restrain their presumption, why may they not imagine, that he is qualified to understand his own meaning?

There are some collateral arguments which justify the execution of Ney, independently of the literal signification of the convention of Paris. In the first place, Louis XVIII. could not be considered as acceding to it, in the capacity of an ally, for he had no army which brought him within the application of the sixteenth article; and, in the second place, the Duke of Wellington could have no power to bind his Majesty. If the right, which he would unquestionably possess, upon his return to Paris, to punish those whose perfidy had endangered his throne, were implicated in that convention, is it not a reasonable presumption, that the Duke of Wellington would have submitted it to his Majesty, for his approbation, he being within a short distance of the capital at the time? The convention might have been sent to him, and returned, without any inconvenient delay. The Duke of Wellington did not do this, which not only diplomatic forms, but common courtesy, under such circumstances, would have required, because he knew that his Majesty's rights, as sovereign, were not affected by it. If they had been, the ordonnance of the 24th of July, which sentenced many of the traitors to banishment, was as much a contravention of that compact, as the trial and execution of Ney, for several of the persons included in that ordonnance, were in Paris at the time the convention was signed.



palliation of Ney's treachery,\* that he was hurried on by the seditious fury of his soldiers, it must at least be remembered, that having gone so far as to proffer that voluntary allegiance, he ought to have stood alone, inflexible in honour, even though his life had fallen the sacrifice. If we once admit that we may become criminal, because we have not power to prevent others from being so, virtue would lose its character, which consists in the triumph over temptation and guilty example. The King could not suspect the sincerity of Marshal Ney. Two days after his departure, meeting his wife, he said, "Madam, you have a husband whose loyalty is equal to his courage."

On the 12th, he arrived at Lons-le-Saulnier, and seemed anxious to promote the royal cause. From the evidence, however, which transpired upon his trial, there is every reason to conclude, that he was only tampering with events, and talked about fidelity, as an experiment to ascertain whether treason would be successful. During the night, some emissaries of Bonaparte arrived, who brought him a letter from General Bertrand, repeating all the stale falsehoods which Napoleon had insinuated through his whole progress, and urgently imploring the Marshal to desert the falling fortunes of Louis, and unite himself with the returning greatness of his former master. Persuasion operates easily upon a willing mind, and Ney was no reluctant convert to the arguments of Bertrand.—On the following day he issued a proclamation to his troops,† couched in language

\* "I saw Ney, whose name will be eternally infamous, lead his four children to the feet of the King, and implore his blessing; I saw the venerable monarch lay his royal hand upon their heads, and exclaim, 'You are the sons of a brave man among the brave; you will serve me, as he has served France; I will take care of your future fortune.' This scene passed at St. Ouen, in the presence of two hundred persons."—*De la Conspiration qui a obligé Louis XVIII. de quitter son Royaume, par un Ancien Membre de l'Assemblée Constituante.*

† "Marshal Prince of the Moskwa to the Troops under his Orders.

"Officers, Subalterns, and Soldiers!

"The cause of the Bourbons is lost for ever. The legitimate dynasty which the French nation adopted is about to re-ascend the throne. To the Emperor Napoleon, it alone belongs to reign over our fine country.—What consequence is it to us, whether the *noblesse* of the Bourbons again expatriate themselves, or consent to live in the midst of us? The sacred cause of liberty and of our independence shall no longer suffer from their fatal influence. They wished to degrade our military glory; but they have been deceived. That glory is the fruit of labours too noble to permit us ever to lose its remembrance.

"Soldiers!—Those times are gone by, when a people can be governed by the suppression of their rights; liberty at length triumphs, and Napoleon, our august Emperor, is about to confirm it for ever.

as hostile to the Bourbons, and as contemptuous, as if he had never pledged his faith and honour to them. There was a baseness in this, which no plea of political necessity can justify. After the interview which he had with Louis XVIII., an interview sought by him, not by the monarch, and after the voluntary protestations of loyalty in which he indulged, what must be the indignant scorn of every virtuous mind, who beholds this man, not only betraying his sovereign, but guilty of all the vituperative jargon against him, which could escape from those who rebelled without the intermediate villainy of deliberate deceit? Compared with him, the other traitors were innocent. Their crimes, at least, partook of the character which belongs to all great national struggles, where the culpability of the actors, depends, to a certain degree, upon the issue of their enterprise. Our ancestors, who expelled James II., would have been traitors had they failed. They succeeded, and are venerated as patriots.\* If, as the advocates of Ney state, he was hurried along by a torrent which he could not controul, why did he publish a proclamation at all? Why stimulate the ardour of his troops, or why gratify them by that sort of idle declamation, which he knew to be so well calculated for increasing their zeal in behalf of the usurper?† Where is the record that proves he exerted himself, even though in vain, to keep them faithful? Had he possessed one spark of that innate honour, which should glow in the jealous bosom of a soldier, he would have disdained to stand in so vile a comparison between his conduct and his professions. The lapse of two days could have created no real change in his opinions. Either, therefore, he gratuitously practised the most

Henceforth, let that noble cause be ours, and that of all Frenchmen!—This great truth must penetrate the hearts of those brave men whom I have the honour to command.

“Soldiers!—I have often led you to victory; now I lead you to join that immortal phalanx which the Emperor Napoleon conducts to Paris, and which will be there within a few days. Then, our hopes and our happiness will be for ever realized.—*Vive l'Empereur.*”

(Signed)

“Marshal of the Empire, Prince of the Moskwa.”

“Lons-le-Saulnier, March 13, 1815.”

\* “As the most just and honourable enterprises,” observes Fletcher, “when they fail, are accounted in the number of rebellions; so all attempts, however unjust, if they succeed, always purge themselves of all guilt and suspicion.”

† It was proved, or attempted to be proved, on the trial, that this proclamation was the production of Bertrand, and that Ney only adopted it. Be it so. His guilt was the greater, if he affixed his name, and lent his influence, to sentiments in which he did not concur. If he did concur in them, then Bertrand was only his amanuensis.



detestable dissimulation at the Tuileries, or, he was a man of such feeble and shallow resolution that no reliance could be placed upon him. The latter supposition, however, is disproved by his whole career; and the former consigns his memory to pre-eminent infamy. It is not by the cold and frivolous distinctions of casuistry, that we must determine the motives of a wily, fawning sycophant, waiting to be a traitor. They are best ascertained, by an appeal to the feelings of a man of honour.

On the same day that Marshal Ney issued his proclamation, Bonaparte at Lyon was exercising all the most important functions of sovereignty. He published various decrees, annulling the different acts of the government since his abdication. How he possessed the right to do this, it would be difficult to shew. The most bigotted of his supporters allowed, that he could derive his authority only from the will of the people, and the people were not supposed to have declared that will before the idle pageant of the Champ de Mai. Having solemnly abdicated his power, nothing could legally reinstate him in it but the voice of the nation. But Napoleon had no time for nice disquisitions upon the elements of royalty. He grasped at the substance, and left his foes or friends to analyse its essence. His first decree, abolished all the changes which had been introduced into the courts and tribunals. By the second, all the generals and officers, both naval and military, who had entered the service since the 1st of April, 1814, whether emigrants or not, were deprived of their rank, and ordered to return to their respective homes, or to withdraw thirty leagues from Paris. The white cockade, the order of the Lily, the orders of St. Louis, of the Holy Ghost, and of St. Michael, were abolished by a third decree. The fourth, sequestered the property of the Bourbons, and all that had been restored to the emigrants since the 1st of April. The Bourbons themselves, if found within the French territory, were declared liable to suffer death, according to the law of the Convention, which was revived in its full force. The fifth decree gave effect to other revolutionary edicts, relating to the abolition of the ancient nobility and feudal rights, while the titles and privileges of the new peerage were declared permanent and hereditary. There were several minor regulations in these decrees, all tending to the restoration of affairs to that state in which they were previously to Napoleon's abdication. The last of them, and not the least important, dissolved the Chambers of Peers and Deputies, and ordered an extraordinary assembly of the electoral colleges of the empire at Paris, called the Champ-de-Mai, "to correct and modify the constitution, and to assist at the coronation of the

Empress, our dear and well-beloved spouse, and that of our most dear and well-beloved son." These objects of his affectionate regard, did not arrive to assist in the splendid ceremony, notwithstanding the efforts made by a band of trusty ruffians to seize them at Vienna.

The tone of imperial authority which characterised these decrees, naturally inspired a belief, that the enterprise of Napoleon had already succeeded, and that resistance would therefore be useless. The confident audacity with which he announced the approaching return of his wife and son, seemed to imply that Austria was favourable to his project, while the unreserved abrogation of all the acts of Louis, and the revival of the sanguinary laws against the Bourbons, were calculated to intimidate those who never inquired by what power he ruled, or by what means his power was supported. It must be admitted, that his policy was suited to his situation. The mass of the people, would not discriminate between the symbols of authority, and authority itself. Energy and decision are the soul of dangerous undertakings, and Napoleon was deficient in neither. He knew that while he was at Lyon, and Louis remained in Paris, he was himself a rebel, and Louis the sovereign of France. But he knew, also, that aspiring in rivalry to the crown, he must assume the state and character of a king, if he hoped to acquire the dominion of one. The delusion would promote the reality. Having placed his pretensions, as a usurper, in competition with the recognised rights of a lawful monarch, he could not act more prudently than by endeavouring to invert the proposition, and change conditions with his antagonist. It was thus only that he could bring the question to a speedy issue, and however absurd it might abstractedly appear, to see an adventurer clothing himself with all the attributes of sovereign power, while only a few thousand soldiers upheld his cause, and he was unpossessed of a single minister to execute his decrees, yet, what better course could he pursue, to obtain, in fact, those rights which he assumed in theory?

After the publication of these decrees, Bonaparte prepared for the further prosecution of his march. He quitted Lyon on horseback in the afternoon of the 13th, escorted by some troops of light artillery, and by the 4th regiment of hussars. He was accompanied to the barriers of the city by a numerous populace, who testified their joy by loud and reiterated acclamations. These venal plaudits were construed, by Napoleon, into sincere and cordial expressions of attachment. Any king who relies upon the shouts of a fickle multitude, proves



his own weakness, for, paid\* or unpaid, they are equally worthless: but Bonaparte, from necessity rather than choice perhaps, acknowledged with affected gratitude the zeal and devotion of his salaried friends. He addressed the following proclamation to them.—“Lyonnese, I love you! About to quit your city, to return to my capital, I feel it necessary to express the sentiments with which you have inspired me. You have always held the first place in my affections. Upon the throne, or in exile, you have uniformly shewn towards me the same sentiments. This elevated character, which peculiarly belongs to you, deserves the utmost of my esteem. In a more tranquil moment, I will return to you, redress your grievances, and promote the prosperity of your manufactures and of your city. Lyonnese, I love you!”—The pathetic burden of this proclamation, must have forcibly touched the sensibility of those who had *earned* so good a title to it.

Omitting the intermediate towns of Villefranche, Mâcon, and Chalons, through each of which the usurper passed, we find him, on the 15th, at Autun, which he entered in the afternoon. Here he was immediately visited by the jacobins, who had espoused his cause, and with whom he seemed willing to co-operate, so long as he might deem their support necessary. They denounced the municipal council of the town, for having issued a proclamation, on the 13th. This proclamation they showed to Napoleon. It breathed the warmest sentiments of loyalty, and characterised the enterprise of Bonaparte as a treasonable and seditious attempt, to subvert the lawful government of the realm. Flushed with success, he was now more impatient of opposition than in the outset of his invasion. He began to consider himself as Emperor, and looked upon fidelity to the King as treason to his own supremacy. The mayor, and the members of the council, were accordingly summoned into his presence, that he might reprove their criminal allegiance. After waiting some time, they were admitted. Bonaparte had on each side, Generals Brayer and Drouot. Turning towards the mayor, an old man of eighty, he exclaimed, with a wrathful aspect, “What do you do here? Begone. I will not see you.” Then, suddenly recollecting himself, he added, “By what right, sir, have you presumed to threaten those citizens

\* The author of the *Itinéraire* gives the following statement, and its credibility is supported by the assertions of other writers:—“The mob were regularly hired, morning and evening, during the three days that Bonaparte remained at Lyon. As soon as he appeared at the window, they vociferated *Vive l'Empereur!* They put their hands behind their backs, and received a piece of *cent sous*. The distribution was made twice a day, at noon and in the evening.”

who should wear the national colours? How dare you act in rebellion towards me? Do you know this writing?" shaking violently the fragments of the proclamation. "It is the production of a madman, of a demoniac: I am surprised that a civil war has not broken out in Autun: go, you are not worthy to fill your place." This intemperate sally of rage did not intimidate his audience. The civil president of Autun, M. de Lachaise, who was one of the members of the council also, indignant at beholding the venerable mayor exposed to the brutal fury of the usurper, for a pretended crime of which he had been guilty only in conjunction with others, ventured to address Bonaparte. He observed, that "by his abdication he had placed all Frenchmen under the authority of Louis XVIII., commanding them to be faithful subjects; and that in forbidding all revolutionary movements, so long as the King held the reins of government, the magistrates had only done their duty." "But did you not know that I was at Lyon?"—"Yes; some agitators announced that you would return; but having been accustomed, under your government, to wage a war against rebels, and to maintain the existing power against their machinations and impostures, the magistrates did not think they could be justified in anticipating events." This reply incensed Napoleon still more, for it was unanswerable. He was content, therefore, to substitute passion for argument, and, with increased violence, demanded, "What have you to do with my abdication? That is a great question, which does not concern you. It is of much more importance you should know that Frenchmen want me, in order to secure to them the benefits of the revolution, and save them from that slavery and misery, in which they would be plunged by the priests and nobles, who wish to re-establish tythes and feudal privileges. You have been influenced by them: but I shall do justice. I have landed with six hundred men,\* and have advanced as far as this without any obstacle, and without any intercourse with the interior. My power is more legitimate than that of the Bourbons. I hold it from this good people, whose songs and patriotic cries you now hear."—The shouts of the rabble, who had collected under the window, were at that moment audible.

The magistrates listened to this tissue of puerile railing, with a silence which did not indicate a very strong conviction of Napoleon's legitimate pretensions.

\* When Bonaparte had only his Elbese followers, rations were demanded for thousands. Now that he had thousands, he talked with affected exultation of the slender force with which he embarked, and even diminished their numbers. His absurdity and arrogance are strongly developed in this speech. That abdication, which released all France from its allegiance to him, was an act which no Frenchman was permitted to examine.



He resumed his invectives, however, directing them against the priests, and the nobles. "They wish to drive me back," said he; "but they do not know, that if I had not come, in less than three months they would have been butchered by the people, who cannot endure their excesses. Withdraw," he continued, addressing the mayor; "you have shewn great weakness: you have been led astray by some of those proscribed persons. I dismiss you from your office, and will take care to provide a successor." After this courteous and dignified reception of the public authorities at Autun, General Brayer reviewed the national guard. He inspected all the musquets, thinking they were loaded with bullets. Several of the officers were cashiered, because they belonged to the ancient nobility. Others shared the same enviable fate, for being emigrants, or for having served in the army of the Prince of Condé. On the following day, Napoleon printed the proclamation of Marshal Ney, which he said he had received during the night. He also printed the decrees which he issued at Lyon, and caused thousands of his proclamations from the gulf of Juan, to be circulated. He then departed, at ten o'clock, for Avallon, preceded and followed by his soldiers, to the amount of about eight thousand.

His emissaries were already in Avallon. One of them, General Girard, who afterwards met his fate at Waterloo, had been there since the 14th. By his indefatigable efforts, the desertion of the fourteenth regiment of the line, which had arrived from Orleans, and of the sixth regiment of lancers, was secured. On the 16th he sent to M. Raudot, the mayor of Avallon, the proclamations of Bonaparte, dated from the gulf of Juan, with an order to have them published. The mayor refused, and waited upon the General to explain his reason, which was that he had taken an oath of fidelity to the King. An officer, who happened to be present, undertook to remove the scruples of the mayor with respect to the sanctity of an oath, observing, that for the last twenty-five years, it had become a mere formality, adopted upon every change of the government. He enforced his precepts by a reference to his own example. "I," said the conscientious disputant, "have taken seven oaths to as many governments successively." He then recapitulated his political perjuries. "That is the reason," replied M. Raudot, "why an eighth oath will cost you nothing. With regard to myself, I never took but two in my life. One, was to the Emperor, who released me from it by his abdication; the other, to the King, from which I know not who can release me." The missionaries of Napoleon heard this simple exposition of the principles which animate an honest man, with abashed countenances. They could not

confute them by argument, and they were now ashamed to oppose them by an appeal to their own conduct. The calm intrepidity of virtue silences the boisterous sophistry of guilt, even when it cannot restrain its practical mischief.

The mayor retired from the conference, and immediately convoked the municipal council, to communicate what had passed. Scarcely had the members begun to assemble, when they witnessed the arrival of a fresh emissary from Bonaparte, who preferred the same request to the mayor which had been already refused. It was again declined. But he was more importunate, and partly by menaces, partly by solicitation, succeeded in obtaining, from one of the council, that which no entreaty could extort from the inflexible magistrate. Soon after, Bonaparte himself entered Avallon. The inhabitants remained in their houses, passive spectators of the scene, and did not venture to swell the mob, who followed in the usurper's train with clamorous cries of triumph. None of the public authorities went to congratulate him; and Bonaparte, surprised at such a reception, now that he regarded himself as Emperor, caused an indirect intimation of his arrival to be given to the mayor. At seven o'clock in the evening, an officer repaired to the residence of M. Raudot, represented himself as belonging to the Grand Marshal, and expressed his astonishment, that the mayor had not requested the favour of an audience with his Imperial Majesty. He strengthened his friendly admonition by referring to what had taken place at Grenoble and Lyon. The mayor replied, that he had no occasion to seek examples for his conduct in the gazette of Lyon, or of Grenoble; that having been nominated by the King, he had neither motive nor right to present himself to Napoleon; and that he had already declared his sentiments upon the subject to General Girard and others; but, if his refusal to appear before Bonaparte was likely to occasion any evil consequences to the inhabitants, he would certainly wait upon him, with the sub-prefect, in behalf of the city. The officer, satisfied with this assurance, departed, and communicated the result of his mission to Napoleon.

The mayor prepared to follow him, and being joined by the sub-prefect, and the commissary of police, they were introduced to Bonaparte, who, having inquired the name and quality of the three individuals, and ascertained what means the city possessed of affording subsistence to the troops, the following conversation ensued. "What news has arrived from Paris?" asked Napoleon—"All the travellers who have come from thence within the last two or three days, say that Paris is quite tranquil. They are far from suspecting the rapidity of your march. The greatest reliance is placed upon the enthusiasm which prevails at Paris for



the King, and the satisfactory disposition of the five regiments which compose the garrison." "I have already received addresses of congratulation, and assurances of attachment, from four of those regiments; and General Maison wrote to me, some days since, for permission to put forth a proclamation in the royalist style, which I granted.\*"—"The prodigy of your return will not be among the least of those which fill your history. You arrive with the rapidity of lightning. You were at Lyon, and we were ignorant that you were in France. To-day you are here, and this morning we thought you were still at Lyon. We confess that this celerity *greatly perplexes our consciences*.†" "Yes, our march has been somewhat quick. My advanced guard is now at Joigny."—"It was doubted, here, whether the fourteenth regiment, and the lancers, of Joigny, would declare for you." "I have returned to France, where I have my army. Every where they receive my orders and obey. There has not been, there could not be, any resistance. Even the royal courts at Grenoble and Lyon, felt that it would be useless to expose themselves to persecution. In six or eight months, you would have had a terrible revolution,‡ the issue of which, none of those who are now at the head of affairs, could have directed in a manner favourable to France. The King is a good man; he has tolerably correct views; but he is surrounded by persons who deceive him; a feudal nobility who incite him to act in a way contrary to the revolution, whose movements he ought to follow. I alone can save France from the evils which menace her, and I have therefore quitted the island of Elba. I have crossed the sea, in vessels similar to those which you employ for transporting your commodities upon canals and rivers, and I have arrived, through the midst of hostile fleets,§ with six hundred men and landed in Provence. This

\* The gross falsehood of this assertion needs no refutation. It is best answered by the conduct of General Maison.

† It is not mentioned whose conscience was so perplexed. Probably the commissary of police. That is an occupation, in France at least, which leaves the conscience quite disengaged for accidental impressions.

‡ There is a homely proverb, which accurately applies to Napoleon. He told the mayor of Lyon, that this revolution would break forth in six weeks; to the mayor of Autun he said it would happen in three months; and he now deferred it for six months. Certainly, they who have strong imaginations should have good memories.

§ Here, again, Napoleon lapsed into a contradiction, which can be accounted for only upon the former supposition, that his inventive faculties were too powerful for his memory. In the official account, which he published, of his voyage, he observed, speaking of the French cruiser, the sight of which so much alarmed him and his followers, "Every thing which was known of the attachment of the crews to the

was my calculation. If the people and the army are not for me, at the first encounter thirty or forty of my soldiers will be killed, the rest will lay down their arms, I shall no longer exist, and France will be tranquil. If the people and the army are for me, as I hope they are, then the first battalion that I meet will give the signal by throwing itself into my arms; the rest will follow; and the revolution will be completed from that moment."

"But are you not afraid that this enterprise will draw down upon France both a civil and a foreign war?"—"I have every reason to believe there will not be a single musket fired. What resistance can be opposed to me? The whole army are in my favour; Marshal Ney is leading his troops to me; you will see his proclamation, it is well written. I have 40,000 men upon this route. Marshal Oudinot is marching with my guard upon Paris.\* Every where the people receive me as a liberator. I have marched from Grenoble to this place in the midst of songs; more than three thousand have been made in honour of me.† They are not very excellent in their composition; but their sentiments are admirable: they speak the language of the heart. You must surely hear your peasants sing them; certainly they have also written some in my praise. I shall enter Paris as I entered Grenoble and Lyon. I am secure of the garrison of Paris, and its chiefs. One half of the National Guard are devoted to me. The household troops of the King are composed of old men and children. They talk of La Vendée: but in that country the war can never be again what it has been. La Vendée will not disturb my enterprise, and every thing will be settled time enough to allow me to reach the frontiers before the foreign troops can

national glory, left no reason to doubt that they would hoist the tri-coloured flag, and range themselves on our side." On the 12th of March he wrote to Marshal Ney, that England connived at his escape. If those two assertions were true, then they deprived Bonaparte of the merit which he so ostentatiously vaunted, of having passed through "hostile fleets." If they were not true, they exhibit him varying his falsehoods every moment, adapting his impostures to different times, persons, and places, and incessantly occupied with some new device. (See *Itinéraire*, p. 106.) The greatest of Napoleon's enemies, indeed, must allow that he possessed a talent which entitled him to rank as the first fabulist of his age.

\* The actual conduct of Oudinot was singularly contrasted with this premature declaration of Bonaparte.

† Chamfort long since observed of France that it was "*une monarchie absolue, tempérée par des chansons*." Might not Napoleon have applied to them the words of Pope,

"A land of dancing and of singing slaves?"



arrive." "But, Sire, what will become of the King? Of the princes? Will they return into England?"—"Aye, aye." "Travellers, who have arrived within these two days from Dijon, say that the mail from Geneva is stopped, which they attribute to the occupation of that city by the Austrians. They added, that at the moment of their departure, it was rumoured that Austria was favourable to you."—"I act in concert with no one but the people and the army of France.\* There is no power leagued with me. I have no need of any foreign aid. I do not wish for their assistance, to enable me to re-conquer my empire. I have chosen a favourable moment. At the congress, the plenipotentiaries are embroiled in difficulties; Italy is in flames; Russia has recalled her troops to the north; Prussia has withdrawn her's from the Rhine: there are, indeed, some British in Belgium, but the parliament having assembled, ministers cannot enter upon a foreign war without discussing the question in both houses: I shall therefore have sufficient time before me."

This conversation lasted an hour and a half, during which Napoleon expatiated upon a variety of topics, but all relating to himself or his enterprise. He was remarkably liberal of his own praises, and his egotism never suffered any impediment from truth. He said and unsaid with equal facility. No one ventured to check his garrulity, or to detect his contradictions; and the self-complacency with which he continued to prattle, must, at least, have amused, if it did not convince, his obsequious auditory. The reproach of cowardice, which had been cast upon him, he considered to be repelled, by acquiescing in an appeal to his conduct at the bridge of Lodi; but that single exploit of momentary ardour, when glory could be won only by a desperate effort of courage, and when defeat might have blasted the hopes of an aspiring general, can scarcely be permitted to outweigh the many prudent escapes of the imperial fugitive, who, while he wore the crown, never placed his honour in competition with his life. Speaking of the decree issued against him by Louis, he said, "The King has placed me beyond the protection of the law, he has pronounced me a traitor and a rebel. The King had no right to do this; I am a sovereign as well as himself, and recognized by all the other powers. I am sovereign of the island of Elba, and have come with six hundred men to attack the King of France, and his six hundred thousand soldiers. I conquer his kingdom. Is not

\* Compare this with his reiterated declarations, during the early days of his march from the bay of Juan.

that allowable among princes?"—If it be permitted, without any just cause or pretence, that one sovereign may invade the states of another, then Napoleon was justified in his aggression, in the same degree that he was justified when he stole the Spanish diadem, and butchered the people, or when he subjugated the monarchy of Prussia, and the independence of Holland. The subterfuge of this parallel, however, is palpable. Bonaparte was sovereign of Elba, upon the condition that he remained in Elba. By quitting it, he became a perjured adventurer, and in pursuing his designs through the agency of treason and rebellion, he could be considered only as the leader of rebels and traitors, confederated for the subversion of a legitimate government.

During this discourse, Napoleon incautiously betrayed the motives of his abdication. "Last year," said he, "when the Duke of Ragusa, by his treason, surrendered Paris to the enemy, I still had a formidable army around me, chiefs and soldiers who were devoted to my interests. I could have organised a civil war, the issue of which it would have been difficult to foresee. But I would not." "We were much alarmed," replied one present; "for we dreaded lest our province, covered with woods and mountains, and contiguous to others of a similar description, into which you would doubtless have retired, should become the continual theatre of such a war."—"I wished to save France from so much calamity, and I had recourse to a stratagem which, preserving me to my people, and them to me, would also secure the country from partition, and deliver it from the enemy. I have been a hundred times solicited by the Italians to land among them, and place myself at their head. Eighty thousand soldiers were ready to join me. I replied, that I was contented in Elba. I was not obliged to disclose my secret to them.\*" The credibility of this statement is supported by every thing which we know of the man, by all that has transpired of his enterprise, and by the very nature of the enterprise itself. To hunt him through all his contradictions, to disentangle the mass of his conflicting assertions, and to expose the perpetual fallacies of argument into which he lapsed, would be an unprofitable task; but it may be permitted to notice the amiable sensibility which prevented him from exciting a civil war in 1814, only that he might provoke a tremendous foreign one in 1815.

The usurper was now advancing rapidly upon the capital, and at each step

\* Itinéraire, p. 115.



augmenting his strength, by rallying under his standard every description of force which was sent to oppose him. The only troops that exhibited fidelity to the throne were those in the north, and it might be doubted whether their loyalty would have resisted the pernicious influence of a near approach to the rebels. When Marshal Oudinot assembled the garrison of Metz, amounting to about thirteen thousand men, and offered safe passports to all who wished to join Napoleon, none accepted the offer, but, on the contrary, they eagerly renewed their oaths of allegiance to the King. Meanwhile, the disastrous tidings from the south, the defection of Grenoble and Lyon, and the precipitate return of the Count d'Artois, left but little room to hope that Louis would be able to maintain himself in Paris. Nothing was omitted, however, which could tend to strengthen the royal cause. Energetic proclamations were issued, calling upon the people and the army, to defend the throne and the country from the dangers with which they were menaced. The two chambers, which had been suddenly convened, came to such resolutions as the pressing exigencies of the moment demanded. Every effort was made to conciliate the army, by the promotion of subaltern officers, and by securing to them their pay and allowances. It could not be concealed that the previous neglect of their interests was tacitly admitted by these tardy regulations, which impending peril had alone extorted: it was too apparent they were dictated by fear rather than justice. The result was consistent with the principle. No gratitude was excited, because no kindness was believed: and the boon which was stamped with such suspicious motives, did not perhaps restrain a single officer or soldier from deserting to the usurper. Marshal Angier proposed that the war should be declared national, that the whole population of France should be called out, that rewards should be bestowed upon those who were faithful, pardon extended to those who returned, and exemplary punishment inflicted upon such as persevered in their guilt.

Much was expected from a royal sitting of the Chambers which the King held on the 16th of March, when he proceeded in state to the hall of the deputies. His appearance excited great enthusiasm, and the most consolatory marks of respect and affection were manifested by the assembly, to whom he addressed a suitable and impressive speech. "I have revisited my country," said the unhappy monarch, "and have reconciled her to foreign nations, who will doubtless maintain, with fidelity, the treaties which guarantee the stability of peace. I have laboured for the benefit of my people. I have received, and continue to receive, the most gratifying proofs of their love. Can I, then, at sixty years of

age, do better than die in their defence? For myself I fear nothing. It is only for France that I am alarmed. He who comes to light the torch of civil war among us, brings with him also the scourge of foreign war. He would again reduce our country under his iron yoke. He would destroy that constitutional charter which I have given you—that charter which is my noblest claim to glory in the eyes of posterity—that charter, so dear to every Frenchman, and which I solemnly swear to maintain and protect. Let us then, rally round it! Let it be our sacred standard! The descendants of Henry IV. will be the first to range themselves under it. And, if the two Chambers concur in giving to the executive power all its necessary force at this perilous crisis, the war now excited will become truly a national one, and prove, by its auspicious issue, what a great nation can accomplish when united by love for its King, and the fundamental law of the state."

The sentiments inspired by this frank and noble appeal to the representatives of the people, and the peers of the realm, were such as might be easily anticipated. When the King ceased to speak, the whole assembly rose with one simultaneous movement, and stretching forth their hands towards the throne, swore to live or die in defence of their sovereign, their country, and the laws. It was long before order could be restored; but, as soon as the tumultuous agitation subsided, Monsieur, advancing to the King, declared in his own name, and in that of his family, how deeply they participated in the language just uttered: then, turning round to the assembly, he exclaimed, "We swear on our honour, to maintain the constitutional charter, which secures the happiness of the French."—Again the hall rung with fervent and loyal acclamations, while the King, overwhelmed at once with emotions of public and private feeling, cast himself into his brother's arms, and tenderly embracing him, yielded to the soft dominion of sighs and tears.\* If the voice or wishes of a generous but transient enthusiasm

\* The "Englishman," in his Letters, (Vol. I. p. 142,) calls this "a ridiculous scene;" and no doubt in his estimation it was so, for it exhibited some of the best feelings of our nature, operating upon *legitimate* royalty. He who could calmly indite the foolish and malignant paradox, that "the vice of ingratitude finds no place in the bosom of a usurper, that baseness belonging *only* to such as are born kings," (Vol. I. p. 45,) may be permitted to laugh at the display of fraternal love in a Bourbon. It was unquestionably highly ridiculous for the brother of a King who was not a usurper, to feel like a man; but if the maxim of the "Englishman" be true, the pedigree of virtue must be very brief, for the son of a usurper, succeeding to his father's honours, could not claim this moral inheritance, and gratitude, with its long train of attending virtues, would be found only in successful pretenders, who "wade through slaughter to a crown." It is strange, however, that a man who had so nice a discernment of the



could have driven back the usurper, Napoleon would never have reached Paris. But the energy of action was suffered to evaporate in protestations of loyalty, and what was said, supplied the place of what should have been done.

When the King retired from the sitting, an address was immediately voted to him, full of respect and affection, and which was delivered by M. Lainé, the president of the Chamber of Deputies. In this address, while every homage was offered to the personal virtues of the sovereign, the voice of truth ventured to arraign the past conduct of his ministers. A hope was indulged, that his Majesty would, henceforth, confide the administration of affairs to men, whose names and principles would be considered by the nation as a security against any

ridiculous in others, should have been insensible of it in himself. When describing his adored usurper, Bonaparte, that paragon of gratitude, and great exemplar of all kingly honour and excellence, he gravely tells us, that while reviewing his troops, he sometimes "played with his nose," sometimes "took snuff," and sometimes "looked at his watch." (Vol. I. p. 37.) Could a rightful monarch have done such things? Nay, he goes further, and informs an admiring world, that his Imperial Majesty being somewhat pot-bellied, his shirt hung out above the waistband of his breeches. (*Ibid.*) Prodigious! This abdominal quality, indeed, savours a little of lawful descent, for both Louis XVIII. and the Prince Regent, have that suspicious protuberance. How far the "Englishman" may consider this adipose similarity as favourable to the character of legitimacy, or unfavourable to the claims of usurpation, posterity will perhaps never be informed; but it is probable the obesity of the Regent will at least tend to reconcile the "Englishman" to the principles of the British constitution.

It would be well if the "Englishman" were never betrayed into any thing more reprehensible than childishness fondness for a tyrant, or the manufacture of unmeaning paradoxes. His stern and unrelenting hatred of the Bourbons seems to have festered into so much malignancy, that he insults the most sacred feelings of the human heart, by endeavouring to stigmatise their influence on Louis XVIII. and his family. When the King returned, a natural and pious sensibility prompted him to collect the ashes of his martyred brother and sister, and bestow upon them the common decencies of Christian burial. This provokes the constant spleen of the "Englishman," and with coarse (I had almost said brutal) levity, he talks of Louis "grubbing up his brother's bones," (Vol. I. p. 104,) while he designates the royal family by the revolting phrase of the "bone collecting court." (Ib. p. 175.) I will quarrel with no man for his political or religious opinions; but there are moral charities of feeling which none can discard who wish to be respected in society. That tender and amiable sentiment which teaches every one to venerate the dust of his kindred, who would treat with ridicule or disdain? The voice of nature is on his side, who gathers the ashes of his father or his mother, gives to them the allowed rites of sepulture, and as he marks the spot of earth where they lie, indulges in the fond and pleasing consolation that when he too shall be no more, his own remains will mingle with their's in one common grave. That heart must indeed be hardened into singular depravity, which from the impulse of political rage, can attempt to degrade by sarcasm, or profane by mockery, a sentiment which has been consecrated, in all ages, by the wisest and most virtuous of mankind.

recurrence to former systems, which might endanger actual privileges and possessions. This advice, however just, came too late; and the advisers would have better consulted the exigencies of the state, if, instead of disuniting the government by suspicion or reproach, they had endeavoured to strengthen its resources and give vigour to its operations. When the very foundations of the throne were undermined, it was no longer time to consider how they might embellish or fortify the superstructure.

The wisdom of the conduct pursued by the French government at this period, may be justly questioned. Deception may sometimes promote the success of a bad cause, but can rarely benefit a good one. Where the promulgation of truth would only be the exposure of turpitude, it is not wonderful that falsehood should spread its veil. There is something in the nakedness of vice from which even the vicious shrink. A general may disguise the circumstances of a defeat, if he requires to sustain the spirit and confidence of his army for future battles; but he would act with very little prudence, were he to tell his soldiers that nothing was to be feared from the enemy, or that they were already dispersed and disheartened, at the very moment when they were advancing to the conflict with ardour and rapidity. This absurdity, however, was committed by the ministers of Louis XVIII. Every day, the Parisian journals were filled with the most unqualified assurances of the public security. The existence of danger was hardly admitted, or if admitted, denied to be imminent. Though each hour teemed with fresh proofs of treachery and desertion in the army, nothing was heard but eulogiums upon its fidelity, and expressions of satisfaction at its zeal. Napoleon had penetrated into the very heart of the kingdom, while he was sometimes represented as stationary, and at others as having retrograded. The court and the ministers were trembling at the approaching disaster, yet the *Moniteur* exulted in merry paragraphs at the forlorn condition of the usurper, or gravely argued upon the impossibility of his success. This most unwise system of delusion was maintained to the last moment, and when Louis abandoned his capital, many were left to suppose that Bonaparte was far distant from it. What must have been the injurious effect, of such fabrications? To repress those energies of loyalty and patriotism, which a manly and unreserved exposition of national peril would have summoned into action. The necessity, indeed, of Louis throwing himself upon the people, was the greater, in proportion as it appeared that no reliance could be placed upon the army. It would be presumptuous to affirm that such an appeal would have been entirely successful; but the experi-



ment should have been made. By abstaining from it, the disposition of the people was never fairly ascertained, while the enterprise of the usurper was negatively promoted.

There was no time, however, to rectify errors, or to engraft the counsels of deliberate wisdom upon the crude and hasty decisions of a fluctuating necessity. In ordinary transactions, the oversight of to-day may be palliated or removed by the prudence of to-morrow. Even in the more pressing exigencies of political danger, there is generally an intervening period which allows scope for sagacity to devise, what vigorous promptitude may afterwards perform, and sometimes, for brief experience to redeem the mistakes of precipitation. But here, the hurricane was hourly widening its devastation and accelerating its progress. Whatever could be done, was done too late, if not commenced immediately. The march of Napoleon was like the inundation of a river which has burst its banks. The spectator, who idly gazes on its distant havoc, soon finds the encroaching flood rolling beneath his feet. He is obliged to fly, almost before he has begun to think how he may stem the destructive torrent. Bonaparte distinctly comprehended the instruments of his success; but the ministers of Louis did not so clearly see the means by which the probability of their's was to be determined. It is not intended to infer, (for it would be a foolish presumption,) that there existed any power in the state, however combined or however exerted, that could have prevented the usurpation: but there seems some reason to conclude, that either from dismay which enervated their resolutions, or from a vain confidence in their security which relaxed them, a steady, consistent unity of action was supplied by a feeble, detached and ambiguous system.

Too much reliance was placed, or affected to be placed, upon the honour of the French nation, as if the supposition of its existence could create it. The experience of five and twenty years was at once obliterated from the calculation of statesmen, who had to uphold the throne in that hour of peril, and where facts should have been their guide, they looked for miracles. A people possessing honour may own its obligations and act from its impulse, but what was there in the long series of revolutionary governments that had alternately oppressed and degraded France, which could cherish such a sentiment in her population? To each and all they had submissively bowed. The reign of terror, of anarchy, and of despotism, like wave propelling wave, had successively exacted and obtained obedience. The return of the Bourbons was only another transformation in their

long pantomime of royalty ; and to suppose that a residence of ten months had engendered any chivalrous attachment to Louis XVIII. any romantic ardour in his cause, any anxiety for his rule, beyond the suggestions of self-interest, was to discard the sober dictates of reason for the wild dreams of fancy. If it be denied that the ministers themselves were the dupes of that fiction with which they sought to delude others, then they are open to the accusation of having practised those paltry arts of deception so familiar to Napoleon, and which were not without their influence in contributing to his overthrow.\*

While ineffectual efforts were made for assembling an adequate royal force at Melun, Vincennes, and Villejuif, at the latter of which places Macdonald fixed his head-quarters, as commander of the army under the Duke de Berri, Napoleon was hastening his unobstructed march towards the gates of the capital. On the 17th, before he quitted Avallon, he ordered all the letters which had arrived from Paris and elsewhere, to be brought to him, and having opened them, to discover whatever intelligence they might contain, he set off at noon, for Vermanton and Auxerre. At Auxerre he slept that night. Scarcely had he arrived, when he summoned the resident clergy, and particularly M. Viart, vicar-general and curate of the cathedral, into his presence, to proffer their respectful homage. He encountered, however, a mortifying denial, which proclaimed he was not yet Emperor of France with all that plenitude of authority he heretofore possessed, abused, and abdicated. To his first mandate a positive refusal was given. A second message, more imperative, was dismissed with no greater ceremony. When a third command arrived, accompanied with menaces, M. Viart returned an answer of compliance. At that moment it was necessary to perform some stated duty of religion in the cathedral, which its

\* Yet they disclaimed, with apparent sincerity, any imitation of that wretched system of falsehood and evasion. So late as the 18th of March, only two days before Napoleon entered Paris, and when all Paris believed the catastrophe at least doubtful if not impossible, in the very teeth of fabrications which that event was soon to falsify, their pretensions to veracity were officially blazoned forth. "The government," said the *Moniteur*, "has deemed it unworthy to adopt that system of artifice and dissimulation which was employed by its predecessors ; a system, which without hindering any disastrous news from being soon promulgated, destroyed the influence of favourable intelligence, and paralysed all energy by annihilating confidence."—"The government will neither exaggerate nor conceal any thing. It has placed, in the very first rank of its duties, that of constantly avowing the truth ; and it is too well acquainted with Frenchmen not to be certain that they will always be worthy of hearing it."



intrepid and conscientious minister would not deign to omit in order to propitiate the usurper. The time elapsed and M. Viart did not arrive. A messenger was despatched, ordering his immediate attendance. *God, before man*, he replied, and calmly proceeded to church. When the service was over, he repaired, in company with some of his brethren, to the prefecture, where Bonaparte held his abode. He was told his Majesty would give no more audiences that evening. M. Viart cheerfully departed, but had scarcely reached his own home, when the prefect arrived to conduct him back again. At length he was introduced to Napoleon, and a conversation ensued between them, which exhibited only an angry petulance on the part of the usurper, remarkably contrasted with the unassuming firmness of M. Viart.

Bonaparte remained at Auxerre during the following day, the 18th, waiting for the arrival of his troops, and for intelligence from Paris. Early in the morning of the 19th he set off, and was met on the road by the public authorities of Joigny. He halted about an hour in this town, and then proceeded towards Sens. Here also he merely staid while he changed horses; but he sent an officer to the mayor (Count de Laurencin,) to express his regret at not being able to remain longer. The amiable motive of his speed should not be concealed. It was, "to save the effusion of blood." No one will doubt the sincerity of this desire, who recollects the many occasions on which a similar philanthropy animated his tender and benevolent heart.\* At night-fall he reached Pont-sur-Yonne, where he reposed a few hours, and on the following morning (the 20th,) at four o'clock arrived at Fontainebleau. At this moment, the troops of the garrison of Paris, received orders to return to the capital; a retreat which was effected by the Swiss Guards without losing a man from desertion. They entered Paris in the

\* The author of the *Itinéraire* is ungenerous enough to insinuate a doubt respecting the compassionate disposition of Napoleon, and relates the following incident to justify his incredulity. The reader will judge to what credibility it is entitled. "When he arrived at Pont-sur-Yonne, he found a boat, filled with some of his soldiers, which was moored, on account of the darkness, and waiting till day-light to pursue its course. Bonaparte, displeased at this delay, asked the sailors *if they were afraid of wetting themselves?* This question was heard by the soldiers, who immediately compelled them to hoist their sails. Scarcely, however, had the boat proceeded, when it sunk to the bottom. Sixty soldiers, a colonel, and several officers were drowned. Bonaparte witnessed the transaction unmoved, nor is it recorded that he slept the less soundly that night for having thus causelessly consigned his devoted followers to an untimely grave."

evening, and with silent dejection crossed the boulevard St. Antoine towards St. Denis, where they were disbanded. Their conduct remained without imitation, except by a few individuals who dared to be faithful to their monarch, their country, and their oaths, amid the general infamy.

The King had now no alternative but to abandon his capital and seek safety in flight, or surrender himself, a useless victim, to the vengeance of a sanguinary faction. Prudence dictated the former course. Despair alone could have suggested the latter. The motives which induce a man to save his life can rarely receive rhetorical embellishment. They are generally composed of materials too homely and too coarse, and will not admit of those splendid decorations with which our fancies invest the more captivating themes of expiring heroes and patriots. When Louis XVIII. held his royal sitting, and asked the assembled senate "what he could do better than terminate a career of sixty years by dying in defence of his people," who doubts that the monarch would have acted as he spoke, had a just occasion presented itself? But the sovereign who is prepared to bleed for his subjects, ought to find that determination reciprocal. Mutual defence demands mutual sacrifices, and if the nation had rallied round its King, honour and gratitude would equally have impelled him to survive or perish with it. He was absolved from his self-imposed obligation, by their criminal neglect of duty for whose benefit it was incurred. He might, indeed, have remained at Paris, to dignify the usurper's triumph, or to gratify his implacable revenge; he might have staid, to fall by the hand of a private assassin, or the judicial mockery of a regicide tribunal; he might have lingered in the palace of his ancestors, to emulate the martyrdom of his brother. But, could the future incense of some school-boy's declamation, or the unthinking applause of history, justify an act, which might have endangered the interests of his family, and exposed his country to the unsparing havock of a vindictive war? There existed, in fact, no necessity which called for such a step, and to encounter unavailing peril is the attribute of folly rather than of wisdom or of valour. The King fled from dangers which he neither sought nor provoked, as the bravest man on earth may attempt to escape from midnight depredators who are bursting into his house. His was not the coward flight of a general who leads thousands to the field of battle, and when slaughter has done its work, hurries from the carnage with fear and trepidation, meanly anxious for his own life, to preserve which, perhaps, the fatal butchery was prolonged. Napoleon's memorable journies from Moscow, Leipsic, and



Waterloo, were of the latter description : yet his partisans have exulted in feeble sarcasms, at the departure of Louis when a rebellious army was invading his unprotected capital.

It was not, however, until the last moment that Louis determined to withdraw himself from Paris, and when there was no longer any possibility of saving it from the hands of the usurper. Yielding to the persuasion of his friends and the advice of his ministers, he reluctantly ascended his carriage at one o'clock in the morning of the 20th of March. The resolution seems to have been suddenly taken, either from the long-resisting scruples of the King, or from the unexpected arrival of news which did not admit of deliberation. In the apartment of Louis was found his writing-desk, containing a correspondence of many years with the Duchess D'Angouleme, some letters from Louis XVI. and various tokens of family remembrance. Even his minister, M. de Blacas, left behind him an iron box filled with state papers, many of which, it is said, tended to compromise his character. But, notwithstanding this hasty departure, and the unusual hour of its occurrence, a considerable crowd had assembled at the Tuileries, to offer to their unhappy sovereign the homage of their prayers and sorrows. His faithful servants melted into tears, as they assisted him down the steps of the palace, and the sympathetic emotion was communicated to the surrounding spectators. The King maintained a firm demeanor, and exhibited, in his countenance, only a tender solicitude for those whose fidelity to him, in that moment of severe trial, could not but excite his gratitude. "Cease your tears," said he, in a tone of unaffected sensibility, "I shall soon return."

It was feared, by the friends of the royal cause, that Louis would perhaps pass into England, and thus deprive his adherents of the authority and influence they might derive from his presence or proximity. But this apprehension was groundless, for the monarch first directed his course to Lille, a strong frontier town, memorable in the military history of Europe. He was accompanied by the Duke of Orleans and the Prince of Condé. During the whole of his journey, he was greeted with every demonstration of attachment and respect, by the people ; but the soldiers, though they abstained from any seditious excesses, evinced by their sullen apathy that Napoleon was still their idol. The household troops escorted Louis to the confines of France, and then returned. When he entered Lille, the inhabitants displayed much loyalty, and would have testified more, had

they not been coerced by the garrison, whom not even the presence of the King could deter from audaciously hoisting the republican standard upon the citadel, and wearing the tri-coloured cockade. This outrage sufficiently indicated the necessity of retiring from Lille,\* and accordingly, on the 23d of March, Louis

\* It was here that Louis received the declaration of the Congress at Vienna, which he immediately ordered to be affixed on the walls of the town, and all public places, and distributed among the soldiers. It was hoped that the promulgation of this document would have intimidated them; but, on the contrary, it rather exasperated their feelings, and tended to produce that desperate ferocity which guilt often assumes when goaded to the worst, by the extremity of its condition. They even meditated the daring enterprise of seizing the King's person, and conveying him as a prisoner to Napoleon. Marshal Mortier commanded at Lille, and probably his influence restrained their licentious fury, while he hastened to the King, and implored him to depart, as he could not answer for the consequences that might otherwise ensue. This counsel was immediately adopted, and it then required all the firmness and ascendancy which Mortier possessed, to save the Duke of Orleans, who still remained at Lille, from the vengeance of the soldiery, thus disappointed in their first design. Their rage was the more tumultuous, because intelligence arrived that the Duke de Berri was advancing upon Lille with some of the household troops, and two Swiss regiments. Happily, the bloodshed which their entrance would have produced, was averted by a change in the direction of their march, when they heard that the King was no longer in Lille. They proceeded towards the frontiers, which they refused to pass, and were accordingly disbanded in the neighbourhood of Bethune.

It has been said that Mortier received an order from Napoleon to arrest the King and Princes at Lille, but that he suppressed its publication till they had quitted the city. According to the official relation of the King's journey, it appears that Louis XVIII. had quitted Lille before this mandate arrived, and that he was informed of it when he reached Ostend, by the Duke of Orleans. The "Englishman" very consistently (Vol. I. p. 159,) expresses his regret that the order was not enforced. A little sprinkling of royal blood upon the newly kindled embers of Jacobinism would have been peculiarly delicious. Not that he, "good easy man," believed there was any danger of such a catastrophe. With whatever anticipated delight he may have snuffed up the steaming incense of a murdered King, reeking from the shambles of his beloved democracy, (for not even his favourite system of usurpation can quite reconcile him to a monarchy) he innocently pretends, that the Bourbon princes would have been perfectly safe in the custody of Bonaparte. A glutted tyger does not devour his prey till hunger rouses him; neither would Napoleon have sacrificed his captives till instigated by necessity, the political hunger of his precarious authority. Besides, had not Bonaparte, when at Lyon, published a proclamation, sequestering the property of the Bourbons, and declaring them liable to suffer death if found within the French territory, according to the law of the Convention, which was revived in its full force? What construction would the "Englishman" put upon that document, when he talked of their safety? He wonders, with the same air of apparent simplicity, that the English, who were in Paris when Bonaparte returned, hastened to make their escape. Were they to forget the infamous detention of their countrymen in 1803? Oh no:—but Napoleon would not repeat such an act of despotism. Perhaps so; but who holds out his hand to a venomous reptile that he may be stung a second time?

It is sometimes amusing to observe the overstrained rancour with which our "Englishman" hunts a Bourbon through every page of his work. Describing the King's departure from France, and anxious to



re-commenced his journey and proceeded to Ghent. Previously to quitting Paris, he issued a proclamation,\* dated the 19th of March, in which he alleged that his motive for withdrawing was to prevent those "multiplied misfortunes," which would result to all classes of the inhabitants, if he remained and disputed the entrance of the rebels. He consoled his people with the assurance that he should soon return; closed the sittings of the Chambers, ordering the peers and deputies to separate; and declaring, that he should convoke them again with as little delay as possible, wherever he might find it expedient to establish the provisional seat of government.

This proclamation was posted up in different quarters of the city, but the partisans of Bonaparte soon tore it down. It was also inserted in the *Moniteur* of the following day, and would probably have made a considerable impression throughout the country, had not Lavalette, who was Director of the Posts under Bonaparte, and who immediately resumed his authority when he heard of the King's flight, prevented the journals from going into the provinces.† This officious zeal would doubtless have been duly rewarded, if Napoleon had preserved his usurped authority.

The capital, meanwhile, presented an aspect at once curious and alarming, in

give it a ludicrous character, (the gentleman's talent lies in the ridiculous,) he says, "only one *drunken* dragoon on a lame horse, pushed his way after him, through the British picquets, and toppled into Menin, crying *Vive le Roi*." (Vol. I. p. 158.) Assuming this to be a fact, which is granting a great deal, the reason of it is explained by the "Englishman" himself, in the very page preceding. "The King took the road to Menin, which was in possession of an English regiment, the Colonel of which stated to his Majesty, that no French troops would be allowed to pass the frontier." (p. 157.) How inveterately a man must love a scurrilous joke, who can stoop to find it in so poor an evasion.

\* See Appendix, No. III.

† This man was afterwards tried and condemned to death, but, by the assistance of three Englishmen, (Sir R. Wilson, and Messrs. Bruce and Hutchinson,) he effected his escape from France. Their conduct was certainly imprudent, but he would be a severe moralist, who could pronounce it criminal, under the peculiar circumstances of the case. Nothing, however, could exceed the absurd bombast with which they endeavoured to justify what they had done. If any thing could make the British Constitution, and the liberty it secures, ridiculous and contemptible, it would be the pertinacious arrogance with which those gentlemen invoked its principles as a protection against the municipal law of France. An Englishman when abroad, is at all times too apt to consider himself as one of the lords of human kind; but it was surely reserved for this triumvirate to insist upon the right of violating, and afterwards insulting, the laws of another country, *because* they were born under the British sceptre.

the mingled symptoms\* of suspicion, confidence, tranquillity and tumult which were exhibited. The royal government had ceased: the functions of the rebel one had not commenced. The tribunals of justice assembled and decreed; the police performed its office; the shops were opened, and the business of the day seemed to proceed as usual. The news of the King's departure, however, gradually diffused itself over the city, and alternately inspired terror or delight. Groups of citizens collected in the public squares and walks, some in consternation at what might happen next, others, with shouts of exultation proclaiming the usurper's triumph. The King's friends were many and respectable, but unarmed; the adherents of Bonaparte, numerically stronger than the former, were powerful also from their military character, and from the desperate habits of those associated with them. Whenever they met, cries of *Vive le Roi*, and *Vive L'Empereur*, were heard from either side, and fierce contentions would often have ensued, had not the national guard interposed. The effusion of blood was thus prevented, but the public anxiety hourly increased. Attempts were made, fortunately without success, to produce that anarchy and confusion which would have afforded opportunities for plunder, and bands of ruffians, collected from the very dregs of wretchedness and vice, paraded the streets, with loud menaces of pillage. In this state of horrible suspense, the peaceful and virtuous part of the inhabitants were doomed to remain, till the arrival of Bonaparte, which terminated indeed their doubts, upon one point, but left them exposed to all the worst apprehensions which such a revolution was naturally calculated to excite. The imperial standard had waved over the Tuileries since two o'clock, by the order of General Excelmans, who preceded the usurper; and this symbol of successful treason was hailed with reiterated acclamations by the fickle populace who, three months after, vociferated just as vehemently when the white banner preceded the second entry of Louis.\*

Napoleon was still at Fontainebleau, when he heard, at seven o'clock in the morning, that the King had quitted Paris. It may be wondered that he did not

\* The pliant character of a Frenchman defies any obligation of moral or political duty. He seems always to act upon the philosophical maxim of our great ethic poet—"whatever is, is right."—An amusing instance of this profligate versatility is related by the author of "*L'Europe tourmentée par la Révolution en France, &c.*" The curate of Quoy, a village about twelve miles from Poitiers, preached, on the 19th of March, for Louis XVIII.: he even urged his congregation to take up arms in his defence. Immediately upon the return of Napoleon, he assembled his parishioners, begged pardon for what he had done, and harangued them in favour of the Emperor who, he said, was sent to them by God himself.—It may be presumed he had not the effrontery to say he also came from the same quarter.



immediately depart, and resume his abdicated crown with all the pomp and splendour of a triumphal procession. He knew the prevailing folly of the people, and that, captivated by external magnificence, by the outward show of ceremony and greatness, they rarely inquired into the reason of the exhibition. They would dance as gaily in the train of a conqueror, or before the chariot of a tyrant, as in the celebration of a just and beneficent monarch, who dispensed to them all the blessings of a mild and paternal government. Thousands of anxious spectators were waiting to witness his approach, yet he deferred it, till, shrouded in the darkness of night, he stole into his good city of Paris as if ashamed or fearful of the reception he anticipated. It was nine o'clock in the evening when he alighted at the palace of the Tuileries. A long train of carriages and horses, conveying generals, municipal bodies, and grand dignitaries of the imperial court, had set forth to meet him. They were received with condescension, but Napoleon declined to exchange his travelling coach for any of the splendid vehicles they had brought. He now avoided pomp with as much solicitude as formerly he had indulged in it; not that his love of ostentation was less, but that his apprehensions were greater.\* Could he have been assured, that a public entry into Paris would be unaccompanied by any expression of popular opinion hostile to his enterprise, who doubts that he would have graced his return with all the solemn state which pride or flattery could suggest? It was his interest to do so, for it

A reluctant confession of Napoleon's humiliating entry is extorted even from the "Englishman," whose love of truth, in this instance, deserves to be respected, when we remember what such an avowal must have cost him. "Napoleon is *not popular*, except with the actual army, and with the inhabitants of certain departments; and, perhaps, even with them his popularity is only relative. At no place is there so great a portion of the population so decidedly averse to him as at Paris. The nobles of St. Germain are his declared foes—they have seceded: the shopkeepers, whose interest is connected with peace, wish him no good, as long as they see in him a promise of perpetual war. Hence, Paris, on the entry of Napoleon, presented but a mournful spectacle. The crowd, which went out to meet the Emperor, remained in the outskirts of the city; the shops were shut; no one appeared at the windows; the boulevards were lined with a multitude collected about the many mountebanks, tumblers, &c., which for the two last days had been placed there in greater numbers than usual by the police, in order to divert the populace. There was no noise, nor any acclamations: a few low murmurs and whispers were alone heard, when the spectators of these open shews turned round to look at the string of six or eight carriages which preceded the imperial troops. The regiments then passed along, and cried out *Vive L'Empereur*;—not a word from any one. They tried the more popular and ancient exclamation, *Vive Bonaparte*;—all still silent. The patience of the dragoons was exhausted; some brandished their swords, others drew their pistols, and rode into the alleys, amidst the people, exclaiming, '*crie donc, Vive L'Empereur!*' but the crowd only gave way, and retreated without uttering a word. Lady —— was present; I have the account from her."—Such is the relation of one who worshipped Napoleon as an idol; and the testimony of an unwilling witness, when it supports the general course of evidence, is always entitled to belief.

would have shown that he dared meet the people in the character he assumed, and claim the honours which they owed him as their liberator. The applause of the multitude, the exultation of the citizens, would have constituted a civil triumph, worth all he had derived from his ascendancy over the military. In his bold calculation of chances, at so critical a moment of his fortune, he would have risked much, had he been sure of gaining something. But the danger was too great, the loss too certain; and he prudently preferred to entrench himself in the Tuileries with an obedient army, before he ventured to receive the congratulations of his subjects.\* Whoever has attentively observed the character and actions of this man during his extraordinary career, and compares the sort of theatrical bombast which uniformly accompanied his designs, or announced his exploits, with the meek and timorous humility he now displayed, can feel no difficulty in explaining the contrast. When he arrived at the Tuileries, he found a crowd of officers, soldiers, ministers, friends, and agents, waiting at the foot of the grand staircase. They pressed round him with importunate demonstrations of joy; but Napoleon seemed to view their impetuous delight with the distrust which a usurper might naturally entertain, who reflects that the hand of an assassin often executes its purpose in the mask of obsequious flattery. He strove, in vain, to shake off the clinging sycophants, while he gently reproved them by observing, "My friends, you stifle me." At length, the Count de Montalivet, some aides-de-camp, and other officers, ventured to violate the dignity of his imperial person, and taking him in their arms, conveyed their precious burden to the apartments where his sisters, Julia and Hortensia, with

\* Miss Williams, in her "Narrative," corroborates the statement of the "Englishman," and as she was in Paris at the time, she probably describes what she saw. "The northern boulevard, from the gates of St. Denis and St. Martin, to the barrier, was crowded in the afternoon by Bonaparte's allies, the mob of the eastern Fauxbourgs. Many hideous figures had crept from their holes on this triumphant occasion; and as a refreshing subsidy had been distributed to these new sovereigns, they had qualified themselves by intoxication to share in the benefit of the *joyeuse entrée*. Paris had not been affrighted by such appearances, male and female, since the days of their former reign in the time of terror, when their ministry had been actively employed, and duly rewarded, as revolutionary committee-men, attendants at the daily assassinations, and what was called *les tricoteuses de la guillotine*, on account of their practice of knitting at the foot of the scaffold while they were waiting for the sad spectacle. It required all the vigilance of the national guard of the city to keep the semblance of order; for the few regular troops who remained in Paris, ashamed of such confederates, disdained the occupation. The day closed, and Napoleon had not yet appeared. He was aware of the greetings that awaited him, and lingered on the road till night should screen his entry, and save him the disgrace of such a reception. The mob, or such at least as could yet vociferate *Vive L'Empereur*, remained at their posts; while he, traversing other streets than those in which he was expected, arrived at nine in the evening at the palace of the Tuileries."



the principal individuals composing his household, were assembled to greet his return.\*

Although he had sustained incredible fatigue during his march from the gulf of Juan, and had taken no regular repose after quitting Lyon, he did not even now venture to seek that relief in sleep which his exhausted frame required. The greater part of the night was devoted to close consultation with his ministers, upon the steps which it would be necessary to take, in order to secure the crown he had usurped, and in arranging the proceedings of the ensuing day. Meanwhile, a battalion, consisting of officers of all ranks, who had joined his standard between Grenoble and Paris, mounted guard in the Carrousel, to protect their general and Emperor. This chosen band was affectingly denominated the *Sacred Battalion*; but it must have appeared a useless precaution to those who maintained that Napoleon was ardently desired by the nation. What better safeguard could such a monarch require, than their hearts and hands by whom he was so beloved?

His puerile confidence in auguries and lucky days did not desert him on this occasion. The 20th of March happened to be the anniversary of his son's birth, and the casual coincidence was considered as an auspicious omen. His courtiers, who knew the superstitious weakness of their master, indulged in predictions which the wishes, as well as credulity of Napoleon, tempted him to believe. Imposture was summoned in aid of prophecy. In reply to a question when France would be blessed with the presence of the august infant, he answered, that the Empress and her son would arrive on the 5th of April, with as little hesitation as if his will were absolute upon the event. The policy of this fraud was obvious, and the abortive attempt afterwards made to carry off the child from Vienna, proved the importance which Bonaparte attached to it. An accidental transition in the weather was another source of consolatory presage. For some time previously to the 20th of March, it had been cold and stormy; on that day it became calm and serene, and the sun appeared in the horizon diffusing his genial warmth and influence. Even this trivial variation in the elements, this common accident of nature, was seized upon by Napoleon as a token of celestial approbation.†

\* This ludicrous scene is attested equally by his friends and enemies. See "Itinéraire," p. 140; "Cinque Mois de L'Histoire de France par M. Warin," p. 233; "M. Gallais," p. 195; and "Une Année de la Vie de L'Empereur Napoleon," p. 195.

† M. Gallais *Hist. de la Rev. du 20 Mars*, p. 197. Shakspeare represents Richard III. as watching

The anomalies of man furnish a fruitful theme for philosophy. Here we behold a once powerful monarch,—an intrepid adventurer, who had braved no common dangers in his ascent to greatness,—a general, familiar with peril from his earliest years, weakly submitting to the dominion of idle fancies, from which the meanest peasant in his realm was probably exempt. Of such various and opposing qualities are we compounded! Now, soaring to the skies,—now, grovelling upon the earth: at one time, wielding the destinies of mankind, like some being of a superior order;—at another, the slave of appetites or prejudices, which make us less than human: to-day, the idol of our fellow creatures;—to-morrow, their scorn and jest. But, in all and every change, vindicating the eternal will of Providence, who has endowed us with faculties of large and comprehensive grasp, with sordid passions, and aspiring hopes, to prove at once our divinity, our corruption, and our immortality.

On the following day, (March 21st,) Bonaparte reviewed his troops, by whom he was received with the customary enthusiasm. Having ordered them to form into squares, he delivered the following harangue, which at least had the merit of affecting no disguise as to the instruments upon which he relied for success, and by which he obtained it:—

“Soldiers, I have entered France with six hundred men, because I reckoned upon the love of the people, and the recollection of veteran troops. I have not failed in my enterprise. Soldiers, I thank you. The glory of what has been done belongs entirely to the people and to you. The only merit I claim, is that of having justly known and appreciated you.

“Soldiers, the throne of the Bourbons was illegitimate, because it was erected by the hands of foreigners, because it was proscribed by the will of the nation; and, lastly, because it afforded security only to a small number of arrogant men, whose pretensions were hostile to our rights.

“Soldiers, the imperial throne can alone maintain the privileges of the

the appearance of the sun with similar anxiety before the battle of Bosworth; and Bonaparte might have inferred an unwelcome truth from the following lines, slightly altered,

“ ————— Why what is that to me  
 “ More than to Louis? For the self-same heaven  
 “ That smiles on me, looks pleasingly on him.”



people, and above all, the first of interests, our glory. Soldiers, we must march and drive from the French territory those princes who are the auxiliaries of foreigners. The nation will second us with its wishes, and follow our example. The French people and myself rely upon you: we will not interfere with the affairs of others, and woe to those who interfere with ours!"

Just as he had concluded this address, he saw General Cambronne approaching at the head of those troops who had accompanied him from the island of Elba. He immediately exclaimed, "Behold the officer of the battalion who partook of my misfortunes! They are all my friends. They were dear to my heart: in loving them, I loved you all: they bring you back your eagles. Treason, and some calamitous circumstances, had covered them with funeral crape. But, thanks to the French people and to you, they re-appear glittering in all their former glory. Swear that they shall always be present wherever the interests of our country require them." *We swear!* was instantly vociferated by all the soldiers.

Satisfied with the success of this piece of state mummery, Napoleon returned to the palace, to superintend the civil regulations of his newly recovered power; but before we narrate his proceedings, it may be desirable to examine the course pursued by the allied sovereigns against him and his adherents.

CHAPTER IV.

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IT deserves to be recorded, as a memorable instance of political folly, that grave disputants were found who questioned the legality of a war, undertaken expressly for the purpose of dethroning Napoleon. It must be admitted, indeed, that this fantastical controversy was raised by a class of reasoners, whose opinions were not far removed from their wishes. They declaimed, because Bonaparte was proscribed. The man, not the cause, provoked their zeal. The principle of foreign interference, always an important inquiry, was artfully blended with the individual case of the usurper; and they affected to discern no difference between vindicating the obligations of a solemn pact, and violating the independence of a nation; between fighting for safety, and arming for injustice. To relieve Napoleon from the necessity of observing the treaty of Fontainebleau, they willingly incurred the absurdity, of denying to the allies the right of enforcing it. To secure him in the possession of that power he had seized, they discovered that no confederacy was legitimate which combined for its destruction. The morality of the first doctrine, and the logic of the second, were equally worthy of applause. A gross and notorious breach of faith, was no crime when committed by Bonaparte, and therefore deserved no punishment. The restoration of a system, whose hostility to the safety of every European state had been demonstrated, was no longer formidable, because adversity had mitigated the ferocity of the despot, and therefore, though we had been stung once, we were to believe the reptile harmless then. The question was very ingenuously asked, whether Napoleon was the only person in the world, who was to be denied the benefit of experience? Supposing the exile to have derived every possible advantage from reflecting upon his past career, it might still have been inquired, in return, whether the allies were not entitled to claim the same benefit; and assuming the fact, what practical



consequences could be expected, but a prudent determination not to repeat the lesson which they perfectly understood? In favour of the confederates, there was the positive evidence of recorded events, and the argumentative proofs of analogy, founded upon the nature of the human character. In favour of the usurper, there was only the slender probability, that eleven months of a compulsory abdication had operated an entire change in his disposition, and the very equivocal assertions of himself or his friends, that the tyger would henceforth be a lamb. Was it extraordinary, that instead of confiding in the metamorphosis, they preferred to pluck out his claws?

The abdication of Bonaparte was a formal instrument that could hardly be vitiated by any subsequent proceedings of the allies, because it was not made contingent upon obligations which they contracted to fulfil. It was an absolute and unconditional renunciation, for himself, and his heirs, of all future claim to the thrones of France and Italy, without any reservation, either implied or expressed. The only reason assigned was, that the allied powers had proclaimed him to be "the sole obstacle to the restoration of peace in Europe." Unless, therefore, it could have been shewn that that reason no longer existed, and that the allies ceased to regard him as an obstacle in the way of peace, how could the validity of his abdication be impaired? The treaty of Fontainebleau followed; and it is worthy of remark, that the first article of that treaty, recited merely that the Emperor Napoleon, renounced for himself, his heirs, and all the branches of his family, all right of sovereignty over France, Italy, and every other country, without making that renunciation dependent, in the slightest degree, upon the performance of any stipulations on the part of the allies. The full and entire surrender of his authority seemed to be exacted from him, not provisionally, not upon condition that certain things should be executed by the other party, but absolutely, and without the implication of any correlative duties it stood unconnected and alone. There was no sentence in the treaty which indicated that the subsequent stipulations emanated from that primary one. It appeared to admit of this construction. Napoleon Bonaparte, having solemnly covenanted to renounce the imperial, and every other power, except what he might derive from that compact, they accepted his renunciation, and in return agreed to guarantee certain privileges and benefits to him and his family. This they did, because he had so covenanted, but not as the principle or condition of the covenant itself.

It is not intended to rely upon this view of the treaty of Fontainebleau as an

argument to prove the legitimacy of the war with Bonaparte. It is urged, rather, as a plausible interpretation of which it seems susceptible. It may be equally contended, that the engagements entered into by the allies were framed as a compensation, however inadequate, for the sacrifice made by Napoleon, and that he had, consequently, a right to demand their exact fulfilment. In conceding this position, no great triumph will be gained by his advocates, who asserted that they were not scrupulously performed. The failure, if any, attached to the King of France, who neglected to pay the money stipulated for the support of Napoleon and his family: but he was no contracting party. It is true, the allies guaranteed, by the twentieth article, the execution of the treaty, and undertook to have it recognised by the French government. Admitting, then, that it was not duly performed, Bonaparte was bound, as in every similar case, to appeal to his sureties, and if no redress followed, he became entitled to seek it by other means. Did he make his appeal? Did he remonstrate upon the violation of the treaty, supposing a violation to have taken place? No. He invaded France, and sought indemnification at the point of the sword. It is clear, however, if he possessed the right of adopting this alternative, the allies had a right to resist it, because its very assumption was falsely founded upon an implied denial of justice in the ordinary way. They could not be dispossessed of their right, to insist upon the performance of the treaty according to their construction, because Napoleon interpreted it by a construction of his own, unless it be absurdly contended that he alone was to judge of its object. In the civil relations of life, where individuals mutually contract for the attainment of a specific purpose, such a doctrine would be despised for its inconsistency; and what axiom of public law sanctions it as applicable to political transactions?

Driven from the technical defence of a diplomatic formality, the apologists of Napoleon took shelter behind a very specious and fascinating dogma. The trite proverb of a school-boy was elevated into a principle of national policy, and *Vox populi, vox Dei*, became the emblematical device of their shield and banner. With that panoply they descended fearlessly into the arena, secure of victory in the intellectual conflict. Englishmen might be expected to acknowledge the practical force of such an argument, and its theoretical beauty could not be lost even upon foreigners. The voice of the people ought to be decisive, in a question which involves the welfare of the people. As an abstract proposition, it had all the conclusive force of an established maxim, and no one was hardy enough to dispute it.—But the fallacy which it contained, when applied to the enterprise of Napoleon, could not escape the most shallow discernment. The people of France,



if by that term we comprehend the majority of her adult population, were neither consulted before, nor had the opportunity of speaking after, the usurpation. The rabble, with few exceptions, was their substitute, during the progress of Bonaparte, and a faction became their organ upon his assumption of the imperial authority. They remained silent, while the voice of treason disposed of the throne. Nor could their silence be construed into acquiescence. It was the melancholy, but intelligible stillness of despair. The portentous evil burst upon them like the bolt from heaven, and before they could recover from their consternation, they found their cause identified with the interests of Europe. On the success or failure of the one, depended the issue of the other, and they remained passive because the world was in arms.

If any proof were needed, that the French people never considered the usurpation of Napoleon as a national transaction, it might be found in their conduct, after the battle of Waterloo. The stupendous disasters of that day, threw Bonaparte at once upon popular support. His army, that distinct and separate body, whose sedition carried him to Paris, and whose zeal kept him there, had been nearly annihilated. A victorious enemy were pursuing him to the very gates of the capital. He had no salvation but in the energy and devotion of his subjects. Did a single province rise? Did a single city proclaim its determination to defend his falling fortunes? Were the scenes of the revolution renewed, when thousands and tens of thousands swelled the ranks of successive armies, to repel foreign interference, and to assert their own right? Did the nation, as one vast body, spring forward, and oppose its bosom to the swords of the invaders? Just the reverse. The clamours of the guilty were alone heard. The call of the rebels was loud and vehement, but who answered it? Treason, in the garb of patriotism, stalked abroad, and cried, the country is lost! Where were its defenders? In the ranks of its betrayers. If Napoleon was that liberator, that saviour, that free choice of a free people, which his partisans affirmed, why was he "deserted at his utmost need?" If, in his welfare consisted the welfare of France, if he alone could make her happy, and great, and prosperous, and independent, if he returned, only to bestow those blessings, and was permitted to remain, only to secure them, why were the people so cold, so passive, so motionless, when all the boasted glories and benefits of his reign were passing away like a shadow? The history of other countries, the history of France herself, would have led us to expect far different things. A war upon a people, and a war upon a sovereign, are perfectly dissimilar. This lesson Bonaparte practically learned in Spain, and happy would he have been if he could have taught it

to the allies. But the people of France rejected him as a despot whose enormous tyranny they remembered with horror.

The source of his authority was very accurately defined in his various proclamations, and in his addresses to the army. Them he thanked, for to them he owed his fleeting and precarious power after escaping from Elba. When he formed an alliance with the Jacobins, he condescended to propitiate their influence by affecting to derive his sceptre from the people. But he was not the dupe of his own artifice. He knew that his soldiers, and his soldiers only, enabled him to usurp the crown, and accordingly in the proclamation dated from the bay of Juan, though equally adapted for the Tuileries, he flattered their pride and confirmed their devotion, by telling them that "*élevé sur leurs pavois*," he had returned to resume his throne. This expression, derived from the feudal practice of the Franks, in the earliest periods of the French monarchy, was doubtless selected by Napoleon as exactly illustrating the character of his enterprise, and the means of its success.\* If his own evidence may be received, as proof of his own purpose, the question is decided: but his adherents in France, and his friends in England, to whom the majesty of the people was still an object of profound veneration, easily fabricated for him a constitutional vehicle, and conveyed him to Paris upon the civil shoulders of the multitude.

It would be difficult, however, to shew, even if Napoleon could have pleaded the popular choice, how his breach of faith with the allies would have been more entitled to impunity. The political existence of a sovereign, in modern times, seems to be compounded of two qualities, the consent, tacit or expressed, of the people over whom he reigns, and the recognition of his authority by foreign states. Supposing then that the French nation had deliberately, and with the customary legal forms, re-elected him their Emperor, his power, with regard to them, would unquestionably have revived in all its original force. But it would have been confined to France, until acknowledged by the other sovereigns of Europe, and he could neither have sent ambassadors, concluded treaties, nor exercised any of those functions out of his own territories, which he would necessarily have a right to do, if his supremacy were duly recognised by the other crowned

\* The phrase is never used except in poetry, or in the language of historical research. Thus, Mezerai, (*Hist. de France, vie de Pharamond*) says "Lorsque les seigneurs avoient élus les rois, ils les elevoient sur un grand *pavois*, et les faisoient porter dans le camp, où le peuple étant assemblé en arme, confirmoit le choix." This military investiture of sovereignty, was practically, though not formally, exhibited by the army of Napoleon.



heads. Without that recognition, he would have been placed in a sort of excommunication, having no political privileges beyond the boundaries of his kingdom. With respect to the treaty of Fontainebleau, no act of the French people could release him from its obligations. By espousing his cause, they would only have rendered themselves his accomplices, as the army did do, and those few who rallied under the usurpation. That treaty was a personal contract between himself (not as Emperor of France, but as the Emperor Napoleon,) and the allied sovereigns. They could not be dispossessed of their claim to enforce its stipulations, by any confederacy between Bonaparte and the French nation, unless the doctrine be admitted, that in the civil relations of life, a third party, having only a remote, equivocal, and contingent interest, may annul the conditions of a covenant by which two or more persons bind themselves to the discharge of a certain duty. It was a flimsy subterfuge, therefore, to set up the choice of the people, assuming such a choice to have actually existed, as an abrogation of the compact.

Among the many arguments employed by the speculative politicians in this country, to arrest the progress of the war against Bonaparte, there was one singularly untenable. They instituted a comparison between him and William III.; though by what ingenuity they discovered the parallel, would baffle all research but their own. Bonaparte, having abdicated the sovereign authority, and confirmed his abdication by a solemn treaty, returned, in defiance of both those acts, and usurped the throne. What power did William abdicate? What treaty did he violate? Bonaparte, before he abdicated, was deposed by his own senate, the legitimate organ of the public voice, who declared his government to be incompatible with the liberty of France, and the security of all other states. William was invited to secure the liberties of England, against a feeble bigot who aimed at their subversion. In seating himself upon the throne of these realms, his power menaced the integrity of no foreign kingdom, nor was there any thing in his past policy which rendered him formidable. We had an undoubted right to offer, and he had a consequent right to accept the crown, for he had never forfeited it by any antecedent engagement. But it would be useless to pursue distinctions where no analogy can be traced. The attempt to identify the revolution of 1688, with the perfidious usurpation of Napoleon, could only spring from ignorance, from the perversity of faction, or the obstinacy of folly, which confounds assertion with proofs, and imagines that no defeat is sustained because no confession of it is extorted.

If all these justifiable grounds of war had been wanting, there was still one remaining which superseded all—the necessity of dethroning a man whose warlike

temper unceasingly instigated him to conquests, and whose perfidy was always the ready instrument of his will. The safety of nations consisted in the destruction of his dominion. Peace, that long desired blessing, for which Europe had sighed in vain during five and twenty years, would still have remained a stranger, or been purchased by the sacrifice of all that could make it valuable. The memory of past defeats, rankling in his haughty and implacable mind, would have prepared fresh sorrow and humiliation for his former victors. He whose public life had been cradled in camps and battles, whose renown blazed forth only in the fierce and terrific splendour of military glory, whose sword alone had created the patent of his greatness, and placed him, as in scorn of ancestry, by the side of mightiest monarchs, would never have known repose, till he had washed out of his escutcheon, with streams of unoffending blood, the dark spots of Moscow, Leipsic, and Fontainebleau. Disarmed of power, he has shown that he can survive in abject captivity : with power, he would have proved that the pusillanimous in adversity, are dreadful and unrelenting in revenge. They who have a long arrear of contumely and dishonour to expunge, are seldom deficient in profligate and malignant industry, when they obtain the means. There are few things more fatal than the vindictive retaliation of an ignoble enemy. It is at once unlimited in extent, and unsparing in execution. Restrained by no honourable feeling, mitigated by no generous impulse, inaccessible to remorse, and insensible to justice, the obdurate monster stalks forth, arrayed in every vice that can make man pitiless to man, and arm him against the voice of nature and religion.

Whoever has learned justly to appreciate the human character, will not be disposed to deny these anticipated evils of Napoleon's second reign, had he firmly established his authority in France. But his native ambition needed not the goad of vengeance ; and the experience of the past became a reasonable ground of calculation for the future. Much was said, by his friends, about magnanimity and confidence, and that the allies ought not to infer he would continue to desolate Europe by his wars, merely because he had hitherto done so. In the minor affairs of life, where no serious injury can arise from credulity, we may sometimes be justified in discarding a prudent vigilance, rather than irritate by precautions which denote suspicion. But when the welfare of empires was at issue, when the freedom and happiness of millions depended upon the resolves of kings and ministers, severe and inflexible duty, guided by the dictates of wisdom, could alone be permitted to prevail. That sovereign would have been the enemy of his people, who compromised their safety upon the contingency of Napoleon's new-born virtue. The very act by which he placed himself in a situation to require that



confidence, proved him unworthy of it ; and it was somewhat illogical in argument, as well as impudent in principle, to demand for a man who had violated a solemn covenant, permission to enjoy the fruits of his perfidy, upon the implied condition of his future fidelity and moderation. Miracles may exercise the sagacity of a philosopher, or the faith of a theologian ; but they should form no part of the calculations which regulate the policy of a statesman. Human affairs must be conducted upon a system of reasoning more permanent and intelligible than what serves for the construction of a specious theory or an amusing tale. The lofty dreams of romance, transferred to the senate and the council-chamber, would have suited admirably with the delicate fiction of Napoleon's advocates. Nothing could be more fascinating than their predictions ; nothing more certain than their fallacy. They did not seek to convince ; they only hoped to persuade.\* If their dull sophistries had lulled us into apathy, we should have been rewarded with their insidious applause, while the sublime conceptions of Napoleon slowly ripened into fatal maturity.

In every point of view, therefore, whether we consider the war against Bonaparte as vindicating the solemn faith and obligations of treaties, as punishing aggression, or as preventing the recurrence of a system which experience had demonstrated to be incompatible with the safety and happiness of other states, it was equally entitled to approbation. The issue of the contest confirmed the wisdom of its principle, though, had it been less auspicious, that wisdom could have been arraigned only by those who judge from events. In contemplating the memorable result, we may admire the decisive skill of our great commander, and the matchless heroism of our immortal countrymen : but while we remember, with grateful exultation, how Europe was saved at Waterloo, let us not forget how she would have fallen, if the councils of weak or designing men had prevailed.

\* The fervent and orthodox faith which these disputants exacted from their antagonists, recalls an amusing anecdote which is related by Rasiel in his *Histoire de L'Admirable Dom Inigo de Guipuscoa*, Vol. I. p. 22. When this militant divine was performing a pious pilgrimage to the monastery of Montserrat, he overtook a Moor who happened to be travelling the same road. They entered into conversation, and their discourse turned upon the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. The Moor could not understand so mysterious a doctrine, and firmly insisted upon its incredibility. Inigo, who was journeying to Montserrat from pure zeal in the lady's cause, was indignant that her most miraculous attribute should be denied, and warmly reproved the heretical Mahometan. At length, after a keen altercation, the latter very reasonably observed, that if he could be made to *comprehend*, he would then *believe*. "Make you comprehend !" exclaimed Inigo with horror ; "Where would be your merit in believing, if you comprehended ?"—Politicians have their dogmas as well as priests.

When the congress at Vienna issued their celebrated declaration of the 13th of March, they only knew that Bonaparte had landed in France to levy rebellious war against Louis XVIII. They were then unacquainted with any of the circumstances attending his enterprise, and that declaration, therefore, was no more than a general anathema fulminated against it. A faint hope was expressed, that the French people, rallying round their monarch, would assert their own cause, expel the invader, and save their country from the dreadful visitation of foreign armies. This expectation was vainly indulged, from causes which have been already developed. The congress heard, with astonishment and regret, of his rapid progress; and having to choose between submission and vengeance, between honour and dishonour, their election was soon made. On the 25th of March, not then aware that he had possessed himself of the capital, but naturally anticipating such an event, they entered into a treaty,\* binding themselves to the maintenance of that "order of things so happily established in Europe," and for the permanent security of which they were then assembled in deliberation.

This treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and the other European powers were invited to accede to its stipulations. By the first article, they unequivocally avowed the object of their confederation, declaring that they would unite all their "efforts against Napoleon Bonaparte, and against all those who might already have joined his faction, or should thereafter join it, *in order to force him to desist from his projects, and to render him unable to disturb in future the tranquillity of Europe and the general peace.*" By the third article, they mutually contracted "not to lay down their arms until that object was attained, nor until Bonaparte was rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew his attempts to possess himself of the supreme power in France." This unreserved exposition of their intentions was dictated by the soundest policy, because it removed all pretext for cavilling, and proved to the world, that they armed, not for the purpose of saying who should be sovereign of France, but who should not. It was calculated, at once, to intimidate the factious in that country, and to conciliate the reflecting. It was a broad and intelligible distinction between the individual cause of the usurper, and the general rights of the French people. They who espoused the former, would become his partizans, and must expect to share the fate of their leader, whatever it might be; while they who prudently abstained from active co-operation, would remain in a condition to participate in any benefits that might eventually result from the struggle.

\* See Appendix, No. IV.



The government of this country adopted a still more decisive conduct, perhaps from a desire to propitiate the prejudices, or silence the clamour, of those who still affected an extreme tenderness for popular rights. When we acceded to the treaty, a separate declaration was annexed, purporting, that though we were prepared to unite our efforts, with those of the allies, against Napoleon Bonaparte and his adherents personally, yet we were not to be understood as engaged "to prosecute the war, with a view of imposing upon France any particular government."—"However solicitous," it continued, "the Prince Regent must be to see His Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this declaration on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to His Most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British government has invariably regulated its conduct."

Not even this concession, however, could soothe the hostility of those who would rather have seen their predictions verified, in the subjugation of Europe, than lose their reputation for prophetic wisdom. During many revolving years, they had laughed at the idea of any successful combination against the power of Napoleon. The campaign of 1814 turned back the tide of ridicule and scorn upon themselves, and then they clung, with a forlorn hope almost amounting to despair, to the possible escape of Bonaparte from Elba, and his re-appearance in France. This hope was realized, and joy once more brightened in their dejected countenances. Again they prophesied, and again, with laudable industry, they strove to secure the accomplishment of their prophecies. So far as their feeble enmity could avail, they laboured in their vocation. Whatever impediments they could create, to obstruct the energies of government, were sedulously provided. Unexhausted and inexhaustible declamation reared its long, dull form, and hung like an unwholesome vapour over the elastic activity of Ministers. Night after night was consumed in frivolous debate, that days might be wasted in sloth. Every hour of action that was wrung from the grasp of the executive at home, was so much gained for the enemy abroad.\* Every week that could be

\* Napoleon was gratefully sensible of the services rendered him by the Opposition in this country. After the battle of Ligny, when some of his officers remarked that Blucher, by retreating upon Havre would be able to unite with the Duke of Wellington, he replied, with a smile, "L'armée Prussienne est complètement battue; elle ne peut se rallier en trois jours; les Anglais n'ont que cinquante; J'attaquerai l'armée Anglaise, je la battrai. Mes amis m'attendent à Bruxelles; *l'Opposition Anglaise ne demandera pas mieux pour elever la tête*—Adieu subsides, adieu coalition!"—There is an awkward suspicion attached to this declaration. It at least proves that Bonaparte calculated upon the advantages he should derive from the proceedings of a party in the British parliament.

interposed before a decisive blow was struck, increased the chances of failure. Nothing was omitted that could excite alarm and dejection. The thrice told tales of the Revolution were evoked from their oblivion, again to inspire terror and distrust. We were reminded of insupportable taxes which yet were paid, of a national debt that threatened bankruptcy, of profligate ministers, and a corrupt House of Commons. We were informed that France was irrevocably attached to Napoleon, and warned against a war which would rouse her population as one man in defence of their choice.\* To complete the climax, Earl Grey employed four

\* How different was the conduct of a great man whose patriotism once saved his own country, and whose eloquence was now employed to save mankind! The following extracts from Mr. Grattan's speech in the House of Commons will be read with delight by all who are not under the infatuation which he so irresistibly exposes:—

“ I agree, that, if possible, we should avoid the evil of renewed hostilities, but there are still greater evils to be shunned—a peace without securities, and a war without allies. I wish the question were merely that of peace or war; but to state it fairly and honestly, it is this, whether you will fight the Ruler of France, aided by your allies, now at hand and in heart, or whether you will defer the conflict until, by abandoning your allies, you compel them at last to abandon you. I will explain my reasons for thus stating the point at issue. I conceive that the present government of France (if so I may call that which is nothing more than a Stratocracy) exists only by maintaining a state of hostility with the rest of Europe. She fights to conquer, and conquers to live. The constitution of that government is war, the object of that war is subjugation, and the victim of their subjugation, Europe. I appeal to history, to shew what such an army, under such a leader, has accomplished: what has it not performed in our own memory, and what, if unopposed, before the period of the life of the oldest may it not again achieve? Recollect how its leader grasped and held possession of all Europe: how he made his brother King of Holland, his son King of Rome: how he banished the Regent of Portugal, and imprisoned the Sovereign of Spain. Recollect that he equipped an army to subdue England, because she not only opposed a barrier to his enterprises, but because the trident with which she lashed her waves shook his empire to its foundation. He called it the tyranny of the sea—Europe found it the salvation of the land. He audaciously recriminated upon England that protected Europe from the effects of his crimes. To subjugate Europe he must conquer England, and to subdue her he must first vanquish her marine. He attacked her in two ways: he raised an army of 60,000 men against her, but fearing to lead it himself, and envying his generals, it effected nothing, while with more success he attacked her commerce. He may be said to have altered the situation of England on the globe, for, instead of continuing the medium of communication between the old and the new world, he cut off her intercourse, and placed her between two fires: he cut off her communication on the continent of Europe, by the armies, and on the continent of America by the intrigues, of France.

“ His ambition, his greediness of power, checked in one quarter, burst out in another, and he made an attempt to plunder the north of Europe. The great potentate of Russia advanced to defend his dominions; he found the Emperor of Austria stripped of half his territories, and the King of Prussia almost deprived of his last province. The name of England, united with natural and physical causes, still was the salvation of Europe.—That city which had sent forth Bonaparte as a conqueror received him as a fugitive, and she soon saw those who had once been the victims of his ambition the masters of his fate. What was the result? An act of which history can produce no parallel, whose magnanimity and generosity would coun-



hours in the House of Lords to prove the impossibility of success, and Mr. Whitbread, many more in the House of Commons, to convince us that Bonaparte must remain an Emperor.—Why did the Duke of Wellington perversely conquer at Waterloo?

terbalance the greatest crime of which nations can be guilty. To France the allies gave life and independence—to Bonaparte they gave life and freedom. No hyperbole of praise can add lustre to an act that was at the same time its own honour and reward. That other great act deserves no less applause—they gave a constitution to France, or to speak more properly, they enabled France to form a constitution for herself. I do not say that the constitution was better than she deserved, but better than that system of grave but vain philosophers, at once flimsy, ponderous, and ungovernable, which from the inequality of its parts was unfit for any useful purpose, like some massive machine with deficient powers of controul, that in its operation destroyed the artists appointed to its management. It was a constitution which if it had some method in its madness, had infinitely more madness in its method. It was framed by those who afterwards silenced the outcries of these deluded citizens by loud and empty promises of freedom, followed by the horrid clamours of internal war. The Goddess of Liberty was converted into a Fury, and the Goddess of Reason into the personification of Folly. When this mighty and complicated machine, with its wheel above wheel and power above power, was put in motion, its force was uncontrollable, and it was fired and consumed by its own velocity. With the aid of England, however, on the removal of the chief artificer, a new and more perfect machine was erected, and the constitution by degrees settled into a resemblance of the fabric of this country—a fabric erected by our ancestors and with pious veneration preserved by their posterity.

“ What succeeded? Bonaparte, who had disregarded all previous treaties, broke that of Fontainebleau, and yet my friends who support the amendment ask you to trust him. He violated it without one expression of compunction or sorrow. ‘ I do not repent,’ on the contrary, he exclaims; ‘ if my throne be not yet firm, I will establish it by new conquests. My abdication was an act of convenience, and not of will. It is of no value, because it was not done with the consent of my people, and my counsellors say that nothing can be legitimate without the approbation of the people. My abdication was a violation of the great original compact between the sovereign and the people, and cannot be binding.’ Such is his language, and who then shall accept a treaty from Bonaparte—from a man who boasts that he acts in opposition to every principle of affiance and truth? What does Bonaparte offer? Six hundred thousand men to secure lasting tranquillity. If public security be the object, shall we hesitate in making our choice? or, rather let me ask, is there a choice to be made?

“ Is it maintained that we are not in a state to make war? Against such an opinion I must enter my decided protest, for what is it but to assert that confederated Europe cannot fight France single-handed. Not only England, Russia, Austria, or Prussia alone cannot meet her, but that all combined with one heart and one object, one detestation of the tyrant, and one love of independence, are unable to combat a man recently usurping a government, and yet infirm on his throne. It is said that Bonaparte has enormous resources, and that the allies have none; that the forces of Austria will be occupied in Italy. Do not Gentlemen recollect that Murat is subdued, and that Austria has at command not fewer than 500,000 soldiers: admitting that 130,000 will still be employed south of the Alps, what is to prevent the rest from taking and maintaining the field? The power of Russia is incalculable, and though Poland may require the presence of some portion of her army, all will not be so engaged. Prussia will bring forward her proportion, and upon the whole it may be fairly stated, that not less than 600,000 men will fight on

We can hardly suppose these disputants meant to be jocular while they appeared so serious; it is difficult to believe they wept and smiled at the same moment; that tears and jokes were simultaneously employed. Yet, such a suspicion might be justified by some of their proceedings. At one time,

the side of the allies. Now, let us see, on the other hand, what is the muster of Bonaparte; and here let Gentlemen remember, that he has lost the exterior dominions of France, and that his population is reduced from 100 to 25 millions. Let them recollect too, that by defeat the French armies have lost the fascination of their invincibility, and Bonaparte the magic of his name. He first appeared on the field of Europe as the redresser of grievances—he was found to be the deposer of kings, the enslaver of subjects: that they will not forget he may hereafter be, though he never can regain that character with which he first started in public life. He talked of liberty while he plotted slavery; he deposed governments because they were bad, to establish tyrannies worse than the vilest institutions he overthrew. He marched his armies like Roman legions into Spain, even with more horrors of savage warfare, and like Attila or Genseric, carried terror in his van and left desolation in his rear. Such is the man, and such the effect of his means. Allow me now to say a few words upon his external resources—first, I say he has no cavalry—secondly, no money—thirdly, no credit—and fourthly, no title. Much is said of the affection of the people of France for Bonaparte. When the armies of the allies entered France, why did not the natives rise in his favour? Why, on the contrary, did they depose him? Does this look like affection? He imposed upon France a military yoke—he pillaged his subjects of their money, and robbed them of their children—he sacrificed the armies of France—he sullied her honour—he disgraced her fame, and finally, reduced her to the necessity of capitulating for her existence. Then for whom are they to shew this affection? Shall they rise for him who was the cause of their fall? Shall they restore him, that he may again place on their bowed necks the yoke of a military despotism? Shall the people shew affection for such a stranger? It is incredible! The army of France, indeed, may admire him. The army of France on his return choose him for a conqueror, and in opposing him it is said that you oppose the government of France. The design of this conqueror is to become anew the oppressor of the people, and in removing him you remove the man who would impose on them a foreign yoke: he would persuade them that he is relieving them from it, while he lays it upon their shoulders. At length a firm alliance was the only security for Europe; it was the only chance France had of being relieved from a foreign yoke, and yet it is supposed that that nation is such a weak, blind, and besotted people, as to be capable of breaking the oath of allegiance, binding them to the king they elected, for the sake of restoring a usurper they deposed, and of submitting to a yoke they detest. Can we believe, is it possible that any man can persuade himself that the French from pride, and the allies from delicacy, permit the restoration of a system which subjects that people to the eternal damnation of a military government? In the sincerity of my heart I say, that I cannot believe such a thing possible. Look at the history of his recent approach to Paris; see him arrive at Grenoble attended by his soldiers, but where are the joyous acclamations of this affectionate people? He reviews his troops at Lyons, and the triumphant shouts of the army were equalled only by the dead silence of the people. It was not the progress of a beloved sovereign—it was the march of a military despot over a prostrate and subdued nation—they were not only conquered in condition but in understanding.

“ The same reason operated against the acclamations of the people on the restoration of the Bourbons: they had been converted into a submissive and abject people: to talk of the popular voice in France is idle; it was never raised for Bonaparte, and do not let us in England give him encouragement and confidence that he does not receive there. Are we now, unless experience has decayed into dotage,



they admitted all the dangers of Bonaparte's former system, and half congratulated the world upon its destruction. At another, they strenuously maintained his cause, and vehemently insisted we had no right to aid in deposing him. When it was hinted, that if he succeeded in re-establishing his power, we might expect a restoration of that policy which had produced so many evils, they gazed with innocent astonishment upon the advocates of so monstrous a doctrine.—Bonaparte, it was true, had been a tyrant and a conqueror; he had enslaved his own subjects by the despotism of laws; he had enslaved others, by the despotism of the sword. Wherever his power extended, liberty expired; and his power was bounded only by physical or moral impossibility. This was not denied: but still he was to be trusted. Why? Because he had been eleven months in Elba.

In what new school of philosophy they learned, that the habits which are

to be imposed upon by his promises? He is well skilled in all the low cant and artifices of usurpation, but he has taught us how to give them their proper appellations. He marched into Italy proclaiming liberty—Did he give it? Into Holland and Germany proclaiming liberty—Did he give it? He subjugated France and made it a storehouse of slavery, which he dispensed to the unfortunate nations of Europe. Once the instrument of slavery, he now again comes forward as the champion of liberty, and having destroyed one constitution, he offers another to the French in conjunction with a set of men generally known by the name of Jacobins. What prospect can this combination afford of good government or good order? What is it? The man who can endure no liberty unites himself with a body who can endure no government. Such a proceeding is to delude France with a mockery—the nation has no security for the observance of this constitution, and while the people swear to exclude the Bourbons, they are to take Bonaparte's word for liberty. It is no small proof in favour of alliance, that do away with that, and you must do away with all hope of liberty for France.

“ Let us now consider for a few moments the justice of the question—Whether we have a right to make war against France? No man can doubt that Bonaparte has been guilty of a breach of the Treaty of Fontainebleau; the Treaty of Paris was founded upon it, and recognised his abdication, and yet he has been guilty of the singular absurdity of offering to confirm that treaty, made only because he had been removed, and incompatible with his restoration. So far our cause of war is just against him and those who support him. Then with regard to the point of interfering with the internal regulations of foreign states, it will not be denied, that if any government contains principles inconsistent with the safety of others, those others have a right to interpose for their own security. If, for instance, it should contain a plan of universal empire, all other powers must oppose it to preserve their own independence: if an army existing by plunder and employed for aggrandizement is made part of the constitution of a foreign state, the same law of self-preservation must prevail; it is first a conspiracy against the neighbours of the kingdom supporting that army, and next, a standing preparation for war, to be used as occasion may offer. Certainly that state would not fail to give abundant assurances of peace, while in the act of plotting destruction. She would doubtless utter many grave maxims and hackneyed saws on the blessings of tranquillity, very prudent in themselves, and only imprudent if in such a case they were followed. Recollect, however, that such offers of peace are instruments of war, and the power who makes them is applying to your folly, to conspire against your existence.”

engrafted by twenty years indulgence, may be discarded by the meditation of half as many months, it is useless to inquire. There are no limits to the wise dispensations of Providence, and man is modified by its will. The exiled tyrant, in the lonely hours of his banishment, perhaps submitted to that severe self-discipline which alone can eradicate all turbulent and evil passions: perhaps, also, he employed his seclusion in ruminating upon the means of escaping from it. Positive evidence was equally incomplete for both suppositions; but all the weight of probability turned upon the latter. Sudden conversions are commonly suspicious, because they disallow the gradual influence of progressive conviction. They become still more suspicious, when they are evidently adapted to promote the personal interests of the convert. This was exactly the case with Bonaparte, whose transformation into a mild and beneficent sovereign, was conveniently announced at the very moment when Europe rang with indignation at his former atrocities.

It is not a very harsh inference, that this reasoning was sportively urged, especially when we remember another mode of dialectics employed. Mr. Ponsby, a gentleman who very sparingly indulges in humour, repeatedly assigned as a motive for not engaging in the war, that Bonaparte was then at a time of life, when men usually begin to desist from great and laborious enterprises, and whatever his disposition for conquest might be, we had a security against it in his increasing age. This felicitous discovery was countenanced by grave dissertations from other enlightened politicians, who apparently forgot, that he whose robust constitution and active energies of mind had so recently encountered the perils of a Russian campaign, was probably still able to wield a sword.

Pride, mortified pride, had its full share in the hostility manifested towards government, and in the anxiety for Napoleon. The little phalanx of cavillers, who so captiously deprecated all interference with France, were more solicitous to confirm their own character for sagacity, than to vindicate any great principles of international policy. They had pronounced that Napoleon could not be subdued, and they wished that he should not. Some latent longings for place and power mingled, perhaps, with this primary feeling; but they would cheerfully have surrendered the one to secure the other. They dignified their inflexibility with the name of consistency; a less courtly, but more conscientious nomenclator, would venture, perhaps, to designate it by a different appellation.

The future historian will relate, with wonder, their misguided pertinacity,



and, removed from the stormy influence of passing events, will rejoice that wiser counsels prevailed. When all the heats of faction are allayed, when personal feelings can no longer usurp upon public duty, when reason shall exercise her power, unchecked by party animosities, unclouded by momentary prejudice, and unperturbed by the whispers of disappointed ambition, justice will then be done to those who unsheathed the sword, as the assertors of universal liberty, the patriots of mankind. Nor, in bestowing this praise, is it intended to ascribe extraordinary wisdom to the objects of it. Nothing more is implied, than that they were exempt from extraordinary folly; a concession which certainly cannot be claimed for their opponents. All the merit of the former consisted in not betraying the interests of the world; all the weakness of the latter was comprised in not maintaining them. If it be contended, that both were equally animated by a sincere conviction, and an ardent wish to promote the general welfare, it is at least a subject of allowable congratulation, that the minority were the friends of Napoleon.

When the allies determined to make no truce or peace with Bonaparte, they pursued their preparations in a manner suitable to the magnitude of their designs. Numerous armies were put in motion from every quarter of Europe; and it was intended to defer the commencement of operations, until a sufficient force was assembled, upon the confines of France, to make one general irruption by her northern and eastern frontiers. The prudent policy of Napoleon, which precipitated the war, did not permit the observance of this original plan, and the glorious issue of the short but murderous struggle rendered it afterwards unnecessary. The three great military powers of Europe were not, however, in a condition to apply all the resources of their strength towards this single object. Russia had to watch Poland; Prussia doubted the allegiance of Saxony; and Austria found herself compelled to defend her possessions in Italy against the revolutionary schemes of Murat. Even England had to wait till her best disciplined and veteran troops crossed the Atlantic, before she could assume a warlike attitude in the Netherlands. But her deficiencies in men were more than compensated by her pecuniary largesses, and the ample tide of British subsidy once more flowed through every court in Europe.\*

A brief survey of the military state of affairs on the northern frontier of

\* Some idea may be formed of the real or expected number of troops arrayed against France, from the following official document issued by Louis XVIII. on the 7th of April. As it was promulgated, however, with a view to intimidate the rebel government, a little allowance may be made for exaggeration:—

France, when Bonaparte landed, will better explain the danger to which Europe was exposed by his enterprise, and the vigorous exertions made by the allied powers to avert it. The Prussian army of the Lower Rhine under Kleist, had been so reduced during the winters of 1814 and 1815, that the whole force between

" The allied powers are about to open the campaign, in order to restore the legitimate sovereign of France. They will employ for the execution of this great design the following forces :

" *Austria* : 150,000 men in Italy: Prince Schwartzenberg, General-in-Chief, having under his orders Field-Marshal the Duke de Bellegarde, Generals Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent; 100,000 men upon the Rhine: the Archduke Charles General-in-Chief, having under his orders Generals Bubna and Sommariva.

" *Russia* : The Russian army on the borders of the Rhine is 210,000 strong, and commanded by His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine, having under his orders Generals Barclay de Tolly, Sacken, and Langeron. A second Russian army of 180,000 men, forming the Army of Reserve, is cantoned in the environs of Manheim, and commanded by Field-Marshal Beningsen, having under his orders Generals Alsusiew, Rajewsky, and Witgenstein. The Hetman Platow commands a corps of 70,000 Cossacks, attached to the different armies.

" *Prussia* : The forces of this power are in advance, and form the van-guard of the allied armies. This army consists of 100,000 men, commanded by Prince Blucher, having under his orders Generals Kleist, Yorck, and Bulow.

" *England* : The troops of this power occupy the frontiers as far as the sea, and, united with the Dutch and Belgian armies, together with a Prussian corps, form an army of 80,000 men, under the orders of the General-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington.

" *Bavaria* : The Bavarian troops are united to the corps of the Archduke Charles, and are under the orders of the General Prince Wrede.

" *Wurtemberg* : The army of the King of Wurtemberg, united to that of the Prince of Baden, and other minor German states, forms a corps of 40,000 men.

" *Sweden* : 30,000 men under the orders of the Prince Royal: a part has already disembarked at Hamburgh.

" The French *corps d'armée*, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, and Marshals Macdonald, Victor, and Marmont, and Generals Dupont, Dessoles, Maisons, Lions, and Aubry, amounts to about 80,000 men, and forty pieces of cannon. This army daily increases.

" The Duke de Berri is organising at Brussels a corps of volunteers which is hourly augmenting, and is composed of all those Frenchmen who abandon the cause of the tyrant. This corps will form the escort of His Majesty.

(Signed)

" The DUKE DE FELTRE."

The aggregate of the above numbers makes 1,090,000 men. If to these were added the anticipated contingencies of Denmark, Piedmont, and Spain, the amount would swell to 1,200,000. Portugal



the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Moselle, amounted to no more than about 30,000 men. A feeble brigade was stationed near the Wesel, along the right banks of the Rhine. The Westphalian militia, consisting of twenty battalions of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry, together with that of Berg, composed of seven battalions of infantry and one battery and a half of artillery, were, with the exception of the depots, dismissed on furlough. The turbulent and dissatisfied Saxons, perhaps 14,000 strong, were interspersed among the Prussians. The army occupied Luxembourg, Juliers, and Wesel. These fortresses, however, were either inadequately or not at all provisioned, from want of money, or because it was disputed by whom they should be supplied. The Hereditary Prince of Orange commanded an Anglo-Hanoverian army of 20,000 men, scattered over the Low Countries, and waiting only for the termination of the Congress, to disperse. The fortresses of Ostend, Nieuport, and Antwerp, were in the same condition as when surrendered by the French, and much remained to be done before they could be put in a proper state of defence.\*

When intelligence reached Brussels and Aix-la-Chapelle, that Bonaparte had escaped from Elba, and was marching upon Paris, the emergency, though unforeseen, immediately called forth the vigilant exertions of both commanding Generals. Count Kleist ordered the fortresses to be victualled without delay, concentrated his troops in the neighbourhood of Juliers, and called in those of Westphalia

remained out of the calculation, for when applications were made to the Regency at Lisbon, they were evaded under the pretence of waiting for instructions from Brazil. It is probable, however, that a somewhat less force actually took the field, and that the following statement by Lord Castlereagh in the House of Commons approached nearer to the truth:—

Austria .....	300,000
Russia .....	225,000
Prussia .....	236,000
Collective states of Germany, including Bavaria .....	150,000
Great Britain .....	50,000
Holland.....	50,000
	<hr/>
	1,011,000

This was exclusively of an army of 150,000 assembled on the frontiers of Russia, ready to be advanced in case of exigency. With respect to Great Britain it should be observed, that whatever may have been the intentions of government had the opening of the campaign been prolonged, it is indubitable there were not 50,000 English engaged at Waterloo.

\* See "History of the Campaign, &c." by a Prussian General Officer, published by Sir John Sinclair.

and Berg which were upon furlough. The Prince of Orange, likewise, assembled his army near Ath, occupied Mons and Tournay, and ordered both places to be fortified. With so small a force, however, should Bonaparte advance into the Netherlands, he could neither have risked a battle, nor covered Brussels; and General Kleist, therefore, offered to co-operate with the Prince in case of an attack. It was accordingly agreed that both armies should unite, at two marches distance from the Meuse. The neighbourhood of Tirlemont was selected for accepting a battle, as a situation best calculated to promote success. General Kleist engaged, in case Bonaparte should attack the Dutch army in the latter end of March, to appear at the head of 50,000 men; and were the attack postponed till the middle of April, with 60,000, including about 10,000 cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon. To protect Brussels, also, would undoubtedly have been desirable, but General Kleist did not feel himself warranted to move so far from the Meuse; and the bye roads being impassable at that time of the year, he could not extend his co-operation beyond Tirlemont.

Such were the precautionary arrangements made, in contemplation of a sudden irruption by Bonaparte into the Netherlands. This did not take place, however, and when the Duke of Wellington arrived at Brussels, from Vienna, in the beginning of April, a different and more comprehensive system of operations was adopted, the description of which belongs to a subsequent part of this history.

Napoleon, having succeeded in the primary object of his enterprise by obtaining possession of the capital, was next solicitous to secure the provinces. This important point had not been wholly neglected during his march upon Paris, for after his entrance into Lyon, he despatched confidential and secret emissaries to all the chief towns of the military departments. But now, that he was invested with the functions of imperial authority, he thought it necessary to employ more distinguished personages, who might openly act as his agents. Drouet, Count d'Erlon, was accordingly sent to Lille, where he supplanted Marshal Mortier, and celebrated the return of Bonaparte by a solemn *Te Deum*, at which Marshal Ney assisted, to whom was entrusted a more extensive commission. The nature of it he himself disclosed when upon his trial.

"I quitted Paris on the 23d of March, by command of Bonaparte to repair to Lille. While in that city I received a very long letter from him, in which he directed me to traverse the whole of the northern and eastern frontier of France, from Lille to Landau. I fulfilled the functions of an extraordinary commis-



sioner. My instructions contained express orders to announce, every where, that the Emperor neither would nor could make war beyond the limits of France, according to arrangements entered into at Elba, between him, England, and Austria; that the Empress Maria Louisa and the King of Rome were to remain at Vienna, as hostages, until he had given a free constitution to France, and executed all the conditions of the treaty: after which, she would come, with her son, to join him at Paris."

Imposture, still imposture. To the very last, fraud and artifice were the instruments he used. Truth he dared not tell, and his marshals, dukes, and other dignitaries, were employed in the degraded office of inventing or propagating falsehoods. Here we have the confession of an accomplice; and who that yet venerates the captive hero, will venture to doubt the declaration of the virtuous, the honourable, the murdered Michael Ney?

Lemarrois, an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, was furnished with similar instructions, and sent to Rouen, in the place of Marshal Jourdan. An order of the day appeared at Caen, on the 22d of March, under the name of Marshal Auge-reau. This officer, when Bonaparte first abdicated, denounced him as a coward, "who did not dare to die like a soldier." The offence was not forgiven, and Auge-reau remained exiled from Paris, notwithstanding his order of the day. On the 23d, Marshal Suchet issued a proclamation at Strasbourg; and on the same day one was put forth by Piré, the commandant at Rennes. This man was afterwards associated with Marshal Grouchy, who marched against the Duke d'Angouleme, while Clausel directed his troops upon Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angouleme displayed a heroism worthy of her race.

In other parts of France, the agents of the usurper found greater resistance, for the friends of Louis were able to maintain a temporary influence against them. The Baron de Vitrolles had left Paris, entrusted with extraordinary powers by the King, to assert the royal authority in the south. In co-operation with him, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr was despatched to Orleans, with instructions to retain possession of that city as long as possible, and thus impede any correspondence between Paris and Toulouse. On the 21st of March, while Bonaparte was reviewing his troops at Paris, General Pajol, who commanded at Orleans, published an order of the day, in which he commanded all the military of the department to wear the tri-coloured cockade. This mandate was disobeyed by many officers, and reluctantly observed by others. Meanwhile, General Dupont,

and a part of his division, arrived. They had marched against the usurper, but were recalled, and now entered Orleans, decorated with the insignia of fidelity. At the same moment, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr reached Orleans, and immediately placed General Pajol under arrest.

On the 22d this Marshal, accompanied by General Dupont, reviewed all the troops under his command. The gates of the city were shut, and every communication with Paris forbidden. Whoever arrived was forthwith conducted to head-quarters. Orleans exhibited a singular appearance. At the corner of every street might be seen, side by side, the last public acts of royal authority, proclamations against Bonaparte, the farewell addresses of the prefect who had departed, no one knew why, and the order of Pajol to assume the revolutionary badge, who was himself a prisoner. There was a numerous garrison, also, which in the space of one short day had passed from the command of a general devoted to Napoleon, to that of a marshal sent by the authority of Louis.

In this equivocal condition, of compulsory obedience and secret disaffection, the military of Orleans continued for three days. At the expiration of that time, the Marshal found it impossible any longer to exclude a knowledge of what was passing in Paris, or to stem the torrent of sedition: he yielded, therefore, where he could not controul, and quitted the city. The inhabitants were now at the mercy of those whom treason had made their masters, and on the morning of Good Friday, while they were engaged in the devotions of that most solemn festival, the troops burst open the gates, and proclaimed Napoleon. It was thus France became subjugated. From Orleans to Bordeaux, along that whole tract of country, the smaller towns were subdued by the terror which every day's intelligence from Paris inspired, and the larger ones by the perfidy of the garrisons appointed for their defence.\*

At Bordeaux, a more protracted struggle ensued, and the people, animated by the noble intrepidity of a princess, long withstood the threats and artifices of a rebellious soldiery. The apathy of the governor negatively promoted the interests of Napoleon. He availed himself of the ample powers possessed by M. de Vitrolles, only to permit the gradual diffusion of sedition among the troops, and to lull the martial spirit of the brave Bordelais. The Duchess d'Angouleme

\* Itinéraire, p. 154.



found herself in a situation of imminent peril, but her undaunted mind never once shrunk from danger while it could lead to safety for her family. Long and severe misfortunes had neither corroded the energies of her character, nor disqualified her for active and ardent enterprise by the deficiency of occasions for manifesting it. In adversity, she had submitted to her wrongs with patient resignation ;—in prosperity, she bore her native greatness like one who knew the frailty of worldly power ;—in the field, when circumvented by her foes, she turned upon her traitorous pursuers with a fearless heart, that might have shamed them from their purpose. The lustre of a diadem could add no splendour to such virtue, which proved its descent equally in the obscurity of exile, and in the conflict with tyranny.\*

The difficulties this princess had to surmount, were of a nature that conferred merit even upon failure. By the sole ascendancy of her name and example, she preserved Bordeaux for eight days from the grasp of Bonaparte. She was between two armies: the one in open rebellion, the other plotting with silent treachery. General Clausel commanded the former, which was stationed on the right bank of the river. The latter, composing the garrison of Bordeaux, was under Decaen, who restrained them from immediate excesses, by the assurance that the batteries should be turned upon the inhabitants, if they opposed the entrance of Napoleon's troops, when the proper moment arrived. The Princess, meanwhile, was indefatigable in her efforts. She levied corps of volunteers, reviewed the troops, and embraced with ardour all the fatigue and hazard of military authority. But she was betrayed by those miscreants, whom neither the gallantry due to her sex, nor the admiration of her heroism, could withdraw from their profligate attachment to the usurper.

General Clausel now approached the city, and every thing was to be feared from the heartless acquiescence of Decaen's regiments. The Duchess, unwilling to incur the horrors of a bombardment, by pertinacious resistance within the walls, determined upon sallying forth against the rebels. She made a last and ineffectual attempt to secure the fidelity of the troops. They were ordered to assemble, and

\* The following lines have been aptly applied to this heroic princess:—

Courage was cast about her like a dress  
Of solemn comeliness:  
A gathered mind and an untroubled face  
Did give her dangers grace.

she appeared in the midst of them. Unappalled by their ferocious looks, or their perfidious designs, she harangued them with a firm but useless eloquence. She reminded them of their oaths, and their duty: she pourtrayed, in glowing colours, the eternal disgrace that awaited their treason; she strove to inspire them with loyal and honourable feelings; she entreated, she implored, she wept. In vain! Sternly silent they listened to her voice, and beheld her tears. The splendid vassalage which their imperial leader prepared for them, was dearer to their hopes, than the calm repose they might anticipate under the benignant sway of Louis XVIII. "Will you fight for the daughter of your King?" she exclaimed. "No." "Will you betray me?"—"No." An awful pause ensued, when the Princess, resuming all her wonted firmness, dismissed them with the command that they should respect the tranquillity of the city and the persons of the royalists. The traitors swore obedience. "No oaths," she indignantly rejoined; "you have taught me their value; only obey the last order of the daughter of your Kings.\*"

The Princess now hastily repaired to the quay, where the national guards and volunteers were assembled. Their zeal and devotion were unalterable; but what could they avail? A useless effusion of blood was a calamity she anxiously deprecated. They received her with enthusiasm, and eagerly demanded to be led against the enemy. To repress this ardour was a painful but necessary duty. She commanded silence, and then said, "Swear all to obey me."—"We swear," was the unanimous and immediate reply, for they hoped the only obedience would be to die in her defence. "Brave Frenchmen!" she continued, "faithful Bordelais! think no longer of defending the city. Your efforts can produce no good; you are not supported by the troops." This injunction at once astonished and afflicted them. They strove to submit: but the soldiers of Clausel appearing, at that moment, on the other side of the river, they could not restrain their impetuous animosity, and a general volley was fired upon them. The distance prevented it from taking effect, and fortunately it was not returned. The Princess, though deeply affected by this act of loyal and generous disobedience, was compelled to oppose it. "You have sworn," said she, "and remain faithful to your oaths. If there be any disgrace, it will fall upon me. I will be answerable to the King and to France. The sacrifice I require is, I know, a dreadful one; but it alone can save the city."—When she returned to the palace, much confusion ensued, and the national guard, in a paroxysm of

\* La Conspiration qui a obligé Louis XVIII. de quitter du Royaume; &c. p. 44.



rage, fired upon several of their own officers whom they suspected of having betrayed them.

The Duchess d'Angouleme, convinced that no effectual resistance could be offered, permitted the departure of a herald to General Clausel, entreating him to abstain from any attack, and intimating, that she was about to embark. He acceded to the proposal, and passed his word for the safety of the city. The Princess quitted it in the evening, and went on board a small vessel which the English Consul had provided. She was accompanied to the shore by tumultuous crowds, who, in the anguish of their disappointment, implored her still to remain. When they saw that their prayers were vain, they then besought her to bestow some memorial, as a token of her regard, or as a relic which they might cherish with sacred affection. They who were nearest her person succeeded in this solicitation, and retired with manifest delight, when they obtained some shred of her apparel, which she kindly permitted should be distributed among them.\*

General Clausel entered Bordeaux on Sunday the 2d of April, and, as the agent of his imperial master, immediately issued a proclamation, remarkable for that modest adherence to truth which was a distinguishing characteristic of Napoleon and his generals. He concealed, indeed, the glory of his triumph over a deserted princess and an undisciplined population, though the reflection must have amply compensated for the little he had to boast of in Spain, against the Duke of Wellington. Satisfied with the secret consciousness of his own renown, he enlarged only upon that of his master, and the prospective blessings of his reign. It would be an unprofitable task to detail all the superlative assurances of

\* The following proclamation was seen on the walls of Bordeaux the day after her departure:—

“ Brave Bordelais!

“ Your fidelity is known to me. Your boundless devotion was insensible to all danger: but my attachment to you, to all Frenchmen, commands me to restrain it. My residence in your city if further prolonged, might aggravate your condition, and draw down upon you the weight of vengeance. I have not courage to see Frenchmen unhappy.

“ I quit you, brave Bordelais! penetrated with the sentiments which you have inspired: I assure you they shall be faithfully conveyed to the King. Soon, with God's help, and under happier circumstances, I shall express my gratitude and that of the prince whom you love.

(Signed)

“ MARIA THERESA.”

“ Bordeaux, April 1, 1815.”

this proclamation, which was addressed to the troops of the 11th military division; but the following extract may find a place, on account of its veracity. Alluding to Napoleon's progress from Cannes to Paris, he called it "truly a triumphal march. All French hearts, upon seeing him again, expressed those national sentiments with which they were penetrated; and *Paris distinguished itself by an enthusiasm unexampled until that day, when all its inhabitants rushed forth to meet their Emperor.*"

The capital of a state has been described, as the heart of the body politic. Can we wonder, then, that the extremities were paralysed, when such multiplied streams of infection issued from that centre which should be the source of health, and vigour, and animation? The provinces of France were deluded, by a system of rapid, extensive, and simultaneous fraud, unparalleled in any age or country.—Many nations may produce a single man as reckless of truth, in the attainment of a great object, as Napoleon; but what nation, except France, could have furnished an army of liars, from the throne to the barrack-yard, through all the gradations of ministers, senators, marshals, generals, prefects, police officers, and drummers, linked in one unbroken chain, to girdle the empire round like a wall? This vast, but harmonious, machine, this curious but portentous fabric of political mechanism, moved at the will of the great artist with unerring precision. The imperial inventor, coiled in the flimsy web of his falsehoods, saw and directed each ramification, while he only rejoiced at the humiliating activity of the instruments he employed. Truth alone, however, can survive the conflict of passion or prejudice, and Napoleon soon beheld the unsubstantial phantom he had created, melt into air before the steady radiance of her unsullied light.

The intelligence of the capitulation of Bordeaux was quickly conveyed to Toulouse, and accelerated there the moment of a similar revolution. The rebellion which had been secretly organising by Generals Delaborde, Cassagne, and Cassan, burst forth on the night of the 4th of April. At day break, the affrighted inhabitants saw the artillery turned upon the city, and all the squares and streets occupied by cannoniers, with lighted matches in their hands. The success of this treasonable exploit was communicated to the minister at war, by a despatch from General Delaborde himself, which contained some instructive contradictions. The writer was sadly embarrassed to reconcile the irresistible enthusiasm of the people of Toulouse for Napoleon, with the military preparations which he found it necessary to make, before that enthusiasm could display itself. He talked of the acclamations of an immense multitude, when the garri-



son assumed the tri-coloured cockade, and the national colours were hoisted upon the churches and public buildings ; nothing but transport prevailed ; no opposition was heard ; yet, he suffered it to escape his pen, that he was compelled to reinforce the garrison with four companies of artillery, fraudulently introduced during the night. Popular joy, when sincere, does not require the protection of an armed body ; but General Delaborde only wished to restrain the possible excesses of that boundless delight, which the return of Napoleon excited. On the preceding evening, that same populace had unaccountably celebrated, with much rejoicing, the intelligence received of the Duke d'Angouleme's success at the bridge of Drome.

This Prince, when he heard of the events at Bordeaux, saw himself suddenly exposed to the most imminent danger. He had previously obtained important advantages over the troops of Napoleon, but the subjugation of Bordeaux and Toulouse, which was followed by that of Nismes and Montpellier, with the treachery of some persons in whom he confided, extinguished all hope of any permanent successes in the south of France. He had already advanced beyond the Isere, and unexpectedly found himself in the midst of Grouchy and Piré's troops, who were marching upon him from Lyon, and those of Gilly, who by the occupation of Pont St. Esprit cut off his retreat. To the right and left, along the banks of the Durance and the Rhone, desertions were hourly multiplying, even among the regiments which were marshalled under his standard.

Thus surrounded by the enemy, and enfeebled by treason, the Prince had no alternative but to capitulate, or wantonly expose the lives of those who still remained faithful to him. He chose the former, and the terms were settled at Pont St. Esprit, by the Baron de Damas, on the part of his Royal Highness, and the adjutant-commandant Lefebvre, on the part of General Gilly. By this capitulation, the royal army of the south was disbanded ; the officers and soldiers were to return to their homes, and no one was to be answerable for the conduct he had adopted. The eighth article thus provided for the safety of the Duke :—  
“ His Royal Highness shall proceed to the port of Cette, where the necessary vessels shall be provided to convey him and his attendants wherever they may wish to go.—Detachments of the imperial army shall be placed at each relay, to protect his Royal Highness on the journey, and he shall every where receive the honours due to his rank, if he desires it.”

This capitulation was signed at Pont St. Esprit on the 8th of April, and

approved by General Gilly ; but Grouchy, who probably thought that Napoleon might wish to secure the Prince as a hostage, to promote his reconciliation with the allied sovereigns, officiously suspended its execution, till he received instructions from Paris. The consequent detention of the Duke d'Angouleme as a prisoner, in violation of this agreement, awakened a lively interest for his fate. The midnight murder of the Duke d'Enghien occurred to every mind, and it was feared the bloody catastrophe of the ditch of Vincennes would be repeated. The Prince alone was calm and resigned. He anticipated that his freedom might be made the price of some concession, injurious to the interests of the crown ; but, in a letter to his father, he expressed the firm determination he had embraced. " I am prepared for every thing," he observed ; " I fear neither death nor imprisonment."

Had Napoleon been at liberty to consult the suggestions of his own mind, there can hardly be a doubt he would have held the Duke d'Angouleme a captive, and once incarcerated, we should soon have heard of his committing suicide ; or perhaps, a military commission would have relieved the usurper from another Bourbon. His offence, indeed, was treason of the blackest die, compared to the speculative guilt for which the unfortunate Duke d'Enghien was butchered. But Bonaparte was in no condition to tamper with the opinion of mankind. The feeble tenure of future good behaviour, was the only one by which he hoped to preserve his stolen diadem, and the tempting opportunity of opening his account with a fair item was not to be neglected. Could it be supposed, that he who had strewed his passage to the throne with gentle promises, who had sought to beguile men's hearts by kind assurances, who had renounced his past errors with seeming sorrow and contrition, and who had laboured to entrap the unsuspecting into confidence by large and liberal declarations of what he meant to be, would commence his career by emulating the dark catalogue of his former crimes ? He knew his own purpose better. He knew, that if any thing were required to alienate the affections of the people, or to inflame the hatred of Europe, it would be supplied by an attempt to wreak his vengeance upon a prince, whose family he had dethroned, and who became his prisoner while fighting for that birthright he had usurped. Magnanimity was policy now ; and magnanimity, as his friends called it, he exhibited. He addressed a letter\* to Grouchy, ordering him to liberate the

\* " Count Grouchy—The ordinance of the King, dated March 6, and the declaration, signed by his ministers on the 13th at Vienna, might authorize me to treat the Duke d'Angouleme as that ordinance and that declaration proposed to treat me and my family ; but adhering to the views which induced me to order that the members of the Bourbon family should be permitted to leave France freely, my desire is,



Duke, and give him safe convoy to the place of his embarkation. A direction was conveyed, in this imperial epistle, to seize upon his treasure, and extort from him a promise that the crown jewels should be restored. Whether the latter was accomplished is uncertain: Napoleon, indeed, hardly waited long enough to receive or use them. After a captivity of eight days, not unaccompanied by insulting treatment, the Duke was conducted to Cette, and embarked on board a Swedish vessel, with the warmest testimonies of attachment from the inhabitants.

In other parts of the South, the cause of Napoleon was equally prosperous. Massena proclaimed him at Toulon on the 10th of April, and on the 12th he cited the prefect of Marseilles into his presence, ordering him to hoist the tri-coloured flag upon pain of military execution, and making him personally responsible for disobedience to that order. Grouchy, who co-operated with Massena, marched himself upon Marseilles; but the people, though coerced were not subdued; and it required the troops of General Brune, to disarm the national guard and inflict exemplary vengeance, before they submitted. Massena was another of those Marshals, whose flexible allegiance will transmit his name with infamy to posterity. On the 9th of March, he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Marseilles, in which were the following sentiments: "You may rely upon my zeal and devotion. I have sworn\* fidelity to my lawful King. I will never swerve from the path of honour. I am ready to shed the last drop of my blood in support of the throne."

When we remember the fate of Ney, it is to be deplored that Massena had

that you give directions for conducting the Duke d'Angouleme to Cette, where he shall be embarked, and that you watch over his safety and protect him from all bad treatment. You will merely take care to recover the money which has been removed from the public chests, and to require the Duke d'Angouleme to bind himself to the restitution of the crown diamonds, which are the property of the nation.

"You will also make known to him the enactments of the laws of the national assemblies, which are renewed, and which apply to the members of the family of Bourbon who may enter the French territory.

"You will, in my name, thank the national guards for the patriotism and zeal which they have manifested, and the attachment which they have shewn to me in these important circumstances.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

"Palace of the Tuileries, April 11th."

\* At "lovers' perjuries they say Jove laughs." What would he do at a Frenchman's?

not the same opportunity of shedding his blood for Louis. That he merited such a distinction is indubitable. Within little more than a month, (April 14,) after thus publicly announcing his fidelity to the King, he basely prostituted his pen, in professing equal zeal and loyalty to Napoleon. The dissembling traitor despatched a detailed report of the proceedings he had adopted, for reducing the eighth military division to obedience. His ardour and activity were conspicuous, and he dwells with evident self-complacency upon the success of his measures, while he laments that the necessity of remaining in the south to complete their security, precludes him from hastening to Paris to offer his profound respect and attachment. "The minister," he observes, "has left me the alternative of repairing thither myself, or of sending Count Miollis; but I cannot conceal from your Majesty, how ardently I long for the honour of seeing you again, and assuring you of my boundless devotion!" If the enterprise of Bonaparte occasioned much evil, it also produced some good. It exhibited the character and principles of modern French marshals and generals, (with a few exceptions) in such native vileness and dishonour, as could have been done by no other event. They are now publicly branded, and wear their appropriate badge of disgrace wherever they go: but had Bonaparte never returned, they might still have shouldered honest men in society without provoking scorn, or enduring silent contempt.

While these scenes were transacting in the south of France, the eyes of Europe were turned towards La Vendée, that theatre of so much imperishable glory in the commencement of the Revolution. It was hoped the spirit of La Roche Jaquelein, who like his illustrious brother fell in the cause of the French monarchy,\* would have animated the Vendéans to a vigorous resistance. The Duke de Bourbon was there also; but whether those provinces, of which Soult was the governor, had been over-run with a larger proportion of the usurper's troops and emissaries, or whether the rapidity of his march left no time for concerting any systematic plan of operations, it appeared impracticable to organise an effective force. The Duke de Bourbon, therefore, finding himself surrounded by the soldiers of Napoleon, reluctantly embarked at Nantes.

Some suspicious alarm was still felt, with respect to the political sentiments that predominated in these districts, and Bonaparte sent one of his aides-de-camp,

\* He fell, after addressing to them the memorable apostrophe of that brother. "If I advance, follow me:—if I retreat, kill me:—if I fall, revenge me."



General Morand, to repress any attempts of the disaffected. Never were the mandates of a tyrant better executed; never was submission more successfully extorted, by all that could inspire terror or preclude hope. On the 3d of April General Morand issued a proclamation at Nantes, which was extensively circulated among all the inhabitants of the west and south, to whom it was addressed. The fury of revolutionary phrenzy scarcely generated an anathema, against the Bourbons, more full of savage hostility and coarse reproach than this proclamation. While Napoleon was extolled with political idolatry, and even approximated to the Divinity by his exemption from all human infirmities,\* Louis XVIII. and his family were loaded with every contumely and insult, which a vulgar mind could imagine or express. Epithets were applied, to the Duchess d'Angouleme, which pronounced their author insensible to every feeling that animates a manly heart.

This disgusting mass of sordid adulation and despicable invective, was introduced by a declaration well calculated to make it effective. General Morand represented himself as at the head of a numerous army, divided into several columns, who were traversing the country in all directions to secure public tranquillity. By the rapidity of his forced marches, and his sudden appearance in various places, he gave countenance to that which was partly untrue. Having traversed the banks of the Loire, he entered Poitou, Angoumois, and penetrated

\* "*Plein de la pensée de ses grandes destinées, inaccessible a toutes les misérables passions humaines, &c.*"

The following extract will shew the boisterous rancour of this emissary, and afford an indication of the means employed by Napoleon to recommend his own cause. After a liberal application of "monsters," and "infamous traitors," to Louis XVIII. and the royalists, he thus proceeds:—

"They well know that they are, all of them, unworthy of our generous nation: hence, what have they not attempted, in order to degrade us, to tarnish our laurels, to deprive our souls of the sacred love of patriotic glory, and all those sublime sentiments which constitute our strength, and the despair of our enemies?—People of France! Noble children of Victory! you beheld them with horror: assassins, base traitors, highway robbers, invested themselves with all the marks of authority over you: they were covered with distinctions, which belong only to services rendered to the country, to honour, and to loyalty. Nobles!—What! Are not all free and victorious Frenchmen equally noble? The blood which flows in the veins of the brave, is not that the most pure and most noble? Have we not done, for the glory of France, in five and twenty years, more than our forefathers did in four centuries?"

Enough of such eloquence. There can be no doubt that General Morand considered himself as one of those demi-gods, whose astonishing victories, sublime sentiments, illustrious honour, and exalted patriotism, rendered them worthy to be governed only by Napoleon Bonaparte, another demi-god of the same character.

as far as Quercy. He marched upon Montauban, one of the best cities in the south, which had not yielded till after the fall of Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Cahors. His van-guard was arrived, while his sanguinary proclamation, which preceded him, inspired more consternation than his columns. Every thing was feared for the people of these districts, whose loyalty had been so signally manifested in the most disastrous times ; but, on the 16th of April, Morand received an order to march his troops towards the eastern frontiers, and he took up his quarters at Caussade.

Thus was accomplished the temporary subjugation of France, by the same instruments which enabled the usurper himself to re-assume his crown. The joyful tidings were communicated, by a salute of artillery fired at one o'clock, on the 17th of April, from all the batteries throughout the empire. Meanwhile, Napoleon was actively employed in consolidating his power, and averting, if possible, the foreign vengeance that menaced it. These require to be next considered.



## CHAPTER V.

NAPOLEON could not conceal from himself, that his former popularity afforded him no protection in his present condition. He had a new part to perform, and he played it with tolerable grace. The people, who had been his slaves, were now amused with the novelty of being his masters. They were ostentatiously proclaimed, by himself and his partisans, as the legitimate source of all power.\*—The metamorphosed Emperor condescended to promise he would receive his authority from their hands, and, to complete the wonder, he also declared he would use it for their benefit. The speculative framers of constitutions, a prolific breed in France, were immediately busy, and schemes of political perfection, which only required human perfection for their object, sprung from many a visionary brain. Liberty, in all its most captivating forms, was at once the end and means of that regeneration which France awaited from the hands of Bonaparte. Carnot, the stern, the republican Carnot, accepted a place (Minister of the Interior) and a title from the Emperor; he surrendered the inflexibility of his own principles, that he might controul those of his sovereign. Was it not as probable, that his unrelenting hatred of a Bourbon, made him willing to serve any cause that tended to their permanent exclusion?

The nomination of Fouché, as Minister of Police, inspired general confidence. The Parisians regarded it as a security against those despotic measures, which constituted the former vigour of the imperial government. Whatever may have been the crimes of this man during the rage of revolutionary fanaticism,

\* The new Council of State, at its first meeting, recognised, "que le souveraineté reside dans le peuple, seule source légitime du pouvoir."

it cannot be denied that, as the minister of Bonaparte, he evinced an intrepidity and firmness honourable to himself and beneficial to his country.\* The fearless character of his remonstrances frequently exposed him to Napoleon's capricious resentment, while the vicissitudes of his condition, sometimes in exile, sometimes in disgrace, and sometimes in power, proved that he was not a supple instrument of tyranny. The inhabitants of Paris, therefore, beheld his appointment with delight, for they hoped to escape the domiciliary visits which had, heretofore, been a formidable evil. In a circular letter which he addressed to the prefects on the 31st of March, he cautioned them "against the excessive exertion of their authority, and against the renewal of the police of attack instead of the police of observation." He condemned, indeed, the whole of that minute and officious curiosity, which is destructive of social enjoyment, and which has been forcibly described as making "the police appear the sword instead of the torch of justice."

The Duke of Otranto was equally explicit, in delivering his opinions to Louis XVIII., as he had been towards Napoleon. There were errors in the government of the former, which he considered likely to produce another revolution, and the return of Bonaparte. He developed those errors, and predicted their consequences. When his predictions were fulfilled, he became an object of suspicion. It was thought he had promoted their accomplishment. The King was earnestly solicited, therefore, to issue an order for his removal to Lille, where he might be retained as a kind of hostage. Louis complied, and the agents of the police entered his house to enforce its execution. The Duke of Otranto, by his firmness, or by the influence which he naturally possessed over such persons, deterred them from proceeding.†

When Bonaparte arrived at Paris, he sent for the Duke. "They wished to carry you off," said he, "that you might not be useful to your country. Well! I afford you an opportunity of rendering additional services to her. The moment is perilous, but your courage, as well as mine, is superior to circumstances; accept, therefore, once more, the ministry of police." In obeying this mandate, the Duke of Otranto did not conceal from Napoleon the real danger of his affairs; nor did he yield, till he was convinced, or affected to be convinced, that Austria and England secretly approved of his escape from Elba. It can

\* See "Precis de la Vie publique du Duc D'Otrante, Leipsic, 1816."

† "Precis" ut supra.



hardly be supposed that so veteran a statesman, one so well acquainted with all the artifices of Napoleon's character, and who must have understood the political interests of Europe, really believed in this stratagem. We are bound to compliment his sagacity, at the expense of his sincerity. His language and writings, however, tended uniformly to inspire confidence, and promote security. He spoke to Napoleon of an amnesty ; not a partial act of grace, but a total oblivion of the past. His own conduct exemplified his precepts. He dissipated the alarms of his personal enemies, and granted passports to those who could not believe he would ever pardon the injury they had endeavoured to do him.

The utmost concord prevailed between Bonaparte and his minister, until the latter received, from Vienna, a letter from one of the members of Congress, who informed him, in positive terms, that Bonaparte would never be recognised, that the allied powers were unanimously agreed, and that they were preparing to march against him. The Duke of Otranto then communicated to Napoleon his sentiments, and represented that it was impossible for France to withstand the shock of all Europe. He observed, that it became him frankly to appeal to the nation ; that he should endeavour to ascertain the final resolution of the allies ; and that, if they were unalterable, his own interests and those of the country, rendered it an imperative duty in him to abdicate, and retire to the United States.

Had this intrepid counsel been followed, if the magnanimity of Napoleon had been equal to the wisdom of his minister, how many evils would France have escaped. But it wounded his pride, and while he disdained to acknowledge the prudence of the advice, he considered the advice itself as indicating principles which might be justly suspected.

The remainder of Napoleon's ministry was composed of the following individuals. Cambaceres, Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, was nominated Minister of Justice ; the finances were entrusted to the Duke de Gaëte ; the Duke of Bassano was Secretary of State ; the Duke Decrés, Minister of Marine and Colonies ; Count Mollien, Minister of the Imperial Treasury ; and Marshal Prince Eckmuhl, Minister of War. The Duke of Rovigo was appointed Inspector-General of the Gendarmerie ; Count Bondy, Prefect of the Seine ; the Counsellor of State, Real, Prefect of Police ; and the Duke of Vicenza, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The same *Moniteur* which contained the preceding appointments, communicated to the Parisians and to France, many other official documents. The decrees issued by Napoleon at Lyon were reprinted, as their circulation hitherto had been confined only to a secret and partial distribution. All their futile falsehoods were retained. The electoral colleges of the empire were convoked for the ensuing May, to meet at Paris in an assembly extraordinary of the *Champ de Mai*. For what? To correct and modify the constitutions according to the will of the nation, and, "to assist at the coronation of the Empress and the son of the Emperor!"

The first care of Napoleon was directed to the organization of his army. This was equally necessary, whether he had to wage a war with the allies, or to overawe an insulted people. Reviews were incessantly held in the court of the Tuileries, and every plausible trick of familiar condescension employed, to confirm that ardent zeal which already animated his soldiers. It must be allowed, that Napoleon well understood the arts by which a general endears himself to his men. The enthusiasm and affection which they felt for him, were boundless and sincere. But that fascination which he exercised over their minds, only made him and them the more dangerous. The same influence which, in its application to honourable purposes, we revere and cherish, becomes mischievous, and perhaps uncontrollable, when directed to a pernicious end. Every regiment in the service sent addresses to Bonaparte, couched in terms of the most unqualified devotion. He could not doubt the honesty, nor mistake the value, of those addresses. All the officers on half pay, who followed the Emperor, and who were in Paris, were immediately put in activity by an order of the 24th of March.

While he was thus indefatigable in his efforts to consolidate the connection between himself and the army, his ministers were no less zealously employed, in restoring harmony to the civil functions of government. Carnot pre-eminently distinguished himself, as if anxious to justify at once his title and his place. The day succeeding his appointment, he addressed a circular letter to all the prefects of the empire. After duly felicitating himself upon the dignified station he held under his august imperial Majesty, the converted republican proceeded to communicate a somewhat pathetic account of Napoleon's journey from Cannes to Paris.

"The Emperor, surrounded by the army and the people, has traversed his dominions in the midst of the most tender emotions: his march presented, every



where, the appearance of triumphal pomp; and that pomp, which enthusiasm alone provided, did not cost a single tear to one of his subjects, whom he called his children, and who saw in him a father, wholly occupied with their happiness, and with the national glory. With what confidence, with what security, such a return ought to inspire you!—Feeble princes, imposed upon us by foreigners, themselves foreigners to our laws and our manners, have attempted, during an interregnum of eleven months, to bring us back again to feudal times; they disguised, badly, their intentions, beneath the cloak of some liberal ideas, which were only in their mouths; but what they could not disguise, was that handful of men attached to their cause, a fearful minority, who suffered them to fly almost alone from a country which, for the second time, expelled them from its bosom.

“The official documents printed in the *Moniteur*, will convey to you the magnanimous intentions of our legitimate sovereign; do not lose a moment in circulating them. Recal to their situations those municipal officers, who were displaced on account of their political sentiments, or from having acquired national property, &c. Appreciate, deeply, the intentions which the Emperor has expressed for the happiness of his people, and let us unite our efforts to make that prince beloved, whom Providence has restored, and who secures to us and our children equality of civil rights, enjoyment of all property, and what is no less precious, the enjoyment of national honour.”

This vapid epistle, conveys no very exalted opinion of Carnot's intellectual powers. Was he ashamed of his task, or did the task itself defy the aid of embellishment? No man can write with energy who does not believe what he writes. He must delude himself before he can delude others. Carnot, when he associated himself with Bonaparte, perhaps acted from principle, and hoped to benefit his country even by such an instrument. This is a supposition which candour will not reject. He described the Emperor as he hoped to find him. It was prophecy, not history, that guided his pen. The falsifying contrast, however, must have obtruded itself upon every line he wrote; and if he had virtue enough to feel as a patriot, could he repress the humiliating blush which reminded him he was the minister of a tyrant? Hence the subdued and struggling enthusiasm, which gleamed with such transient flashes through his official letter. Hence the timid bitterness, with which he inveighs against the Bourbons; hence the coy devotion, with which he prostrates himself before the constitutional idol whom “Providence restored;” and hence the awkward simplicity, with which he invites the prefects to unite their efforts in making that idol

beloved. What ! was the labour then to be begun ? His wholesale and hacknied panegyrists had incessantly proclaimed, that Napoleon was adored ; but Count Carnot, young in the avocation of a flatterer, and not yet divested of some lingering attachment to truth, directs his workmen to build the edifice, which less conscientious artificers had sworn was already complete.

At a subsequent period, he managed the delicate materials of fiction with more boldness, either because the necessity was greater, his hopes stronger, or his incredulity less. Warmed with the conceptions of liberty, when he issued his instructions to the prefects, relative to the idle pageant of the *Champ de Mai*, he painted, in vivid colours, the romantic visions by which his reason was seduced. Believing him sincere, it is impossible not to respect the error into which he was betrayed. The following extract, from those instructions, exhibits a curious contrast with the frigid and elaborate adulation of his preceding address.

“ The decree of the Emperor, and the considerations which influence him, are a homage rendered to those grand and eternal principles which constitute civilised states. Obscured and oppressed by feudal anarchy, they have resumed additional energy and lustre in modern times, while the progress of knowledge, promises a long duration to them hereafter. It was to assert those principles that France rose in 1789 ; it was for them that she fought against all Europe ; their conquest is united with that prodigious glory which will for ever illustrate the French arms. The Emperor recognises these rights of the people, acquired by five and twenty years fighting ; he abhors the idea, that the nation is made for the throne, and not the throne for the nation : he wishes to be surrounded by the electoral colleges, to correct and modify our constitutions, according to the interests and the will of the nation. What a grand and beautiful sight, to see a hero, the idol of the army, and who has been the conqueror of Europe, declaring, from the shield on which the suffrages of the people and the soldiers have raised him, that it is from them he derives his power ; that he wishes to reign only by the laws ; and that, in conjunction with the deputies of the nation, he is about to establish, by wise and decisive institutions, an alliance between monarchical power and a brave and enlightened people !

“ Thus Charlemagne, restoring these *Champs de Mars et de Mai*, which are as ancient as the French name, surrounded himself with the flower of his people ; from the bosom of those national assemblies, emanated those capitularies which form one of the noblest monuments of his reign, and which have



survived his conquests. But then, a small part of the nation only was represented: at present, all classes of citizens unite in choosing members for the electoral colleges. They whom his Majesty convokes, being composed of the principal proprietors and many Members of the Legion of Honour, have, as their elements, property, which is the true basis of national stability, and courage, which secures and protects it.

“ In this new federation, the Emperor will present to his people his august consort, and the prince, who is the hope of that country over which he will one day rule. According to an ancient and much-loved practice in France, they will receive the crown in the midst of the Champ de Mai, and take their places on the throne by the side of the great Napoleon. This affecting solemnity, combined with the grand era of the constitutional organisation of our country, will consecrate the alliance of the French with the fourth dynasty, the mutual oaths of the subjects towards their rulers, and of the rulers towards their subjects.”

Two observations suggest themselves upon perusing the above. Carnot, with all his republican zeal for pure, unmixed liberty, recognises the army in their deliberative capacity, and accepts the Emperor from their hands. He could not be ignorant, that a chief, elevated to the supreme power by his soldiers, must hold the civil authority subordinate to the military; nor could he disguise from himself, what the history of all ages has demonstrated, that where an army acquires such an ascendancy as to be able to dispose of the throne, it is no longer subjected to the laws which regulate the conduct of all other citizens. The sword that is drawn to bestow a crown, will always be ready to maintain it, and though prudent legislators may circumscribe its functions, those limits are not transgressed only while there is no motive sufficiently powerful. The soldiers of Napoleon made him their Emperor, because he was their general; it was their own interests they consulted in the election, not the collective welfare of France. Carnot knew this: yet he condescended to propitiate their influence, by the admission of a principle subversive of the only end which he professed to have in view. The allusion to Charlemagne also, “ whose laws,” observes Gibbon, “ were not less sanguinary than his arms,” was unfortunately employed, by a man who affected a profound veneration for all the sterner virtues of democratical freedom.

The other observation impeaches his morals or his judgment. He talked of the Empress and her son, who were to be crowned in the Champ de Mai. Did

he believe they would be permitted to return? If he did, then he was probably the only man in Europe whom Napoleon's clumsy falsehood had deceived. If he did not, he proved his qualification for a minister of Bonaparte, by promoting that system of deception, which had already degraded the people of France into the veriest tools that despotism ever wielded.

On Sunday, the 26th of March, Napoleon received addresses of congratulation from the ministers and other public bodies. They were just the same as they had presented, a fortnight before, to Louis. Like the epithalamiums and elegies of Settle, which by the alteration of a name, celebrated every marriage, and bewailed every death, that could reward his venal smiles or tears, the official gentlemen in France, kept a regular assortment of addresses, adapted to any government that wanted them. It is sickening to reflect upon such profligacy, though it may plead the prescription of antiquity.\* The Municipal Council, the Court of Cassation, (memorable for its hypocrisy and bombast when it approached Louis,†) and the Institute, were foremost in their fawnings. The latter afflicts an ingenuous mind with most shame and indignation. That civic magistrates, an unthinking race in most countries, should float with the stream, is more vexatious than wonderful; but that an association of men elevated by their talents, dignified by their pursuits, and qualified to estimate the human character, uninfluenced by vulgar prejudices, should prostitute their high calling by servile adulation, is a melancholy proof of the individual debasement which accompanies national degradation. It would be useless to transcribe their expressions, for they exhibit a close resemblance to the inflated hyperboles, which infect all the protestations of a Frenchman. When he is most intent to deceive, he soars highest into the regions of unutterable fidelity.

The address of the ministers was conveyed in the same jargon, but entitled to more consideration, because it might be regarded as an exposition of their principles and motives. Some allowance, also, may be made for men who connected their destiny with Napoleon's, and who pleaded for themselves while they were extolling him. Their sincerity, at least, must be exempt from suspicion.—The following was the congratulatory harangue they employed.

\* Cicero has painted the Gallic character in a few words. "*Gallis fidem non habendam, hominibus levibus, perfidis, et in ipsos Deos immortales impiis.*"

† See p. 103 of this Volume.



" Sire,

" Providence, who watches over our welfare, has opened to you again this throne, whither you have been conveyed by the free choice of the people, and by national gratitude. The country erects, once more, its majestic front. It salutes, for the second time, with the name of liberator, the prince who dethrones anarchy, and whose existence alone can now consolidate our liberal institutions.

" The most just of revolutions, one which restores to man his dignity and all his political rights, has hurled from the throne the dynasty of the Bourbons. After twenty-five years of war and tumult, all the efforts of foreigners could not awaken extinguished affections, or such as were wholly unknown to the present generation. The struggle of partial interests and prejudices against the knowledge of the age, and against the interests of a great nation, is at length terminated.

" Our destiny is accomplished. That which alone is legitimate, the cause of the people, has triumphed. Your Majesty is restored to the wishes of the French; you have resumed the reins of empire, amid the blessings of the people and of the army. France, Sire, has for guarantees, her will and her dearest interests; she has, also, every thing which your Majesty has said to the multitudes who incessantly surrounded you on your journey.

" The Bourbons have not learned to forget any thing; their actions and their conduct belied their promises. *Your Majesty will keep yours !!* You will remember only the services rendered to the country; you will prove, that in your estimation and in your heart, whatever may have been the diversity of opinions or the rage of parties, all citizens are equal before you, as they are before the law.\*

" Your Majesty will also forget, that we have been the masters of surrounding nations. Generous thought! which adds another glory to what you had before acquired. Your Majesty has already traced for your ministers the course they are to pursue. You have communicated, to every country, in your proclamations, the maxims by which your empire is henceforth to be governed. No external war, unless it be to repel unjust aggression. No internal re-action, no

\* " Why," asks M. Gallais, " did he dismiss twenty-eight judges, sixty-one prefects, thirty-seven military commandants, and three thousand five hundred mayors, merely because they had been nominated by the King?"—This question is rather an unceremonious comment upon the text of the ministers.

arbitrary decrees ; but freedom of persons, security of property, and liberty of thought, are the principles which you have consecrated.

“ Happy are they, Sire, who are called to co-operate in such sublime objects. Such benefits will obtain for you, from posterity, that is, when the period of adulation is passed, the name of father of your country. They will be guaranteed, to our children, by the august heir, whom your Majesty is preparing to crown in the Champ de Mai.”

This address was signed by Cambaceres, Gaudin, Maret, Carnot, Fouché, &c.

When we contemplate this picture of Utopian felicity, which France was to enjoy under the paternal sceptre of Bonaparte, it is difficult to repress our sorrow at the policy of the allies ; but then, we are immediately relieved by reflecting, that like the tears shed at some well-wrought tragic scene, the woes we deplore are wholly fictitious. It is doubtful whether Napoleon listened to all the harangue with equal pleasure ; for wherever the people are congratulated upon their prospective happiness, there is always a tacit implication of their former sufferings. The future blessings of Bonaparte's reign were exhibited in contrast, and his claim to confidence founded exclusively upon his not ruling as heretofore. His reply to the ministers was brief, and the first sentence remarkable, when those parts of the address are remembered, which conveyed personal flattery to himself.

“ The sentiments you have expressed are mine. Every thing for the nation, and for France, that is my device. I and my family, whom this great people placed upon the throne of the French, and whom they have maintained there, in spite of political tempests and vicissitudes, we desire, we deserve, we claim no other title to it.”

The Council of State annexed a political confession of faith to their address, which Napoleon must have found very instructive. They commenced with the fashionable dogma of the day, “ that the sovereignty resides in the people, who were the only legitimate source of power.” They then indulged in an historical digression upon the causes and consequences of the Revolution, and proved, with infinite dexterity, that Louis XVIII. had no right to reign. Having disposed of His Most Christian Majesty's pretensions, they satisfactorily demonstrated that Napoleon's abdication was a mere nullity, because it arose “ from the unhappy situation to which France and the Emperor were reduced by war, by treason, and the occupation of the capital.” They discovered, also, that the only object of



the abdication was "to avoid a civil war, and to spare the effusion of French blood." From these premises they easily deduced, that when Louis XVIII. returned, he ought to have remained in England, "for he was a stranger to their laws, to their institutions, to their manners, and to their glory," besides which, "the people, subjugated by the presence of foreign armies, could not freely and validly express their will." They next enumerated all the dreadful crimes he had committed during his short sway. He had thanked a foreign prince for his throne—he dated the first public act of his authority in the nineteenth year of his reign, thus subverting the legitimacy of all the intermediate governments since 1793—he granted a constitutional charter by his own royal will, instead of accepting a ready made one from Napoleon's senators—he favoured the ancient nobility\*—he declared war against all liberal opinions—and committed sundry other offences which existed only in the imagination of his accusers.

Turning from the barren and desolate waste of Bourbon depravity, they next expatiated, with rapture, upon a character fertile in all that can adorn or benefit humanity. They selected Napoleon Bonaparte. Fancy paints in vivid colours, and her brightest tints were employed, to pourtray the ideal beauties of this faultless monster. Truth "saw them spurn her bounded reign," and an oriental fabulist might have owned he was surpassed, in the boldness of their conceptions. Every blessing which society can derive from political institutions, every security which legislative wisdom can provide, every glory which a patriotic monarch can confer upon the people whom he governs, every virtue which a king can possess, was predicted by those seers in their prophetic mood. Napoleon reigned by the "only principle of legitimacy, which France recognised;" and beneath his auspicious sceptre, "all liberal principles, individual liberty, the liberty of the press, liberty of conscience, the independence of tribunals, the responsibility of ministers, and the sacred right of national property," was to be enjoyed.

Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna;  
 Jam nova progenies cœlo demittitur alto;  
 Te duce, si qua manent sceleris vestigia nostri  
 Irrita perpetua solvent formidine terras —  
 Pacatumque reget orbem.

VIRGIL.

\* The "Englishman" and his friends are at issue upon a very interesting question of morals. He says (See p. 133 of this Volume) that ingratitude is the peculiar vice of legitimate kings; they say, that Louis XVIII. was guilty of gratitude, for he thanked the Prince Regent of England, who helped him to his throne, and he favoured the ancient nobility, who had shared all his misfortunes. Who shall decide between these profound casuists?

These halcyon days, alas! were not reserved for the present generation, and again a philanthropist who believes they were attainable under Bonaparte, will have to accuse the unrelenting hostility of Europe. Napoleon, in his reply to this address, cautiously abstained from any expressions which might seem to contradict its principles. He played the popular sovereign, with as much facility as if he had never been a tyrant, and artfully insinuated a declaration, which he hoped would relieve him from the suspicions that still clung to his character.

“Princes,” said the imperial demagogue, “are only the first citizens of the state. Their authority is more or less extensive, according to the interest of the nations which they govern. The sovereignty itself is hereditary, because the interest of the people requires it. I know of no legitimacy, exclusively of these principles. I have renounced all ideas of the great Empire, whose basis only I had founded during the last fifteen years. Henceforth, the prosperity and consolidation of the French Empire will be the single object of my thoughts.”

This reply contained an important disclosure. The subjugation of Europe was only laying the foundations of Napoleon's great Empire. In what other quarter of the world he meant to seek for the superstructure, can hardly be conjectured. Perhaps the spoils of Asia would have satiated the rapacious victor, or he might contemplate the addition of Mexico and Peru. Those, however, were remote projects, and the allies were at liberty to indulge the comfortable reflection, that their territories and thrones, were regarded as the basis of Bonaparte's universal dominion. The only benefit of experience consists in its application to the future: and they might prudently consult their interests, by confederating to prevent a revival of Napoleon's sublime plans. But he had renounced them: so does the gambler forswear dice, when the last guinea is staked and lost. With a replenished purse, however, he returns, in the ardent but fatal hope of retrieving his dissipated fortune; and with renovated power, Bonaparte would have played again for kingdoms.

Addresses, similar to the preceding in all the qualities of falsehood, exaggeration, and servility, were presented by the Royal Court of Paris, the Court of Accounts, the Polytechnic School, and the military bodies. The answers of Napoleon were equally oracular.

Many efforts were made to propitiate England. The French journals teemed with elaborate dissertations, and amicable paragraphs, in which the virtues, the



generosity, and magnanimity of this country, were eminently extolled. Every excellence was ascribed to us, which could be beneficial to Napoleon. If it had been possible to detach Great Britain from the confederacy, he would have found the league much less formidable, for our exchequer imparted vitality to the coalesced armies. Among the artifices employed, the abolition of the slave trade, was conspicuous. This great object had failed in negotiation with Louis, and Napoleon considered its accomplishment, by an imperial decree, as a master-stroke of policy. He knew it was a favourite wish with the people of England, and he hoped to secure, at least, their cordial approbation.

The promptitude with which he adopted the measure, was not only contrasted with the scruples of Louis, but represented as an indication of the stability of his power. With respect to the first, it may be observed, that Louis hesitated, because the interests of a considerable number of his subjects were implicated; while Napoleon decided, because neither the inclinations, nor the will, of the people, were ever allowed to interpose between his mandate and its execution.—Nor should it be forgotten, that we debated twenty years before we abolished the traffic. Louis required only three. As to the second inference, what probability was there, that they who supinely yielded to domestic slavery, would rebel against African freedom? If they found no sufficient motive to resist, when the yoke was fitted to their own necks, it could hardly be supposed they would arm to rivet the chains of negro servitude. Our passions are seldom very vehemently excited by remote and unseen objects.

But there was one point of view in which this transaction was peculiarly grateful to Napoleon's friends. It afforded such a convincing proof that he was a much more virtuous and moral being than Louis. The moment he regained his former power, he granted emancipation to the blacks. This was so delightful a touch of benevolence and humanity, that we cannot help wondering he never displayed it before. During fifteen years, in which he held the supreme authority, how did it happen he forbore to exercise the amiable philanthropy of his disposition? We had set him the example since 1806, yet it remained unimitated. His advocates are silent here, but truth may whisper, that Napoleon had not, before, any necessity to conciliate England. When a man delays to do that which he might have done, till the performance of his duty is palpably in unison with his interest, it is not a very illogical supposition that his interest prompted his duty.

Among the earliest acts of Napoleon's second reign, was a decree, abolishing

all those restrictions upon the press which the ministers of Louis imposed. There were few writers who ventured to use this dangerous liberty. M. le Comte, one of the editors of *Le Censeur*, embraced the ambiguous privilege, but he soon found that permission to write any thing, signified in the imperial vocabulary, liberty to write nothing against the government.\* Such freedom is the common boon of tyranny, and when flatterers hold the pen, they boast the intrepidity of their sentiments. It would have been preposterous to suppose, that in Napoleon's precarious situation, he could permit an unlicensed current to public opinion; that he could safely allow his character, his enterprize, and his pretensions, to be investigated by the acrimonious zeal of his adversaries. The policy of repressing such offensive inquiries was obvious, nor could it be rationally condemned: the culpable folly consisted in the parade of a virtue which he did not really exercise.

There seemed no limits, indeed, to his gracious concessions, for a man gives largely who gives in promises only. When the Count D'Artois preceded his brother in 1814, he announced the future abolition of the *droits reunis*, a hateful tax, levied upon the people in a manner somewhat similar to our excise duties. This impost, which had originated under Bonaparte, was universally detested, and its removal was therefore calculated to conciliate a very considerable class of society. When Louis, however, ascended the throne, he found the royal treasury so impoverished, that it was impossible to provide for the public expenditure without the aid of this tax. He had either to disregard the premature assurance of his brother, or to incur the hazard of a deficiency in the revenue, which would have been attended with infinite danger.† He preferred the former, and continued the *droits reunis*, for one year, when the legislature was to examine the subject, and provide a substitute, if necessary. Napoleon, upon his return, immediately decreed the abolition of all the odious regulations accompanying this impost; but, (as in the question of the slave trade,) if it be again asked, why he never condescended before to relieve his subjects from so galling a system of finance, the same answer occurs, that till now, he was not reduced to the necessity of courting popular opinion. Besides, his decree was to be operative only from the

\* See the "Avant Propos" to M. Comte's pamphlet, "De L'Impossibilité d'Etablir une Monarchie constitutionnelle sous un chef militaire, et particulièrement sous Napoleon."

† See Chateaubriand, *Report on the State of France made to Louis XVIII. in Council*, who obscurely hints at a national bankruptcy as the alternative.



1st of June, and he probably confided in the hope that he should then be able to annul it.

It is pleasing to turn from the specious liberality of enthralled and perplexed usurpation, to contemplate an act of moral bounty, whose consequences must have proved extensively beneficial to France. Carnot addressed a memorial to Napoleon upon the subject of national education, and proposed the introduction of that system which is now so generally adopted throughout England. He stated, that there were two millions of French children, wholly destitute of primary instruction, and suggested the propriety of remedying so deplorable an evil. Bonaparte listened to the advice and embraced it. He issued a decree, ordering the establishment of an experimental school at Paris, and directing, that when its success was ascertained, the Minister of the Interior should devise means for extending similar institutions to all the departments. Whatever was sincere, in this scheme, may be ascribed to the philosophical patriotism of Carnot, which Napoleon countenanced merely as another mode of testifying his reformation.

These measures of internal policy did not divert his attention from the more important consideration of his foreign affairs. He had little reason to hope that the allies would abandon their cause, after the decisive declaration they had promulgated, and the mighty efforts they were making. Though it was prudent in him not to seek the quarrel, both from consistency and necessity, yet he could not safely remain passive till the ripened vengeance burst upon his devoted head. In order to avoid any act that might increase the jealousy, or accelerate the preparations, of his enemies, his first step was simply to recal the whole army to its post, without ordering any addition to its numbers. This decree applied, therefore, only to the military force that had existed under Louis; but it was naturally regarded as the precursor of augmentation, and as indicating the probable approach of hostilities. To confirm his pacific protestations, however, he seized the opportunity of a review which he held, in the beginning of April, when he told the troops, "The French did not wish to interfere in the affairs of other nations, but woe to those who sought to interfere with their's, and treat them as Genoa and Geneva had been treated."

Every endeavour was made by Napoleon to withhold, from France, all knowledge of the declaration issued by the Congress; but when it became no longer possible to prevent its dissemination, he thought it expedient to counteract

its effects, by a manifesto which accompanied its publication in the *Moniteur*. This state document contained an elaborate justification of his enterprize, a specific detail of the grievances, real or imaginary, which were cited as the pretexts for invading France, and an appeal to the law of nations, against the doctrine supposed to be inculcated by the language of that celebrated anathema. It would be superfluous to examine either its arguments or its assertions, for all the principal points of controversy which it embraced have been discussed in the Fourth Chapter of the present work.

Napoleon made a last, but ineffectual attempt, to avert the hostility of Europe, and obtain a recognition of his power from the allied sovereigns. He abandoned the usual mode of official communication between governments, and imitating his conduct when elected to the consular throne, addressed a letter personally to the different monarchs. In the former instance, his epistle received an answer; not, indeed, from George the Third, but from Lord Grenville, His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, who insinuated a dignified reproof, of so novel and affected an innovation upon the established medium of diplomatic intercourse. On the present occasion, Napoleon was exposed to the bitter mortification of having his overture scornfully rejected, by those to whom it was addressed, or the very couriers who were the bearers of it, not permitted to proceed to their destination. He did not probably anticipate this slight, or he would scarcely have incurred it, unless he was anxious to provide another proof of his ardent desire for peace till he found it convenient to make war. The following is a translation of this document :\*

“ Castle of the Tuileries, April 4, 1815.

“ Sir, my Brother,

“ You will have learned, during the last month, my return to the French coast, my entrance into Paris, and the departure of the Bourbon family. The true nature of those events ought now to be known to your Majesty.— They are the consequence of an irresistible power, the consequence of the unanimous will of a great nation, who understands its duties and its rights. The dynasty which force restored to the French people, was no longer adapted to them. The Bourbons could not mingle either with their sentiments or with their manners. France was justified in separating itself from them, and her voice

\* For the original, see Appendix, No. V.



called for a liberator. The hope, which induced me to make the greatest sacrifices, has been deceived.

“ I came ; and from the spot where I touched the shore, the love of my people has conveyed me to the bosom of my capital. The first wish of my heart is, to requite such affection by the maintenance of an honourable tranquillity. The restoration of the imperial throne was necessary to the felicity of Frenchmen. My most anxious wish is, to render it also useful for the repose of Europe. The colours of different nations have been alternately adorned with sufficient glory. The vicissitudes of fortune have caused, often enough, great reverses to follow great successes. A nobler field is now open to monarchs, and I am the first to descend into it.

“ After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great battles, it will be more delightful, henceforth, to know no other rivalry than that of promoting the blessings of peace ; no other contention than the sacred one of advancing the felicity of mankind.

“ France delights in frankly proclaiming this noble object of her unanimous wish. Jealous of her own independence, the invariable principle of her future policy will be the most entire respect for the independence of other states. If such should also be, (as a propitious confidence tells me they are,) the personal sentiments of your Majesty, general tranquillity is secured for a long time, and justice, seated on the boundaries of different kingdoms, will be alone sufficient to protect them.

“ I am, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ NAPOLEON.”

The comfortable promises of this penitent letter could not operate any conversion in the British cabinet, for it was returned unopened.\* A similar epistle was despatched to Vienna, but the Congress disdained to make any replication, and confined themselves to publishing an extract from their conferences, as a justification of their conduct. They renewed the assertion, that Napoleon, “by breaking a solemn treaty entered into with the allies, had placed himself in that state of hostility with them which existed before the treaty ;” and the equity of the war, they deduced from the indubitable principle of self-defence. “The man,” they observed, “who now

\* See Lord Castlereagh's note to M. Caulincourt, April 8, 1815, and Lord Clancarty's despatch, dated Vienna, May 6.

offers to sanction the treaty of Paris, and pretends to substitute his guarantee for that of a sovereign whose loyalty was unstained, and benevolence unbounded, is the same who, for fifteen years, has ravaged and convulsed the earth to find food for his ambition ; who has sacrificed millions of victims, and the happiness of a whole generation, to a system of conquest, which truces, little entitled to the name of peace, have only served to render more oppressive and more odious ; who, after having by his wild enterprises wearied even Fortune, armed all Europe against him, and exhausted all the resources of France, has been compelled to renounce his projects, and abdicate his power, in order to secure the wreck of his existence ; who, at a time when the nations of Europe indulged in the hope of enjoying permanent repose, has meditated fresh catastrophes, and by an act of double treason, to the powers who too generously spared him, and to a government which he could attack only through the blackest treachery, has usurped a throne which he had renounced, and which he had occupied only to inflict misery on France and on the world. This man has no other guarantee to propose to Europe but his word ; but after the fatal experience of fifteen years who would be rash enough to accept that guarantee ? Peace with a government placed in such hands, and composed of such elements, would prove only a perpetual state of uncertainty, anxiety, and danger. No power could really disarm ; nations would not enjoy any of the advantages of a true peace : they would be crushed by inevitable expences. As confidence would no where revive, industry and commerce would every where languish ; as there would be no stability in political relations, gloomy discontent would sit brooding over every country, and agitated Europe would be in daily fear of fresh explosions."

The firm and unaltered tone of this manifesto, destroyed any lingering hope Napoleon might possibly have cherished, and he now saw, that the swords which had opened his passage to the throne, must be again drawn to maintain him there. A decree was issued, calling out the national guards throughout the whole empire, including every man between the age of twenty and sixty, with such exceptions only as were made in the year 1813. The Minister of the Interior addressed a circular letter to the prefects, urging them to promote this levy of troops, by every means in their power, and the Minister at War published an appeal, which was not without its effect upon the veteran soldiers of Napoleon. He told them, explicitly, that truth which the English friends of Bonaparte were most anxious to suppress. " *You wished to have your Emperor ; he is come. You have supported him with all your efforts. Assemble forthwith, in order that you may all be ready to defend the country against those enemies who would regulate our national colours, who would impose a sovereign upon us, and dictate*



a constitution to *us*. In such circumstances, it is the duty of all Frenchmen, accustomed to the *trade of war*, to rally under their standards."

The magnificent decrees of Napoleon for enrolling his army, when compared with their results, recalled the sarcastic rebuke of Hotspur to the fiery Glendower:

"*Glend.* I can call spirits from the vasty deep.

"*Hotsp.* Why, so can I; or so can any man:

But will they come, when you do call for them?"

Napoleon issued his imperial mandate for the organisation of a military force, commensurate with the magnitude of the dangers that menaced him: but, his call was not obeyed. He was no longer that absolute despot whose mere will could consign thousands to the tomb. The people of France were animated by no spontaneous zeal in his behalf, nor could his three-and-twenty extraordinary commissioners, whom he despatched into the different military divisions of his empire, succeed in rousing even a transient enthusiasm. All the eloquence of their proclamations, failed to convince the nation that its best blood and treasure should be lavished for the support of Napoleon's dynasty; all their activity could not excite one decided manifestation of opinion favourable to his cause. His army principally consisted of those who, in the language of Davoust, "were accustomed to the trade of war," and who, as they had no other trade, very naturally preferred occupation to indigence. These veteran troops, however, composed a force distinguished for its discipline and valour, and worthy of displaying those qualities on a better occasion.

It was studiously endeavoured, indeed, to conceal the imperfect influence of Napoleon over his subjects, and the inadequate means he possessed of meeting the formidable league arrayed against him. The columns of the *Moniteur* were daily filled with the most exaggerated accounts of warlike preparation. The aggregate was vauntingly computed at above 2,000,000 of effective men; but not more than one-tenth was actually equipped and took the field. The Imperial Guard was re-established, and consisted of eighty infantry regiments, five regiments of cavalry, several corps of gendarmerie, engineers, &c., composing a total of more than 40,000 men. Unceasing exertions were made to provide a powerful artillery, which was always an important part in Napoleon's armies, and that they were successful, was sufficiently proved by the number of cannon captured on the 18th of June. Similar efforts were employed in the manu-

facture of muskets, and when we remember in how short a space Bonaparte was enabled to conduct so large a force into Belgium, it must be regarded as the proof of no common energy.

The measures adopted were equally applicable to foreign and defensive war. Besides his endeavours to raise a vast army, which, had they been successful, would have empowered him to contest many a stubborn conflict with his adversaries, he neglected no precaution that might secure France from the sudden calamities of invasion. An unobstructed march to Paris, could scarcely have resulted from any event less disastrous and less decisive than the battle of Waterloo. The first line of fortifications, which guarded the French frontiers, could not be repaired without violating the treaty that assigned to France her ancient limits, and Bonaparte had announced his desire to respect the stipulations of that treaty. The second and third were inspected and placed in a state of defence, while the most important towns and positions, as Soissons, Laon, Lafère, St. Quentin, Guise, Chateau-Thierry, Vitry, Langres, were made capable of opposing a vigorous resistance.\* It is related, that Napoleon also wished to fortify Paris, and inquired of Carnot how much time and money would be necessary. "Two hundred millions and three years," replied the minister, "and when it is finished, I would ask only 60,000 men and twenty-four hours to demolish the whole." Bonaparte concealed his resentment at this answer, and persisted in a partial execution of his purpose.† The heights of Montmartre, of Chaumont, and of Mesnil-Montant were fortified, but the Parisians viewed the labour with natural alarm. It betrayed two probable events; that Napoleon calculated upon the advance of the enemy as far as the capital, and that he was determined to endure a siege: either of them sufficient to inspire terror.

An attempt was made to revive those federations which played so conspicuous a part in the commencement of the Revolution; but though the principles of the instigators were the same, it was no longer possible to produce consequences precisely analogous. A few misguided or designing men associated themselves,

\* M. Warin, p. 297.

† His petulant humours experienced many rebukes from his ministers, which must have convinced him he was now their instrument. He was anxious to renew the system of domiciliary visits, which Fouché opposed. He became angry, and threatened to displace Fouché. "Do so," said the latter, "but to-morrow I would not answer for your life." This significant hint quieted his anger.



and promulgated vehement invectives against Louis. Brittany set the example, and emulated the conduct of those who, in 1790, signed a similar federation at Pontivy, now Napoleonville. The object of their union was, (to use their own words,) "to consecrate all its means to the propagation of liberal principles, to oppose truth to imposture, to enlighten the erroneous, to sustain the public spirit, to oppose all disorders, to maintain internal security, to employ all the influence and credit they may possess to retain every one in the line of his duty towards his prince and his country, to bring an effectual and prompt succour to the first requisition of the public authorities, whenever there may be need, to protect cities, towns, and villages, when menaced, to defeat every plot against the liberty, the constitution, and the sovereign of the state; and, lastly, to lend each other a mutual assistance and protection, according to circumstances and events.\*"

The language of this declaration was moderate, and even dignified, compared with the ravings in which some other federal bodies indulged. "What can the proud race of kings do, who menace us?" exclaimed the federation of Lyon. "Brave inhabitants of the neighbouring departments, the Lyonnese call you; they propose to you a holy and fraternal federation. Let us renew that alliance, which made kings tremble in the day-spring of liberty! Let us cement, in the sight of an impious league, that solemn treaty which will render all their efforts abortive."—In a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Roanne, by a delegate from the Lyonnese federation, these patriots employed a still more explicit language. "The cries of liberty, of national independence, have resounded from all parts; they are the presage of victory. What French heart does not beat at hearing these inspiring names! In the dawn of the revolution, they awakened our heroes; they saved France, when she was menaced, as now, by a conspiracy

\* The following stanza, adapted to the Marsellaise, was sung at a banquet given at Rennes, in commemoration of this federal union. It expresses the sentiments of those who adhered to the usurper:—

"Aux jours où notre belle France  
Voulut recevoir son honneur,  
Nous avons bien la vaillance,  
Nous n'avions pas notre Empéreur.  
Des parties souillaient la victoire,  
Tous, vous marchez au même rang,  
Vous verserez bien moins de sang,  
Et vous n'aurez pas moins de gloire.  
Braves confédérés, brave peuple Bréton  
Servons la liberté, l'honneur, Napoleon."

of kings : the greatness of the French power sprung from the efforts intended to destroy it.—The Emperor, at the head of the French army, always the terror of hostile kings, advances, and will break the chains of their people.”

This was precisely the jargon of the first revolutionary apostles. They talked of liberty and independence, while their very sources were polluted by massacre and proscription ; they, too, designated the just and politic alarm which all Europe felt at the ruthless fanaticism of French principles, as a sacrilegious conspiracy of thrones against the universal rights of human nature : and, as if to justify imputed guilt, they strove to arm nations against their rulers, by holding out the flag of rebellion to every state in Christendom. The federations of 1815 were the genuine progeny of that monster of anarchy, whose wild misrule had convulsed the civilised world ; but, instead of the prostitute Goddess of Reason, or the one and indivisible republic, they now invoked the equally immaculate and equally august Napoleon. He was their tutelar saint and leader, and at the head of lawless armies, this jacobin Messiah was “ to break the chains ” of every people. The banners of atheism and sedition were to be again unfurled, and in the shadow of their funereal canopy, myriads of freebooters were to march upon a second crusade, against the repose and well-being of society, against its morals, its order, its religion, and its government.

“ Madmen ! ” exclaimed the federation of Burgundy, apostrophising the allied sovereigns, “ free, like our forefathers, and worthy of being so, him whom you have proscribed, we have adopted.—You have declared war against him ; be it so ; him we are determined to defend. Accustomed to conquer under his auspices, our heroes have formed the first barrier of iron which you will have to pass ; we are about to second their magnanimous efforts ; and in a short time, two millions of armed men will laugh at your threats, and force you to implore his clemency ! ” This lofty declamation was a suitable appendage to Napoleon’s decrees ; but the two millions of warriors, who were to sweep before them confederated Europe, and humble her monarchs to the dust, dwindled into that brave but perjured army, whose three days campaign left their chief himself a servile suppliant at the feet of England.

The rabble of Paris eagerly united themselves into one of these federal associations, and the suburbs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau poured forth their inhabitants, in a sacred league for the maintenance of Napoleon’s throne. These martial bands, whose appearance might have rivalled Falstaff’s troops, were not



viewed with much complacency by Bonaparte, for neither their quality nor their numbers imparted dignity to his cause; but he was unable to reject their services, because he affected popular support. The protection of the capital was their self-imposed vocation, and, imitating their superiors, they *swore* to preserve it from the pollution of hostile foreigners. Had the metropolis been plunged into civil dissensions, these desperate partisans would have proved useful ministers of blood: against defenceless citizens their valour would have been irresistible; but when the British and Prussian artillery menaced destruction to the city, they forgot their oaths, and could not find their courage. Bonaparte endeavoured to elevate the motley groupe of mechanics into importance, and reviewed them in the court of the Tuileries, on the 14th of May. When the ceremony was concluded, he delivered an appropriate harangue. "Federal soldiers," he exclaimed, "I have returned alone to France, because I relied upon the patriotism of the inhabitants of the South, upon the peasants of all France, and upon the artificers of great cities. My confidence has not been betrayed. I behold you with pleasure around me: I accept your offer. Tranquil now, as to the fate of the capital, I shall repair to the frontiers, there to head my army, and defend our territory, if the kings dare attack us." The squalid legion\* listened to this address with attention, and when the Emperor ceased to speak, rent the air with acclamations; but they were heard, also, to indulge in some songs which recalled a period little calculated to gratify the imperial hopes of Napoleon. The majesty of the people (comprehending that portion only which co-operated with the usurper) was adequately represented by these miserable recreants, whom poverty had ripened into patriots, and who were qualified for impartial destruction, because no ravage could injure their condition.

About this period, the precipitate enterprise of Murat terminated with his exclusion from the Neapolitan throne. It has been already observed, that he seized the moment of Napoleon's departure from Elba, for the execution of a plan which he hoped would make him master of Italy. Whether any previous concert existed between him and his brother-in-law, cannot be distinctly ascertained, but it seems certain, that when Bonaparte arrived at Paris, and became anxious to manifest his pacific disposition, he regarded the hostile measures of Murat with

\* It consisted of workmen of the lowest class, liberated prisoners, drunken wretches, and ancient *Septembrisers*, composing a mob of horrid ruffians, whose union was contemplated by the Parisians with dismay. Nor was less terror inspired by another federation, which exacted from its members that they should be "men without fear and without reproach."—Shade of Bayard! it was not by treason, rebellion, and perjury, thy gallant spirit earned this memorable title!

displeasure, as likely to frustrate any chance he had of conciliating the allies. It was the time, not the attempt, that provoked Napoleon's anger, and when it was known that Murat had advanced upon the papal territories, reiterated remonstrances were despatched from Paris, urging an immediate retreat, and the adoption of a purely defensive policy. Whether these advices arrived too late, or that Murat felt confident of success, he persisted in his scheme, until the issue of a short campaign exhibited in him the prelude of Napoleon's fate. The Pope quitted his capital on the same day that Louis XVIII. passed the frontiers of France. Flushed with this easy conquest, Murat advanced towards the north, proclaiming Italian independence, and inviting its assertors to rally under his standard; but though a strong desire of union and liberty animated the people of the different states, they wisely distrusted the instrument by which the struggle was then to be directed. His army consisted of a hundred thousand Neapolitans, commanded chiefly by French officers. When he arrived at Rimini, he issued a proclamation, declaring the independence of Italy. The following extract will shew that he had imbibed his creed from the political dogmas of revolutionary France.

“Italians! formerly masters of the world, you have expiated that fatal glory by a slavery of twenty centuries: let your present glory be, to have no more masters. Every people ought to remain within the limits which nature has prescribed. The sea, and inaccessible mountains, are your fortresses! Never think of passing them, but repel the foreigner who would attempt it, and force him to retire within his own. Eighty thousand Italians from Naples hasten to you, under the command of their King; they swear never to repose themselves until Italy is free, and they have already proved, on many occasions, that they know how to keep their oaths.”

Murat, also, knew how to imitate his august relative in all the petty arts of deception. Casual success he transformed into permanent triumph, and converted positive defeats into splendid victories. On the 4th of April, General Bianchi was beaten, on the Tanaro, by Murat in person, and the result of this battle was the capture of Modena. His left wing, however, which penetrated into Tuscany, sustained a signal overthrow by the army under General Nugent, while the English threatened an attack on Naples. This discomfiture on the one hand, and impending peril on the other, induced him to retreat, which he did so precipitately, that he had not time to collect the contribution he had levied upon Bologna, as the price, it may be presumed, of that independence he promised to



confer. He now strove to obtain an armistice from the Austrian General, and offered to remain quiet in his own kingdom ; but his proposals were answered by the sword. The enemy's advanced guard entered Rimini on the 26th of April, and Murat was slightly wounded on the 28th, in a sharp skirmish which took place near Gambia. General Nugent obtained possession of Rome on the 27th, and Murat would willingly have fled, without another battle, but he found the Austrian army prepared to dispute his march near Tolentino. The conflict commenced on the 2d of May, memorable as the anniversary of that detestable and bloody massacre in Madrid, which Murat authorised and directed. It was soon decided, for on the 3d the Austrian reserve came up, and the Neapolitans were completely routed. General Bianchi availed himself skilfully of this success, by diligently pursuing the vanquished fugitives, until they were wholly dispersed. Murat, attended by four lancers, entered Naples on the 19th at night, gave directions to his wife for saving his immense property, and embarked on the 21st in a vessel which conveyed him to France. Before he quitted the country, which he still affected to call his kingdom, he sanctioned a capitulation, which Madame Murat had signed with Captain Campbell, by which the tranquillity of Naples was secured, and an English garrison admitted. On the 23d of May, the Austrian army entered Naples, where it was received as the ally of Ferdinand, who hastened to receive the congratulations of his subjects, released, at length, from an odious and foreign tyranny. He immediately proclaimed a general amnesty for the past, without any exception, and even permitted Madame Murat to depart, with her family and treasures, for Trieste. The King of Naples was thus restored to his hereditary dominions by the decisive issue of the single battle of Tolentino.\*

\* General Sarrazin, (*Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration*) accuses Murat of having committed an irreparable fault by dividing his forces. "As he wished to make common cause with Napoleon, he ought to have organised a force of a hundred thousand men in five corps, each of twenty thousand, without any other equipment than their arms. He should have precipitated himself, like a torrent, upon Turin, by Rome, Sienna, Florence, Sarzanne, Chiavari, Acqui, and Asti. This bold movement would have intimidated the King of Sardinia, who would probably have proposed some arrangement. The Austrians, not being attacked, would have remained merely spectators, and Murat would have established his communications with Napoleon. So far from this manœuvre tending to expose the kingdom of Naples, it would have drawn the enemy's forces in an opposite direction, and Murat had all the officers of his army as hostages for his family. He might have been master of Turin by the 25th of April, as well as of Mont St. Bernard, Mount Cenis, and the Col-de-Tende. As he drew his sword from its scabbard for Napoleon, he ought to have adopted the concentric system, and advanced to form the right wing of his brother-in-law's army, by leading his last man, and bringing, or sending by sea, the two hundred millions in gold which he had amassed in his coffers."—The opinion of a military man, upon military subjects, is entitled to consideration : but it must not be forgotten, that General Sarrazin has never yet found the commander whom he esteems greater than himself.

The intelligence of this catastrophe excited, in France, little sympathy for the fate of Murat. The royalists beheld in it only another triumph of legitimacy, while the friends of Napoleon remembered the treacherous apostacy of the King of Naples, when the imperial throne was shorn of its splendour by the victorious exploits of the allies in 1814. Neither could he claim commiseration from his conquerors, for the duplicity of his motives in co-operating against Bonaparte had been subsequently detected, and it was evident he tampered with all parties for the exclusive object of his own security.\* There were political reasons, however, why the knowledge of his defeat and flight should be disguised from the French people as long as possible. His enterprise being viewed as a part of Napoleon's scheme, its fatal termination would be regarded as prophetic of the whole; every effort was therefore made to inspire the most sanguine belief of his success. Sometimes he was represented as having a numerous party in Italy favourable to his views; at others, he had vanquished the Austrians in several pitched battles. Even the decisive defeat which he sustained on the 2d and 3d of May was metamorphosed into victory, and instead of his own disaster being admitted, it was stated that Generals Niepperg and Stahremberg were mortally wounded. To complete the climax of audacious falsehood, the Paris papers, on the 25th of May, (the very day when Murat landed in the gulf of Juan) told of the extreme ardour of his troops, of his own unimpaired health, and of the prosperous condition of his affairs.† It may be hoped, for the honour of human

\* He had become an object of suspicion, long before his hostile proceedings. Lord W. Bentinck, in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated January 7, 1815, justly appreciated the value of his political character. "There can be no doubt," observes his Lordship, "that all the advantages contemplated in the alliance with Murat, by Austria and the allies, would have been realized, *if he had embarked honestly and cordially in the cause*; but his policy was to save his crown, and to do this he must always be on the side of the conqueror. His first agents were sent to me, after his return from Leipsic. He then thought Napoleon's affairs desperate. His language was plain and sincere. He said, 'Give me an armistice, and I will march with the whole of the army against the French. Give me the friendship of England, and I care not for Austria or the rest of the world.' Subsequently, when Austria came to seek his alliance, he naturally discovered both his own importance, and the uncertain issue of the contest. He then began to entertain views of aggrandizement; and by possessing himself of the whole south of Italy, he seemed to think he could render himself independent, whatever might be the events of the war."

† The subsequent attempt of Murat to recover his crown, does not come within the scope of this Work. It was a rash and desperate enterprise, and that it failed can be matter of astonishment to no one. The closing scene of his life became the man who had always been the willing agent of Napoleon's tyranny. Murat, as Governor of Paris, nominated the eight military commissioners who adjudged the unfortunate Duke D'Enghien to death, attended in person to witness that atrocious murder, and insulted the royal victim by his ferocious answer, the very moment before he was butchered. How fit, then, that his crimes should be overtaken by the same punishment which he was instrumental in inflicting upon the guiltless descendant of the great Condé.



nature, that, as this execrable system of unceasing deception, so pernicious to society, so destructive of confidence, so debasing in its operation, sprung from the depraved maxims of the Revolution, and was matured by the unblushing effrontery of Napoleon, it will be suffered to rot in the grave of the one, or be banished to the lonely habitation of the other.

While these events were transacting in Italy, Bonaparte and his ministers were actively employed in promulgating edicts, decrees, and proclamations, calculated to excite or confirm the zeal of his followers. Some of them related merely to temporary regulations of internal policy, while others manifested the principles upon which the future government of the usurper was to be regulated. Among the latter, may be reckoned, as most important, the preparations for the Champ de Mai, that idle mockery, which was to delude France into a persuasion that she possessed the privilege of freely deliberating upon her own independence and welfare. Unremitting exertions were made to bestow upon it all the pomp and solemnity which should belong to so important a transaction, for had it really been what it professed to be, what could affect the imagination as more august, than a great and powerful nation convoked, in full assembly, to pronounce upon its own destiny? This, however, was not its purport. On the contrary, it had no other end than to gratify Napoleon's frivolous desire of imitating Charlemagne, or to amuse the Parisians with a show, which might abstract their attention from his ulterior designs. If the former were his object, he succeeded; if the latter, he failed, for long before the pageant was celebrated, the people viewed it with anticipated contempt and derision.

The decree which authorised this ceremony was issued by Napoleon while at Lyon, but the reasons for which it was to be held had ceased to exist. The "electoral colleges" would certainly not be called upon to assist at the "coronation of the Empress, his dear and well-beloved spouse," nor at that "of his most dear and well-beloved son;" neither would they have to "correct and modify the constitution." The Emperor of Austria absolved them from the one, and Napoleon himself from the other. Without waiting for his favourite Champ de Mai, he had promulgated the *Acte Additionnel* on the 23d of April, and left to the electoral colleges no other duty than to accept his gracious bounty. This was precisely that violation of popular rights which Louis had committed, and which the partisans of Bonaparte so loudly condemned. Nor did it now escape censure, for it was vehemently contended, that to the representatives of the people, alone, ought to have been entrusted the task of framing a constitution. The principle

asserted in this distinction was rational and just. Whatever wisdom or sagacity may be displayed by the monarch or his counsellors, in determining the provisions of a charter that is to define and secure the privileges of the subject, the greatest privilege is abandoned, when it is permitted to originate with the crown. The power that gives may take away, and therefore no other power should be recognised than that which can have no interest in revoking. A free constitution is a rampart, erected by free men, against the probable encroachments and abuses of kings; it is the governed who stipulate with the governors; the strong, who surrender a portion of their strength, that what remains may be exercised for the common good; and what can be more absurd in theory, or more destructive in practice, than to surrender the question, of how much shall be granted, to the discretion of that party who must reluctantly concede any thing? The appetite for dominion is insatiable in human nature, and "grows by what it feeds upon;" we may circumscribe, but can never subdue, its voracity. Hence the primitive servitude of all nations; hence the stubborn struggles in those favoured few, who wrest their liberties from the eager grasp of authority; and hence their final overthrow, by the incessant vigilance and rapacity of this lynx-eyed, tiger-fanged vice, which is always watchful to detect, and active to seize, every opportunity for widening its empire.

The *Acte Additionnel* of Napoleon was understood to be the work of Cambacères, Carnot, Benjamin Constant, Merlin, Rœderer, and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely. Some of these lawgivers were men whose avowed principles inspired sanguine hopes of rational, practical liberty: while others could only boast, that they had assisted in the manufacture of similar goods on preceding occasions. The few, therefore, who anticipated any advantage from the firmness, moderation, and wisdom of the former, felt some apprehensions from the pliancy and prejudices of the latter. But what was the astonishment and disappointment of those, who imagined that whatever Napoleon did must be something exclusively excellent, to find, upon the publication of this new constitution, that it differed in none of its essential provisions from the charter of Louis XVIII.? It was thought wonderful that a usurper, who seized the throne to emancipate the people from some nameless and undefined oppression, could not devise a more perfect scheme of popular liberty than had been already bestowed by the legitimate monarch. They began to consider what they had gained by the exchange, and found it difficult to calculate their profits. Their securities, upon paper, were much the same, but with this alarming difference, that the present donor



was not remarkable for fidelity in the performance of his engagements. The much-vaunted benefit was also accompanied by the same formalities as had excited the factious reprobation of the enemies of Louis. It was a gift from Napoleon to the French, instead of a condition imposed by the French upon Napoleon, by which he was to receive, and according to which he was to exercise, the functions of royalty. The people were effectually excluded from all participation in framing this constitution, either themselves, or through their representatives; but, as a compensation, they were permitted the delusive privilege of a vote upon its acceptance.

On the same day that Napoleon promulgated the *Acte Additionnel*, he issued a decree, ordering that registers should be opened at different offices, throughout all the municipalities of France, for receiving the votes of the people. These registers were to be examined, and the numbers cast up, at the approaching Champ de Mai, when the constitution would be solemnly proclaimed. This mode of collecting the suffrages of a nation, comprising many millions of inhabitants, is inherently defective, and became a mere nullity from the vague method employed on the present occasion. It was easy to foresee, that menace and fraud would obtain as many votes as were required.\* They who durst not refuse, would be compelled to sign their names, while they who despised intimidation, from virtue or policy, would be supplied by fictitious signatures. A third, and more numerous class, whose obscurity or quiet seclusion protected them from solicitation, would be wholly overlooked. Thus, by the aid of threats, of artifice, and of neglect, what difficulty could arise in procuring a nominal inscription of votes sufficient for the purposes of temporary delusion? Besides, no precautions were adopted to verify the qualifications of individuals, and it is at least probable, that many gave their names who could not write them, and who had no legal claim to deliver any suffrage at all. This artful scheme, therefore, for investing Napo-

\* M. Gallais, (*Hist. de la Revol.* p. 329,) relates the following circumstances, and affirms their veracity. "A Swiss officer, demanding a passport to return to his native country, could not obtain one, till he had given his vote for the constitution. The commissaries of police entered the dwellings of humble artisans who were solely occupied with their daily labour, and compelled them, by menaces, to sign their name at the bottom of a constitution which they had never read, nor ever wished to read. All the clerks, likewise, in the different offices, were reduced to the alternative of indigence or infamy, of signing, or of losing their places."—When we recollect how signatures are often obtained, in this country, to a factious petition to parliament, we need not, perhaps, be very reluctant in believing the assertions of M. Gallais.

leon's constitution with the shew of popular authority, was equally repugnant to all parties, if we except the royalists, who beheld, with secret satisfaction, a measure which tended rather to alienate, than inspire, national confidence.

Nor was this the only obstacle to its undisputed reception. Its very title was offensive to many, and to none more than to the vigilant assertors of plebeian rights. What was implied by the *Acte Additionnel aux Constitutions de l'Empire*? That the empire, or, in other words, Bonaparte's former sovereignty, remained unimpaired. It had sustained no change. His abdication, and the intermediate reign of Louis, were mere dreams. The imperial government, endued with some self-existent and eternal principle, was incapable of political dissolution. It still subsisted in all the plenitude of its functions and activity, and only required a supplemental legislative act to make it complete. This construction was further confirmed by the preamble, which probably emanated from Napoleon himself. "Since we were called, now fifteen years ago, by the wish of France, to govern the state, we have endeavoured, at various periods, to give perfection to the constitutional forms according to the wants of the nation, and profiting by the lessons of experience." He then slightly adverted to the projects of his baffled ambition, which he tenderly denominated, "the organisation of a great European federative system," repeated his renunciation of that system, and added, that as he meant, henceforth, to promote exclusively the internal prosperity of France, it was therefore necessary to engraft "many important modifications" upon the various acts, decrees, &c., by which the empire had heretofore been governed. He thus clearly identified his past and present power, and proved, that he considered his sovereignty to have been no more destroyed by his banishment to Elba, than when the personal exercise of it was temporarily suspended by his campaigns in Germany, Spain, and Russia. This was a severe disappointment to his new friends, who exulted in the belief that they had converted their disciple from the heresy of legitimate thrones. They hardly expected he would embrace the obsolete bigotry of divine right, and proclaim himself "Emperor by the grace of God," or imitate the abominable sin of Louis, who called the first year of his power, the nineteenth year of his reign.

Every one was eager to express his disapprobation of the principles or origin of this Additional Act; and, as far as prudence would allow, it became the object of playful raillery, of sarcastic ridicule, or of virulent reproach. The general feeling of contempt and abhorrence was so manifest, indeed, that the adherents of



Napoleon were alarmed, and they who were permitted to advise, vehemently insisted upon the necessity of some measure that might allay the public indignation. Accordingly, on the 1st of May, there appeared an imperial decree, which, it was hoped, would remove the irritating suspicions created by his assumption of absolute authority. This decree announced a truth, from which a direct but convenient falsehood was deduced. It allowed that the actual government was a dictatorship, "with which Napoleon found himself invested by circumstances and *by the confidence of the people*," while an anxiety to avoid the prolongation of that dictatorship, was alleged as the cause for prematurely framing a constitution. No one, probably, believed this assertion, though it was received as a homage to public opinion, which indicated the precarious condition of Bonaparte. It was now ordained that the electoral colleges should be convoked, within four days from the publication of the decree, and the Chamber of Deputies immediately chosen. Although it was not distinctly affirmed, that the constitution should be submitted to these representatives, a general persuasion existed, that it would become the first object of their legislative labours. And so, in fact, it did, during the brief period of their functions. This reluctant obedience to the popular will,\* was hailed with delight by those who abetted the usurper's designs, because they hoped it might strengthen his power; but the more reflecting, viewed it only as a concession wrung from necessity, which, in an auspicious moment, would be despised or revoked.

The discontent excited by the *Acte Additionnel* was not confined to its deviation from constitutional formalities. Many of its articles were condemned, as inadequate for the protection of personal liberty, and others, as inconsistent with the maxims which were presumed to form the basis of Napoleon's millennial reign. The creation of an hereditary peerage, dispelled the democratic dreams of those, who weakly imagined he would restore the chimera of titular equality. The jacobins were in absolute despair, and only consoled themselves with the

\* The original plan of the imperial government was thus announced. "En convoquant les électeurs des collèges en assemblée du Champ de Mai, nous comptons de constituer chaque assemblée electorale de département, en bureaux séparés, composer ensuite une commission commune a toutes, et dans l'espace de quelques mois arriver au grand objet de nos pensées." It has been justly observed, that by this arrangement, "the representatives of the people, the parliament, would have been unassembled for several months, and the mere commission of the electoral colleges, chosen at the Champ de Mai, an anomalous irregular body, would have been entrusted with the great work of legislating for the French nation of the present age and for all posterity."

slender hope, that *if* France could defeat all Europe, and *if* Bonaparte could retain his power, they might gradually acquire such an ascendancy as would enable them to demolish this aristocratic edifice. Nor were the individuals, selected to constitute the nobility of France, persons who derived dignity from their virtues, their endowments, or their ancestry. The French language admits a refinement which accurately distinguished their quality; Napoleon might *anoblir*; they could not be *ennoblis*. The respect paid to rank, is a salutary prejudice which springs from usage, or is fostered by reflection. The vulgar homage of the populace belongs to the former; the willing tribute of liberal feeling, and just discrimination, partakes of the latter. We are naturally disposed to treat the inheritor of an illustrious name, with somewhat of that veneration and regard which were due to the founder of it; nor can we easily resist the influence of antiquity when it alone exacts our reverence. But the patrician order of Napoleon's empire, could neither plead the recorded honours of their ancestors, nor point to the high ascending stream of their greatness, coeval perhaps with the epoch of historical research, and widening its channel through successive generations. In their personal merits consisted the whole pedigree of their honours. The same may be affirmed, indeed, of every man who first transmits a title to his son. But what were *their* merits? They might be traced through all the accumulated enormities of the Revolution, ending with that most finished piece of treachery, which placed Napoleon a second time upon the throne of France. These were their exclusive claims; and however much the vehemence of political zeal may strive to extenuate their offences, it cannot be denied, that they exhibited as small an aggregate of uncorrupted and incorruptible integrity, as ever adorned a similar body in any nation of the world.

The sentiments of distrust and dissatisfaction excited by this new peerage, (which was little else than the ancient senate, under a different name,) were feeble, compared to those which the 67th article of the Additional Act produced. It would be difficult to determine, whether its absurdity provoked more contempt, or its deliberate audacity more disgust. The terms in which it was composed shall be transcribed.—“ The French people moreover declare, that in the delegation which they have made, and make, of their powers, they have not meant, and do not mean, to give a right to propose the reinstatement of the Bourbons, even in case of the extinction of the imperial dynasty; nor the right of re-establishing either the ancient feudal nobility, or the feudal rights, or tithes, or any privileged or predominant religion; nor the power to question the irrevocability of the sale



of the national domains. They formally prohibit the government, the chambers, and the citizens, from all propositions to that effect.\*"

It seemed as if an over-ruling fatality directed all the actions of Napo-

\* The following satire upon Napoleon's constitution, was inscribed in the register of the prefecture of the department of the Seine, on the 1st of May. It presents a lively epitome of the arguments which were more elaborately urged by graver opponents.

"I, the undersigned, by virtue of that portion of sovereignty which was promised to me in 1792; out of which I was cheated in 1800; which was solemnly voted to me by an *organical senatus consultum* in 1814; which was restored to me by a proclamation of the 1st of March, 1815; which has been taken away by an *Acte Additionnel* on the 22d of last April, and which I shall take again when I am the strongest, if I think it worth the trouble—

"Refuse the Additional Act to the Constitutional Act, every thing which has followed from the said Constitutional Act down to the said Additional Act, and every thing which may hereafter follow:

"First, Because Napoleon himself acknowledges, that he has no other title to authority than a dictatorship imposed by force, and because the right of a conqueror is not that of a legislator:

"Item, Because the liberty of Bonaparte is a very awkward kind of joke:

"Item, Because the equality of Bonaparte, is the equality of Helots and galley-slaves:

"Item, Because the peerage of Bonaparte is a Saturnalia at which the gorge rises;

"Item, Because the hereditary character of Bonaparte's peers, is a gratuitous insult to future generations;

"Item, Because the exercise of the right of thinking, speaking, and writing, under Bonaparte, can only prove a snare;

"Item, Because the vote of the people will be a mere illusion;

"Item, Because the vote of the public functionaries will be a mockery;

"Item, Because the vote of the army will be incompatible with all moral ideas, and hostile to all the constitutional principles of nations;

"Item, Because the insolent prohibition of the 67th article, is the paltry precaution of a suspicious tyranny, and can be adhered to only by its accomplices;

"Admitting, however, that the martial disposition of the nation, and the alternate character of hero and buffoon, which it has played upon the theatre of Europe, during five-and-twenty years, require, according to the principles of the Bonapartists, a king who mounts well on horseback, *I propose* Franconi (the Astley of Paris) and his dynasty."—*L'Europe Tourmentée, &c., Vol. II. p. 532.* To understand the concluding sarcasm, the reader may refer to the note at p. 24, of this Volume.

leon. Every thing which he reprobated in others, he committed himself. The only faults imputed to the charter of Louis, were retained in his constitution, and the arch-crime of the allies, who solemnly proclaimed that he should not be sovereign of France, was here perpetrated by his own interdiction of the Bourbons. Was it an involuntary tribute to the rectitude of his adversaries, that he unconsciously imitated them, or did it emanate from a precipitate arrogance, which disdained to reflect before it acted? How did he acquire the right, to disfranchise the French people, and disinherit Louis XVIII.? Was it conferred by treason, or derived from usurpation? At the moment he fulminated this interminable proscription, he pronounced not the nation's, but his individual will: while he betrayed, at once, his fear and his designs. He wished to secure the succession in his family, but he dreaded the predominant inclination towards the Bourbons, and therefore annihilated the power of proposing them. There could be no necessity to forbid the exercise of a privilege, which it was improbable would ever be asserted, or if asserted, not likely to be dangerous. It was competent to the legislature, being adequately elected, to declare such a legal incapacity in the people, because the safety of the state might require, that a competitor for the crown should not be placed in a condition to urge his pretensions. But Napoleon inculcated a different doctrine. His notions of a popular choice were curiously inconsistent. Crowned by a rebel army and a traitorous faction, he condescended, though with unskilful hypocrisy, to recognise the sovereignty of the people in his own elevation to the throne. Seated there, he discarded their controul, and denied their functions; they were permitted to accept *his* dynasty, but peremptorily excluded from the liberty of selecting a particular family. This he denominated freedom. Will it be replied, that the people were invited to receive or reject the constitution, and that, consequently, they were ultimately responsible for its provisions? Let the advocates of this argument shew when the collective opinion of the nation was obtained. Let them explain why, of those who voted for it, nearly one-fifth consisted of the military,\* of the very men whose perfidy had driven Louis from his capital. Let them prove that the remainder contained no suffrages which were either fictitious or compulsory, and then some confidence might be reposed in Napoleon's mockery of an appeal to the

\* The aggregate number of votes amounted to 1,288,357. The army gave 222,000, and the navy about 22,000. Many of the regiments did not send in their registers. It would be idle to animadvert upon the anomaly of presenting a code of civil rights to soldiers and sailors for their acceptance. What state, that ever obtained or preserved its liberties, has admitted the military to deliberate upon legislative measures? This was another part of Napoleon's plan which excited general dissatisfaction.



nation. But even if this could be accomplished by the aid of ingenious sophistry, a difficult task would still remain, to instruct mankind by what political dexterity the people could be made to interdict themselves from proposing a King of their own choice? Was it not possible, that by a concurrence of various causes, the restoration of the Bourbons might become their unanimous wish? What would follow? By the absurd obligation of this 67th article, they disqualified themselves from giving effect to that wish, and though perfectly free, they could not exercise their freedom without violating the constitution. It was certainly a scheme worthy of Napoleon's crafty ambition, to ensnare a whole nation into the voluntary surrender of its will, under the mask of confirming its independence. Had the subterfuge been successful, had the French bartered away their future right to think and act for their common welfare, what a monstrous incongruity would have descended to posterity! We might be tempted to smile at the shallow artifice of the legislator, were not our mirth repressed, by reflecting upon the subtle malignity of the tyrant.

Among those who ventured to publish their objections to this constitution, the intrepid censures of M. de Kergorlay deserve to be recorded. In his pamphlet,\* he boldly and explicitly expressed his sentiments. Alluding to the 67th article, he said, "I protest formally against this, because it is an encroachment upon the liberty of French citizens, because it pretends to forbid them the exercise of their right in proposing the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne, and because I am convinced that the restoration of that dynasty is the only means of bringing back happiness to France. The experience which we have had of the practical felicity of France, since its return, can leave no room for doubt upon the subject, and the unanimity of the national wish in favour of Louis XVIII. is fully confirmed by the anxiety betrayed by the authors of the article I condemn, to interdict the manifestations of that unanimous wish. The mingled confusion which they have introduced into that article, by uniting in it various unpopular phantoms that have no connexion whatever with the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, is an additional proof in favour of it. It is only when real objects are deficient, that we evoke shadows, and the noblest eulogy that can be pronounced upon the acts of a government we wish to proscribe, is to be reduced to the necessity of supposing its intentions." The work which contained these opinions, was, for a time, gratuitously circulated, but the activity of Napoleon's police soon checked its distribution. This might be reasonably expected; as might also

\* *Motif du Vote Négatif, &c.*

the author's punishment, had not the hand of vengeance been restrained by the dictates of a prudent clemency.

The decrees which had been issued, for immediately electing the deputies, deprived the Champ de Mai of any little interest it might have possessed in the public estimation. So insignificant had it become, indeed, and so little curiosity did it excite, even among the Parisians, that it was deemed necessary to remind them of its intended celebration. As to the anticipated acceptance of the constitution, which would be announced from the throne, that was no longer a motive, because the two chambers were expected to revise its articles, and solemnly declare it the great charter of the nation. The primary causes being thus removed, the original design might be persisted in, to confer a seeming popularity upon Napoleon's hitherto successful enterprize, or to confirm, with specious pomp, his fascination over the army. Both conjectures are supported by the events that actually occurred.

By an odd coincidence of contradictions, the Champ de *Mai* was held in the Champ de *Mars*, on the first of *June*. The discharge of a hundred cannon from the bridge of Jena, ushered in the important day ; a similar salute had been fired on the preceding evening. A vast amphitheatre, immediately in front of the military school, was covered with temporary erections for the reception of those who were to assist in the ceremony, and for spectators. In the centre was placed an altar, surmounted with a canopy, and encircled with seats for the priests, musicians, and others. It was computed that fifteen thousand persons might be contained within the building. There were divisions in the seats, decorated with large wooden eagles, and inscribed with the names of departments, for the respective deputies. A throne was placed against the face of the military school, which Napoleon was to occupy ; and besides this, there was a bare pyramidical platform, about a hundred yards in front of the amphitheatre, upon which a plain arm chair, open and uncovered, was placed, destined to become a throne by his august presence. The general effect was magnificent, from the multitude, variety, and splendour of the objects : but, examined in detail, the component parts were gaudy and meretricious. The officers of Napoleon's court, and the members of different public bodies, were arrayed in fantastical dresses, which recalled the tinsel dignity of a theatre, rather than the majestic solemnity of a great, national assembly. The intervening spaces were filled with soldiers, cavalry and infantry, whose variegated banners, glittering arms, rich caparisons, and



burnished eagles, exhibited a brilliant appearance. A promiscuous throng of citizens occupied the external area.\*

At one o'clock, Napoleon, surrounded by his rebel princes and nobility, presented himself, and immediately ascended the throne. He was clothed in a mantle of purple velvet, lined with white ermine, and edged with rich embroidery. On his head he wore a Spanish bonnet, black, shaded with plumes, and fastened in front with a large diamond. His diminutive stature, disproportionate bulk, and inelegant demeanour, detracted largely from that lofty and imperial air, which he strove to assume. He was accompanied by his brothers, Joseph, Jerome, and Lucien; the two former sat on his right, the latter on his left. When he entered, a general acclamation proclaimed his presence, and all remained uncovered except himself. He returned the greeting with two or three abrupt nods, and the discharges of artillery being silenced, the ceremony of the day was commenced with the performance of mass by the Archbishop of Tours, and the Cardinal de Bayanne. It is somewhat curious, that prayers and oaths should predominate, on all momentous occasions, in the most irreligious and most perjured country in Europe.† They are used as a man uses his umbrella; put up in a storm, and laid aside when it is calm. Napoleon is described, however, as paying but little attention to the celebration of mass, being more occupied with viewing the assembly through an opera-glass, than with his devotions. When it was concluded, the central deputations from the electors of the empire, composed of five members from each electoral college, ascended the steps of the throne, conducted by the grand-master of the ceremonies. M. Dubois, deputy from the department of Maine-et-Loire, then addressed Napoleon, in a speech previously prepared. It breathed the most exalted sentiments of virtuous and indignant patriotism, for all is patriotism in modern times that is not loyalty, and teemed with expressions of zeal and affection towards Napoleon, which could be equalled only by those that were proffered, three months before, to Louis. The Emperor graciously indicated his assent to every part which extolled himself and reviled his

\* The reader who wishes to peruse a minute and animated description of this ceremony, may consult the "Englishman's" nineteenth letter. His admiration of the principal actor supplied him with indefatigable zeal, while his impartiality seems unquestionable, for he allows that Bonaparte looked "very squat and ungainly," when he "plumped himself down into his throne."

† The facility with which oaths are taken and violated, needs no illustration; and a modern traveller justly observes, that "if ever there existed a country without a sense of religion of any kind, it is that of France."

enemies. Though the orator delivered his harangue in a loud voice, it was scarcely audible, except to those who immediately surrounded the throne; but the populace, without, applauded it, according to the Parisian journals, "with transports of joy which they were unable to describe." We may suppose their vociferations kept pace with the speaker's gestures, and a violent jerk was naturally construed as the visible sign of a vigorous conception.

Some parts of this address may be appropriately introduced, as an exposition of Napoleon's reply. It began with the accustomed fictions, already consecrated by the usurper and his minions. "Sire, the French people decreed the crown to you; you resigned it without their consent; and their suffrages now impose upon you the duty of resuming it. A new contract is made between the nation, and Your Majesty. Assembled from all parts of the empire round the tables of the law, upon which we come to inscribe the national will, that will, the sole legitimate source of power, it is impossible we should not echo the voice of France, of which we are the immediate organs; that we should not proclaim, in the presence of Europe, to the august head of the nation, what it expects from him, and what he ought to expect from it. Our words shall be solemn, like the occasion which inspires them. What is wished by the league of allied kings, with that preparation for war which startles Europe, and afflicts humanity? By what act, by what violation, have we excited their vengeance, and provoked their aggression? Have we, since the peace, endeavoured to impose laws upon them? We merely wish to enforce the adoption of those which are adapted to our manners. We do not wish to have the chief, selected by our enemies; we wish to have him whom our enemies refuse. They dare to proscribe you personally; you, Sire, who, so often master of their capitals, generously strengthened their tottering thrones. This hatred of our enemies increases our love for you. Were the humblest of our fellow citizens proscribed in the same manner, it would be our duty to defend him with the same energy. He, like you, would be secured from foreign assault, beneath the ægis of the law and of the French power. They menace us with invasion! Are they not afraid to remind us of former times, of a state of things which, though lately so different, may yet be produced again? Do they require only guarantees? They are to be found in all our institutions, and in the will of the French people, henceforth united with your's. It would not be the first time we had conquered the whole of Europe armed against us. Vainly do they seek to conceal their fatal designs, beneath the pretext of merely separating you from us. They would give us masters with whom we have no longer any thing in common, whom we do not understand, and who cannot under-



stand us; who appear to belong neither to the age, nor to the nation which received them into its bosom for a moment, only to behold its most generous citizens proscribed and degraded by them. Their presence destroyed all the illusions which still belonged to their name. They could no more trust to our oaths; we can no more trust to their promises. Sire, a throne founded by foreign arms, and surrounded with incurable errors, has fallen, in an instant, before you, because you brought us from your retreat, which is fertile in great ideas only to great men, all the pledges of our true glory, and all the hopes of our true prosperity. The three branches of the legislature are about to commence their functions: one single sentiment will animate them. Relying upon the promises of Your Majesty, we confide to you, we confide to our representatives and the Chamber of Peers, the task of revising, consolidating, and improving, without precipitation, without contest, but with wisdom and deliberation, our constitutional system, and the institutions by which it must be secured. Sire! nothing is impossible—nothing shall be omitted—to preserve honour and independence, which are dearer than life. Every thing shall be attempted, every thing shall be performed, to resist an ignominious yoke; we avow this to nations; may their rulers hear us! If they accept your offers of peace, the French people will expect from your firm, liberal, and paternal government, reasons to console them for the sacrifices which peace has cost. But, if they leave us only the choice between war and infamy, the whole nation will rise to wage that war; it is ready to absolve you from the offers, too moderate, perhaps, which you have made to save Europe from new convulsions; every Frenchman is a soldier; victory will follow our eagles; and our enemies, who calculate upon our discord, will soon repent that they have incensed us.”\*

This fierce anathema, and servile panegyric, of M. Dubois, citizen of Angers, merits a few remarks. He is not accused of being its author; that honour is ascribed to M. Barrère, whose virtues, recorded with those of Robespierre, acquired for him the expressive appellation of “purveyor to the guillotine.” But, emanate from whom it might, the pathos and philosophy are equally entitled to applause. The innocent surprise of the orator, when he asks “What have we done,” to provoke enmity, is singularly affecting, and we can scarcely withhold our sympathy from the persecuted, though unconscious, offenders. Still less can we restrain our sensibility, when we find that Napoleon, so mercilessly proscribed, “had generously strengthened the thrones” of Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain,

\* See Appendix, No. VI.

and Holland. How many fatal errors were confuted by this single discovery of M. Dubois ; and with what remorse and shame must they reflect upon themselves, who had rashly reproached that guiltless victim with inordinate, or perfidious, ambition. When he placed a sceptre in the hands of his brothers, Joseph and Louis, he was only upholding the thrones which short-sighted politicians imagined he had subverted. When, too, he curtailed the possessions of Austria and Prussia, when he menaced the capital of Alexander, and when Jerome wore the Westphalian diadem, he was merely pursuing the same plan of comprehensive benevolence. In ordinary life we might mistake such a benefactor for a robber, because a robber could but seize our property, and keep it himself, or transfer it to another : but imperial virtue must be estimated by a different criterion. With what success M. Dubois would have persuaded the fugitive monarchs of Spain, Holland, Naples, and Portugal, that, while they were in exile, their " thrones were strengthened" by Napoleon's benign policy, I pretend not to determine ; but surely, if deeds exemplify principles, the allies were at liberty to affirm, that they also sought to maintain Napoleon's throne by means precisely similar. M. Dubois wished, that the rulers of those nations to which he alluded, might hear him ; and judging from events, he may congratulate himself upon the accomplishment of that wish.

He next asks, whether the enemies of France " require only guarantees," and assuming the affirmative, answers, that " they are to be found in all their institutions, and in the will of the French people." The same amiable propensity to remove inexplicable prejudices may here be discovered. An erroneous notion prevailed in Europe, that neither the " will of the French people," nor their " institutions," especially when controlled and regulated by Napoleon, were worth accepting as a security ; but M. Dubois, in the unsuspecting simplicity of his nature, proposes them to the allies with implicit confidence. He generously buries in oblivion the transactions of five-and-twenty years, and particularly casts a friendly veil over those of 1815 ; they are tinted and softened down with peculiar delicacy, nor can he anticipate that what he forbears to revive, the allies will be so uncivil as to remember. But discordant opinions will sometimes exist, and so it happened between M. Dubois and the " league of allied kings ;" for the latter persisted in believing, that France was a fickle and treacherous nation, notwithstanding the unequivocal and warlike hint, that she had, heretofore, " conquered the whole of Europe." It would hardly be doing justice to M. Dubois, if his indignant retaliation against the Bourbons were suffered to pass without notice. His remarkable modesty requires no eulogy. He does not attempt to



say, that the oaths of Frenchmen deserve credit ; that is a flight beyond even his invention : he only repels the obloquy thrown upon them, by the Bourbons, by declaring, that as they will not believe a Frenchman's oath, Frenchmen will not believe a Bourbon's promise. The candid concession implied in this angry recrimination, is a valuable comment upon all the lofty pretensions urged by M. Dubois in the other parts of his address, and irrefragably proves the unjust suspicions of Europe.

When the orator concluded his harangue, which, as already mentioned, was received, not heard, with indescribable transports, the Arch-Chancellor rose from his seat, and advancing towards the Emperor, communicated to him the acceptance of the constitution. The result has been stated, and it is only necessary to add, that there were negative voters, amounting to 2,407, while eleven departments made no return at all. The one million three hundred thousand affirmative suffrages, therefore, were interpreted as a national assent fully, freely, and formally pronounced. A flourish of trumpets was now heard, when the herald at arms, in a loud voice, proclaimed, in the name of the Emperor, " that the Additional Act to the constitutions of the empire was accepted *by the French people.*" The batteries, upon a signal being given, immediately fired a general salute, and reiterated acclamations resounded from the assembly. A small gilt table, with a gold standish, was then placed before Napoleon, and the Arch-Chancellor unfolding the constitution, while Joseph Bonaparte presented a pen, he hastily subscribed his name, and thus deigned to ratify his own will. When this ceremony was concluded, he addressed the multitude, in a shrill tone, elevated above its natural reach, in order to make himself audible. His speech, which he read from a written paper, was doubtless his own composition, for it partook largely of that plausible declamation which is adapted rather to obscure truth than enforce it ; and Napoleon's pre-eminent excellence, in that branch of rhetoric, has never been disputed. As an historical document, it merits transcription.

" Emperor, consul, soldier, I hold every thing from the people. In prosperity, in adversity, upon the field of battle, in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the single and constant object of my thoughts and actions. Like the King of Athens, I sacrificed myself for my people, in the hope of seeing that promise realized which had been made, to preserve for France, her natural integrity, her honours, and her rights. Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, acquired by the victories of five-and-twenty years, despised and lost for ever ; the cry of insulted French honour ; the wishes of the nation, have restored me to that throne which I cherish, because it is the palladium of the independence, the

honour, and the rights of the people. Frenchmen! in passing through the different provinces of the empire to reach my capital, surrounded by every demonstration of public joy, I had a right to reckon upon a long peace. Nations are bound by the treaties which their governments conclude, whatever they may be. My mind then became wholly occupied with the means of establishing our liberty, by a constitution conformable to the will, and the interest of the people. I convoked the Champ de Mai. I soon learned that the monarchs, who have violated all principles, who have offended the opinion and the dearest interests of so many nations, design to make war upon us. They meditate an increase of the kingdom of the Netherlands; they would surrender to her our northern frontier garrisons, as a barrier, and conciliate existing discord among themselves by a partition of Alsace and Lorraine. It was necessary, therefore, to prepare for war. However, before I personally exposed myself to the hazards of war, it became my first duty to consolidate the nation without delay. The people have accepted the act which I presented. Frenchmen! when we shall have repelled these unjust aggressions, and when Europe shall be convinced of what is due to the rights and independence of 28,000,000 of Frenchmen, a solemn law, framed according to the forms prescribed by the Constitutional Act, shall combine the various enactments of our constitution which are now dispersed.

“ Frenchmen! you are about to return to your respective departments. Tell the citizens that circumstances are momentous; that by union, energy, and perseverance, we shall rise victorious from this struggle of a great people with their oppressors; that future generations will severely scrutinize our conduct; and that a nation has lost every thing, when it has lost its independence. Tell them, that foreign kings, whom I elevated to a throne, or who owe to me the preservation of their crowns; who, in the time of my prosperity, sought, with eagerness, my alliance and the protection of the French people, now direct all their vengeance against my person. Did I not perceive that it is the country which they aim at, I would surrender to their mercy this life which they so inveterately pursue. But, tell the citizens, also, that as long as they preserve for me those sentiments of love which they have so often manifested, the rage of our enemies will remain impotent. Frenchmen! my will is that of the people; my rights are their's; my honour, my glory, my happiness, can never be separated from the honour, the glory, and the happiness of France.”

This tissue of invective and bombast was received, like the oration of M. Dubois, with exuberant raptures by those who could not hear, and those who durst not question, it. If ever a nation was deliberately mocked and insulted by



glozing protestations and shameless falsehoods, France now appeared in that abject and pitiable condition. The alleged motives of his return, were only a repetition of his former declarations, and entitled to equal credit. But what can be said of his petulant aphorism, that "a nation which loses its independence, loses every thing?" Had he forgotten his late imperial despotism, or did he suppose France could forget it, when he taunted her with this insolent reproach? We can more easily imagine, that the haughty arrogance inspired by momentary security, dictated this avowal, than that it sprung from so much fatuity as would be implied in the contrary supposition. Consistent with himself, however, he still derided, while he sacrificed, his victims. He told them, in explicit language, I despoiled you of every thing, heretofore, and left you desolate; trust me again, I will give you every thing, and make you prosperous. This presumptuous confidence in the unlimited credulity of the people, became the man, who had so long sported with it. Nor were the contradictions into which he was betrayed, less worthy of a usurper who anxiously endeavoured to identify his personal cause, with popular rights. Eager to ensure his own success, in any engagements he might contract, he established the maxim, that "nations were bound by the treaties concluded by their governments, whatever they might be." This doctrine, promulgated for present and future purposes, had also a retrospective application, which seemed to have escaped his penetration. It equally proclaimed the moral obligation which he professed to respect, with regard to the treaty of Paris, and furnished a precept which he might find it convenient to enforce, should he, by his military triumphs, be placed in a condition to negotiate with the allies. Perhaps it might even contemplate the concessions of adverse fortune.

But how did it apply to his assumed grounds of the war against France, and to the treaty which Louis XVIII. concluded with the sovereigns of Europe in 1814? Napoleon affirmed, that the allies "meditated an increase of the kingdom of the Netherlands, and the surrender of the French frontier garrisons in the north, as a barrier." These were the only causes of hostility which he affected to recognise, if we except his gratuitous position, that Alsace and Lorraine were to be partitioned. But, according to his own axiom, these constituted just and legitimate reasons for going to war, unless they were removed by the voluntary acquiescence of France. The treaty of Paris was concluded by the then existing authority, and consequently, it bound the French people to an observance of its provisions. What did the preamble assert? That the allies, "not wishing to exact from France, now she was restored to the paternal government of her kings, *the same conditions and securities as they had demanded from her*

*preceding government*, had named plenipotentiaries to discuss, agree upon, and sign, a treaty of peace and friendship." If words have a meaning, the import of these signified, that France, under a Bourbon, obtained milder conditions than she could have procured under Napoleon: that the allies surrendered those securities in the one case, which they would have deemed indispensable in the other. Were the people bound to respect this treaty? Napoleon told them, yes; and told them also, with singular absurdity, that the "league of kings" had armed solely to enforce it. France, therefore, if Bonaparte's logic was sound, ought to have yielded, spontaneously, the very principle upon which she was going to war; for having expelled Louis XVIII. she forfeited her right to that clemency which she received through him. To such puerile incongruities are we exposed, when evasive quibbling supplies the place of honesty and truth, and when the occasional maxims of emergency are substituted for the permanent dictates of wisdom and justice.

Napoleon indulged in a strain of heroical self-devotion, likewise, which is irresistibly ludicrous contrasted with his actual exploits. It would perplex a very acute inquirer, to discover any similitude between him and that "King of Athens," whose example he cites. We suppose he alluded to Codrus; but Codrus died for his country, a species of patriotism which Bonaparte could never comprehend. What he called his sacrifice for France, was mean submission for liberty to breathe; as his shallow artifice of indignation at her wrongs, was merely a cloak thrown over the workings of his restless and insatiable ambition. How nobly, too, he redeemed his declaration, that he "would place his existence at the mercy" of his enemies, did he not know that they aimed their vengeance at the nation. Admitting that he could, for a time, have been deceived as to the real object of the war, namely, his overthrow, a period soon came, when he was no longer able to disguise this truth. He knew it before the battle of Waterloo; he felt it afterwards; he fled in terror from their wrath, and instead of yielding to their mercy, strove to escape from their power. When he found that flight was impossible, then, indeed, he quietly surrendered, and, forgetting Codrus, remembered he might still save his life like Themistocles. Perhaps he now consoles himself with the reflection, that Dionysius kept a school at Corinth.

When the tumult of applause, which this speech excited, had subsided, the Archbishop of Bourges, first Almoner of the Empire, presented the Evangelists on his knees, to Napoleon, who *swore* "to observe, and to cause the observance of the constitution." The oath was then administered to Cambaceres, the Arch-Chancellor, who also *swore*, "obedience to the constitutions and to the Emperor."



A sacred enthusiasm now animated the whole assembly, and they all *swore*, in one general shout, submission to the laws, and fidelity to Bonaparte.\* This part of the performance being ended, a new scene commenced. The steps of the throne were cleared, by withdrawing the central deputation, and the imperial eagles were advanced into the centre, forming one unbroken line of dazzling splendour from the altar to the throne. The eagle of the national guard, of the department of the Seine, was borne by Carnot, attired in a white Spanish dress; Davoust carried that of the 1st regiment of the line, and Decrès of the 1st Marine Corps. Napoleon had diligently studied his character. Casting off his mantle, he hastily leaped from the throne, and advanced to meet his eagles. A profound silence succeeded to the wildest acclamations. Taking the standards in his hands, he returned them to the three ministers, respectively, with appropriate addresses. They differed but little from each other. The national guard, the troops of the line, and the imperial guard, were exhorted to perish in defence of their eagles, to protect their country and the throne, to acknowledge no other rallying sign, to surpass their former deeds in arms, and never to suffer the capital of the great nation to be again polluted by foreigners. At intervals, the air was rent with long continued cries of *We swear*, and this constituted the most impressive part of the pageant. The army fulfilled their oaths, (treasonable and rebellious as they were,) with their blood, and the philanthropist may at least lament, that such intrepid heroism was lavished on so foul a cause.

Napoleon now ascended the platform in the open plain, clothed only in his short crimson tunic, and surrounded by his princes, marshals, and other dignitaries. Here he distributed the eagles to different regiments, and sat while all the troops, amounting to nearly fifty thousand, filed off before him. The spectacle was magnificent, as a thing of mere external pomp and show. The inspiring sounds of music, the blaze of military decoration, the glittering of innumerable arms, the countless concourse of spectators, their prolonged vociferations, the occasion, the man, the mighty events that hung in suspense, all concurred to excite feelings and reflections, which only such a scene could have produced. Napoleon did not witness it unmoved. When the last battalion had passed, he returned to his former position with increased alacrity, while visible joy and satisfaction beamed from his countenance. At that moment, perhaps, his heart swelled with fearless confidence, with unforeboding hopes, and the imperial crown

\* The "Englishman," who witnessed the ceremony, denies the *Nous le jurons* of the multitude. The *Moniteur*, and other journals, strenuously affirmed it. Experience pronounces for the latter.

seemed fixed upon his brow, beyond the power of chance to remove. How would one prophetic fear, pointing to the disastrous field of Waterloo, have dashed the exulting smile from his lips ! But he rioted in the fulness of his present grandeur and prosperity, and elate with pride, retired from the assembly, bowing frequently in acknowledgment of its applause. His departure was announced by discharges of artillery, and he returned to the Tuileries with the same pomp as accompanied his arrival.

The meeting of the two chambers was appointed for the third of June ; the nomination of the peers took place on the second. They amounted to one hundred and sixteen, of whom nearly one half was general officers.\* The selection did not inspire much respect for Napoleon's new aristocracy ; but what was he to do ? Men of honour, and integrity, and virtue, disdained to accept titles from him, and they were inevitably prostituted, therefore, among the demagogues and rebels who composed his faction.† The nobility of a country, as it emanates from the crown, should exhibit, at least in its primitive institution, a faithful transcript of the dignity, wisdom, and munificence of its source. As it flows onwards, it may be expected to lose something of its limpid character and original raciness ; because such is the radical imperfection of hereditary distinctions. Now, who can deny that Bonaparte's peerage reflected as much of these qualities as was inherent in him ? A notion was entertained, by some, that it would have been better, if a certain number of the principal persons in each department had been named by the electoral colleges, and submitted to the Emperor, who was to exercise his own choice in elevating one to the rank of a peer. Had this mode been adopted, it is possible that an honest man might have found " greatness thrust upon him," like Malvolio, but even that chance would have depended upon there not being a knave in the list.

The Chamber of Deputies offended public opinion from other causes. The election of the greater part was incomplete, because they were returned by an inadequate number of electors. In one department, six deputies were chosen by

\* The Parisians exercised their pleasantry upon some of these nobles. Labedoyere, Drouot, Ney, and Lallemand were denominated the *quatre pairs fides* (*perfides*), while Lefebvre Desnouettes, Vandamme and others, received the appellation of the *quatre pairs siflés* (*persiflés*.)

† Wherever this limitation was transgressed, Napoleon regularly lost a peer. Count Boissy, Count Canclaux, Count D'Aboville, and Count Primat, though placed in the list, refused to take their seats. It is believed, a few others followed their example.



thirteen votes.\* But it was not their legal disqualifications alone which excited distrust. Their names and principles revived recollections, which could not be contemplated without alarm. Almost every man, of any note, who had survived the revolution, appeared among these representatives. The republicans, whom Bonaparte could not conciliate nor overawe, when he arrived from Egypt, were now his counsellors, and entrusted with the welfare of the nation. The democratical leaven was tempered, indeed, with a few imperial ingredients, but not enough to impart any predominant flavour; and hence there arose, from the chaotic mass, a curious equipoise of mutually repelling powers, which eventually preserved the state. The jacobins had their own schemes; Napoleon, also, had his. Restrained, however, by reciprocal jealousies, their several designs were suspended in neutrality, till time should ripen them into an open struggle between the *empire* and the *republic*. Thus France was saved from tyranny and anarchy, by the equal vigilance and suspicion of the parties who respectively sought each.

When the Chamber of Deputies met, their first business was to elect a president. Their choice was declared in favour of M. Lanjuinais, a man of intrepid political character, and personally obnoxious to Napoleon, for having voted against his assumption of the imperial title.† He had participated in many of the most important transactions during the revolution, but always shunned its worst excesses. As a member of the Conservative Senate, he firmly opposed the ambitious views of Bonaparte, and, for a time, thwarted his desire of becoming Emperor. His last act of hostility towards him, was drawing up the instrument in 1814, which declared him dethroned by the senate, and which detailed the enormous abuses of power he had committed. The choice of such a man, as president of the new chamber, indicated no disposition to consult the feelings of Napoleon, and it was thought he would refuse to confirm the election. But the obvious impolicy of a rupture with the representatives, restrained him from manifesting any displeasure. He soon found, indeed, that they resolved to assert their own authority; for when the provisional president informed them that an answer from his Majesty, upon the choice of M. Lanjuinais, would be communicated by a chamberlain, they loudly condemned the message, and insisted, that the Emperor's chamberlain was not a person from whom they ought to receive the intimation of his will. This peremptory declaration soon obtained the laconic assent of

\* See Letters of an Englishman, (an indisputable authority here,) Vol. I. p. 449.

† He is said to have exclaimed, on that occasion, "What! are you so degraded as to give your country a master, taken from a race of men so ignominious, that the Romans disdained to use them even as slaves?"

"I approve—Napoleon;" and M. Lanjuinais took his seat, amid the shouts of the assembly.

Napoleon proceeded in state to open the imperial session on the 8th of June. When the oaths of allegiance had been taken by all the members of both houses, he addressed them in the following speech. "During three months, circumstances, and the confidence of the people, have invested me with unlimited power. To-day, the most earnest wish of my heart is gratified; I commence the constitutional monarchy. Man is unable to secure the future; the destinies of nations are fixed by their institutions alone. Monarchy is necessary in France, to secure the liberty, the independence, and the rights of the people. Our constitutions are scattered: one of our most important duties will be to consolidate and arrange them in one general system. This labour will endear the present era to future generations. It is my ambition to see France enjoy every possible liberty; I say possible, because anarchy always ends in absolute government.

"A formidable coalition of kings threatens our independence: their armies already touch our frontiers. The Melpomene frigate has been attacked and captured, in the Mediterranean, after a sanguinary conflict with an English vessel of 74 guns. Blood has been shed during peace.\* Our enemies reckon upon our internal dissensions. They excite and foment a civil war. Insurrections have taken place, and communications are maintained with Ghent, as they were with Coblenz in 1792. Legislative measures are indispensable. In your patriotism, your wisdom, and your attachment to my person, I implicitly confide. The liberty of the press is inherent in the present constitution: nothing can be changed, without altering our whole political system; but restraining laws are requisite, especially in the actual state of the nation. I recommend this important object to your consideration. My ministers will inform you, from time to time, of the situation of affairs. The finances would be in a satisfactory condition, but for the augmented expences created by circumstances. However, every charge could be met, if the receipts comprised in the budget were all realised within the year; and it will be to the means of attaining this result, that my Minister of Finances will direct your attention.

\* The Englishman says, "he looked a little red" when he heard Napoleon pronounce this. Does he mean that he blushed? Strong evidence should be produced in support of a phenomenon apparently so incomprehensible.



“ It is possible that the first duty of a prince may soon call me, at the head of the children of the nation, to combat for the country. The army and myself will do our duty. You, peers and representatives, give to the empire an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism; and, like the senate of the great people of antiquity, be prepared to die, rather than survive the dishonour and degradation of France. The sacred cause of the country shall triumph!”

Immediately after the delivery of this speech, so full of oracular nothings, so evasive, and so contradictory, he retired amid the loudest acclamations of the assembly. The three following days were occupied in preparing an address, but many stormy and tumultuous debates arose, before one was proposed which they could adopt. It would be an unprofitable labour to relate all the bickerings and squabbles which ensued. There is not a petty debating society in England, which conducts its proceedings with so little decorum, as prevailed in this chamber of French representatives. Among the intermediate topics which occupied their attention, was one for abolishing all titles, because the names of prince, duke, count, and baron, “wounded the irritable self-love of humble merit, and appeared to be calculated only for gratifying the vanity of a few individuals at the expence of the greater number.” Another proposition, by M. Lepelletier, was intended to convey a piece of premature and obsequious flattery to Napoleon. He wished to bestow upon him, in the address, the title of *Saviour of his country*; but this attempt at fawning was instantly rejected, after a vehement and eloquent harangue from M. Dupin, who wisely asked, “if we anticipate events, what means will be reserved by which we can demonstrate our gratitude, when our country *shall* be saved?” At length, by the united labours of twenty members, an address was composed, couched in such terms as the Chamber approved. The Peers, who studied a commendable brevity, were less fastidious or more expert, and on the 11th of June, the two bodies approached Napoleon with their respective congratulations.

In his reply to the Chamber of Peers, he cautiously abstained from advertising to their sentiments respecting the popular origin of monarchical power, and merely expatiated upon the dangers which menaced the country, with a trite allusion to the Caudine forks. The address of the Deputies contained matter still less acceptable. It teemed, indeed, with enthusiastic professions of attachment to his person, but it also uttered opinions of too democratical a character for such a constitutional sovereign as Napoleon. We may imagine with what com-

placency a warlike monarch, in whose estimation the sword was above the laws, listened to the declaration, that "no ambitious projects entered into the thoughts of the French people," and that "the will *even of a victorious prince*, would be unable to draw the nation beyond the limits of self-defence." It expressed a hope that Napoleon had sincerely sought to obtain peace; and, that he might not forget he was now an accountable being, the address reminded him, that such documents and papers were expected from his ministers, as would convince the Chamber he had employed every effort for that purpose. In fact, both the peers and the deputies were, or affected to be, unreasonably credulous. They confided in the veracity of Napoleon's assertions with a courtly acquiescence which disconcerted him. He was pleased to exult, at commencing "a constitutional monarchy," and they were pleased to address him in something like constitutional language. Perhaps there was equal insincerity on either side; but all the disappointment and vexation recoiled upon the inventor of this new machine, with whose effects, when once put in motion, he seemed no less astonished than displeased.

A little peevishness and spleen were displayed in his answer to the representatives. The first sentence must surely have discomposed the serene dignity he would be anxious to preserve. "I perceive," said he, "with satisfaction, my own sentiments in those which you express. At this momentous crisis, my thoughts are absorbed by the perilous war, upon the issue of which depends the liberties and honour of France. I shall depart this night, to place myself at the head of my armies: the hostile movements of the enemy render my presence indispensable. During my absence, I shall behold, with pleasure, a committee nominated by each chamber, occupied with our constitutions. The constitution is our rallying point: it should be our polar-star, in this tempestuous moment. All public discussion which may tend to diminish, directly or indirectly, the confidence which ought to be placed in its dispositions, would be a misfortune to the state: we should find ourselves amid rocks, without a compass and without a rudder. The crisis in which we are placed is imminent. Let us not imitate the example of the Lower Empire, which, pressed on all sides by the Barbarians, became the laughter of posterity, by occupying itself with abstract discussions, while the battering rams thundered at their gates.—On all occasions my march will be upright and unshaken. Help me to save the country. As the first representative of the people, I have contracted the obligation which I here renew, to employ, in more tranquil times, all the prerogatives of the crown, and any small experience I may have acquired, in seconding your efforts towards the amelioration of our institutions."



The meaning of Napoleon's sarcastic reproof, derived from the imbecility of the lower empire, it is not easy to penetrate. Perhaps he glanced at the protracted discussions occasioned by the address ; or, perhaps, he wished to insinuate, that the chambers were not to transgress the boundaries he had laid down. By abstract questions, he might imply all those large and liberal inquiries, all those profound and wise deliberations, which are comprehended in the labours of a free and enlightened legislature, acting for the common good. He expected them, probably, to assemble, merely as the docile instruments of his own will, to confer a seeming sanction upon his pleasure, and to think only of promoting his designs. Whatever may have been his object, he at least gratified his petulance by the rebuke ; but we should startle, if a king of England were to taunt his House of Commons with what he considered the frivolity of their debates.

Napoleon kept his word, and departed that night for the army, but with prudent foresight concealed his route. Relays of horses were ordered upon all the principal roads, a plan which he often adopted, though it was never so necessary, perhaps, as on the present occasion, when he wished to make his sudden appearance in the field, and avail himself of every advantage that could arise from the unexpected commencement of hostilities. Had he formally indicated his intended progress, or previously announced his departure, messengers might be despatched by his enemies in the capital, with intelligence to the allied commanders, and his projects partially frustrated ; for it is more than doubtful, whether he would have obtained a victory over the Prussians on the 16th, could the Duke of Wellington have brought his army into complete co-operation with Blucher. When it was known that he had quitted Paris, the least sanguine ventured to predict, that his head-quarters would be at Brussels by the 20th ; but on the evening of that day he returned,—a pale and wretched fugitive, from a field of slaughter, which entombed his proudest hopes, and blighted his fairest laurels. He anticipated a longer absence, for he had nominated a council of regency, composed of fourteen members, of which Joseph was the president, who were to administer, provisionally, the executive authority. The two chambers, meanwhile, continued their discussions, but they contained nothing which ought to withdraw our attention from the scene of mighty strife that was fast approaching. A brief recapitulation of the King's proceedings at Ghent, and the preparatory measures of the allies, shall alone be permitted to intervene.

It was necessary that Louis XVIII. should assert the unimpaired existence

of his authority, which, politically residing in his person, could not be destroyed by the successful usurpation of Bonaparte. We will not examine this doctrine too curiously, because it might be found more consonant to practice than reason. A monarch *de facto*, and a monarch *de jure*, are two beings essentially distinct, if we believe the advocates of divine or hereditary right; but tried by the test of homelier faculties, perhaps they might appear inseparable. Opinion, however, is a supreme arbitress in matters of faith, and the fiction of indefeasible prerogative has alternately upheld the pretensions of crowned and uncrowned sovereigns. Louis had already entrenched himself behind this dogma, when he disclaimed "Mr. Bonaparte's" title to the French throne after the peace of Amiens; and could hardly be expected to abandon it now, when his visionary sceptre had been exchanged for positive dominion. While at Ghent, therefore, he continued to issue proclamations and manifestoes, with as little hesitation as if he had never quitted the Tuileries; and this nominal exercise of sovereignty at least served to remind France, that such a personage intended to dispute the crown with Napoleon. He was accompanied by a few faithful followers, who composed his little court, and exercised the functions of his ministers. Among them were some of Bonaparte's marshals, who disdained to perjure themselves by abandoning his cause, upon the return of their former master. On the 15th of April he put forth a declaration, expressive of his sentiments, and of the intentions of the allies; but the most important document that appeared, was the manifesto of April the 24th, which was drawn up by Lally Tollendal. The arguments of this manifesto, were regarded as so conclusive, that nearly one half of them was suppressed or altered in the French journals, where it was permitted to appear with affected indifference, from an insidious desire to prove that the liberty of the press was inviolable.\* The uniform object of these proclamations, was to disclose the paternal wishes which animated the King, to sustain the hopes of the royalists, to denounce the usurpation of Napoleon, and, if possible, to detach the army from its rebellious adherence to him. How ineffectual the latter effort was, need not be told; what beneficial influence was obtained by the former, can only be surmised. An energetic address to the French people, published on the 2d of April, contained the following affecting appeal: "Enfeebled by age, and twenty-five years of misfortune, I cannot say, like my ancestor, *Rally around my white plume*; but I will follow it, for you, to the field of honour." Whatever may be affirmed of his political conduct, by the zealots of revolutionary principles, it cannot be denied

\* See Appendix, No. VII. The omissions are there restored; hitherto, it has appeared only in its mutilated state.



that every thing which appeared with his authority, breathed the most amiable and tender solicitude for the welfare of France.

The allies, who, in espousing the cause of Louis, espoused the general cause of Europe, continued their preparations with unabated activity. History does not record any instance of a confederacy so numerous and so gigantic, linked together by such perfect unanimity and concord. One common spirit impelled and regulated the whole. No petty jealousies, no disheartening doubts, no separate interests were permitted to prevail. The vast machine moved onwards with portentous energy. Army after army traversed the plains of Germany, and hovered upon the confines of France, waiting the appointed moment when they should rush to battle, and spread over that devoted land fire, and carnage, and desolation. Renowned generals appeared on either side, and nothing could be hoped from negligence or mischance. A fierce and sanguinary struggle, between the bravest troops, guided by the most experienced commanders, could alone decide the issue. It might almost be called a war of heroes, for never, perhaps, were such disciplined veterans opposed to each other. Bravery was the distinction of none, where all had been nurtured in warlike habits, and had stood the shock of many a stubborn field. Slight exceptions cannot destroy this characteristic of the whole. The warriors who emancipated Europe in 1814, were again embattled in the same cause. Those banners were once more unfurled, which had waved in triumph before the walls of Dresden, Leipsic, Salamanca, Vittoria, Toulouse, and Paris. Could it be feared, that victory would now desert them? The motive, the will, the instruments were the same: and, without presumption, reason might presage the result would correspond. Beleaguered, by this stupendous array of war, France had yet an ark of refuge and of safety; she might have averted the storm her perfidy had gathered: the olive-branch was still held out;\*

\* The following proclamation, dated Francfort, April 2, appeared with the signatures of the ministers of the allied sovereigns. It was a last and generous effort to save France from the calamities of invasion. Had she accepted the offer, how many noble and illustrious houses would have been spared, in their nearest and dearest relations; how many brave and honourable men might now repose beneath their former laurels, cherished by their country, beloved by their families, respected by their friends. But the iniquitous faction who presided over her destinies, were professors of that selfish patriotism, which teaches, that millions may suffer for the safety of thousands:—

“ The allied powers, assembled at Francfort, in order to be near the reviving focus of European war, wishing to inform the world of their sentiments as to what has taken place in France, and of their designs, declare, that they mutually guarantee their thrones and territories; that they consider the legitimacy of

but, finally refused, indignant wrath cast it to the ground, and prepared to inflict that vengeance her contumacy merited. The rapid and decisive career of glory, which conducted the victors a second time to the gates of Paris, was opened to them by the stern valour of British troops, whose prowess, as it surpassed all example, so it transcends all praise. Nor was it the glory alone that should excite our grateful admiration. The blood we shed at Waterloo saved Europe from a series of battles, each of which might have changed the relative hopes of the combatants. Who, indeed, can venture to predict, what would have been the consequence of so splendid a triumph to Napoleon, as was that day permitted to grace the annals of this country? Success would have generated confidence, and confidence, zeal: while France, roused by her vanity, might, perhaps, have forgotten the tyrant in the conqueror. But despair filled every bosom, and enervated every arm, at the mournful tidings of that dire overthrow; terror bewildered those whom it should have excited to action; and loud execrations were heaped upon him, who, had his brow been encircled with the laurel-wreath of victory, might have summoned obedient thousands to his standard.

princes as the safeguard of the internal tranquillity of nations, and that they will sacrifice all to make that legitimacy every where respected. Accordingly, they grant ten days to Napoleon Bonaparte to quit France, and return to that island which the clemency of the allies bestowed upon him, and ten days to the French army to resume its obedience to Louis XVIII. After that period, unless order be restored, the allied powers proclaim Napoleon Bonaparte and the French army, the irreconcilable enemies of France and Europe, and they will cause the combined troops of Germany, England, and Russia, to march to replace a prince upon his throne to which his sacred and imprescriptible rights entitle him." Some doubts have been expressed, as to the authenticity of this document; but they are not sufficient to destroy the authority it derives from its consistency with the principles and issue of the contest.



## CHAPTER VI.

**THE** Duke of Wellington, having signed, in the name of his sovereign, the treaty of the 25th of March, immediately quitted Vienna, to prepare for carrying it into effect, by the powerful aid of his military skill. On the 28th of March, the Prince Regent appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the British forces on the continent, and on the 5th of April he arrived at Brussels. The Prince of Orange, to whom this important trust had been confided, resigned it on the 10th, in a general order which he addressed to the troops, whom he congratulated upon having so able a successor. Subsequently, the King of the Netherlands placed the Dutch and Belgian army under his command, by which judicious arrangement he became the supreme chief of all those allied forces. This unity of controul and direction, was well calculated to prevent any conflicting plans or opinions when the moment of action should arrive, and when every thing would depend upon combined operations. In this respect, at least, the Duke of Wellington was more fortunate than his illustrious predecessor, Marlborough, who sometimes had to lament the petty intrigues, or ignorant presumption, of the deputies appointed by their High Mightinesses the States-General, to superintend his campaigns.\* The army, consisting of British, Hanoverians, Belgians, and the contingents of Nassau and Brunswick Oels, was divided into two great corps, the 1st, commanded by the Prince of Orange, and the 2d, by Lord Hill. Each corps was separated into divisions, and the latter, again subdivided into brigades. The discipline, clothing, equipment, and conveyance of these troops, were regulated by their respective officers.

\* See Appendix, No. VIII. The document derives all its interest from the battle of Waterloo.

Belgium, for above a century and a half, has been the theatre where rival monarchs have waged their wars of ambition, of policy, or of necessity. There is scarcely a town within its boundaries, which does not recal some memorable siege or battle during that period. Its local character eminently adapts it for military operations. The roads are good, and render communication easy, while its level plains, but slightly diversified with gentle eminences, and intersected with numerous rivers or canals, facilitate the movements of warlike bodies. Nor should its fertility be forgotten, which presents, in general, an abundant supply of forage and provisions. In 1815, these resources were less prolific, partly from the casualty of a bad harvest, and partly from the exhausted state in which the preceding campaign had left them. Hence, the Duke of Wellington found it necessary to distribute his troops over a considerable extent, that they might be secure of subsistence; and this increased the difficulty of collecting them into one mass, when Napoleon suddenly precipitated himself upon the Prussian out-posts along the Sambre. It must be remembered, however, that it formed no part of his original plan to concentrate his forces too closely, because, as the enemy was strengthening himself in the vicinity of Maubeuge, he could, from that point, commence his attack either upon Mons, Binch, and Nivelles, or upon Charleroi. If the former contingency had been neglected, he might perhaps have made himself master of Brussels, and the occupation of the capital, besides carrying him into the rear of his opponents, would have accelerated that explosion of treachery upon which he so confidently relied. That this precaution indicated the most sagacious prudence, may be inferred, from the reproaches which many of Napoleon's generals vented upon the plan he actually pursued. It was thought he would have made two feigned attacks, one to the right, upon Namur, by the corps of Gerard, which was at Metz, and another to the left, upon Courtrai, by the corps of D'Erlon, which was at Lille. Meanwhile, advancing with his choicest troops, he might attempt Brussels, by Mons, Braine-le-Comte, and Hall, leaving the forest of Soignés on his right.\* Whether this scheme, had it been employed, would have baffled the cool and provident calculations of Wellington, can now be matter only of vague speculation. After a battle is lost, there is little difficulty in conjecturing how it might have been won; for retrospective wisdom may always be cheaply acquired by those who cannot pierce futurity.

When the Duke of Wellington arrived at Brussels, he laid down a plan of defence, which depended, for its efficacy, upon the Prussians establishing their

\* Sarrazin, *Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration*, p. 397.



main force in the neighbourhood of Namur and Charleroi. This condition was, of course, promptly acceded to, and immediate preparations were made, for fortifying Ostend, Nieuport, Antwerp, Ypres, Tournay, Mons, Ath, and Ghent, while a *tête-de-pont* was formed near Oudenarde. Upwards of 20,000 men were daily employed in these labours, which were completed by the 12th of June.\* Happily, the most cordial unanimity subsisted, at this time, between the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher; they had drawn their swords for one object, and they pursued it with equal energy and zeal. Reinforcements continued to reach our army in rapid succession, though, from the circumstance of the American war being just concluded, which had occupied most of our veteran troops, it was impossible to send as large a force as might have been wished. But the exertions of government were unremitted,† and every man that could be spared was forthwith despatched. Many regiments, upon their return from America, were ordered to join the Duke of Wellington without being permitted even to disembark in this country. The distribution of the army, previously to the commencement of hostilities, was as follows: the right wing, under Lord Hill, was stationed near Ath; the left, commanded by the Prince of Orange, near Brain-le-Comte and Nivelles; a strong corps of cavalry, under the Marquis of Anglesea, were quartered near Grammont; while the reserve, composed of all arms, occupied the town and vicinity of Brussels, where the Duke had fixed his head-quarters.

Much controversy has arisen with regard to the numerical strength of the respective armies. The question was necessarily involved in doubt and contradiction at first, equally from the difficulty of obtaining exact information, and from the common infirmity of human nature; for we are prone to magnify our own exploits by exaggerating the obstacles we overcome. The latter propensity was the more liberally indulged because of the former imperfection; but now, when exultation and shame no longer operate with the same intensity, it may be possible to approach the truth. Numerous authorities have been consulted to elucidate this interesting point, and though no two of them coincide, yet, from the whole, aided by collateral inferences, a tolerably authentic result appears attain-

\* History of the Campaign by a General Officer; published by Sir John Sinclair.—Introduction, p. vii. viii.

† Sir George Wood, who commanded the artillery on the 18th of June, and to whom I am indebted for much valuable information, told me, that when the Duke of Wellington arrived at Brussels, there were only two brigades of foot artillery there. They were subsequently increased to twenty.

able. The Duke of Wellington's army has been computed, by some, at 82,000 men; by others, reduced to 60,000; while General Sarrazin does not hesitate to name 100,000, who were present at the battle of Waterloo.\* Happily, all doubts as to the proportion of British troops in that army are, at length, removed, by official returns obtained from the Adjutant-General's office; and without entering into their minuteness of regimental detail, it will be sufficiently satisfactory to present the aggregate amount.

The total number of British and Hanoverian troops, serving under the Duke of Wellington, was 43,939; but from these were to be deducted the effective strength of several regiments, (including nearly the whole 4th division,) which were not engaged in any of the actions, and which reduced the 43,939 to 38,505. The proportions of each contingent were as follow: British cavalry, 6,170; infantry, 16,816, making 22,986; German and Hanoverian cavalry, 2,713; infantry, 12,806, making 15,519. To this total, of 38,505, must be added the Belgians and Brunswickers. The former have never been estimated at more than 30,000,† while the latter could scarcely exceed 10,000. Thus the whole force, which the Duke had at his disposal, amounted to only 78,505 men, and that number was actually reduced to about 64,000, by casualties, and by the detachments necessary to garrison various fortified places.‡ Nor must it be forgotten, that the action at Quatre Bras, on the 16th, diminished even this small army to a still inferior force, when the palm of victory was disputed at Waterloo. The artillery employed on that memorable day, I am enabled to state, from an official return§ communicated to me by Sir George Wood, who commanded it, with so

\* An officer, who held a distinguished command on the 18th of June, told me, that the Duke of Wellington declared he had "never fought with so bad an army since the battle of Talavera." This must surely be understood in reference to their equipment and length of service; a construction which is sanctioned by the statement of Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Commons, who observed, "that except the British part, (who themselves were only such as the country could spare at a time when a strong detachment of our veteran troops had been sent to America) nearly the whole was a green army; the allies, particularly the Dutch, Belgians, Hanoverians, and troops of Nassau, being chiefly young soldiers." General Alava, in his despatch, says, that the Duke of Wellington, after the battle of Quatre Bras, told him, "that he never saw his troops behave better, during the number of years he had commanded them."

† See History of the Campaign, by a General Officer, Introduction, p. x.

‡ This estimate perfectly agrees with the statements I have received from several officers, and among others from General G. Dundas, of the 71st Highland regiment. Lord Castlereagh, also, fixed them at that amount, in the House of Commons, when he moved its thanks to the Duke of Wellington.

§ See Appendix, No. IX.



The Prussian forces were more numerous. Prince Blucher fixed his headquarters at Liege, which was then occupied by the Saxons, but some symptoms of disaffection appearing among them, they were sent back to the Rhine. By the 27th of May, the Prussians were concentrated, in full force, upon the Meuse. The 1st corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Von Zieten, was stationed near Charleroi; the 2d, commanded by Major-General Von Pirch, was near Namur; the 3d, under General Thielman, was in the vicinity of Ciney; and the 4th, headed by General Bulow of Dennewitz, was at Liege. This position of the different corps, was calculated to keep the enemy in suspense, as to their ultimate destination, whether they would move to the right, and join the Duke of Wellington, or to the left, and unite with the Russians, who were then approaching towards the Rhine. The effective strength of the Prussian army was about 115,000 men.\* When it was subsequently ascertained, that the enemy were concentrating in the neighbourhood of Maubeuge, Blucher directed his 2d corps towards Sombref, the 3d towards Namur, and ordered the 4th to Hanut.

	men	gens
3960 -	7939 -	46
	24361 -	46
	19160 -	38
	15995 -	38
	10265 -	32
Casey	3784 -	48
3 Park	3500	
28088 -	34	

Division of the Dept  
at Paris

\* History of the Campaign, by a Prussian General Officer, Introduction, p. ix.

† General Sarrazin, (*Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration*, p. 394) says there were six, and names Lemarrois as the commander of the 5th; but this 5th corps certainly formed no part of the army which invaded Belgium.

6th corps, 17,840. It may be remarked, that a French *corps d'armée*, is formed upon the same principle as the Roman Legion, each being a little army of itself, having not only cavalry and infantry, but even a species of artillery. The cavalry, therefore, under Marshal Grouchy, constituted a separate and distinct body; and there were, besides, two divisions of the imperial guard, (20,000) commanded by Counts Friard and Morand, together with the young guard. The aggregate force, with which Napoleon opened the campaign, has been thus computed, in a French report, which appears to possess a character of official authenticity: infantry, 122,100; cavalry, 24,750; artillery, &c., 7,520; making a total of 154,370 men. The regiments of cuirassiers amounted to ten; the number of cannon was 296. Never did a finer army take the field, for it consisted almost entirely of veteran and highly-disciplined troops, animated too with a spirit of enthusiasm, which may be said to have increased its physical energy.

Eminent, however, as it was for all those warlike qualities which elicit glory in the hour of battle, it retained, also, every vice which could make it dreadful to the vanquished enemy, or protecting friend. This, indeed, constituted the common infamy of French troops. Their fierce and licentious depredations wherever they passed, their spirit of wanton destruction, and their insolent barbarity, inspired more terror than their valour. Napoleon had always encouraged this ferocious propensity, and not only promised plunder as the reward of victory, but even enforced it by his military system. He never encumbered his army, during a campaign, with any magazines for their subsistence; that care was entrusted to themselves, and pillage supplied their wants. It is no metaphor to say, that wherever they alighted, desolation and ruin accompanied them: worse than locusts, they not only consumed the produce of the earth, but extended their rapacity to every spoil which could gratify avarice or pamper appetite. No doubt, such a mode of supporting armies, greatly diminished the national charge for their maintenance, while it equally facilitated their operations in an enemy's country; and with these advantages, Napoleon was little disposed to consider its moral influence upon the soldier. A melancholy proof of that influence was exhibited by the corps now destined to invade Belgium. Their thirst for rapine could not be restrained, even while quartered among their fellow-citizens. An impartial French writer\* has drawn an afflicting picture of their excesses. Destitute of all feeling for their unhappy countrymen, who, with the utmost alacrity, furnished them with every thing in their power, they treated them with the

\* Relation Fidèle et détaillée de la dernière Campagne de Bonaparte, par un Témoin Oculaire. Troisième édition: p. 12. Paris, 1815.



greatest rigour ; regarding plunder as one of their indisputable privileges, they seemed to emulate each other in committing the most atrocious injuries. Every where, houses were despoiled ; under pretence of seeking for provisions, they shattered doors, pillaged store-rooms, maltreated the peasants, and roaming from place to place, returned to their camp laden with booty, after destroying what they could not carry away. " Happy, if, being exposed to every species of reproach and contumely, the *pekin*,\* accused of having too carefully concealed his money, escaped their vengeance by surrendering all his property."

Nor was the interior discipline of the French army better maintained. The same want of subordination prevailed among the several corps, and often led to scenes of anarchy and confusion. Mutual and implacable animosities existed, which were sometimes inflamed into open feuds. There was no reciprocal confidence, no cordiality, no sentiments of fraternal regard. Supercilious pride, repulsive egotism, and selfish avidity, universally predominated. This discord extended its baneful effects equally to the officers. When the commander of a column, or the colonel of a regiment, arrived in a place which he was to occupy, he immediately seized upon every thing, unrestrained by any considerations of what his successor might require. Guards were placed in those houses which contained conveniences, and without any other claim than that of first occupancy, all participation was denied. Sometimes the sentinels were attacked, and then, perhaps, a serious fray ensued. The imperial guard, in particular, were detested by the army ; for, proud of their office as the Prætorian bands of Napoleon, their arrogance knew no bounds. They regarded themselves as the exclusive depositories of their general's confidence and favour, and viewed the other troops only as inferior agents of his will. Hence, wherever they were most numerous, they always strove to assert an insolent authority ; while, on the other hand, if they happened to be the smaller number, they were sure to experience a

\* A cant phrase, insolently applied by the French military, to every person engaged in the civil occupations of life. " The Prussians of our time," observes an eminent writer, " will never forget or forgive, the series of dreadful injuries inflicted by the French, upon their country after the defeat of Jena. The plunder of their peaceful hamlets, with every inventive circumstance which the evil passions of lust, rapine, and cruelty, could suggest ; the murder of the father or the husband because ' the *pekin* looked dangerous ;' when he beheld his property abandoned to rapine, his wife or daughters to violation, and his children to wanton slaughter ; such were the tales which the Prussian land-wehr told over their watch-fires to whet each others' appetite to revenge."—And such tales might the Belgian, the Austrian, the German, tell ; such might the inhabitant of every country relate, which had once been cursed with the frightful visitation of a French army. Let it not be forgotten, then, when we talk proudly of the field of Waterloo, that one, and not the least, of its blessings, was to rescue Europe from the dominion of these savage hordes.

galling retaliation. This spirit of rivalry and hatred, subsisted also between the cavalry and infantry, where it was exercised with even more vindictive acrimony.\* When such a relaxed state of discipline was permitted to vitiate the very elements that composed the army, we cannot wonder at its unbridled enormities in war, where every evil passion is goaded into crime, by motives and facilities peculiar to that disastrous calamity.

At the head of this army, however, Napoleon, leaving his senators and people to enjoy their dream of freedom, now prepared to contest the crown he had usurped. He quitted Paris, (as already mentioned) on the 12th of June, at three o'clock in the morning, and by ten, he reached Soissons. From thence he proceeded to Laon, where he employed a few hours in visiting the fortifications. Orders had been transmitted to the different corps, to concentrate themselves upon the Sambre, and with that admirable combination of movements which distinguished Bonaparte's preparations, they all attained, on the same day, and nearly at the same hour, a united position on the Belgian frontier. The precision with which this junction was effected, excited the wonder and applause even of the French generals, accustomed as they were to witness such evolutions. On the 14th, Napoleon arrived at Avesnes, and there he issued the following proclamation, which explained his intentions, and dissipated all doubts as to the nature of the war about to commence. It was the first and last he had occasion to publish; for in his premature address to the Belgians, dated from his palace of Lacken, he forgot that the Duke of Wellington and a British army lay between him and Brussels.

“ Avesnes, June 14th.

“ Soldiers!

“ This day is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, which twice decided the destiny of Europe. Then, as after the battle of Austerlitz, as after the battle of Wagram, we were too generous. We believed in the protestations and in the oaths of princes, whom we left on their thrones. Now, however, leagued together, they aim at the independence, and the most sacred rights of France. They have committed the most unjust aggressions. Let us then march and meet them. Are not we and they still the same men? Soldiers! at Jena, against these same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were one to <sup>two</sup> three, and at Montmirail one to six. Let those among you, who have been captives to the

\* Relation, ut supra, p. 16.



English, describe the nature of their prison-ships, and the horrible sufferings they endured. The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Confederation of the Rhine, lament that they are obliged to use their arms in the cause of princes, who are the enemies of justice and the rights of all nations. They know that this coalition is insatiable. After having devoured twelve millions of Poles, twelve millions of Italians, one million of Saxons, and six millions of Belgians, it now wishes to devour the states of the second rank in Germany.

“ Madmen ! One moment of prosperity has bewildered them. The oppression and humiliation of the French people are beyond their reach : if they enter France, they will find their tomb there. Soldiers ! we have forced-marches to make, battles to fight, and dangers to encounter ; but, if we are firm, victory will be our’s. The rights, the honour, and the happiness of the country will be recovered. To every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment is now arrived, when he should either conquer or die !”

Napoleon condescended to a plagiarism from M. Dubois in this proclamation, when he talked of his exceeding generosity after the battles of Marengo, Friedland, Austerlitz, and Wagram. It consisted, we presume, in “ strengthening the thrones” of his enemies. We are aware, some license must be allowed to rhetorical embellishment, but how could the assertion, that the allies had commenced the aggression, be reconciled with the fact, that they were still in Belgium ? It would seem to require all the confidence of Bonaparte’s daring genius, to venture upon so palpable a falsehood ; or, had the long habit of fabricating motives, so corrupted his moral perception, that he considered truth and his necessity as synonymous ? He never possessed the opportunity of manifesting his generosity towards England, and therefore he could not reproach her with ingratitude ; but it would have been as politic, perhaps, if he had refrained from reminding his soldiers, of their sufferings on board our prison-ships. So impotent an accusation, at such a moment, resembled, very much, the imbecile rage of a little mind that will vent its spleen upon shadows rather than repress it. Cholerick boys seek petty wrongs to inflame their animosity ; heroes should find nobler arguments, before they draw the sword. Surely, Napoleon might have devised a more inspiring impulse for his army, than an appeal to those who had been our captives ; for had their “ horrible sufferings” been all that he insinuated, they were only among the casualties of war, and as the sufferers still survived to relate them, could scarcely have been very dreadful. It is really matter of astonishment, when we consider the stuff of which Bonaparte’s proclamations were commonly composed,

their oracular ambiguity, their pompous flippancy, their foolish prophecies, their thrasonical vauntings, and their systematic scorn of truth, that they should so long have deluded a nation, capable of feeling and exposing their absurdities. The servile bondage of the press does not wholly explain this mystery, which may, perhaps, be better solved, by remembering, that few care to examine what none are permitted to condemn.

Every thing being prepared, hostilities were commenced, on the 15th of June, at three o'clock in the morning, by the 2d corps under General Reille, who attacked the Prussian outposts, (forming part of the 1st corps commanded by General Ziethen,) near Thuin, and drove them back. Availing himself of this success, he continued vigorously to pursue the enemy, who were much harassed by the cavalry, as far as Marchienne-au-Pont. Intelligence was immediately despatched to Prince Blucher, at Namur, who ordered the different corps to effect a junction, and directed General Ziethen to retreat slowly upon Fleurus, that sufficient time might be allowed for this concentration. But the rapid advance of the French, towards Charleroi, and their vast superiority of force, rendered it impossible to execute this movement without considerable loss. The light cavalry of the centre, attacked the different positions of the Prussians on the right bank of the Sambre, and soon compelled them to re-cross that river. An attempt was made to delay the enemy's progress, by destroying the bridges, but they were soon repaired, and towards noon, a passage was effected near Charleroi and Marchienne. There was some severe fighting, and Napoleon's army displayed all its accustomed ardour and impetuosity. The Prussians sustained the shock with much gallantry, and yielded no ground which any troops could have maintained. An obstinate conflict was waged at Charleroi, (where General Ziethen had his head-quarters,) before it surrendered. Bonaparte entered it about one o'clock, and found considerable magazines. The Prussians were briskly pursued in their retreat, which they conducted, however, in good order, and towards evening concentrated themselves behind Fleurus. The 2d corps, meanwhile, advanced in the direction of Gosselies, on the Brussels road, where they pushed forward a strong detachment, and repulsed a regiment of Belgians, who were posted at Frasnes. The principal object of this movement was to intercept the Prussians, should they attempt to retire in that direction. The 3d corps occupied the road to Namur, and Bonaparte fixing his head-quarters at Charleroi, whither he returned at eight o'clock in the evening, the remainder of the army was assembled there or in the neighbouring villages.



Though the engagements on this day could scarcely be considered as very important, (for the French, according to their own account, lost only ten men, and had eighty wounded) yet it was magnified by them into a decisive battle. The success was certainly not greater than might have been anticipated; but it had the effect of elevating their hopes, by such an auspicious opening of the campaign, and tended to revive all their wonted confidence in the resistless genius of their leader. Nor did Napoleon neglect so fair an occasion for confirming that confidence. The most exaggerated statements were circulated; while the prisoners, amounting to about 1,000, were carefully marched, in small bodies, along the roads by which the other corps were advancing. On beholding them, enthusiastic acclamations burst forth from all sides, and not a Frenchman ventured to doubt that the English would hasten to embark at Antwerp, and Blucher save his army by crossing the Rhine. Among the many advantages which Bonaparte claimed as the result of this partial triumph, was the opportunity afforded to the Belgians of manifesting their attachment to him. "Their joy," he said, "was not to be described;" a negative mode of conveying ineffable intelligence peculiar to the French. "There were villages, where, on the sight of their deliverers, they made dances; and every where it was a transport which came from the heart." A more impartial narrator, however, has presented a very different account. He admits that they found a few peasants, who, when they entered a village, received them with cries of *Vive L'Empereur*; but he adds, "in general they did not seem animated by any sincere enthusiasm, and, to speak candidly, they resembled hired applauders, rather than citizens who yielded to a spontaneous impulse in expressing their real sentiments." The same writer details, with sympathetic indignation, the cruel injuries inflicted upon the inhabitants by their "deliverers."

During the night of the 15th, and the morning of the 16th, that portion of the French army which remained on the right bank of the Sambre was occupied in passing over to the left, and taking up its appointed positions. The Prussians, also, lost no time in concentrating their forces, and the 2d and 3d corps having reached Sombref, early on the 16th, the following distribution of the 1st corps was immediately ordered by Blucher, upon perceiving the gradual advance of the enemy. The 1st brigade was posted at St. Amand; the 3d at Bry; the 4th at Ligny, and the 2d, with the cavalry, was placed in reserve. The approach of the Duke of Wellington's army was anxiously looked for. When Blucher received intelligence that General Ziethen's corps was attacked, a despatch was instantly sent off to Brussels, where it arrived at half-past four in the afternoon. The

information it conveyed was not sufficiently explicit to enable the Duke to issue any positive orders. It merely stated that the Prussian outposts, along the Sambre, had been assailed, but whether the French intended to cross that river and enter Belgium, was unknown. General instructions, however, were given, to the troops in Brussels, to hold themselves in readiness for marching. Nothing more could then be done with safety, for as the attacking army might choose its own point where to commence operations, had any precipitate directions caused the sudden concentration of our army in the neighbourhood of Brussels, all that part of Belgium between the Dender and the sea would have been exposed to the enemy. It was necessary, likewise, to ascertain whether any of their columns were advancing by Mons. The manner, indeed, in which the Duke of Wellington had stationed his troops, so that they could unite, within twenty-four hours, upon any particular position, and even effect a junction by their left, with the right of the Prussians, indicated the most consummate judgment. Combined with this facility of union, there was the transcendent advantage, also, of opposing a defence, in every direction by which Napoleon might attempt to make himself master of Brussels. It has been said, that Wellington and Blücher were taken by surprise. They were, perhaps, so far taken by surprise, that they doubted whether Napoleon would act upon the offensive; an opinion which was generally entertained by the most experienced officers in both armies. A defensive war, in the French territory, was one which appeared better suited to the military resources of France, and more likely to rouse a national spirit. It was accordingly concerted, between the two illustrious commanders, that they should be ready to enter France, in the vicinity of Maubeuge, by the 1st of July. But though this plan was in contemplation, no precaution was neglected by the Duke of Wellington, which would enable him to act upon the opposite system, should Bonaparte, as in the event he did, precipitate himself into Belgium, and there open the campaign. With such an extent of frontier to defend, and with so small a force, how was it possible to dispose of that force in any way which could more effectually have embraced the double object of protection and attack? Such appears to be the concurrent judgment of the best military writers upon this subject, and in that judgment it at least becomes me to acquiesce.

A second despatch from Blücher, reached Brussels towards midnight on the 15th, communicating that decisive intelligence which the Duke of Wellington required, namely, that the French had actually crossed the Sambre in force, and were marching in the direction of Charleroi and Fleurus. He now directed those corps which were stationed at Ath, Braine-le-Comte, Murbecke, Grammont,



Enghien, and the circumjacent villages, to break up from their cantonments, and advance upon Nivelles, where the Prince of Orange had concentrated his corps. Being united there, it would be easy, when the enemy's intentions were more completely developed, to regulate their subsequent movements according to circumstances. At the same time, the troops which were in Brussels, received orders to march through the forest of Soignies, and along the great road to Charleroi. Thus the whole army would simultaneously unite, in proportion as it approximated towards the scene of action, and a junction might also be effected between the left of the British and the right of the Prussians. Nor should another important advantage, which was secured by this arrangement, be forgotten. It was possible that Napoleon, agreeably to his usual system of daring onset, might leave his right wing to engage with Blucher, and keep him in check, while with his centre and left, supported by the reserve, he would attempt to penetrate to Brussels, by the Charleroi road. It is true, this would have been a hazardous experiment, but how many of Bonaparte's triumphs have sprung from similar temerity. He would have had 80,000 Prussians on his flank, and eventually in his rear, (augmented, too, by Bulow's corps, to nearly 110,000); yet, if he had found, between him and Brussels, no other force than what the Duke of Wellington could march out of that city, to oppose him, who can venture to say that he might not have succeeded in his favourite scheme of surprising the capital? This contingency, however, was providently anticipated, by the concentric movements of the whole army upon that line of march.

The Duke of Wellington, together with the Duke of Brunswick, and the principal officers then resident in Brussels, were participating in the festivities of a ball, given by the Duchess of Richmond, when Blucher's second despatch arrived. In an instant all gaiety ceased, and the solemn tidings might be read in every anxious countenance. Our gallant officers, who, but a moment before, were sprightliest in the dance, now took a hurried leave of their friends or companions, and hastened to join their respective regiments. Though pleasure had resigned her blandishments to the stern summons of a warrior's duty, the cheering smile of unreflecting hope still animated those eyes, which were shortly to be closed in a glorious death. Many a graceful form, that might have captivated the timid glance of beauty, lay festering in its wounds, ere that sun, which now ushered in the morn, shed its farewell gleam upon the field of battle; many a youthful lip, on which the parting kiss of friendship or of love was then imprinted, was soon to quiver in expiring agonies, while faintly murmuring forth a soldier's prayer for victory. The high-spirited Duke of Brunswick, pensive and brooding

over a father's wrongs, departed, never to return. Our valiant countryman, Sir Thomas Picton, who had arrived that very night, heading his brave division, rode through the streets of Brussels with a gay inspiring aspect, which seemed the harbinger of success. But the lamented hero fell, before that proud triumph was achieved, to which his great example so largely contributed. Many were the noble fellows who shared his fate. When the bugle sounded, and the drum beat, every quarter of the city poured forth its martial bands, firm, intrepid, and rejoicing. Who, that had a heart to feel, could have witnessed such a scene without emotion? The kind and generous inhabitants, expressed the warmest wishes for the welfare of their gallant friends. Our soldiers, by their gentle and inoffensive demeanor, during the time they lay in Brussels, had inspired the natives with the most sincere and benevolent sentiments towards them, which they amply experienced afterwards, when they returned, wounded and dying, to their sympathizing hosts.\* They now assembled in crowds to witness their departure, and, as they marched onwards, with a steady and collected air, breathed many a fervent vow for their safety.

The artillery, the cavalry, the waggon-train, were all in perfect order, and by eight o'clock in the morning, the whole army, with its attendant trains and equipages, were gone. Brussels then presented a striking contrast. Instead of the bustle and confusion which had every where prevailed,—instead of the din of arms, the sound of music, the clattering of horses, the mingled cries for preparation and departure, the impatience of anxious curiosity, the frequent and tender adieus from husbands, fathers, relatives—suddenly—all was silent and desolate; the inhabitants retired to their houses, or collected in distant groupes to interchange foreboding questions upon the approaching conflict; the busy traffick of the city was suspended; shops were opened but neglected; every man had some-

\* The Scotch regiments, in particular, had excited these benign feelings. Many instances are related of the good-will manifested by the people of Brussels towards our army; and among them, the following cannot fail to be read with interest. "Our two distinguished Highland corps, the 42d and 92d, were the first to muster. They had lain in garrison in Brussels during the winter and spring, and their good behaviour had attracted the affection of the inhabitants in an unusual degree. Even while I was there, *Les petits Ecossois*, as they called them, were still the theme of affectionate praise among the Flemings. They were so domesticated in the houses where they were quartered, that it was no uncommon thing to see the Highland soldier taking care of the children, or keeping the shop, of his host. They were now to exhibit themselves in a different character; they assembled, with the utmost alacrity, to the sound of the well-known pibroch, '*Come to me and I will give you flesh*;' an invitation to the wolf and the raven, for which the next day did, in fact, spread an ample banquet at the expence of our brave countrymen as well as of their enemies."—*Paul's Letters*.



thing to tell or ask, something to hope or dread; and the anxious, awful suspense in which they remained, could only be heightened by the varying rumours of disaster which each hour brought with it, until despair was changed to exultation, by the glorious tale of victory which our wounded heroes proclaimed.

The English army, meanwhile, pursued its course through the forest of Soignies, in the direction of Genappe and Quatre Bras. The Duke of Wellington delayed his departure from Brussels, till seven o'clock, probably wishing to receive intelligence from the more distant divisions, to whom orders for advancing had been transmitted: but he joined his troops before they reached the scene of action. The march was long and painful, especially to many of the officers, who had not found sufficient time to put off their ball-room dresses, and properly equip themselves for such an expedition. The distance, from Brussels to Quatre Bras, is about two and twenty miles, and when we consider the fatigue the men endured, it must be matter of astonishment that they were able instantly to encounter, and successfully to resist, the impetuous assaults of a superior enemy. The 5th division, commanded by Sir Thomas Picton, arrived at Quatre Bras about half-past two o'clock, and was followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau. They found the Prince of Orange, with a division of his army, keeping the French in check, and gallantly maintaining a position, the importance of which he accurately discerned.

The Duke of Wellington's whole force, at the commencement of the action, could not exceed 16,000 men;\* in cavalry and artillery it was greatly deficient, having only a few Belgian and Hanoverian guns, and a small body of Brunswick hussars.† The enemy more than doubled our numbers, even from their own

\* The 5th division, including the Hanoverian brigade, amounted to 6,815. The Nassau troops about 4,000. (See the Prince of Saxe-Weimar's letter.) The Brunswickers, with the small number of the Prince of Orange's corps, that could advance from Nivelles, augmented the total to about 16,000.

† The British cavalry and horse artillery did not reach the field of battle till the very close of the action. They had to march from their cantonments behind the Dender, (above forty miles,) and the roads were very bad. (Account of the Battle of Waterloo, by a Staff Officer, p. 10.) The first cavalry that arrived, was the 6th brigade, commanded by Sir H. Vivian; this was about seven o'clock in the evening. It was composed of the 1st Hanoverian Hussars, the 10th Royal, and the 18th Hussars. Yet, a writer, (*Témoin Oculaire*, p. 32,) whose temperate impartiality generally entitles him to confidence, mentions our "numerous battalions, supported by a formidable cavalry." This is surely a singular mistake to be made by an eye-witness.

account. Marshal Ney,\* by whom they were commanded, states, in his letter to the Duke of Otranto, that he was ordered to place himself at the head of the 1st and 2d corps, and attack the English at Quatre Bras. The 1st corps, however, was rendered useless, by Bonaparte's ordering it to support his own operations against the Prussians, which the Marshal severely condemned. But the 2d corps amounted to 30,000, including its cavalry and artillery, besides which, he had the 2d corps of cavalry,† commanded by General Excelmans, which was 3,600 strong. That the Marshal, who suffered himself to be repulsed by an inferior army, almost destitute of artillery and cavalry, should feel a little exasperation, is not surprising, and hence, perhaps, his peevish criticism upon Bonaparte's dispositions during the day. But what language can adequately express the undaunted heroism of his conquerors? For, that they were conquerors, was sufficiently proved by their occupying, during the night, the ground which Ney's troops held during the battle.

The enemy used every effort to prevent our regiments from forming in line or square as they successively came up, and their attempts were too frequently successful. The Lancers committed dreadful havock, before we were prepared to receive them. These onsets were much facilitated by local circumstances. The village, or farm-house of Quatre Bras, (which derives its name from the intersection of four roads, leading to Charleroi, Brussels, Nivelles, and Namur,) was almost surrounded by fields of rye, which grows to an enormous height in Flanders. It reached nearly to the shoulders of the men, who, as they marched through it, often found themselves suddenly attacked before they perceived their assailants. On the right of the British position, was a large and thick wood, called Le Bois de Bossu, with a hollow, or kind of ravine, in front of it. The occupation of this wood was of the utmost importance, because the French

\* This general, whose infamous disloyalty will brand his name to the latest posterity, was unexpectedly summoned to a command. In Napoleon's or rather Baron Fain's *Portfeuille*, (his First Secretary,) which was found at Charleroi, after the tumultuary retreat of the French, there is the following laconic note to the Minister at War: "Let Ney be called. If he wishes to be at the first battle, he must repair on the 13th to Avesnes, where my head-quarters will be." There seems to be a sullen anger lurking in this abrupt command, which Bonaparte should not have felt towards a man who had incurred universal contempt for his sake. Ney, indeed, in his letter to Fouché, appears to complain that "neither the Emperor nor his minister had given him any previous hint he should be employed during the campaign. He was accordingly taken by surprise, without horses, without accoutrements, and without money, and he was obliged to borrow the necessary expenses of his journey."

† See French official account.



might debouche, from it, upon the Brussels road. A corps of Belgians was detached for its defence, but they were overwhelmed by superior numbers, and the enemy established themselves there in considerable force. The Prince of Orange, who did not know his soldiers were repulsed, mistook the French for them as they advanced through the wood;\* but the Duke of Wellington instantly perceived what had happened, and ordered the position to be regained. At this juncture, a division of the Guards, under General Maitland, arrived from Enghien, and notwithstanding their fatigued and exhausted state, having marched fifteen hours, without any thing to eat or drink, they gallantly advanced to the charge, and in half an hour completely cleared the wood.† Though they thus became masters of it, they found some difficulty in emerging from their shelter. As often as they attempted to come out, a tremendous fire of round and grape-shot was opened upon them, followed by a charge of cavalry. When they retired, and the enemy endeavoured to penetrate the wood, they were received with a steady and well-directed volley of musquetry, which compelled them, also, to return.— These alternate attacks continued for nearly three hours. At one time, the enemy was furiously encountered by a square of “black Brunswickers,” while the British, rapidly lining the ditches, kept up a most destructive fire; but our loss was very severe, and the men found great difficulty in forming their line again. The undismayed gallantry of the Guards was the more remarkable, as they were composed chiefly of young soldiers, and volunteers from the militia, who had never been in action. Some of these noble fellows were so overcome with fatigue, that when they entered the wood, they sunk down, and had only sufficient strength to cheer their comrades to the onset. The carnage was dreadful, for the conflict was obstinately waged on either side; the French, from their superiority in cavalry and artillery, committed great slaughter, which was well repaid,

\* Many calamitous consequences ensued from the similarity of uniform between the French, and other foreign corps. The Belgians, in particular, suffered from this resemblance, as they still retained the military dress which they wore when under Bonaparte. In the heat of battle, mistakes frequently occurred which proved fatal to the objects of them. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, in a letter addressed to his father, says, “unhappily the Prussians, who were to support me in my village, mistook my Nassauers, whose uniform is still very French, though their hearts are true German, for Frenchmen, and made dreadful fire upon them. They were driven from their post, but I rallied them about a quarter of a league from the field of battle.” This was on the 18th of June.

† It is stated that General Maitland employed a *ruse de guerre*, on this occasion, which reflects equal credit upon his presence of mind, and upon the intrepidity of the men who executed it. Apprehending he should find much difficulty in performing his task by fighting, he ordered the soldiers to make an impetuous advance with loud huzzas. The enemy were astonished, and precipitately retired.

however, by our musquets, and at length we succeeded in retaining undisputed possession of the post.

The battle continued to rage with equal fury in other parts, and the Duke of Wellington is described as having frequently looked at his watch, anxiously calculating when he might expect the arrival of his more distant divisions. It must, indeed, have been a moment of awful trial, requiring all his serene composure to sustain without perturbation; but he continued as calm and collected during the incessant havoc, as if he were merely directing the operations of a field day. He was often exposed to the most imminent peril. At one time, the enemy's cavalry succeeded in arriving at some guns close to the farm of Quatre Bras, almost immediately on the spot where the Duke was standing; when a battalion of young Hanoverians, by a well-directed fire, at the very moment that it could be most effectual, destroyed nearly the whole body of cuirassiers, who had made the rash and daring attempt.\* Gratitude, perhaps, mingled with justice, the noble Duke, in his despatch, "particularly mentioned the battalion of Hanoverians," as entitled to his approbation.

Sir Thomas Picton's "superb division," was singly engaged with the enemy for nearly two hours. Every man fought with a desperation which no language can describe. The French, also, displayed the utmost gallantry, which might justly be inspired by their superior numbers, as well as their strength in cavalry and artillery. The latter is a potent substitute for personal prowess. The fine brigade of Highlanders suffered much. They were every where in the hottest of the fight, and well did they maintain their warlike renown. Exposed to a most destructive fire from the enemy, who were posted on a rising ground, they patiently endured it, waiting only for opportunities when they could become the assailants. The third battalion of the Royals, also, distinguished itself in a particular manner. Being removed from the centre of the 5th division, it charged and routed a column of the enemy. It was then formed into a square to receive the cavalry, and though repeated attacks were made, not the slightest impression was produced. Wherever the lancers and cuirassiers presented themselves, they found a stern and undismayed front, which they vainly endeavoured to penetrate. The 42d displayed unparalleled bravery. They were advancing through a field of rye, by which they were almost concealed, when a column of French lancers

\* Account of the battle, by a Field Officer, p. 10.



suddenly attacked them. Colonel Macara, who commanded the regiment, ordered it to form a square, in doing which, two companies were left out. The lancers rushed upon them, and in an instant they were literally annihilated. The attack was repeated, and nearly one half of the remainder was mowed down. Their brave and veteran Colonel was among the number who fell. The small remnant was now formed into a diminished square, by Colonel Dick, who succeeded to the command, and the men, standing back to back, maintained a desperate conflict with the foe, till they succeeded in putting them to flight.\*

Thus heroically was every foot of ground contested, with a degree of unyielding courage, which, the more it is contemplated, fills us the more with admiration. Were not the facts indisputable, our reason might reject them as fabulous; they are true, and of what other nation can similar deeds be related? The men vied with each other, who should dare the greatest hazards; and the only murmur that escaped their lips, was when they looked, for a moment, idly on, and could not share the danger with their comrades.† With such soldiers, a general must more frequently have to restrain than incite their ardour, for their fiery and undaunted mettle would court peril which prudence might avert. The 28th regiment eminently distinguished itself, and, together with the 42d, 78th, and 92d, was honourably mentioned in the Duke of Wellington's despatch. It was formed into a square, and sustained an attack on three sides at once, from the French cuirassiers and lancers. By their steady and continued volleys, however,

\* The Scots regiments were principally engaged at Quatre Bras, and their loss was in proportion. Their dead lay in ranks on the field. A French writer, who traversed it on the following day, says, "the road and skirts of the wood were concealed by heaps of dead, of which the greater part were Scotch. Their costume, which consists of a kind of short wrapping coat, made of a sort of brown stuff, interspersed with stripes of blue, and which, hardly reaching so low as the knee, leaves a part of the limb uncovered, singularly attracted the attention of the French soldiers, who gave them the name of *sans culottes*."—*Relation, &c., par un Témoin Oculaire*, p. 44.

† The following characteristic anecdote has been related. "A Scots regiment was, for a considerable time, unemployed by any French column, though exposed to a fire of round shot. The officers, who had a complete view of the field, saw the 42d and other battalions warmly engaged in charging. The young men could not brook the contrast presented by their inactivity. 'It will,' said they, 'be the same now as it always has been: the 42d will have all the *luck* of it. There will be a fine noise in the newspapers about that regiment, but devil the word of us.' Some of their elders consoled them, by assuring them of the probability that before the day was over they would have enough of it. This regiment was one of those that suffered the most, and the greater number of those fine, spirited youths, who expressed this impatience, were laid on the field in cold and silent lifelessness before the evening."

they kept the enemy in check, while their Colonel, Sir Philip Belson, used every exertion to prevent them from moving till the proper moment arrived. At the same time, the enemy's artillery continued a heavy firing upon the square for above an hour ; but every gap which its destructive aim created, was immediately filled by their rear ranks, before the lancers, who hovered on each side, could avail themselves of it. The slaughter produced by these successive discharges of cannon, and attacks of cavalry, was so great, that General Kempt advanced the Royals to their support. Another furious onset was then made by the lancers, which obliged General Kempt to take refuge in the square ; but they again repulsed their assailants, and at that moment Sir Thomas Picton riding up, ordered them to advance, for the enemy were giving way. The gallant Picton led them to the charge himself, and they drove the French from their position with great loss.\*

The fearful odds against which the British, with the Brunswickers†, and other contingents, had been contending for nearly two hours, were, at length, somewhat diminished by the timely arrival, about four o'clock, of the 1st division under General Cooke, and of the 3d, under Sir C. Alten. These troops had marched a considerable distance from their different cantonments, but like their brethren, fatigue and hunger were forgotten, when the work of death was to be begun. As fast as they reached the field of battle, each regiment formed itself into square, and awaited the enemy's assaults, which were made in rapid succession, and as rapidly repulsed. Thus reinforced, however, the Duke of Wellington was enabled, not only to maintain his position, but ultimately to drive back the French from the ground they had occupied during a part of the day. Much confusion and dismay was spread through the enemy's ranks ; and some fugitives carried consternation as far as Charleroi. They propagated the rumour, that the English were advancing ; but pursuit, on our part, was impossible, for the cavalry

\* It will be proper to correct an error here, which appears in almost every account of this battle ; that the 79th regiment being taken by surprise in a corn-field, would have been cut to pieces by the cuirassiers, if the 42d had not come up, and assisted them. Sir N. Douglas, who commanded this regiment, has contradicted, in the most formal manner, what he considers as an " unfounded calumny against his fame and character, and those of the regiment." It appears, that the 79th, though often threatened by the enemy's cavalry, did not lose a single man by them on the 16th.

† The gallantry of these troops was eminently conspicuous. A distinguished officer in the British army informed me, that " of the foreign levies, the best soldiers in discipline as well as courage were those of Brunswick Oels."



did not arrive till night-fall, and the infantry were too exhausted by their previous march, and subsequent contest. Ney, therefore, had leisure to rally his army upon the heights of Frasnes, and with the approach of darkness the combat ceased.

The action at Quatre Bras, was an appropriate prelude to the battle of Waterloo. The same inflexible bravery, which here operated upon a smaller scale, was there repeated through an arduous day, till the unequal struggle closed in victory. Marshal Ney was defeated as gloriously, if not as decisively, as his master on the 18th. Vainly did he endeavour to palliate his disgrace, by complaining of Napoleon's removal of the 1st corps. Had he not enough without it? Were two to one insufficient? Could neither that superiority, nor his strength in cavalry and artillery, where we were weak, enable him to conquer? Even if the contending forces had been numerically equal, the latter advantage was so great, that it ought to have ensured success. A British army so circumstanced, would have taught a different lesson, and never deigned to infer honour from it. Napoleon, too, on the same day, achieved a victory over the Prussians, without a superiority as preponderating as Ney possessed for two hours against the British, who, wearied with a long march, arrived only in detail upon the field of battle. Nor, when reinforced by the 1st and 3d divisions, did we stand upon a level with our adversaries. No doubt, if Ney could have brought his first corps into action, with the addition of five and twenty thousand men he would have gained "a very glorious triumph;" but it is affirmed, he unjustly complained of the absence of that corps.\* On the 16th, at noon, he surveyed the position of Quatre Bras, and perceiving but few troops collected, he concluded the English were at too great a distance, to arrive in any strength during the day. This opinion he communicated to Napoleon, who, confiding in it, very naturally employed the 1st

\* Giraud, "Précis des Journées des 15, 16, 17, et 18 Juin 1815." This writer has committed a great mistake with regard to the Duke of Wellington's army, "the *whole* of which," he says, was present; and he supports the assertion by the following sentence in the Duke's own despatch. "In the meantime, I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras." True; but did the whole army reach Quatre Bras, when the battle was fought? It is one thing to direct an operation, and another to accomplish it. If M. Giraud had only finished the sentence, of which he extracted a part, he would have found what proportion of the army actually commenced the action at Quatre Bras. But that was an inquiry, which only a very impartial Frenchman could be expected to make. M. Giraud preferred an assumption, which afforded an opportunity for a little of that gasconade which, like the term itself, belongs to his country. "Our troops," he says, "attacked with firmness and audacity, an enemy whose strength they *disdained* to calculate." This sentence merely requires a slight verbal alteration to make it correct; I should propose to substitute "*ashamed*" for "*disdained*."

corps of his army, when he thought it might decide the success of his own attack against the Prussians. Besides, in what respect could Ney consider that corps as a reserve, ready to act upon any sudden exigency? It was in the rear of Frasnes, above three miles from the field of battle, a distance which must have precluded it from co-operating in any movements necessary to repel urgent and immediate danger. In fact, the Marshal was beaten by a superior bravery, which did not enter into his calculations, and that part of his querulous epistle to the Duke of Otranto, may be considered as the determined fallacy of a man more anxious to disguise than reveal the truth.

The loss sustained in this action was considerable, amounting, in the whole, to about 4,000. The number of killed and wounded, belonging to the British, was 2,474, the former being 319, the latter 2,155.\* The Hanoverians had thirty-four killed, and two hundred and eighteen wounded. The united loss of the Brunswickers, Belgians, and Nassau troops, must have exceeded a thousand. The French admit theirs to have been 4,200;† an extraordinary havock, by the musket and

\* Duke of Wellington's letter to Earl Bathurst, dated Louvres, June 30, 1815.

† Napoleon and his marshals were greatly elated by the retrograde movements of Wellington and Blücher on the 17th, and the defeat of the latter on the 16th. They even contrived to make a victory of the battle at Quatre Bras. Soult, in a despatch to Davoust, the Minister at War, announced that they had not only separated the line of the allies, but that "Wellington and Blücher saved themselves with difficulty. The effect was theatrical. In an instant the firing ceased, and the enemy was routed in all directions."—Another Bobadil, whose account appeared in the *Moniteur*, declared "that a British division of 5 or 6,000 Scottish, was cut to pieces; *we have not seen any of them prisoners.*" The latter assertion was undoubtedly true; but admits of a different explanation. They would certainly have seen prisoners if they could have made any. A third account detailed fresh miracles for the Parisians, and contradicted the former. "The noble Lord must have been confounded. *Whole bands of prisoners are taken.* They do not know what is become of their commanders. I hope we shall not hear again of the Prussians for some time, even if they should ever be able to rally. As for the English, we shall see now what will become of them. The Emperor is there!" The curiosity of these gentlemen about the English was soon gratified; and three days after they might have written from Paris, "The Emperor is here!"

This kind of childish exultation, (always the proof of a frivolous mind,) becomes ridiculous, when contrasted with ultimate discomfiture, and despicable, when opposed to facts. But it is not peculiar to modern Frenchmen. There is an historical document which exhibits this vapouring propensity in a very amusing form, a century ago. When the Duke of Marlborough won the battle of Malplaquet, Marshal Boufflers, who commanded in the French army, under the *Marechal de Villars*, gave the following description of his glorious defeat, to Louis XIV.:—

"It is a great affliction to me, Sire, that I am unfortunately obliged to send you the news of the loss of a new battle; but I can assure your Majesty, never was misfortune attended with greater glory. All



bayonet alone: It would be difficult to produce a more conspicuous proof of the desperate courage with which our troops fought. Among those who fell was the Duke of Brunswick, after animating his men to the conflict by his own heroical example. Universally was his fate deplored; deeply was it afterwards avenged by his gallant band. It is said, he was killed by a shot from Jerome Bonaparte's division, and that the fugitive King of Westphalia, was savagely congratulated by the French generals, upon the fatality which always pursued the unfortunate

your Majesty's troops have acquired the greatest reputation, as well for their valour as for their firmness and obstinacy, not yielding at last but to the enemy's superiority, having all done perfect wonders. All the Marechal de Villars' dispositions were entirely good, and the best that could be made by the most accomplished and experienced general. He behaved himself in the action with all imaginable bravery and activity; and besides his good example, gave all possible good orders: but his valour and want of care of his person occasioned his wound, which was very prejudicial to the affair of this unfortunate day.— He did me the honour to entrust me with the right, and himself took care of the left. We repulsed the enemy more than three or four times at both attacks, with incredible bravery on the part of the troops; but the centre being somewhat exposed, we were forced to carry troops to the left, where they were very much wanted, and the enemy marched so many horse and foot against the centre, where there were none but horse to oppose them; that we were obliged to yield to the infinitely superior number and prodigious efforts of the enemy, after having charged them, however, at least six times, and with the greatest vigour pushed and broke two or three of the enemy's lines. I can assure your Majesty, that the enemy's loss is three times greater than ours,† and that they can make no other advantage of this unfortunate action, than gaining the field of battle, and that this ill success will not cost you an inch of ground. M. D'Artagnan, who commanded the right of the foot, distinguished himself in a particular manner; the Duc de Guiche behaved himself likewise with all possible skill and bravery; M. de Gassion did wonders at the head of your Majesty's household; the Prince de Rohan and Mons. de Vidame did all that could be expected from persons of the greatest valour. The gendarmerie did wonders also; the cavalry behaved themselves very well; all the foot did wonders, and distinguished themselves. Never was a retreat, after so long, bloody, and obstinate a fight, made with more order and firmness. The enemy followed us in battalia, and in very good order, as far as the defile of Givri, but with respect, not daring to attack us."

This wonderful description of a very wonderful battle, which ended in a wonderful defeat, has no inconsiderable resemblance to many of the despatches which Bonaparte's marshals sent from Spain, and some which he himself found it convenient to write, after his Russian campaign. It was happily ridiculed, at the time, by Steele, in the Tatler, who gave the following humorous epitome of it:—

"Sire,—This is to let your Majesty understand, that to your immortal honour, and the destruction of the confederates, your troops have lost another battle. Artagnan did wonders; Rohan performed miracles; Guiche did wonders; Gassion performed miracles; the whole army distinguished themselves, and every body did wonders. And to conclude the wonders of the day, I can assure your Majesty, that though you have lost the field of battle, you have not lost an inch of ground. The enemy marched behind us with respect, and we ran away from them as bold as lions."

† Here the moderns have improved upon their ancestors. In one of the accounts of the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, it is quietly asserted, "that there were eight enemies to one Frenchman on the field of battle."

Prince, in opposing him to the conqueror of his states.\* Sir Thomas Picton, also, received a (severe) wound, which was not discovered, however, till after his death on the 18th. That brave officer, reluctant to forego the glory or the danger of the subsequent conflict, secretly applied to it only a piece of torn handkerchief, and continued the command of his division, till a more fatal aim, on the 18th, deprived his country of a skilful and intrepid general, his friends, of a man whose memory they can never cease to venerate.

Bonaparte, meanwhile, was more successfully conducting his operations against the Prussians, who had taken up a strong position on the heights between Brie and Sombref, and occupied, with a large force, the villages of St. Amand and Ligny. Only three corps of the army had joined; the fourth, under Bulow, which was between Liege and Hannut, having been delayed in its march by several untoward circumstances. The effective strength of these three corps was about 85,000 men. The right wing was posted at St. Amand, the centre at Ligny, and the left at Sombref, extending towards Gembloux, and along the Namur road. These villages are built upon broken and uneven ground, with court yards and orchards well adapted for stations of defence. Behind them was an ascent of considerable elevation, with a deep ravine in front, edged by straggling thickets of trees. Masses of infantry were placed in this ravine, destined to support the troops in the villages. It was the intention of Blucher not to exhibit his army, between Ligny and Brie, to the enemy's view, keeping them concealed in the hollows; but the heights of Fleurus presented a survey of the Prussian position so distinct, that Bonaparte was enabled to regulate his movements upon the most accurate calculations. The force which he had at his disposal amounted to about 120,000 men, though if the first corps be deducted, who "were idly paraded during the battle, without firing a shot," according to Ney, it will reduce the number actually engaged with the Prussians, to somewhat less than 100,000. General Gneisenau estimates them at 130,000, but they would scarcely have been so much, even had the first corps actively co-operated.

The left wing of the French army was commanded by Marshal Ney, and the right by Marshal Grouchy, consisting of the 3d and 4th corps of infantry, and the 3d corps of cavalry. The latter occupied the heights in the rear of Fleurus. The centre, commanded by Napoleon himself, was composed of the 6th corps of infantry, the 1st and 4th corps of cavalry, and the whole of the guard. It was

\* Relation, par un Temoin Oculaire, &c. p. 39.



necessary to make some change in the plan of operations, after Bonaparte had examined the Prussian position, and the column of Marshal Grouchy, which was advancing upon Point de Jour, (a small collection of houses about a quarter of a league from Sombref,) turned to the left, for the purpose of supporting the attack upon Ligny.\*

It was nearly three o'clock before all the requisite dispositions were completed, and the battle was then begun by the third corps, under General Vandamme, attacking the village of St. Amand. Bonaparte was probably influenced by two motives in ordering this attack. The right wing of the Prussians was the weakest, for Blucher, considering his centre, at Ligny, as the most important, had concentrated his principal strength there; it was also the line of communication between Blucher and Wellington, and if Napoleon could have penetrated to its flank of rear, he might have succeeded in separating the two allied armies. Perhaps, even, he calculated upon what actually took place, that Blucher, finding himself pressed on the right, would detach thither some regiments from the centre, and thus weaken the latter. The division of General Lefol, belonging to Vandamme's corps, rushed forwards, and in spite of an obstinate resistance from the Prussians, succeeded in carrying a part of the village, called Little St. Amand, at the point of the bayonet. But they were soon driven back, by a battalion which Blucher himself led to the charge, and for a time the Prussians remained master of the ground they had recovered. The whole 3d corps now became engaged, assisted by the division of General Girard from the 2d corps. The conflict was equally sanguinary on both sides, and at one period seemed to preponderate so decidedly in favour of the Prussians, that Bonaparte ordered the advance of the 1st corps to support the 3d. Before it arrived, however, the French had established themselves in the church and church-yard, from which every effort to dislodge them proved unavailing; but the Prussians still kept possession of the heights behind, and in such force as prevented Vandamme from attempting to advance beyond the village. The mutual ferocity with which the troops fought, was no less terrible than unexampled. Every man, on either side, seemed to consider himself as having a personal quarrel with, and animosity against his antagonist. The fury of revenge thus animating the natural ardour of battle, rendered the slaughter not only more extensive, but more pitiless in its character.

By degrees, the combat extended along the whole line of both armies, and

\* History of the Campaign, by a Prussian General Officer, p. 7. Bonaparte, in his own despatch, says, "it was necessary to change front, the right in advance and pivoting upon Fleurus."

Ligny now became the scene of a desperate and prolonged contest. The 4th corps, under General Gerard,\* advanced upon this village, while Marshal Grouchy, with the cavalry of Pajol, attacked the extreme left of the Prussians at Sombref. There seems to have been some miscalculation on the part of Blucher, of which Napoleon promptly availed himself. At the commencement of the battle, he conceived his centre was the point against which Bonaparte would direct all his efforts, agreeably to his favourite system, and there he accordingly concentrated his chief strength. But, when he found the enemy endeavouring to force St. Amand, he forwarded a brigade from Bry, by Lecaile and Wagnele, and ordered the whole reserve, with the exception of three battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, to move towards that village. By the time they reached St. Amand, the 4th corps of the enemy, supported by the guards, with the 6th corps in reserve, marching from Fleurus, arrived at Ligny, now weakened by the troops which had been detached to the right. One street of that village, composed of the houses nearest Sombref, was soon taken by the French tirailleurs, and Blucher had no alternative but to rush forward with his cavalry, though at the moment, no more than six squadrons could be collected.†

It would be difficult to describe the dreadful carnage that ensued. The combatants were soon fighting hand to hand, upon the dead bodies of their comrades. It was literally a murderous struggle between battalion and battalion, in orchards, gardens, and streets. The village was six times taken and retaken within five hours. The castle of Ligny was disputed by the Prussians, to the last gasp. Each army continued to supply its losses with fresh troops from the rear, and the slaughter became tremendous. A French regiment of infantry, 800 strong, retired from the conflict with only 80 men.‡ Every wall, every fence, every hedge, was obstinately and fiercely defended. At one period, 200 cannon were

\* Some confusion has arisen, from confounding the names of Generals Gerard and Girard. General Girard, commanded a division of the 2d corps, which formed the reserve of Vandamme. He was killed in the attack upon St. Amand, and Giraud pays an honourable tribute to his memory as "an officer of rare intrepidity, and possessing a still more rare disinterestedness."—General Gerard commanded the 4th corps, or army of the Moselle.

† History of the Campaign, by a Prussian General Officer, p. 10. This writer, whose accuracy and judgment seem unquestionable, distinctly insinuates that Blucher might have won the battle. "Had the movement to St. Amand not taken place," he observes, "which would have left an equal, if not a superior force opposed to the enemy, the position at Ligny could not have been forced, and the battle, it cannot be doubted, must have had a very different result."

‡ Giraud, *Precis*, ut supra.



directed from both sides against the village, which was on fire in several places. The Prussians were more exposed than the French, as their troops lined the sides and tops of the surrounding heights, while the latter were partly sheltered in the hollows.\* Towards evening, a desperate charge was made by the Prussian cavalry, upon the enemy's columns; but they were repulsed, and driven back upon three battalions of infantry posted beyond the eminence, along a road leading from Brie to Sombref. Repeated attempts were afterwards made to dislodge the French cavalry from the ground between Ligny, Brie, and Sombref; they could only make them recede upon Ligny. It was in one of these charges that Blucher nearly closed his illustrious career. Heading a regiment of cavalry, which failed in its attack, his horse was wounded, and galloped furiously forward, till it dropped down dead. The Marshal fell under it, and could not be immediately extricated, for the enemy were pursuing. The last Prussian horseman had passed him, as he lay senseless on the ground; but his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Count Nostiz, gallantly determining to share the fate of his general, cast himself by his side, and covered him with his military cloak, that he might not be recognised. The French cuirassiers rode rapidly by; the flying Prussians suddenly rallied, repulsed their pursuers, and they again passed him in their retreat. The opportunity was instantly seized, and the veteran hero, mounting a dragoon horse, escaped from his imminent peril. It is said, the first use he made of his returning consciousness, when he knew the danger that encompassed him, was to conjure his faithful aide-de-camp to shoot him, rather than suffer him to become the captive of an enemy, whom he abhorred with deadliest hatred.

The issue of the battle now depended upon Blucher's receiving aid from the English, or the arrival of his 4th corps; but he learned that the Duke of Wellington could with difficulty maintain himself at Quatre Bras, and no tidings were received of Bulow's approach. Night was advancing, and Bonaparte determined to end the conflict by one desperate assault. He was completely master of the village of Ligny, but the Prussians still occupied the heights of the mill of Bussy with large masses of infantry. If he could succeed in penetrating their centre, the two wings would then be forced to find safety in separate retreat, while the right would be wholly cut off from the Namur road. This bold attempt was made with the greatest intrepidity. Eight battalions of the imperial guard, supported by four squadrons of cavalry, two regiments of cuirassiers, all the reserves of the 4th corps, and a formidable artillery, traversed the village of Ligny,

\* *Relation, par un Temoïn Oculaire*, p. 35.

and rushed into the ravine which separates it from the heights. These they began to ascend, in the face of a dreadful fire of grape and musketry which was poured down upon them by the Prussians. Nothing, however, could check their impetuosity, and a horrible carnage took place, when the grenadiers of the guard attacked the Prussian squares at the point of the bayonet. For a considerable time the havoc continued with equal fury on both sides; neither of them relinquished a foot of ground, and the awful struggle was maintained over a continually increasing mound of dead and dying. At the same moment, the Prussian cavalry was engaged with the enemy's and finally repulsed; when a division of infantry, favoured by the darkness of the night, made a circuit round the village unperceived, and took the main body of the army in the rear.\* Though surprised by this movement, the Prussians did not suffer themselves to be disconcerted. Formed into masses, they coolly resisted all the attacks of the cavalry, and preserved their line unbroken. But having no reserve at hand, by which they could restore the battle, and unable any longer to oppose the repeated assaults of superior numbers, Blucher prudently determined upon a retreat which might enable him to unite with his 4th corps. The order was accordingly given, and about ten o'clock the Prussian centre and right commenced a retrograde movement upon Tilly, in such a firm and unbroken array, as deterred the enemy from pursuing them. They were permitted even to form themselves, unmolested, at a quarter of a league from the field of battle; while the imperial guard took possession of the heights they had quitted.

An unsuccessful attempt was made by General Vandamme, to occupy the attention of the right wing behind at St. Amand, till the retreat of the centre would have exposed it to the danger of being surrounded; but General Ziethen was too vigilant, and when the centre receded, he fell back with his brigades so as to preserve his communication with it. The village of Brie was retained by the Prussians during the night, and General Thielman, who had maintained himself in Sombref, against all the efforts of Grouchy, did not quit it till the following morning at day-break, when he slowly retired with the 3d corps upon Gembloux, where Bulow had now arrived. Napoleon at first thought the Prussians would

\* See General Gneisenau's official report. General Sarrazin (*Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration*, p. 407,) denies this statement. "The Prussian General," he observes, "endeavours to excuse his retreat by a *surprise*, as if a division could march with the same secrecy as a patrol, especially a division strong enough to take the main body of an army in the rear. The Prussians are too vigilant, and guard themselves better. They were not *surprised*, but they were forced to yield to superior numbers."—General Gneisenau described what he saw: General Sarrazin what he read. Which ought to be believed?



endeavour to rally in the neighbourhood of Namur, but he soon found that Blucher had more judiciously retired upon Wavre, in a line parallel with the retreat which he anticipated the Duke of Wellington would have to make from Quatre Bras, thus defeating, what the French prematurely boasted of having accomplished, the separation of the allied armies.

The loss sustained on both sides, during this sanguinary battle, was very great, but, from causes already mentioned, that of the Prussians preponderated. Bonaparte computed his own at 3,000 killed and wounded, being 1,200 less than he allowed for the action at Quatre Bras. Though prodigal of blood beyond, perhaps, any other general, he always wished it to appear as if he gained victories by magic, and generally calculated one Frenchman for six enemies. The most authentic accounts concur in stating Napoleon's loss on this day at 6,000 killed and wounded; nor could it be less. M. Giraud even mentions that number of wounded only, who were sent to Charleroi, where, he adds, they found no preparations for assistance, which occasioned much murmuring among the troops. The division of Girard was almost totally destroyed, and its feeble remains were unable to advance with the army on the following morning. The loss of the Prussians was at least 14,000;\* Napoleon estimated it at 15,000, and probably did not exceed the truth. Fifteen pieces of cannon were abandoned on the field of battle. Few prisoners were taken, except a part of the wounded, for the conflict was waged with such unrelenting ferocity, that no quarter was either asked or given. The French, indeed, in some accounts which were sent to Paris immediately after, vaunted of having not only killed 25,000, but of making as many prisoners, and that Marshal Grouchy had more than he knew how to dispose of. We may presume they ran back again, for they could not be found next day.

Though the battle of Ligny was unattended by any of those decisive results which belong to a victory, it could not fail to have an important influence upon the ulterior operations of the campaign. Blucher and Wellington found it necessary to retreat, while, by the position of the former at Wavre, their line of com-

\* History of the Campaign, by a Prussian General Officer, p. 10. This writer surely exaggerates their loss on the 15th, in the following statement. "Including the 15th and 16th of June, the 1st corps of the Prussian army had 245 officers, and 13,000 privates; the 2d, 122 officers, with 5,533 privates; and the 3d, upwards of 2,000 men, *hors de combat*; in all, about 20,900 officers and men, killed, taken prisoners, or disabled for service." If the total be accurate, a larger proportion of it must be given to the battle of the 16th, for the loss sustained by General Ziethen, in retreating from Charleroi upon Fleurus the day before, does not appear to have exceeded 2,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

munication was considerably widened. The advance of the French army, also, was construed into the pursuit of a flying enemy, whom the pursuers, easily elate, would scarcely expect to overtake. These were the presumptuous hopes of the moment, which were gradually extending among the partisans of Napoleon in the capital, and throughout France, when his sudden return disclosed their fallacy. Military men, however, have severely condemned his daring plan of attacking two such adversaries as Wellington and Blucher, on the same day. Without conceding to Marshal Ney all his inferences, or believing that the English army might have been "destroyed between Quatre Bras and Genappe," soon enough for Napoleon to turn round afterwards and "crush the Prussians in their turn," it cannot be denied that many of his arguments upon "the bad arrangements" of his master, are forcible and conclusive. Bonaparte seemed to have forgotten that he had no longer one of those gigantic armies under his command, which superseded calculation, and reduced success to certainty. In the game he now had to play, much would depend upon stratagem and skill; upon prudent combinations, and sagacious manœuvres. But he aimed at more than he could accomplish. With limited means he acted upon a great and comprehensive scheme; disdaining to recognise his weakness, he pursued an object demanding ampler resources than he possessed.\* This was sufficiently proved by the result, for he was unable to gather the fruits of his triumph over the Prussians, whom he permitted to retreat without the slightest interruption. His army contented itself with remaining upon the ground it had conquered,† without even

\* "Bonaparte's attack upon Ligny," observes a writer, to whose authority frequent reference has been made, "was the worst plan he could have adopted. That upon St. Amand was better; but the correctest movement was, to march with the whole army (including the guards, consisting of six corps,) in two columns, so as to separate the English army from the Prussian, and then to attack that, promising the easiest victory. In this case, he ought to have marched by Mallet and Wagnele. At all events, he ought to have attacked the right wing of the Prussian army; it was only by that means that he could hope for victory. The French were too weak to engage with both armies at once."—*Prussian General's Account*.

† General Sarrazin is loud in his reproaches upon this subject, and upon the unmolested retreat of the English from Quatre Bras; but he has discovered a very ingenious principle for explaining them, as well as the subsequent loss of the battle of Waterloo. He seriously affirms, in his preface (p. xiv.) that Bonaparte "was in connivance with England," calls George III. his "new sovereign," (p. 296,) and declares that he suffered himself to be beaten at Waterloo, in order to revenge "the hatred which his tyrannical government had excited." (p. 421.) He allows that he displayed much "ability in obtaining his defeat, and prolonging the battle, time enough, for the enemy to conquer;" and gravely avers, that "his utmost hopes were gratified when he knew that the whole Prussian army was attacking his right." (p. 423.) No wonder, that "he respected the English" so much, as "to escort them as far as Mont St. Jean." (p. 422.)



an attempt to harass their slowly retiring columns. As to the precipitate flight of which Napoleon speaks, that is best answered by this fact, were it not also refuted by the statement of Blucher himself, who while he candidly admits the "battle was lost, though not their honour," affirms, that his troops formed themselves "a quarter of a league from the field," whither the French did not venture to approach. The Duke of Wellington likewise notices this incident, and observes, that "a patrol which he sent to Sombref, in the morning, found all quiet, and the enemy's videttes fell back as the patrol advanced." Thus undisturbed, Blucher continued his retrograde movement with the 1st and 2d corps, behind the defile of Mont St. Guibert, till he arrived at Wavre, whither he was followed by the 3d and 4th corps from Gembloux.

The retreat of the Prussians, which was not known to the Duke of Wellington till the following morning, rendered a corresponding movement necessary on his part. During the night, the remaining divisions of his army, with the cavalry and artillery, had arrived at Quatre Bras, and he was combining his measures to attack the enemy,\* when he received the intelligence which compelled him to retire, first upon Genappe, and afterwards upon Waterloo. This operation commenced about ten o'clock, and seems to have been conducted with a degree of skill which baffled Napoleon, who arrived at Frasnes by nine o'clock.—Having reconnoitred our position, he waited for his 6th corps and reserve, from the right, in order to commence an attack. The 3d and 4th corps, with the cavalry of Generals Pajol and Excelmans, (amounting to 45,000 men, of which 39,000 were infantry,†) were despatched, under Marshal Grouchy, in pursuit of Blucher. When he had collected his whole army, however, and was prepared to advance, he perceived, from the heights of Frasnes, that the English had masked their retreat, leaving only a strong rear guard in front of Quatre Bras, to protect it. This may account for the surprise which the Duke of Wellington himself (who probably did not anticipate the complete success of his manœuvre) is said to have expressed, at being permitted to pass the narrow defile of Genappe,

What can we say to the General, upon this extraordinary discovery, unless we apply the expression which he disclaims for Napoleon, "*qu' il est devenu fou*?" (p. 421.)

\* Despatch of General Alava. I refer to this document with implicit confidence, being assured, by the *highest authority*, that after the Duke of Wellington's own despatch, "it is the nearest to the truth of the other official reports published," though containing some statements "not exactly correct."

† See the answers, obtained by Sir John Sinclair, from distinguished officers in Grouchy's army.—*Account of the Campaign, by a Prussian General Officer*; p. 150.

unattacked. An observation in his Grace's despatch seems to confirm this statement. "Neither," says the Duke, "did he attempt to molest our march to the rear, *although made in the middle of the day*, except by following with a large body of cavalry (brought from his right) the cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge." General Dundas, also, in reply to some questions which he permitted me to put to him, says upon this subject, "I do not think the French columns made any movement until the whole of our infantry and guns had made good their passage through the village of Genappe, which I conceive to have been the difficult part of the operation.\* It is not easy to explain here the French supineness. I believe the Duke himself thought that Bonaparte had left the army." The latter persuasion was certainly entertained by many of our officers.† Yet Napoleon, with his usual veracity, informed France, that "he *drove* the English army to the entrance of the forest of Soignies, with the left wing and the reserve."

When, indeed, he saw himself foiled by the skilful retreat of our main body, he ordered his cavalry to advance; but this only afforded an opportunity for the Marquis of Anglesea to make a most decisive charge against them. After our rear guard, which the noble Marquis commanded, had passed through the village of Genappe, they were pressed upon by the French lancers, supported by a great mass of cuirassiers and other cavalry. As the enemy, however, debouched from the village, the Marquis ordered the 7th hussars, with part of the 11th and 23d light dragoons, to rush upon them, without waiting for their attack. The order was gallantly obeyed, and Major Hodge, leading the front squadron of the 7th, was killed; but it failed, because the lancers had their flanks completely secured, and were backed by large bodies of cavalry.‡ They immediately rallied, renewed

\* Genappe is a small village through which runs the ~~main~~ road from Charleroi to Brussels. It is also intersected by a branch of the river Dyle, over which there is a narrow wooden bridge. Napoleon has been justly censured, for hazarding a battle in a position, where, if defeated, he had no other retreat than by this single road, and over this bridge. In fact, on the 18th it was completely obstructed, and here Bonaparte with difficulty escaped from his carriage when pursued by some Prussians under the command of Major Von Keller.

† Account of the Battle, by a Staff Officer, p. 12.

‡ See a letter, dated Brussels, July 2, 1815, addressed by the Marquis of Anglesea, to the officers of the 7th, (his own regiment,) against which, it appears, some injurious reports had been circulated. "However slightly," observes the noble Marquis, "I think of lancers under ordinary circumstances, I do think, posted as they were, they had a most decided advantage over the hussars. The impetuosity, however, and the weight of the Life Guards, carried all before them. Whilst I exculpate my own regiment, I am delighted in being able to bear testimony to the gallant conduct of the former. Be not uneasy,



the attack, and were again repulsed, with considerable loss. The Marquis of Anglesea then headed the 1st regiment of Life Guards himself, whom he led against the enemy, (the only fact suppressed by him in the letter quoted below,) and completely drove them back through the village of Genappe. This successful charge checked their audacity, and during the rest of our march, they might almost be said in the words of General Sarrazin, to "have escorted us as far as Mont St. Jean." The flanks of our retiring columns were secured by the badness of the roads, which from the heavy rains, and the passage to and fro of our artillery, were so broken and swampy, that the enemy could not harrass us by any rapid movements. Occasional skirmishing, however, occurred during the whole retreat.

It was about five o'clock in the afternoon, when our army (after a fatiguing march, along a road where the men sunk to their ancles in mud, every step they took,) reached the ground, upon which they were next morning to sustain the mighty shock of battle. The remainder of the evening was employed by the different divisions taking up their respective posts. It has been said, that the Duke of Wellington, when making a military tour of the Netherlands in the preceding year, and seeing every thing with a soldier's eye, observed, that were he ever to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels, Waterloo would be the position he should choose. This statement originated in a quarter where its accuracy might be presumed indubitable, and the singularity of the circumstance, that shortly afterwards he had to protect Brussels precisely on that spot, excited much interest. Yet I have been assured that the whole is erroneous, by an officer of high rank, to whom the noble Duke disclaimed that prophetic intuition.

The position which our army occupied may be very briefly described. In the extreme rear, was the forest of Soignies, through which runs a paved road from Brussels to Charleroi. At a small distance from the entrance to this forest, is the village of Waterloo, where the Duke of Wellington established his headquarters. About two miles in advance of Waterloo, is the hamlet of Mont St. Jean, which Napoleon, confounding with the heights of Mont St. Jean, said was taken by a brigade of Count D'Erlon's division. But to have done this, the

my brother officers; you had ample opportunity, of which you gallantly availed yourselves, of avenging yourselves on the 18th for the failure of the 17th; and after all, what regiment, and which of us, individually, is certain of success? Be assured, that I am proud of being your Colonel, and that you possess my utmost confidence."

enemy must have broken the centre of the British. Our army was placed in a position, which crossed the high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles. Its right was thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, (which was occupied,) and its left extended to a height above the hamlet of Ter la Haye, which was also occupied. This last village, as well as Merke Braine, being situated on a defile, great difficulties were opposed to any attempt which the French might make for turning our flanks. Along nearly the whole extent of our front, was a gentle declivity, which formed, in most places, an admirable glacis.\* Upon the crest of the ridge behind, was stationed the first line, consisting of the *elite* of the infantry. At the bottom of the declivity, immediately in front of our left centre, was the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, occupied by a detachment of Hanoverians. The second line, being in a kind of hollow, was considerably sheltered from the enemy's fire. The cavalry, under the Marquis of Anglesea, formed a third line, extending on the left, almost as far as Ter la Haye. In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, was the chateau of Hougomont, (or Goumont,) which covered the return of that flank. This chateau, the residence of a Flemish nobleman, had on one side a large farm-yard, and on the other a garden fenced by a brick wall. The whole was encircled by an open wood of tall trees, growing upon about three acres of ground. Here the Guards were posted, with 300 Nassau troops employed as sharp-shooters. The Duke of Wellington attached the greatest importance to this position, and during the battle sent repeated orders to maintain it, (even though the house should not be tenable,) by forming the soldiers in any way that might oppose the enemy's advance. So great was his anxiety, indeed, that he twice despatched an aide-de-camp to the officer† who commanded, to know whether his former directions were clearly understood. It may be mentioned, that no loop-holes were made in the garden-wall, till about ten o'clock, scarcely more than an hour before the place was attacked.

The extreme right of the British army, turning rather backwards, extended as far as Merke Braine, to protect the Nivelles road, while an advanced corps occupied the village of Braine-le-Leud. From the immediate left of our line, in front of Ter la Haye, was a road leading to Ohain and the woody passes of St. Lambert, by which the communication with the Prussians was maintained.

\* Account of the Battle, by a Staff Officer.

† Colonel Home, of the Guards, honourably mentioned by the Duke in his despatch, and who politely communicated to me the above, as well as other valuable intelligence.



The Duke of Wellington had informed Blucher, that if he could support him with two corps, he would accept a battle upon the ground he had chosen. The gallant veteran replied, he would not only march with two corps, but with his whole army, a remarkable proof of zeal and activity, considering how severely the Prussians had been engaged the preceding day. A part of Lord Hill's corps, consisting of nearly the whole 4th division, under Lieutenant-General Sir C. Colville, was stationed at Halle, to protect Brussels, in case the enemy should turn the right of the British army, and march upon that city.\* Lord Hill, himself, commanded the reserve, in front of the village of Merke Braine, with its right resting on Braine-le-Leud.

Such was the position chosen by the Duke of Wellington, and it was most judiciously adapted for accepting battle, or for continuing a retreat, if Blucher had been unable to move from Wavre. Our numerical inferiority would have justified a retrogression upon Brussels, in the latter event, for though the Duke might calculate upon the matchless bravery of his troops, he could not but be aware, that even a victory would leave him in too disabled a condition to profit by it. It has been computed, that when he fought the battle of Waterloo, his army did not exceed 60,000 men, including the corps of observation stationed at Halle, which amounted to at least 5,000. The force under Napoleon, on the contrary, must have been nearly 100,000. The original strength of his army was about 154,000; and allowing his losses on the 15th and 16th to have been 11,000, (which is considerably more than himself admits, though certainly near the truth,) he would still have 143,000. From this number, if the 3d and 4th corps (45,000,) be deducted, which were despatched after Blucher to Wavre, there would remain 98,000 effective soldiers brought against the Duke of Wellington on the 18th of June.† To this may be added, 296 pieces of cannon, while, as already mentioned, the British and Belgian artillery did not exceed 150.

\* It is said, the foresight of the Duke of Wellington in making this arrangement was amply justified, for though the French did not succeed in turning our right, yet it was found necessary, to detach one British brigade, and the Hanoverian brigade, to occupy the road from Braine-le-Comte to Halle, the enemy having actually moved a force in that direction.

† In a work professing to be the "Letters" of a William Warden, surgeon on board the Northumberland, it is stated, p. 195, that Bonaparte declared his force was only 71,000. If there were any reason to consider this as an authentic book, the credibility of Napoleon's assertion might still be a question: but perfectly satisfied, both from internal evidence, and positive information, that it is only one of those numerous manufactures with which the press has teemed upon the subject of Bonaparte, it would be

The position occupied by the French, was on a ridge parallel to the heights where the British were stationed; but their ground was considered stronger than our's, the ascent to it being longer. The intermediate space, forming a kind of valley, was entirely open, and on that memorable day bore a tall and strong crop of corn. The distance between the two lines varied in breadth from a 1,000 to 1,200 yards. This small extent added greatly to the slaughter, and particularly enabled the artillery to maintain a certain and destructive fire. It has been calculated that every sixth man fell. The whole range, from right to left, was scarcely more than a mile and a half; while from the rear of the French to that of the British might be about two miles. Bonaparte established his head-quarters at the farm-house of Caillou, (or Caioux) near Planchenoit, on the 17th; and on the 18th at La Belle Alliance. The Duke of Wellington, with the principal officers of his staff, slept at the village of Waterloo.

The night was tempestuous. Heavy rains descended, accompanied by the most vivid lightning, while, at intervals, awful peals of thunder rolled along the sky. It scarcely required superstitious feelings, to regard this war of elements, as the similitude of that more appalling strife, which the morrow's dawn would bring. The officers and soldiers, equally unsheltered from its inclemency, passed the tedious hours in silent rumination upon the approaching struggle, or in busy labour to prepare for it. In such moments, when we cannot forget that eternity yawns before us, and when the natural dread of death, which is dissipated by the tumult, or subdued by the glory, of actual conflict, possesses the heart, how feebly must language depict its emotions! Nor could it be concealed, on this occasion, that accidental causes increased every apprehension which our common infirmity might inspire. Cold, wet, and fatigued with a toilsome march, where was the soldier to find that cheerful glow of spirits, that vehemence of enterprise, which arms him, in the hour of battle, with a proud and unreflecting disdain of life? After a short but bloody combat, fruitful, indeed, in themes of valour, that outvied all records of ancient prowess, he had retreated from the enemy, and a retreat always carries with it something ominous and disheartening. It breaks down that firm reliance, that unquestioned conviction of success, and that high-minded daring, which almost commands it. Our men, too, were aware that the French greatly outnumbered them, while the defeat of the Prussians, magnified by

useless to enter into any refutation. There are, indeed, two or three facts relating to the battle of Waterloo, mentioned in the volume; but they are such as were attainable without going to St. Helena for them.



rumour into an overthrow which precluded any assistance, and the doubtful fidelity of the foreign levies in their own ranks, only tended to augment their apprehensions. Yet, in scorn of all that could create dismay, their native intrepidity supplied unshaken fortitude, and with stern composure they awaited the mighty shock, prepared at least to die, though fortune should deny them victory. Guided by their renowned commander, they knew they had only one duty to perform, a brave obedience; if genius, if skill, if profound judgment, could make that duty the means of glory, they had the assurance it would not be discharged in vain.

In Napoleon's army different sentiments prevailed. There, exultation was heightened into arrogance, and neither doubts nor fears were permitted to intrude. That which had depressed our soldiers below their natural level, had elevated them above their wonted ardour. The battle of Ligny, though unaccompanied by any of the decisive results of victory, had all the inspiring influence of one; while the contest at Quatre Bras, now viewed through the medium of our retreat to Waterloo, revived no recollection of the heroism it had elicited. A Frenchman never allows he is beaten, even when he flies; what logic, therefore, could convince him, that when he advances, he may be only pursuing a circumspective foe who is ensnaring him into defeat? So eager were they to fall upon their prey, and gather the spoils of conquest, that many murmurs were heard lest the English should escape during the night; an alarm in which Napoleon himself affected to participate, for when upon the following morning, he saw them in battle array, before him, he exclaimed with seeming transport, *Ah! Je les tiens donc, ces Anglais!*\* It was generally expected, also, (with what justice, the event testified,) that the Belgians only waited for the engagement to begin, when they would pass over to the French. Perhaps a more accurate discrimination would have deferred that catastrophe till the imperial eagle was triumphant, when fear might have produced what French vanity anticipated from affection.

At length the day appeared, and then began the awful scene of hostile preparation. From the heights on which our army was posted, they could perceive

\* He frequently allowed, in conversation with his Marshals, that Wellington was the second General in Europe. After his abdication he sometimes learned, that public fame had pronounced him the first. "Well," said he, "I never had the good fortune to come across him." When he left Paris for the army, he observed, *Je vais me frotter contre Wellington*, "I shall send you a good account of him." The Duke, however, saved him this trouble, by carrying the account himself.

immense masses of the enemy, both cavalry and infantry, moving in every direction. Bonaparte had ordered up all his columns from the rear, and made the necessary dispositions for an immediate attack. The 1st corps, under Count D'Erlon, was placed, with its left, on the road to Brussels, and opposite the farm of La Haye Sainte. The 2d, under Count Reille, leaned its right on the Brussels road also, while its left extended to the wood in front of Hougoumont. The cuirassiers were in reserve behind, and the imperial guard in reserve upon the heights. The 6th corps, commanded by Count Lobau, with the cavalry of General D'Aumont, was placed considerably in advance, and in rear of the right, "to oppose a Prussian corps which appeared to have escaped Marshal Grouchy,\* and threatened to fall upon their right flank." The strongest columns occupied the two wings, and particularly the right. Towards noon, all the preliminary arrange-

\* French official account. Bonaparte had obtained information of this, from various reports, which, he says, "were confirmed by the letters of a Prussian general, intercepted by his light troops." It is difficult to disentangle the mass of contradictions which exist, respecting the knowledge he possessed of the real movements of the Prussian army. Ney, in his exculpatory letter, says, that "General Labedoyère brought him a message from the Emperor, that Grouchy had arrived on their right and attacked the left of the English and Prussians united. This was at seven o'clock in the evening." If Ney's assertion be true, Bonaparte, either wilfully or ignorantly communicated a falsehood. The latter can hardly be supposed, because it impeaches his acknowledged military science, while the former may be explained, by his desire to conceal the disaster, and the hope, perhaps, that the English might be defeated before the Prussians could operate decisively. That he anticipated an attack upon his right flank, may be presumed from the position he assigned to Count Lobau's corps; but it is not improbable that he calculated upon driving back the Duke of Wellington ere that attack could be executed. It appears, also, (which will be adverted to hereafter,) that Marshal Grouchy imperfectly obeyed the instructions he received. M. Giraud, in his *Precis*, distinctly denies that Napoleon was deceived upon this point, but he leaves it for tacticians to decide, whether, knowing to what hazard he was exposed on his right, he ought to have persisted in his original plan against the English. It has been observed, that Bonaparte thought Blücher would have retired upon Namur, after the action at Ligny; and hence he might consider himself at liberty to engage the Duke of Wellington with his whole army. But, at nine o'clock in the morning, on the 18th, according to M. Giraud, "he learned that a Prussian column, which was at first mistaken for a straggling corps that had escaped the pursuit of the French, was advancing in the direction of his rear. At the same moment, also, he heard that Blücher had retreated upon Wavre, and the disposition of the English left, which obliquely bent in the same line, did not permit him to doubt that both armies had manœuvred so as to restore the communication which he had endeavoured to separate." This statement is not inconsistent with what is related by the Prussian General Officer (*History of the Campaign*, p. 18,) of the operations of the Prussian army. He says, (which is confirmed by General Gneisenau's Account,) that the 4th, or Bülow's corps, "began to move from Dion-le-Mont, by Wavre, upon Chapelle St. Lambert, at day-break on the 18th." Bonaparte, therefore, might be apprized of this movement, by nine o'clock. In fact, his situation was so desperate, that desperate remedies alone could extricate him. He tried them; they failed; and he was ruined.



ments were completed, and now, the opposing hosts stood in view of each other, awaiting the dreadful signal for mutual destruction.

" .....They had drawn to the field  
Two royal armies, full of fiery youth;  
Of equal spirit to dare, and power to do;  
So near entrench'd, that 'twas beyond all hope  
Of human counsel they could e'er be sever'd,  
Until it were determined by the sword  
Who had the better cause. How uncertain  
The fortune of the war is, children know;  
And, it being in suspence, on whose fair tent  
Wing'd victory would make her glorious stand,  
You could not blame the Duke, though he appeared  
Perplexed and troubled." MASSINGER.

Napoleon took his station, on the right of the Brussels road, near the farm house of La Belle Alliance, attended by his squadrons of service for the protection of his person. Here he could command an entire view of the field of battle, and was enabled to issue such orders as the varying circumstances of the day required. He was on foot, and continued to walk backwards and forwards, sometimes with impatient gestures, as he remarked how little impression was made upon us, by the different attacks of his army. About five o'clock he mounted a horse, and advanced somewhat further in front of La Belle Alliance, and at seven, when he directed his guard against the centre of the English, he placed himself, with his staff, in the hollow, half way between Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte.\* This was his last position, and from hence he took flight, when he seemed so solicitous to illustrate the maxim of La Fontaine, that

" *Mieux vaut goudat debout, que monarque enterré.*"

At the commencement of the action, the Duke of Wellington stationed himself on the ridge to the right of the road, and in rear of La Haye Sainte. Plainly

\* La Coste's narrative, from questions put to him by Sir John Sinclair. In reaching this hollow, it is said he ran great risks. A bullet struck the pommel of the saddle of one of his officers, without touching him or his horse. Bonaparte coolly observed, "that they must remain in the ravin." On each side of the road there was a battery, and perceiving that one of the cannons in the left battery did not fire well, he dismounted, ascended the height of the road, and rectified the error. It has been incorrectly stated that, at one time, he occupied a high wooden observatory. La Coste denies this; and I have heard it contradicted by others, but am told, that a general officer was stationed there with a glass, to reconnoitre the field.

attired, his garb as unostentatious as his nature, he calmly, though anxiously, contemplated the scene, and in silent thought revolved the arduous duties of that great day. As the battle proceeded, he was to be found wherever danger called for prompt decision to avert it. Constantly riding to and fro, the soldiers saw him, heedless of peril, sharing in their own toil and hazards, and always present to sustain, by his example, their fortitude and confidence. How he escaped, they must explain who deny "a special providence even in the fall of a sparrow."

" ..... Had you seen him,  
How in one bloody scene he did discharge  
The parts of a commander and a soldier,  
Wise in direction, bold in execution,  
You would have said the world yields not his equal."

The battle began with a furious attack by Jerome's division, forming part of the 2d corps, against Hougoumont.\* This post was occupied, as already men-

\* The anecdote recorded of Sir Walter Raleigh, when composing his *History of the World*, is well known. It applies to the fallibility of all human testimony; a fallibility of which I was never more deeply convinced than while writing this Volume. That subordinate transactions should be variously related, may be explained by the little impression which their occurrence probably produced; but that great, important, or singular events, are contradictorily told, must be ascribed to the imperfection of the human faculties. Lord Shaftsbury has justly observed that "there is more of innocent delusion than voluntary imposture in the world." Some of these conflicting accounts, I have been fortunate enough to disentangle, upon the authority of the individuals themselves whose actions and conduct were the subjects of misrepresentation; others I could only endeavour to rectify by a dispassionate estimate of probabilities, without flattering myself, however, that I have always been successful. Even the time when the battle began has been stated with a marked contrariety. The Duke of Wellington, says it commenced "about ten o'clock," and further observes, that when his troops discontinued the pursuit at night, "they had been engaged during twelve hours." In this, General Gneisenau concurs, but of course, only from information he had received. General Alava, who was by the side of the Duke the whole day, fixes it at "half-past eleven." Napoleon, and General Drouet, state "twelve" as the hour, while Marshal Ney names "one o'clock." Without tracing minuter contradictions, this may suffice to shew the difficulty of attaining exact knowledge where it might have been presumed no difficulty could exist. With one exception, which I think ought to be decisive, I was equally bewildered by the intelligence I received from officers whom I had an opportunity of consulting. By one, I was told, the battle began "soon after mid-day;" by another, "exactly twenty minutes past eleven," and by a third, "at ten o'clock." But Sir George Wood, and his information is what I conceive cannot be disputed, gave me the following statement. "The action commenced about half-past ten, or a quarter to eleven. There had been skirmishing before, all the morning. A column of the enemy was advancing against Hougoumont, and the first gun that was fired was from our lines against that column. I gave the order, by the command of the Duke. The gun did immediate execution, and killed six or eight. The column then retired, and went round the wood." I may be permitted to connect with this fact, a circumstance which displays the calm intrepidity of our great commander, as related to



tioned, by a detachment from General Byng's brigade of Guards, which was in position in its rear, and the light companies of General Maitland's brigade. The light companies of the Coldstream and 3d Guards, were in the house and garden; those of the 1st regiment in the wood, to the left; the remainder, upon a gentle eminence behind, ready to support their comrades when necessary. The whole force did not exceed 1,500 men, exclusively of the 300 Nassau troops, employed as sharp-shooters, (who were soon dispersed,) and was commanded, at first, by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, afterwards by Colonel Home. Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Saltoun commanded the light companies of the 1st Guards, stationed in the wood. Against this post, thus feebly garrisoned, the enemy directed the whole 2d corps, consisting of nearly 30,000 men; not, indeed, in one combined attack, but by successive reinforcements during the day. It was formed into three divisions. Jerome Bonaparte was soon driven back. Our men defended themselves with obstinacy, as in a citadel, the loop-holes that had been made enabling them to fire securely. Though the Nassau troops were quickly repulsed, the enemy never succeeded in keeping possession of the wood. At one time, the division of General Foy advanced entirely through it, and surrounded the house, but four companies of the Coldstream, and two of the 3d regiment, moving promptly down, they were forced to retire with great slaughter, and the loss of several prisoners. It was during this conflict, that a French officer, and a few men, got inside the gate of the farm-yard; when Colonel Macdonald, fighting hand to hand with the enemy, succeeded, no less by personal strength than prowess, in closing it, and the adventurous assailants were all killed. The French covered their approach by a tremendous cross fire of artillery, which was well answered, however, by our own guns. For a considerable period the battle raged with uncommon fury, every walk, hedge, and avenue, being the theatre of sanguinary encounters. The French were killed in heaps, round the house, and in the wood, the trees of which not being so thick as a man's body, and planted at considerable distances, afforded no shelter. The efforts to obtain possession of this post were unabated, and it was defended with equal vigour. Had we been compelled to abandon it, the most serious consequences must have ensued, as it would have uncovered our flank, and procured the enemy a fatal advantage over our whole line. Napoleon was sensible of this, and hence the pertinacious

me by an officer who was receiving instructions from him at the instant. The Duke of Wellington was so completely in the range of the French artillery, that a cannon-ball ploughed up the ground beneath his horse's feet. Without the slightest emotion, however, he continued to buckle on his horse-coat, and observing, at the same moment, the execution of the gun that had been fired against the enemy's column, tranquilly observed to the officers about him, "pretty service, gentlemen—very pretty service."

frequency of his attacks. It was repeatedly attempted to cut off the communication between Hougomont and the rest of the army; but except a temporary success, when the cavalry charged our squares, and for a moment remained upon the ridge immediately in its rear, all their endeavours proved unavailing, and the garrison was regularly reinforced with men and supplied with ammunition. It is said they were ignorant of its real strength, the wall that encompassed it, being concealed by the wood, and hedge. Finding every effort fruitless, to carry it by the sword, they at length strove to dislodge their brave opponents by setting fire to the house. The shells striking an ancient tower, it was soon enveloped in flames, which penetrated to the chapel. It is melancholy to relate; that many of the wounded, French as well as British, perished in the conflagration; but the Guards still remained in their entrenchment, while the devouring element was raging above their heads.\*

After this, the vehemence of the attack somewhat abated, but it was not discontinued till the French were routed in the evening. Occasional sallies were made, through the whole afternoon, even while the enemy's centre and right were seriously engaged. About six o'clock, when the second line was brought forward, the Hanoverian battalions occupied the ground where the second brigade of Guards had been placed, at the commencement, and two battalions of Brunswickers were sent into the wood. These troops, especially the latter, behaved with great gallantry, and steadily maintained their position. The loss sustained by the enemy in their reiterated attempts to carry this post, was enormous, being estimated at above 10,000 in killed and wounded. General Foy's division, alone, lost 3,000. Our's was small in proportion to that of the French, but great, in proportion to the whole amount employed. It is stated at nearly 1,000, of which about 100 were Nassau and Brunswick troops. The great slaughter in the enemy's columns, was occasioned by the destructive fire of our artillery, which, placed on the adjacent eminence, poured down a continued shower of balls upon them as they advanced through the wood. This dreadful sacrifice, unaccompanied as it was by any corresponding results, has been pronounced by some military men, an unnecessary effusion of blood. Among them, is General Sarrazin, who

\* M. Giraud says, it "was not till this desperate attack was made, that the English were *completely driven out*, and the *occupation* of this post promised to facilitate the success of the attack against our centre." Has M. Giraud read no other part of the Duke of Wellington's despatch than that where he discovered that our whole army fought at Quatre Bras? An attentive perusal of it would have informed him that Hougomont "was maintained throughout the day, with the utmost gallantry by our brave troops."



says, that " Napoleon ought to have masked the post, and proceeded to the principal attack, which should have been against the left wing, to separate it from the Prussians, and at the same time approximate the French army to the corps of Grouchy. By this operation, Napoleon might have been master of the position of Mont St. Jean, and avoided the battles at Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte."\* Without conceding to this opinion all which it assumes, it may be observed, that the most experienced officers in our army, anticipated a different attack from what was really made.† The Duke of Wellington himself, (as I have been informed by one who had good opportunities of knowing it,) expected that Napoleon would have manœuvred so as to turn his left, which was comparatively weak, probably from a calculation upon the *early* support of Blucher.‡ To this, among other errors, Napoleon perhaps alluded, in his own despatch, when he mentioned " a

\* Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration, &c. pp. 416-422.

† A General, in the Duke of Wellington's suite, familiar with Bonaparte's usual system of tactics, having looked at Ferrari's map, offered a bet that he would attack the centre, " for," said he, " as by this map he must perceive, that the two high roads of Nivelles and Genappe, after meeting at Mont St. Jean, lead direct and united to Brussels, he will be irresistibly hurried to adopt his favourite manœuvre of forcing the centre."

‡ I am assured that Blucher promised to be on the ground by *eleven o'clock*; and an officer, who held a high command during the battle, but whose name it might be injudicious to mention in so delicate a matter, gave me the following answer, to a question I put upon the subject. " I told the Duke of Wellington, at two o'clock, that an officer of the 10th had seen the Prussians on our flank. I have no doubt they might have been upon the ground five hours sooner than they were. Bulow's corps was quite fresh. An English army would have been there by that time. They suffered us to bear the whole brunt of the battle, and came up just time enough to share the advantage." The following, also, are the words of a General Officer, to whom I am indebted for much valuable information. " I am of opinion that the corps, under Bulow, might have arrived at Waterloo, much sooner, *if he had marched at an early hour* of the morning of the 18th of June." I could multiply these opinions; but the above are sufficient to shew, that at least there was an expectation and a possibility, of more prompt succour. With regard to the conditional one last quoted, we have only to refer to General Gneisenau's Account; and we shall find, that the Prussian army " began to move from Wavre at *break of day*, on the 18th of June." That would be about three o'clock. The same fact is stated by the Prussian General Officer, in his Account, (p. 18,) but he adds, that " various obstacles" impeded its march. It should be recollected, that Wavre is not more than ten or twelve miles from Ter la Haye, where the left of our army rested, and then, it may surely be inquired, whether any local difficulties, such as bad roads or narrow defiles, could really retard an army, anxious to reach its destination, for above twelve hours. It cannot be forgotten, that the British, who marched out of Brussels on the 16th hastened with a different ardour to the conflict that awaited them at Quatre Bras. Can it be, that any unworthy resentment was felt against us, because a more effectual support was not given that day, to the Prussians? Painful as this supposition is, it derives some support when we remember the reiterated aspersions cast upon the Duke of Wellington by the *Rhenish Mercury*, which professed to speak the sentiments of the Prussian army.

battle terminated, *a day of false manœuvres rectified*, the greatest success ensued for the next day,—all lost by a moment of panic terror."

The attack upon Hougoumont was accompanied by a very heavy cannonade, from more than 200 pieces of artillery, upon our whole line, intended to support repeated charges of cavalry and infantry. These charges were sometimes made by the cavalry alone, sometimes by the infantry, and sometimes by both together. Our men were drawn up in nearly solid squares, each being several files deep, and so posted as to afford mutual aid. Sufficient space was allowed between the squares, to deploy into line when occasion required, while a third square, receding somewhat from the rear of those that were parallel, presented a menacing front to the enemy's cavalry, as often as they penetrated beyond them, being thus encountered by a triple fire. In this firm and compact order of battle, with the artillery playing upon the French columns as they advanced, and the cavalry in reserve, ready to rush forward whenever opportunities occurred, our gallant soldiers sustained the conflict for nearly twelve hours. Their unexampled fortitude extorted admiration even from Napoleon, who, mingling false prophecy with false pity, repeatedly expressed his affected sorrow that he must subdue such brave troops. Never were men placed in a situation which demanded so positive and undisguised a display of heroism. In the tumult of a furious onset, the sense of personal danger is absorbed in the general enthusiasm which each individual catches and inspires: there is not time to calculate peril; scarcely are there the means of observing it; but here, all was passive, quiet, endurance; each square stood on its appointed ground, to feed the slaughter; they saw their companions struck down, and took their place, to share their fate. Sometimes a sullen, angry feeling appeared, and discipline and duty almost yielded to the impulse of nature. They did not comprehend the sagacious motives of their leader; they could, with difficulty, believe, that the safety of all depended upon that which seemed to involve the destruction of all; and often they implored to be led against the enemy, that they might avenge the havoc he inflicted. To repress this impatient and exasperated ardour, was a task which our illustrious chief and his officers frequently had to perform during the eventful struggle.

Napoleon's plan of attack seemed to comprise a double object. While the divisions of his 2d corps were employed in endeavouring to turn our right, the 1st corps used every effort to penetrate our left centre, a combined operation which, had it been successful, would have surrounded one half of the British army. In support of this design, the most desperate charges of infantry and cavalry were



made, in such numbers, that, to use the words of General Alava, "it required all the skill of his Lordship, to post his troops, and all the good qualities of the latter, to resist them." It was in one of these charges, that the lamented Picton fell. His division was stationed on the left, behind a straggling hedge, which extended from La Haye Sainte to Ter la Haye. This fence, though partly masking our position, was incapable of presenting any thing like a breast-work or entrenchment, the spaces between the bushes affording sufficient room for cavalry to pass. Some Belgian infantry, who were placed a little in advance of the 5th division, soon gave way, as the enemy's columns, (forming part of D'Erlon's corps,) approached, without presuming to dispute their progress. They marched close up to the hedge, while the 5th division, moving towards it on the other side, the muskets were almost muzzle to muzzle. At that moment, Sir T. Picton, ordering General Kempt's brigade to rush forward, himself leading on the remainder of the division, a sanguinary conflict ensued, when the French, astounded by the impetuosity of their opponents, retreated, after discharging a steady and well-directed volley. They did not attempt to run, but slowly retired in close columns, with the greatest order, allowing themselves to be butchered almost unresistingly. Sir Thomas Picton was shot through the head by a musket-ball, while in the act of cheering his men forward to a charge with bayonets, "by which one of the most serious attacks made by the enemy on our position was defeated."\* He fell off his horse, and instantly expired. But his intrepid example had done its work. Animated by their gallant chief, the men fought with a degree of fury which nothing could appal or resist. At one moment, formed into squares, they received and repulsed the dreadful assaults of the lancers and cuirassiers; at another, deploying into lines, their vigorous arm and undaunted courage, drove back the enemy's masses at the point of the bayonet. This terrible carnage lasted about three quarters of an hour, at the end of which our brave troops beheld themselves the conquerors over 9,000 of their foes.

They were not, however, left wholly to their own efforts. Sir W. Ponsonby's heavy brigade of cavalry afforded a timely support, and eminently distinguished themselves. The Marquis of Anglesea, who had watched the conflict, saw at length a favourable moment for operating. He galloped up to the second brigade, and the three regiments which composed it, (the 1st, 2d, and 6th dragoons,) wheeling into line, presented a beautiful front of about 1,300 men. The noble Marquis was received with an enthusiastic cheer as he rode along; when, perceiving

\* Duke of Wellington's despatch.

that our infantry was likely to be outflanked by the French, he ordered a charge, which was most gallantly executed. They took the enemy in flank, and a tremendous cavalry fight commenced with the lancers and cuirassiers. The three régiments were typically representative of the British Empire. The Royals—the Greys—and the Inniskillens. Their military glory this day was as inseparable as, it may be hoped, will ever be their political welfare. Their only triumph was over their common foe. Every man fought with unparalleled heroism, for every man had his own individual task to perform. Neither the defensive armour of the cuirassiers, nor the deadly weapon of the lancers, could protect their owners from the resistless onset of this brigade. The slaughter was prodigious, and the manner in which the Scots Greys plunged into the thickest of the fight, dealing destruction around them, excited equally the wonder and the apprehensions of Napoleon. “What fine troops!” he exclaimed: “what a pity it is, that I shall cut them all to pieces!” Even our own officers, trembled for the safety of these daring and gallant men, who frequently encountered masses of the enemy that trebled their own numbers. It was during this conflict, that Serjeant Ewart, described as of gigantic stature, captured the eagle of the 45th regiment, after a contest in which he displayed extraordinary personal prowess.\* The Royals, fired with a noble emulation, resolved not to be outdone by the Greys, and two squadrons, under Colonel Dorville, rushed into a column of 4,000 men, where a serjeant of the name of Styles, seized the eagle of the 105th regiment, and bore it off in triumph.† The greater part of this column then threw down their arms, and were immediately swept off to the rear by the Inniskillens.

\* His own words deserve to be quoted from a letter which he wrote to his father. — “It was in the first charge I took the eagle from the enemy: he and I had a hard contest for it: he thrust for my groin:—I parried it off, and cut him through the head; after which I was attacked by one of their lancers, who threw his lance at me, but missed the mark, by my throwing it off with my sword by my right side; then I cut him from the chin upwards which went through his teeth; next I was attacked by a foot soldier, who, after firing at me, charged me with his bayonet—but he very soon lost the combat, for I parried it, and cut him down through the head: so that finished the contest for the eagle. After which I presumed to follow my comrades, eagle and all, but was stopped by the General, saying to me, ‘You brave fellow, take that to the rear; you have done enough till you get quit of it,’ which I was obliged to do, but with great reluctance.—I took the eagle into Brussels, amidst the acclamations of thousands of the spectators that saw it.”

† It has sometimes been remarked with surprise, that more eagles were not captured in such decisive charges by our troops. The following circumstances will explain this apparent singularity. “The number of eagles is very small; each regiment has but one eagle, though it has four battalions, so that in our army there are eight colours for the same number of men to whom one eagle is assigned. It appears, also, from the order-book of one of the French regiments which was picked up on the field of battle, that the



Almost the whole of the Royals fell in this affair, which proved fatal also to the brave leader of the brigade, Sir William Ponsonby. This respected and lamented officer, beloved by all who served with or under him, met his death in a manner that conferred upon it an interesting character. He was badly mounted, for not expecting to be so soon in action, his own charger had not arrived. When the order was given for attacking the enemy, he led hismen forward with a noble ardour, and succeeded in checking their advance. Having cut through the first column, he passed on to where Colonel Dorville was so hotly engaged, and found himself outflanked by a regiment of Polish lancers, in a newly-ploughed field, the ground of which was so soft, that the horse could not extricate itself. He was attended by only one aide-de-camp. At that instant, a body of lancers approached him at full speed. His own death he knew was inevitable, but supposing his aide-de-camp might escape, he drew forth the picture of his lady, and his watch, and was in the act of delivering them to his care, to be conveyed to his wife and family, when the enemy came up, and they were both speared upon the spot. His body was afterwards found, lying beside his horse, pierced with seven wounds. It is said, however, he did not fall unrevenged, for the brigade he commanded, had an opportunity before the battle ceased, of again encountering the Polish lancers, almost every one of whom was cut to pieces.

The determined gallantry of the 5th division, in defeating this attack, considerably cramped the operations of the enemy in that quarter during the rest of the day. Besides the killed and wounded, above 3,000 prisoners were taken; but the conquerors paid dearly for their triumph, being reduced from between 5 and 6,000, to 1,800. Meanwhile, discomfited on this point, as well as at Hougoumont, the battle began to rage with increased fury towards La Haye Sainte in front of our left centre. When it was resolved to defend this place, the walls were loop-holed, for the infantry to fire through; but unfortunately the entrance to the house fronted the high-road, which being in the very line of the enemy's fire, it became ultimately impossible to supply the troops with ammunition, when the contest was hotly carried on in the immediate neighbourhood of it.

eagles had not been generally distributed to the army, and that only a few favoured regiments had yet had them. It is surprising, indeed, that one eagle ever should be taken, for they are purposely made portable, and easily detached from the staff; and it is a practice of the French, with that mixture of rhodomontade and meanness which characterised them under Bonaparte, to boast that they had secured their eagles when the staff and the colour were abandoned, and the eagle itself was in the pocket of some runaway ensign."

Its defence was entrusted to Colonel Baring, with a detachment of the German Legion, amounting to about 300 men, subsequently reinforced by 200 more. The attack was begun between twelve and one o'clock, and continued above two hours. Several cannon were brought to bear upon the house, but the conflict was chiefly maintained by massy columns of infantry, who advanced with such fury, that they actually grasped at the rifles of the besieged as they projected through the loop-holes. Four successive attempts were thus made, and three times the assailants were gallantly beaten off. Twice the enemy succeeded in setting fire to a barn or out-house, contiguous to the main building: and both times it was fortunately extinguished. Their numbers, at length, began to diminish; many were either killed or wounded; and at the same time their ammunition was failing. It became impossible to supply the one, or reinforce the other, for there was no practicable communication with the rest of the army. The men, reduced to five cartridges each, were enjoined to be not only sparing of their fire, but to aim well. A fourth attack was now made, by two columns, stronger than either of the preceding, and the enemy soon perceived that the garrison could not return a shot. Emboldened by this discovery, they instantly rushed forward, and burst open one of the doors; but a desperate resistance was still made with the sword-bayonet, through the windows and embrasures. They then ascended the walls and roof, whence they securely fired down upon their adversaries. This unequal conflict could not long continue, and after an heroic defence the post was surrendered. It is affirmed that the French sacrificed to their revenge every man whom they found in the place. It is at least certain, that some individuals were most barbarously treated. The shattered and dilapidated state of the house, after the battle, conspicuously evinced the furious efforts which the enemy made for its possession, and the desperate courage displayed in its defence. The door was perforated by innumerable shot-holes; the roof destroyed by shells and cannon-balls; there was scarcely the vestige of a window discernible, and the whole edifice exhibited a melancholy scene of ravage and desolation. Yet when obtained, it afforded no advantage commensurate to the loss with which it had been purchased; for our artillery, on the adjacent ridge, continued to pour down such a destructive and incessant fire, that Napoleon could make but little use of the conquest to promote his subsequent operations.

This, however, was the single, the solitary, success which permanently attended the enemy, during the whole day. In every other part of the field, his utmost advantages consisted in momentary impressions produced by his impetuous



onsets of cavalry. These, indeed, were often of a description which would have spread confusion and dismay through any but a British army ; they were accompanied with such carnage, and supported by such a succession of column after column, rolling onwards like the waves of the sea, that a degree of fortitude and courage, heretofore deemed fabulous almost, could alone oppose an effectual resistance. Napoleon, ignorant of the fearless character of British bravery, calculated that in a given number of hours, so many thousand men must be destroyed, and the battle would be won ; this military arithmetic had never failed, in his former wars, and he relied upon it now with implicit confidence. The Duke of Wellington also calculated, that if his troops could maintain their position till night, the arrival of Blucher's forces would enable him next day to leave Bonaparte without an army. Every thing, therefore, depended upon the cool, unshaken, persevering intrepidity with which they could continue to sustain the tremendous conflict.

There was little room, indeed, for the display of warlike science. Complicated operations, skilful stratagems, and all the sagacity of comprehensive design, were necessarily excluded. After the judgment exerted, in selecting the position, and posting the several corps, the contest on our part was reduced to a mere exercise of passive courage. The enemy's attacks were unvaried ; our defence, the same. They continued to rush upon our adamantine front ; we, to receive and repulse them. Again and again did our soldiers prostrate themselves, to let the storm of death from the French artillery, pass over their heads ; then, instantly rising, they formed in squares to encounter the cavalry ; no sooner were their mailed adversaries driven back, than they deployed into line, to await the approach of heavy masses of infantry. This, with few exceptions, constituted the whole manœuvres of the day, diversified occasionally by such exploits on the part of our cavalry as will long be remembered. Such a stern performance of so heartless a duty, might well excite the reluctant panegyric even of Napoleon himself. " These English," said he, to Soult, " fight admirably, but they *must* give way." Soult, who knew something more of our quality in war, than his master, replied, " I think not." " Why ?" quickly interrogated Napoleon. " Because they prefer being cut to pieces." To them, indeed, might truly be applied the language of the Roman historian, when describing the guilty valour of Catiline's followers. "*Confecto prælio, tum vero cerneret quanta audacia, quantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinæ. Nam ferè, quem quisque vivus pugnando locum cæperat, eum, amissâ animâ, corpore tegebat.*"

An ample illustration of this exalted heroism, had been witnessed by Napo-

leon, in the discomfiture of his three great efforts, at Hougoumont, upon our left, and against our centre. In vain had the dreadful fire of 300 pieces of artillery swept off whole battalions; in vain had his cuirassiers and lancers dealt their slaughter around; he still saw his antagonists in firm array before him, unappalled and terrible. From the height where he surveyed this increasing carnage, he beheld his columns recoiling at every charge, and though the fierce struggle had now been maintained for several hours, no decisive success was secured. Moments there were when he might yield to hope; but scarcely could the exulting thought of victory animate him, before some new display of matchless daring, baffled his designs, and left him to ruminate upon other means of accomplishing his end. His soldiers fought nobly for him. With unabated zeal and alacrity they obeyed his call, and marched to assured destruction. Never perhaps did an army take the field with more devotion for their leader; a devotion, founded not merely upon military attachment, but united with his personal cause and quarrel, and associating a corresponding feeling of individual glory with its ultimate triumph. Well did he know the extent to which that feeling prevailed; well did he employ its energies; *forward, forward*, was his unrelenting cry, while the blood of his victims could hope to purchase the prize he grasped at: but when all their prodigal sacrifices could not avert the disaster of defeat, then the cry of *forward* was exchanged for the exclamation of "*we must save ourselves!*" and he abandoned them to irretrievable ruin!

In a battle, pregnant of such feats as signalised this day, it is difficult, perhaps invidious, to select examples. Were the period more remote, it would not accord with the spirit of general history; but, writing for the present generation, it might seem a deficiency if all record of them were omitted. Some consolation may thus be imparted to those, who still weep over the memory of the slain; some glow of honourable pride awakened in their bosoms, who survive to hear their deeds recounted; some lofty impulse communicated to the future champions of their country's fame, and when, to emulate the field of Waterloo, will fire the meanest soldier with ambition. Posterity, looking back upon this memorable contest, will not pause to inquire what regiments or what battalions won renown; their glory will be blended with the glory of the nation; but the names of Wellington, Ponsonby, Picton, De Lancey, Brunswick, will be familiar, and pronounced with that veneration which now belongs to the conquerors at Cressy, Poitiers, Azincour, and Blenheim.

It is an observation ascribed to a French Marshal, "that the British are the



only troops in the world that can be trusted in lines against columns ; they will stand or advance, two deep, against a mass some yards in thickness."\* Many proofs of this quality were exhibited. The 92d, when reduced to scarcely 200 men, charged a column of the enemy amounting to above 2,000. They broke into their centre with the bayonet, and gallantly supported by the Scots Greys, captured or destroyed every man. The 95th, also, sustained a terrific onset of cavalry, and after a desperate conflict, succeeded in killing the whole of their assailants. The cuirassiers often walked their horses on all sides of a square, to find an opening through which they might penetrate. Sometimes, with a degree of courage worthy of admiration, a few of them would ride out of the ranks, and fire their pistols at our men and officers, hoping to provoke a return of fire from the face of the square, which would thus render it an easy prey. But in vain. The troops remained immoveably firm, nor pulled a trigger, till the word of command announced that a general volley would be effectual. In fact, the disciplined coolness with which every man stood his ground, receiving or escaping death, as chance might order, transcends all eulogy. Hundreds were annihilated, by the enemy's artillery, without having fired a shot. The 27th regiment had 400 men, and every officer except one subaltern, knocked down in square, neither moving an inch nor discharging a single musket.

So rapid and impetuous were the assaults of the cavalry, that our guns were frequently in their possession, the artillery-men being forced to seek shelter in the squares behind. But the well-directed fire of the infantry, and the charges of the cavalry, who rushed forward at every opportunity, prevented them from ever removing any of the cannon. On one occasion, the activity of two artillery officers, enabled a single gun to do much execution. As often as the enemy's squadrons retired, these officers, issuing from the square, loaded and fired the gun, which was sure to destroy six or eight. This manœuvre was repeated several times, when the French officer who commanded the corps, by a noble act of self-devotion, saved his men from at least one discharge. As the squadron recoiled, he placed himself singly by the piece, and waved his sword as if to defy any one to approach it. He was killed by a Brunswick rifleman.

The 5th division, which bore the brunt of the battle, both on the 16th and

\* An author, who has described the character of different European armies, says, " Les Anglais sont indubitablement le peuple le plus intrepide de l'Europe ; celui qui affront la mort et la voit approcher, avec le plus de sang froid et d'indifference."

18th, suffered greatly, being diminished from 6,000 to only 1,800 men. The 79th regiment alone, forming part of this division, lost 700. Such dreadful havoc sometimes disheartened our troops, and they impatiently demanded to be led against the enemy, as the Duke rode along the line, sustaining them by his presence. He heard their prayer, but could not grant it. "Not yet, not yet, my brave fellows," was his answer; "be firm a little longer, and you shall have at them." On another occasion, an officer galloped up, and told him that a particular division was reduced to one third of its original strength. "I cannot help it," replied the Duke; "every man must stand or fall, where he is, as I mean to do;" then, turning to an aide-de-camp, he emphatically exclaimed, "Would to God that night or Blucher were come!" A moment's respite, a moment's relief, was asked for the few survivors of the 33d. "Impossible—every thing depends upon the firm countenance of the British—they must not move." The 95th, being in front of the line, was threatened with a formidable charge of cavalry. The Duke, riding up to it, roused every martial feeling, by one short appeal; "Stand fast 95th, we must not be beaten; *what would they say in England?*" Was there a man that heard him, who did not that moment resolve to perish, rather than yield? How different, this simple but touching allusion to their country, from the turgid stuff with which Bonaparte and his Generals would have striven to animate their men.

Instances of individual heroism occurred which may rival all that history or fiction has related of ancient chivalry. Major Dumaresque, aide-de-camp to General Byng, was entrusted with an important message from the Duke of Wellington, relative to the defence of Hougoumont. When he reached that post, he found the movement, which his Grace had ordered, successfully anticipated by General Byng himself. Scarcely had he ascertained this, when he was shot through the body by a musket-ball. Regardless, however, of all suffering, and knowing the Duke's anxiety upon the subject, he rode back to him, to communicate the welcome intelligence that the French were repulsed from the wood, when, fainting from the loss of blood, he was conveyed to the rear by the assistance of a friend. Sir William De Lancey was struck from his horse by a cannon-ball. He heard the surgeons pronounce his wound mortal, as he lay on the ground, and while they thought him insensible. "Leave me to die," said he, to some friends who approached, "attend to the Duke." He was found on the following morning, still breathing; but all medical aid was then unavailing. The ardent attachment which our great commander had excited towards his person, in every officer of the army, and especially among his own staff, was displayed



in the most affecting manner during the battle. Sir Alexander Gordon, an officer of distinguished promise, received his death, while expostulating with the Duke upon the danger to which he was exposing himself.\* Lieutenant-Colonel Canning, another of the Duke's aide-de-camps, expired with his name upon his lips. Towards the close of the action, while carrying a message from the Duke to a distant part of the line, he was struck by a grape-shot in the stomach. He instantly fell off his horse, and his friend, Lord March, riding up to him, he eagerly demanded, "Is the Duke safe?" Being answered in the affirmative, he faintly exclaimed, "God bless him!" and breathed his last. Most feelingly and most justly has the Duke of Wellington himself observed, to whom these instances of sublime devotion were not unknown, "Believe me, nothing except a battle lost, can be half so melancholy as a battle won. The bravery of my troops has hitherto saved me from that greater evil; but to win even such a battle as this of Waterloo, at the expense of the lives of so many gallant friends, could only be termed a heavy misfortune, were it not for its results to the public benefit."

Among the examples of personal glory achieved in the very agonies of death, such glory as thrills to the heart, when read of some illustrious Greek or Roman, there are two that pre-eminently demand our admiration. Colonel Miller, of the Guards, fell mortally wounded. To a friend who stood beside him, he said, "I know I must die—but I should like to see the colours of my regiment before I quit them for ever." His gallant spirit was not denied this consolation. The colours were brought, and waved round his wounded body, while one transient gleam of a warrior's pride, mantled for a moment over the pallid countenance of the expiring hero. The Hon. Captain Curzon, fourth son of Lord Scarsdale, displayed an ardour equally chivalrous. Riding along the field, with his friend Lord March, he received a ball in his chest. "Farewell, dear March!" said he, as he fell to the ground. His companion was not permitted to perform those tender offices which his heart dictated. A furious onset of cuirassiers called him to his post; and Captain Curzon, seeing him nobly rally a Nassau regiment

\* The letter which the Duke of Wellington wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen, the brother of Sir A. Gordon, upon this melancholy occasion, well became the moral feelings of a British General. "I cannot," said he, "express to you the regret and sorrow with which I contemplate the losses the country and the service have sustained—none more severe than that of General Sir Alexander Gordon. The glory resulting from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot imagine that it is any to you. But I trust the result has been so decisive, that little doubt will remain that our exertions will be rewarded by the attainment of our first object,—then it is, that the glory of the actions in which our friends have fallen may be some consolation."

which he led to the charge in person, feebly but heroically exclaimed, "That's right—that's right—well done, my dear March!" and immediately expired.

Many similar instances might be related, for every individual, officers as well as men, seemed to consider the issue of that day, as depending upon his single prowess. The exploits of Shaw, a Life Guardsman, ought not to be omitted; it is affirmed, he slew or disabled ten Frenchmen, with his own hand, before he was killed. To be wounded was regarded as no reason for quitting the field, if nature still supplied strength to remain there. Colonel Morice, of the 69th regiment, was struck by a spent ball in the stomach early in the day, and soon after received a musket-shot through the shoulder. But neither pain, nor loss of blood, could tempt him to retire, and he continued with his men, till seven o'clock, in the evening, when his career was closed by a ball through the head. Colonel Ferrier, of the Life Guards, led his regiment to the charge no less than eleven times, and most of them were after his head had been laid open by the cut of a sabre, and his body pierced with a lance.\*

It is well known, that the cavalry, particularly the household troops, signalled themselves in several fierce contests with the cuirassiers and lancers. The

\* Among the examples of intense suffering, and miraculous escape, which the eventful history of this day disclosed, there is not one more calculated to excite our sympathy, than the case of the Hon. Colonel Ponsonby, of the 12th dragoons. I have been favoured with an account which that gallant officer drew up, to satisfy the painful curiosity of his family and friends; an account equally remarkable for its affecting simplicity and moral reflection. If the reader peruse it with the same emotions I have experienced, he will be thankful for its introduction, and rejoice with me, that notwithstanding his many perils, Colonel Ponsonby still survives for his country and his friends. Subjoined is a medical certificate from Mr. Hume, Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals:—

"I was stationed with my regiment (about 300 strong,) at the extreme of the left wing, and directed to act discretionally:—each of the armies was drawn up on a gentle declivity, a small valley lying between them.

"At one o'clock observing, as I thought, unsteadiness in a column of French infantry, (50 by 20, 1000, or thereabouts,) which were advancing with an irregular fire, I resolved to charge them. As we were descending in a gallop, we received from our own troops on the right, a fire much more destructive than their's, they having began long before it could take effect, and slackening as we drew nearer; when we were within fifty paces of them, they turned, and much execution was done among them, as we were followed by some Belgians, who had remarked our success.

"But we had no sooner passed through them, than we were attacked in our turn before we could form, by about 300 Polish lancers, who had come down to their relief. The French artillery pouring in among us a heavy fire of grape-shot, which, however, for one of our men killed three of their own: in the



armour of the former, proved no defence against the vigorous blows of their opponents. In some instances, their helmets were cloven, and dreadful gashes on the head, evinced the physical strength of the arm that inflicted them. Major Kelly, of the Life Guards, was engaged in single combat with an officer of cuirass-

melée, I was disabled almost instantly in both of my arms, and followed by a few of my men, who were presently cut down, (no quarter being asked or given), I was carried on by my horse, till receiving a blow on my head from a sabre, I was thrown senseless on my face to the ground. Recovering, I raised myself a little to look round, (being, I believe, at that time in a condition to get up, and run away,) when a lancer passing by, exclaimed, 'Tu n'est pas mort coquin,' and struck his lance through my back; my head dropped, the blood gushed into my mouth, a difficulty of breathing came on, and I thought all was over.

"Not long afterwards (it was then impossible to measure time, but I must have fallen in less than ten minutes after the charge,) a tirailleur came up to plunder me, threatening to take my life. I told him that he might search me, directing him to a small side-pocket, in which he found three dollars, being all I had; he unloosed my stock and tore open my waistcoat, then leaving me in a very uneasy posture; and was no sooner gone, than another came up for the same purpose, but assuring him I had been plundered already, he left me; when an officer, bringing on some troops, (to which probably the tirailleurs belonged,) and halting where I lay, stooped down and addressed me, saying, he feared I was badly wounded: I replied that I was, and expressed a wish to be removed into the rear: he said it was against the order to remove even their own men, but that if they gained the day, as they probably would, (for he understood the Duke of Wellington was killed, and that six of our battalions had surrendered,) every attention in his power should be shewn me. I complained of thirst, and he held his brandy-bottle to my lips, directing one of his men to lay me straight on my side, and place a knapsack under my head: he then passed on into the action—and I shall never know to whose generosity I was indebted, as I conceive, for my life—of what rank he was I cannot say, he wore a blue great coat. By and by another tirailleur came and knelt and fired over me, loading and firing many times, and conversing with great gaiety all the while; at last he ran off, saying, 'vous serez bien aise d'entendre que nous allons nous retirons; bon jour, mon ami.'

"While the battle continued in that part, several of the wounded men and dead bodies near me, were hit with the balls, which came very thick in that place. Towards evening, when the Prussians came, the continued roar of the cannon along their's and the British line, growing louder and louder as they drew near, was the finest thing I ever heard. It was dusk when two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, both of them two deep, passed over me in full trot, lifting me from the ground, and tumbling me about cruelly; the clatter of their approach, and the apprehensions it excited, may be easily conceived; had a gun come that way, it would have done for me. The battle was then nearly over, or removed to a distance—the cries and groans of the wounded all around me, became every instant more and more audible, succeeding to the shouts, imprecations, outcries of 'Vive L'Empereur,' the discharges of musquetry and cannon: now and then intervals of perfect silence, which were worse than the noise—I thought the night would never end. Much about this time, I found a soldier of the Royals lying across my legs, who had probably crawled thither in his agony; his weight, convulsive motions, his noises, and the air issuing through a wound in his side, distressed me greatly, the latter circumstance most of all, as the case was my own. It was not a dark night, and the Prussians were wandering about to plunder; (and the scene in Ferdinand, Count Fathom, came into my mind, though no women, I believe, were there;) several of them came and looked at me, and passed on: at length, one stopped to examine me. I told him as well as I could (for I could say but little in German,) that I was a British officer, and had been plundered already; he did not desist, however, and

siers, whom after a desperate struggle, he despatched by running his sabre through his neck. At first, our men were surprised to find their swords recoil from the breast-plates of their adversaries, but when they ascertained the cause, they soon

pulled me about roughly, before he left me. About an hour before midnight, I saw a soldier in an English uniform coming towards me; he was, I suspect, on the same errand. He came and looked in my face; I spoke instantly, telling him who I was, and assuring him of a reward, if he would remain by me. He said that he belonged to the 40th regiment, but had missed it. He released me from the dying man; being unarmed, he took up a sword from the ground, and stood over me, pacing backwards and forwards.—At eight o'clock in the morning, some English were seen at a distance; he ran to them, and a messenger was sent off to Hervey. A cart came for me. I was placed in it, and carried to a farm-house, about a mile and half distant, and laid in the bed from which poor Gordon, (as I understood afterwards,) had been just carried out; the jolting of the cart, and the difficulty of breathing, were very painful. I had received seven wounds; a surgeon slept in my room, and I was saved by continual bleeding, 120 ounces in two days, besides the great loss of blood on the field.

“Such, probably, is the story of many a brave man, yet to me it was new. The historian, describing military achievements, passes silently over those who go into the heat of the battle, though there, as we have seen, every character displays itself. The gay are still gay, the noble-minded are still generous; nor has the Commander in his proudest triumph a better claim to our admiration, than the meanest of his soldiers, when relieving a fallen enemy in the midst of danger and death.

“The lancers, from their length and weight, would have struck down my sword long before I lost it, if it had not been bound to my hand. What became of my horse I know not; it was the best I ever had.

“The man from the Royals was still breathing when I was removed in the morning, and was soon after taken to the hospital.

“Sir Dennis Pack said, the greatest risk he run the whole day was in stopping his men, who were firing on me and my regiment, when we began to charge.—The French make a great clamour in the action, the English only shout.”

“August 10, 1815.

“I hereby certify, that Colonel the Hon. F. C. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th Light Dragoons in the battle of Waterloo, on the 18th of June last, received a cut from a sabre on the outside of the right arm, opposite the edge of the urna, which divided the integuments and muscles longitudinally down to the bone, extending from near the elbow to the wrist.—He was also struck behind on the left side by a lance, which fracturing the sixth rib, entered the chest, and wounded the lungs. Besides these two severe wounds, he received several smaller cuts on his head, shoulder, and left arm, (which was also disabled,) and different parts of his body, and was bruised all over in such a manner as to render his recovery very doubtful. His recovery towards convalescence has been very slow: he has still little or no use of his right arm and hand; his breathing is much affected, by the wound in his chest, which is still open, and his strength is so much impaired, that it is more than probable, his constitution will never recover the shock which it has received.

(Signed)

“ROBERT HUME,  
Deputy Inspector of the Hospitals,  
And Surgeon to the Commander of the Forces.”

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remedied the evil, by cutting at the limbs, face, and throat. The lancers were much more formidable, especially to our light cavalry. Neither the one nor the other, however, could resist the tremendous charges made by the heavy dragoons, who, as the day advanced, scoured the whole field, and, with the other cavalry regiments, afforded the most important aid. Lord Edward Somerset's brigade, consisting of the Royal Horse Guards and the 1st Dragoon Guards, highly distinguished themselves. It is the opinion of many, that the battle was more than once restored, by the timely operations of the cavalry; and that had not the heavy part of it been employed, no successful resistance could have been made against the enormous masses of the enemy's which doubled our's. The Life Guards behaved most gallantly, and amply disproved the insinuations indulged by the pacific party at home, when they were ordered to join the army.\*

Against such troops, not even the veteran legions of Napoleon could prevail. Three great attacks, each of them a battle in itself, had now been made, and in vain; they were followed also by many desperate charges, which Bonaparte was accustomed to find decisive, but which here only augmented the unavailing slaughter. Night was approaching, and every thing depended upon being able to subdue the British before the arrival of the Prussians. Their advanced columns, emerging from the wood of Frischermont, already began to disclose his perilous condition. For awhile, any serious operations upon his rear might be checked by the 6th corps, in reserve, under Count Lobau; but dangers thickened round him, and he knew the disasters that must follow, should Blucher reach the ground with any considerable portion of his army. The utmost he could hope, was that Grouchy had followed the Prussians, and might occupy them so as to distract their movements. Still he had a firm, unflinching adversary in front, upon whose defeat rested any ultimate advantage he could gain. Fresh masses of infantry and cavalry, therefore, were brought forward, under cover of a heavy cannonade,

\* A very different example was set by the Cumberland Hussars, a foreign regiment, who deemed it quite superfluous that they should engage in the battle. Having equipped themselves at their own expence, they concluded they were to fight or not at their own discretion. When ordered to support a charge made by the British, their Colonel (Hake) evinced so little alacrity, and so much ceremony, in obeying it, that a second message was despatched to request he would either advance or quit the field, and not infect other regiments with what looked so much like cowardice. The gallant hero accepted the alternative, and wheeling round, gaily trotted off, at the head of his men, to a secure place in the rear. The poltroon was afterwards tried by a court-martial at Hanover, and sentenced to be cashiered and degraded. He ought to have been shot.

against our centre, and towards our right. The left was only so much engaged as might prevent it from detaching reinforcements. This was about five o'clock. Our cavalry were driven back for a moment, our advanced artillery taken, and victory seemed no longer doubtful. More than once, did the Duke of Wellington, seeking refuge in a square till the rage and torrent of the conflict was over, confide his valued life to the undaunted bravery of his men; then rushing forth, placed himself at their head, and led them to the charge. Our artillery was thus recovered, nor did the French again dare to advance so close. The cavalry, meanwhile, made some brilliant attacks, especially the Household troops, who penetrated into the enemy's columns and literally cut several battalions to pieces. The battle, which gradually extended itself nearly along the whole line, lasted above an hour, when after prodigious efforts, and a carnage horrible beyond description, the assailants were once more repulsed.

Napoleon must have witnessed this failure with no common feelings of dismay, for the operations of the Prussians upon his right flank and rear now began to assume a more serious character. Blucher, as already mentioned, had put his army in motion at break of day. Bulow's corps (the 4th,) marched from Dion-le-Mont, by Wavre, upon Chapelle St. Lambert. Among the obstacles which are said to have retarded the progress of this corps in particular, was a fire that broke out in Wavre, which raged with such violence as to prevent the troops, especially the cavalry and artillery, from marching through the principal street. The 2d corps followed nearly in the line of the 4th, and the 1st was ordered to advance by Ohain, the immediate communication with our left. The 3d, commanded by General Thielman, was also to have proceeded towards Chapelle St. Lambert, and there await whatever orders circumstances might require; but on quitting Wavre, it was vehemently attacked by Grouchy, and forced to return to the defence of the Dyle.\* Blucher, when he heard of this, which was not before six o'clock in the evening, sent directions to General Thielman, that he must defend himself as well as he was able, till reinforcements could be detached. The sagacious veteran well knew, the only battle which could determine the campaign, was to be fought on the field of Waterloo, and that any reverse at Wavre would be of little consequence, if victory could be achieved over Napoleon. "Perhaps," observes the writer referred to below, "the greatness of this determination has not been duly appreciated; what a common General would have done

\* Prussian General Officer's Account, p. 30.



is not the question ; but such a report might have induced the most distinguished commander to adopt measures of precaution, nay, to convert a powerful attack into a demonstration ; and in both cases, the fate of the battle would have been extremely precarious."

The whole Prussian army, with the exception of Thielman's corps, continued its march.\* General Bulow passed through the defile of Chapelle St. Lambert, the extreme difficulties of which were alleged as the cause of his not arriving at the covered position assigned him in the wood of Frischermont so soon as was expected. At half past four, it is said, only two brigades were come up, with the reserve cavalry under Prince William of Prussia, and these were immediately ordered to break from their retreat, lest the Duke of Wellington should be overwhelmed by the accumulated force directed against him. A cannonade was accord-

\* The conduct of Marshal Grouchy seems inexplicable, in permitting the main body of the Prussians to march from Wavre unmolested. It is said he could not avoid seeing their route by Grand Sart and Neuf-Cabaret upon Chapelle St. Lambert, from the heights of Wavre, which he occupied at noon, and from which the whole country to St. Lambert is distinctly visible. Besides, the 2d Prussian corps marched off before his eyes, and he opened a cannonade upon it from the right bank of the Dyle. It has been insinuated that Grouchy was over-persuaded by Vandamme (whose cupidity is infamously notorious) to push on to Wavre, in the hope of getting first to Brussels, and securing the plunder of that town to themselves. Whatever may have been his motives, it is indubitable, he not only neglected his orders, but that his neglect proved a serious evil to Napoleon. The very object for which he was detached with so large a force, was to prevent the junction between Wellington and Blucher,† and instead of that, he allowed himself to be detained at Wavre by a single Prussian corps, while the other three actually united with the Duke of Wellington's army. Ten thousand men would have been amply sufficient to keep General Thielman in check. When the cannonade at Waterloo was heard, General Gerard, and several other officers, insisted strongly with the Marshal to cross the Dyle, and approach nearer the Emperor ; but he constantly refused. When a messenger (Colonel Zenowitz) arrived at Wavre, from Napoleon, about six o'clock in the evening, he resolved to make this movement ; but it was then too late. He seems, also, to have been culpably tardy in his pursuit of the Prussians on the 17th. His advance did not appear on the high road between Namur and Quatre Bras till one o'clock, and instead of continuing his march, and pressing the Prussian rear, he halted during the night at Gembloux ; a route which, in the opinion of military men, he ought not to have taken at all, being bound by the principles of war to march along the Dyle, to force the defile of Mont St. Guibert, and thus be prepared to support Bonaparte, or be supported by him. The Prussians quitted Gembloux at noon, on the 17th, and Grouchy left it on the morning of the 18th, to find them out and fight them. Had Napoleon derived that support from Marshal Grouchy upon which he must have calculated, his overthrow at Waterloo could not have been so very disastrous.

† See the Answers obtained by Sir John Sinclair from distinguished officers in Grouchy's army: Prussian General's Account, page 150.

ingly opened, at a great distance, upon the enemy, intended rather as a signal to the British, and to prevent Bonaparte from employing more troops against them, than from any military motive. Count Lobau, instantly prepared to oppose the Prussians, and some cavalry skirmishing took place. The remainder of Bulow's corps, meanwhile, with the 2d, under General Pirch, continued to arrive, and the 1st began to develop its operations upon Napoleon's right, by Ohain. As they passed our columns on the left, they cheered us with the exulting confidence of victory, and all their bands played, 'God save the King.'

The enemy's right wing now began to retrograde, while a part of Bulow's corps, marching between Frischermont and Aywier, established some batteries, which soon drove their opponents from the opposite heights. The left wing of the Prussians advanced separately, and commenced a furious attack, with six battalions, upon the village of Planchenoit,\* in the rear of the French. Here several bloody charges were made, but the post was obstinately maintained. This was about seven o'clock; and Bonaparte, thus critically circumstanced, still determined upon another effort to force the British position. He formed a fourth column of attack, composed almost entirely of his guard, and which, according to Ney, (though De Coster does not mention it,) he conducted in person. When they reached the middle of the slope, he ordered Ney to lead them on. The attack was supported, as before, by a formidable discharge of artillery. The Duke of Wellington prepared to receive it with his usual promptitude and decision. He directed the battalions of the Guards to form line, and after advancing nearly to the brow of the hill, to lie down and shelter themselves from the enemy's cannon, which kept up a destructive fire. Some corps, exhausted with fatigue, and diminished in numbers, were giving way; placing himself at their head, and exposed to every danger, he led them to the charge, and restored the battle. He then returned, and took his station behind the

\* It is said that the peasant, who guided Bulow's army, resolved not to come out of the wood at Frischermont, but to descend into the valley lower down, and penetrate by Planchenoit, nearly in the rear of the French reserves. "Then," said he, "we shall take them all." Upon such chances do the most important events of a battle sometimes depend! Had this man guided wrong, had he conducted them where cannon could not pass, or had Bulow's army arrived an hour later, who can say what might have been the issue of the conflict? In the same manner, Bonaparte's escape was nearly prevented by the ignorance of De Coster, who led him through Genappe, obstructed with baggage-waggons, artillery, and fugitives, because he did not know there was a bridge over the Dyle at Ways, where nobody passed.



Guards, watching the moment for them to spring up and rush upon their assailants. General Vandeleur's, and General Vivian's brigades of cavalry, which had not yet been in action, were ordered from the left to support the centre, the heavy cavalry being much reduced. This movement was productive of the most important consequences, and had become practicable, from the demonstrations of General Ziethen's corps, upon Papelotte, which prevented the enemy's right from making any serious efforts against us.

The imperial guard, those fine and veteran troops, whose bravery all Europe had acknowledged, and whose former prowess almost entitled them to the proud epithet of invincible, intrepidly advanced towards the ridge. They were exposed to a galling fire from our right, which had been gradually converging during the day upon Hougoumont, from the extreme point of Merke Braine and Braine la Leude. The service of the artillery was so accurate, that whole files were annihilated as fast as they came within its range. With dauntless perseverance, however, they still pressed onwards, and at length reached the summit, behind which our men were crouching. This was the decisive moment, and the Duke, who had intently watched its crisis, exclaimed, "Up, Guards, and at them again!" The enemy did not expect to be so soon encountered. They were permitted to approach still nearer; and then such a volley was opened upon them, that they halted. Instantly our men rushed forward, at the point of the bayonet; with three cheers, and completed their dismay. They did not wait to receive the charge, but fled in terror and confusion. The shape of their column might be tracked by their dying and dead. In less than two minutes three hundred had fallen, while the Duke, leading up the <sup>52</sup>42d and <sup>7</sup>95th took them in flank. A regiment of tirailleurs of the guard attempted to check our progress; they heard our *hurrah!* but did not stay for our bayonets. This attack had been made with what was called the middle guard, conducted by Marshal Ney, who displayed a degree of heroism worthy a better cause. His horse was soon shot under him, but, sword in hand, he continued to rally the faltering columns, and mingled in the thickest of the fight. His example and his exhortations were equally vain. Confusion began to spread itself. The advanced corps recoiling in disorder upon the old guard, who were in reserve at the bottom of the ascent, the whole became one undistinguishable mass. Opportunity was now afforded for our cavalry to act. They plunged into the midst of the enemy, and committed dreadful havoc. Some battalions of the old guard, forming themselves into

squares, endeavoured to protect the retreat which was become inevitable ; but they were soon cut to pieces by the cavalry,\* or hurried along with the general torrent. A horrible carnage ensued. No quarter was either asked or given. When the guard were summoned to surrender, the answer was, "*Elle ne se rend pas ; elle meurt.*" The artillery had ceased firing, on account of the small distance between the combatants ; but the slaughter was no less terrific from the sabre and bayonet.

Meanwhile, the offensive operations of the Prussians on the right and in the rear, were continued with increasing activity. General Ziethen, advancing with one brigade, and the reserve cavalry, retook Papelotte, opened a fire with some twenty-four pounders, and directed an attack through the hollow, (leaving Papelotte on the left,) straight upon La Belle Alliance. The enemy gradually lost ground, receding as far as La Haye Sainte. This only tended to increase the confusion which already prevailed in that quarter. The battle continued to rage also at Planchenoit, where Bulow's corps, reinforced by troops from the 2d, now falling simultaneously into line, were opposed by Count Lobau, to whose assistance the young guard were ordered to march. The 2d Prussian corps had sent a detachment to Maransart likewise. Repeated, but unsuccessful, attacks, were made upon Planchenoit. It was at length carried by storm, and many prisoners, as well as cannon, were captured. The possession of this village, had it been obtained an hour earlier, would have enabled Blucher to cut off the retreat of the French by Genappe, and part of the troops must have laid down their arms. As it was, however, it decided the day. The enemy's right wing was broken in three places, while the utmost confusion prevailed in the rear. General Ziethen continued to press forward, in the direction of La Belle Alliance, and no chance remained of restoring the battle in front. Napoleon saw this fatal catastrophe ; he saw his imperial guard repulsed ; his last hope destroyed ; his doom pronounced ; and not choosing to remain till Blucher should place his army in force upon the high road to Genappe, he uttered the memorable words—" We must save ourselves !" Pale with fear, this great, this heroical commander, whose crown, whose empire, whose glory was annihilated, who could not dare to imagine that fresh victims would be found willing to immolate themselves for his unrighteous cause, and who therefore must have felt how utterly he had fallen, again

\* M. Giraud, speaking of the imperial guard, says "*elle se sent écrasée comme par la foudre.*"



exhibited that abject love of life which clings to it, though shorn of honour, though blotted with disgrace, though accompanied by defeat, by ruin, by all that could make it vile and worthless.

The Duke of Wellington remarked not only the confusion in which the enemy retired from this last desperate attack, but the disorder in their rear, occasioned by the successful operations of Blücher, and suddenly closing his telescope, exclaimed, "Now every man must advance." This decisive step, determined upon with that unerring sagacity by which he had so often controlled events, consummated their disasters. The order was no sooner given than executed. The fatigue of that arduous day was forgotten in the smile with which victory graced its closing scene. The men were inspired with new energy, to find themselves at last relieved from the cheerless duty of mere defence, and permitted to retaliate on their assailants. The whole line formed four deep, supported by the cavalry and artillery, and were guided by the Duke, who placed himself at the head of the Foot Guards. At that instant the "radiant sun, with farewell sweet," streamed from the western clouds, as if rejoicing in the triumph over ambition, perfidy, and despotism. The regiments on our flanks, formed into squares, and accompanied the line down the slope to protect it from cavalry. The enemy's batteries, from the eminence of La Belle Alliance, covered the retreat of the four battalions of the guard. The fire of Bulow's artillery, which was now directed against this spot, reached the British, as they advanced through the hollow, but immediately ceased when the circumstance was known. The attack completely succeeded in every point, the whole French army, panic-struck, hurrying away in whatever direction seemed best calculated to facilitate flight. Six thousand men of the 2d corps attempted to retreat along the ridge where the Observatory stood, hoping thus to avoid the high road; but unable to accomplish this, they became mingled with the common mass of fugitives near La Maison du Roi.

Never was there beheld a spectacle of so much misery and tumult. The flying enemy were cut down unresistingly by their eager and exasperated pursuers. Their well-attested barbarities during the day, which casual successes enabled them to exercise, inspired every man with vengeance, and the savage lesson they had taught, was not now forgotten. The Prussians, in particular, gave loose to their deadly hatred, and mercy pleaded in vain for those who had never shewn it. The slaughter was terrific, for, in their consternation, they had thrown from them their arms, as incumbrances which only impeded escape. The screams and

prayers of poor wretches, who lay weltering in their blood, and unable to move, as they saw column after column, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, rolling furiously onwards, threatening to crush them in their progress, have been described in language, at which humanity sickens. Yet such are the horrors of war! The gentlest and most pitiful, become fierce and unrelenting, when honour, and safety, and glory, are to be won only by the bloody triumphs of slaughter and death. Napoleon's own account exhibits a faithful picture of that stupendous overthrow which his army sustained; faithful, because he wished to extract from it some balm for the wounded vanity of France. "Cries of 'All is lost!'—'The guard is driven back!' were heard on every side. The soldiers assert even that on many points ill disposed persons cried out, *Sauve qui peut*.\* However this may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole field of battle, and they threw themselves in the greatest disorder on the line of communication; soldiers, cannoniers, caissons, pressed to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was infected, and was itself hurried along. In an instant the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers of all arms, were mixed pell-mell, and it was utterly impossible to rally a single corps. Every one knows what the bravest army in the world is, when thus mixed and thrown into confusion, and when its organization no longer exists."

Such and so complete was the ruin that now overtook these perjured legions and their faithless leader. Even the rout at Vittoria sunk in comparison with it. General Gneisenau describes it as resembling the flight of a horde of barbarians, and says, the road to Genappe presented "the appearance of an immense shipwreck; it was covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind." The pursuit was continued, by the British and Prussians, as far as Genappe, where the Duke of Wellington and Blucher met,† and exchanged mutual congratulations upon the glorious issue

\* Ney, in his letter to the Duke of Otranto, says, "there was not a total rout; nor the cry of *sauve qui peut*, as has been calumniously stated in the bulletin."

† With the exception of General Alava's despatch, every account, official and unofficial, that I have had occasion to consult, in mentioning this interview, fixes its occurrence at La Belle Alliance. General Gneisenau even says that Blucher wished the battle to be called by that name, as if to render it commemorative of their meeting. Against this host of testimony, it might appear presumption in me to oppose myself, had I not an authority for so doing *which admits of no question*. The fact is, the two illustrious commanders, as stated above, met at Genappe, between ten and eleven o'clock. It is the more surprising, indeed, that this error should have prevailed so generally, for it only requires the inspection of an accurate



of the battle. Finding himself on the same road with Blucher, and his troops being exhausted with fatigue, it was agreed that the Prussians, who were comparatively fresh, should continue to follow the enemy.\* Well did the veteran hero execute his task. Assembling the superior officers of his army, he ordered that the last man and horse should be sent in pursuit. The British halted, and gave their gallant allies three cheers as they passed, which was returned by the Prussian bands playing the national air of God save the King. Not a moment's repose was allowed the fugitives, and the moon rising in full splendor, they were deprived even of the advantage which they might have gained from the obscurity of darkness, and were successively driven from nine bivouacs during the night. In some villages they attempted to maintain themselves, but the sound of the Prussian trumpet, or the beat of the Prussian drum, renewed their panic, and accelerated their flight. At Genappe, an entrenchment was formed with cannon and overturned carriages, while a brisk fire of musquetry was opened upon the Prussians as they approached. This was answered by a few cannon shot, and in an instant the town was abandoned. It was here that Napoleon's carriage was taken, which he quitted in so great a hurry, that he left his sword and hat behind him.

He was the first to quit the field of battle, and as he ran the fastest, he reached this place about half past nine.† The single street of which the village is composed, was so encumbered with baggage, cannon, &c. that an hour elapsed, before he could effect his inglorious escape, by passing alongside the houses. Having at length got through, he hurried on towards Quatre Bras, often looking back in terror, to see whether the Prussians were at his heels. After he had passed Quatre Bras, he recovered his courage, and at Gosselies even

plan of the battle, to perceive, from the operations of the Prussians, that the two armies *could not* have met at La Belle Alliance. Yet, some travellers boast of having actually seen the chair in which the Duke of Wellington sat in that farm-house. With what patience will they suffer themselves to be told, that the Duke never quitted his horse, till he returned to Waterloo between eleven and twelve at night?

\* Duke of Wellington's despatch, Appendix, No. X. I avail myself of the opportunity to rectify an error in this document, as it appeared in the Gazette. Describing the French force, it is said, "the enemy collected his army with the exception of the 3d corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blucher." The reader is already aware that the 4th corps was united with the 3d in that service.

† De Coster's Narrative. Some accounts say that it was half an hour after midnight when he passed through Genappe; but the distance from La Belle Alliance, and the precise time when Blucher and Wellington met there, equally disprove the statement.

ventured to dismount, walking the remainder of the road to Charleroi, which he traversed on horseback, between two and three o'clock. He did not stop till he reached a meadow called Marcenelle, at the other end of the town. Here a large fire was made, and the imperial runaway partook of some wine with his officers. At a quarter before five o'clock, having taken another guide, to whom he transferred De Coster's horse, he remounted, made a slight bow to De Coster, and rode off, continuing his expeditious journey to Paris. De Coster's reward was a single Napoleon, given him by General Bertrand, and he was left to find his way back on foot. Bonaparte scarcely spoke a word from the moment he commenced his flight, till he reached the meadow of Marcenelle. Many were the wretched expedients he employed to divest himself of the troublesome attachment of his soldiers, whose fidelity, he feared, might prove a beacon to guide the enemy in their pursuit.\*— "There is the Emperor! Look at the Emperor!" exclaimed his men, as they saw the frightened hero, galloping along; a recognition which never failed to quicken his speed. At the gates of Phillipeville, he underwent a humiliating examination by the sentinel, who, though *the Emperor* disclosed himself, refused to let his *Majesty* pass, till the governor of the place identified the timorous suppliant. When the scattered wreck of his army knew that he had sought refuge in this fortress, they began to form a sort of encampment round it, for his defence. The prudent fugitive, however, who dreaded lest their presence should attract his pursuers, contrived to disperse them by a noble stratagem. He sent out some emissaries, who ran towards the camp, exclaiming, "The Cossacks! The Cossacks! Save yourselves!" The trick was successful, and Napoleon was enabled to outrun his followers.

How different was the conduct of his great antagonist! Had England lost the battle, she would have lost her General. Never did ambition, or glory, or duty, inspire a more thorough determination to set life upon every hazard that might win victory, than what animated the Duke of Wellington that day. Upon this point, there is no conflicting testimony; here all are agreed; his repeated perils, his miraculous escapes, are still the glowing theme of those who witnessed them. Often did affectionate anxiety prevail over the cold ceremony of military subordination, and they who were nearest the person of our illustrious chief, presumed to remonstrate with him upon his negligence of danger. That their fears

\* Relation, par un Temoin Oculaire, pp. 68—76. Some persons, ignorant of his character, imagined that when he saw defeat inevitable, he had devoted himself to a glorious death, by rushing into the thickest of the fight.



were not vain, was too fatally proved by their own lot, for scarcely one of his immediate staff remained untouched. Many were killed; others grievously wounded. The Duke, meanwhile, riding from place to place, now rallying broken battalions, now exhorting squares steadily to receive the enemy, incurred greater risks\* than even the common soldier, who could only be exposed to the hazard of a single station. He, on the contrary, confronted danger wherever it was most imminent; and more than once found safety by casting himself into the centre of a square of infantry. At a critical period of the battle, he placed himself on a ridge, from which he declared he would never move, till he moved in triumph. He kept his word; and would have kept it, at the forfeit of his life. Men who fight under such a leader, are ambitious to imitate the great example, and a dauntless spirit is thus infused into every bosom. The emulation of valour creates a faculty of individual courage, far surpassing mere disciplined bravery, which is often but mechanical, and when not acting in concert, degenerates suddenly into panic cowardice. Such was the utterly defenceless and deplorable flight of the French, who, once disunited, recoiled in consternation from an attack which allowed no time for combined resistance. It may safely be affirmed, that Napoleon's troops could not have won such a victory as Waterloo; for they proved, in many instances, that they were incapable of sustaining charges similar to what they executed.

The Duke of Wellington felt and acknowledged all that was due to his soldiers, whose extraordinary fineness and intrepidity accomplished, what his genius devised. Honourably and feelingly did he lament their fate, not only in his letters to particular friends,† but in that genuine impulse of manly sympathy, which dissolved itself in tears as he re-passed, at midnight, the dreadful field of slaughter. Their mangled bodies lay in frightful heaps around him. His mind was then no longer oppressed with anxious thought, and though perhaps the exultation of victory had not wholly subsided, yet there was leisure to calculate its price. The groans of the wounded and the dying, the silence of the dead, solemnly proclaimed it. The

\* The following anecdote has been related upon the authority of an eye-witness. On the 16th a French officer of dragoons having penetrated very far in a charge, was riding close to the Duke, who, turning to some soldiers that were near him, said, "What! will you allow him to escape!" The Frenchman was taken prisoner within a few yards of his Grace.

† "My heart is almost broken," exclaimed the noble Duke, with a tenderness which exalted him above his warlike renown, "by the terrible loss I have sustained of my old friends and companions, and my poor soldiers."

moon had risen, and her soft melancholy light unveiled a scene of devastation which no human eye could contemplate without emotion. A profound stillness had succeeded to the tremendous roar of battle, or if interrupted, it was only by such sounds as more intensely revived its horrors. The ground was literally drenched with human blood, into which the horses' hoofs sunk at every step. It is not often that such a spectacle, at such a moment, and under such circumstances, presents itself to the commander of an army. More commonly, conquest or defeat, pursuit or flight, hurries him from the theatre of desolation, and he learns its ravages only from description. But the Duke of Wellington traversed the plain of Waterloo when it was yet reeking with carnage, and can we wonder, that while with gratitude he reflected upon his own preservation, with tears he deplored the loss of his friends and companions in glory?

That loss was indeed great, and could be compensated only by the mighty triumph which it purchased; a triumph that affected, not a single state, but all Europe. The total of British and Hanoverians, who were killed or wounded, amounted to at least 10,000; and the Belgians and Brunswickers were computed at one third as many. The Marquis of Anglesea received his wound by almost the last shot that was fired, and the amputation of his leg became necessary.—The Prince of Orange, also, was wounded by a musket-ball through his left shoulder, only half an hour before the battle terminated. It will be seen, by an inspection of the returns, that an unusual number of commanding officers were either killed or wounded—a melancholy proof of the ardour and intrepidity with which they discharged their duty. The loss sustained by the French has never been exactly ascertained,\* but the most moderate estimate fixes it at 20,000 who were left dead on the field of battle,† besides 7,000 prisoners, 203 pieces of artillery, and the whole of what they call the *materiel* of an army. Every thing, in fact, was abandoned, and each man thought it fortune enough if he could carry off himself. Among the prisoners, were Count Lobau, who commanded the 6th corps, and General Cambronne. The aggregate loss of the Prussians, in this short campaign, from the 15th June to the 3d July, has been officially stated at 33,132, without,

\* It was difficult to prepare any accurate list, because hundreds disbanded themselves when they entered France, and returned to their homes, the cavalry and artillery selling their horses to the country people. (Duke of Wellington's despatch, dated Le Cateau, June 22, 1815.)

† I have been assured by a General Officer, who went over the field next day, that the greater part had evidently been killed by artillery shot.



however, distinguishing the particular amount on either the 16th or 18th of June. It would be injustice to omit the tribute which is due to the humanity and kindness displayed by the people of Brussels towards our wounded heroes. It is spoken of with grateful enthusiasm by those who experienced them, and was publicly acknowledged by the Duke of Wellington himself, in a letter he addressed to the Mayor of that city.\* From the highest to the lowest, all classes, and of both sexes, were eager to mitigate, as far as human assiduity could mitigate, the sufferings of their brave deliverers. Many private houses were literally converted into hospitals for their reception, and hundreds now live to bless the benevolent exertions of their benefactors. But for such active philanthropy, they must inevitably have perished. It is a pleasing relief to record this exercise of the social virtues, after having so long dwelt upon scenes of strife and misery produced by guilty ambition.

The exultation, the proud sentiment of national greatness, which this victory excited in England, will not easily be forgotten by those who participated in it. And who did not participate in it, if we except a few select friends of Napoleon, who had prophesied for him, and could ill conceal their mortification? The joy, the transport, that echoed on every side, smote their ears in most discordant tones; for what their full-blown vanity had predicted to be impossible, the Duke of Wellington had presumed to accomplish; what their petulant invectives had derided, a British army had performed. This little, mournful band stood aloof from the popular felicity, and must have looked down upon its ebullitions with something of that amiable feeling which our great epic poet ascribes to Satan, when he beheld our first parents in the bowers of Paradise. The country, however, gave full scope to its rejoicings, and though public grief sympathised with private sorrow over the heroes who had fallen, the glory of the triumph was not obscured. Rumours of disaster had been rife, before the glad tidings burst upon us, and the sudden transition from despondency, only heightened subsequent exultation. The deeds of former times, the exploits of Wellington himself, all that Englishmen were accustomed to revere as the boast of ages, faded before the immortal renown which their countrymen had won at Waterloo. The voice of acclamation was every where heard, from the throne to the cottage. Parliament was eager to testify its gratitude and admiration, and (besides bestowing its thanks upon the Duke of Wellington, his officers, and army, which were also extended to Prince Blucher and the Prussian army) a grant of

\* Appendix, No. XI.

two hundred thousand pounds, in addition to its former donations, was unanimously voted, for the erection of a palace equal to Blenheim. Honours he could not receive; his splendid services had already exhausted all which the crown had to bestow. Foreign sovereigns, indeed, were eager to heap them upon him; and while the King of the Netherlands created him Prince of Waterloo, he was installed a member of the most distinguished military orders of other states.

Nor were the merits of the army forgotten. Every regiment which had been engaged, was permitted to have the word Waterloo inscribed upon its colours; and every man was allowed to reckon that day's work as two years service in his claim for increased pay, or for his pension when discharged. Proportionate rewards were established for the officers; and a new regulation adopted with regard to the allowances granted for wounds, which extended to the whole service. By this regulation, gratuities of that description were to rise with the progressive promotion of the individual, so that a wounded ensign, if he subsequently attained the rank of a general, would receive a general's pension. So far the legislature bestowed substantial benefits upon the survivors of that great day; but something was due to their honour, something to the honour of the country that owned them, something less perishable than personal advantages. It was therefore decreed, that a national monument should be erected to commemorate this glorious victory, and upon it the name of every man engraven who had fallen in the battle. A medal, also, was ordered to be struck, composed of fine silver, and presented to the officers and privates. The moral influence which this honourable badge is calculated to produce, especially upon the latter, needs no illustration. Around the outer edge of the medal is impressed the person's name, his rank, and the regiment to which he belonged. Who can doubt that these memorials of warlike fame, will be preserved with conscious pride by their possessors, and transmitted to their children as an inheritance of honour which no accidents of time or fortune can impair?

The most prompt and vigorous exertions were made to secure every advantage that could result from this decisive victory.\* The necessity, however, which the Duke

\* To complete the series of military operations in the Netherlands, it will be necessary to relate what occurred at Wavre, between the 3d Prussian corps and the force under Marshal Grouchy. It was naturally presumed that the total overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, would compel Grouchy to retire, as soon as he received intelligence of that disaster, and it became, therefore, unnecessary to reinforce General



of Wellington was under, of affording a short repose to his harassed army, enabled the Prussians, whose zeal and activity were most laudable, to gain a day's advance upon him in pursuit of the French. On the 19th the British began their march towards Paris, by the road of Nivelles. On the 20th they reached Binch, on the 21st Malpla-

Thielman; but it was most desirable, if possible, to intercept the enemy's retreat. The 2d Prussian corps was consequently ordered to march to the left for that purpose. At three o'clock, on the 18th, Vandamme's corps had attacked the town of Wavre, and soon obtained possession of that part which lay on the right bank of the rivulet. General Thielman had not more than 15,000 men, with which to oppose the enemy, and it required equal skill and bravery to maintain the position. His right was posted on Bierges, and his left on Bas-Wavre, so that he could every moment advance troops to defend the few passages that were practicable. Marshal Grouchy, finding himself unable to ford the Dyle at either of those places, and receiving orders from Napoleon to approach the field of battle, detached the 4th corps, under General Gerard, with the cavalry of Pajol, to force the bridge at Limale, where were stationed only one regiment of cavalry and one of infantry, which had formed the rear-guard of the 1st Prussian corps, and remained behind upon learning the enemy's advance to Wavre. General Gerard's corps reached Limale about five o'clock in the evening, and though opposed by so feeble a resistance, he succeeded in gaining the height most contiguous to Limale, only towards night-fall. General Thielman, in order to prevent the enemy from establishing himself in the rear of the Prussian army, detached a brigade, with the reserve cavalry, under Colonel Stulpnagel, to drive him back over the Dyle. Colonel Stulpnagel commenced the attack at midnight, but getting into some hollows and ravines of which he had no knowledge, he was obliged to desist, and as soon as day broke, a vigorous cannonade from the enemy compelled him to retire. By this time General Thielman had heard of the victory of Waterloo, and he concluded that when it was also known to the enemy, he would convert his attack into a retreat. Being unwilling, therefore, to give way without necessity, he deployed, with his left leaning on Bierges and Wavre, and his right towards Rosvere. The enemy immediately attacked Bierges, took it, and at the same time crossed the Dyle with a part of Vandamme's corps. Extending, also, as far as Roziere, he flanked the Prussian right. "If," observes the Prussian General Officer, (p. 42,) "Prince Blucher had sent back troops by Chapelle St. Lambert to support General Thielman, and had they, by Neuf, Cabaret, or Grand-Sart, fallen upon the enemy's rear, Grouchy's corps, it was obvious, must have been totally destroyed." General Thielman, however, maintained himself, till noon, in a position parallel to the high-road from Wavre to Brussels, but the action then became so serious, that he was forced to retreat towards Achantrodt, where he was enabled to refresh his troops and feed his cavalry. About that period Grouchy learnt the disastrous fate of Napoleon, and began to think of retreating instead of pursuing General Thielman further. The French army, accordingly, passed the Dyle at four points, Wavre, Limale, Limilet, and Oittigny, masking the operation with part of the cavalry. General Excelmans pushed on with his corps to Namur, where he arrived in the evening of the 19th; while the main body retired upon Gembloux. They were not overtaken till the morning of the 20th, while marching off in two columns for Namur. An action took place with the rear-guard, but it was not attended by any important consequences. With the loss of four pieces of cannon the enemy arrived safe at Namur. The 2d corps, for want of correct intelligence from General Thielman, did not come up with the French till the 20th. Both corps had received orders, first to pursue the enemy, and then, by forced marches, again to join Marshal Blucher. Conformably to these instructions, an attempt was made to take Namur by force, but after a loss of 60 officers and 1,600 men, killed and wounded, the attack failed, and the Prussians did not obtain possession of it, till Grouchy had fully secured his retreat. They prevented him, however, from destroying the bridge across the Sambre. These operations of the 2d and 3d Prus-

quet,\* and on the 22d Cateau Cambresis. They met with no enemy during their progress, a small detachment only having retreated by Maubeuge. Blucher, meanwhile, was indefatigably pressing upon the fugitives, along the Charleroi road. General Gneisenau conducted the pursuit with unabated perseverance. On the 19th the head-quarters of the Prussian army were at Gosselies, while the light cavalry were harassing the enemy between Charleroi and Avesnes, where they captured twelve pieces of cannon. At Charleroi, intelligence was received that part of the defeated army had taken the direction of Phillipville, where it was supposed a junction would be effected with the troops under Grouchy. This, however, was prevented by those operations which have been already detailed, and, in consequence, the enemy were unable to oppose any effectual obstruction to the advance of the allies upon the capital, where Grouchy arrived from Wavre, after a skilfully conducted retreat of eight days. On the night of the 21st, General Ziethen invested Avesnes with the 1st corps. Its capitulation was accelerated by the accidental explosion of a magazine, containing 150,000 pounds of powder, which destroyed a considerable part of the town, and above 400 persons. On the 23d, the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher had an interview at Catillon, when they determined upon the combined movements of their respective armies in approaching Paris. It was not considered necessary to create any delay, by attempting to reduce the frontier garrisons, though a sufficient force was left to observe them. Such only as lay in the direct line of march, and which could be easily subdued, were attacked. With this view, the 2d Prussian corps was destined to besiege Maubeuge, Landrecy, Phillipville, Rocroy, and Givet. The town of Cambray was taken by escalade, on the evening of the 24th, by Sir C. Colville's division, with trifling loss. The citadel did not surrender till the following day. St. Quentin also was abandoned to Marshal Blucher, while General Ziethen, having blockaded Guise, soon forced it to capitulate.

sian corps were of infinite advantage, as they prevented Marshal Grouchy from retiring in the direction of Charleroi, and effecting a junction with Napoleon at Phillipville and Avesnes, which were "given as the points of re-union." (See French official Account.) Bonaparte understood that Grouchy's retreat was entirely cut off. Had he foreseen his arrival in Paris, with so considerable a force, it is probable he would not have abdicated without that struggle which he threatened should accompany the fall of a great man.

\* From this place, already celebrated in English history, by the victory of the Duke of Marlborough, Wellington issued a proclamation, (See Appendix, No. XII.) which deeply offended Napoleon's English friends, because he was designated as "a usurper, and the enemy of human nature, with whom no peace nor truce could be maintained."



The Duke of Wellington, who was in constant correspondence with Louis XVIII., and who justly conceived that his Majesty's presence would have a beneficial influence, invited him to repair to Cambray, whither he accordingly proceeded, with his court and troops on the 26th. Two days after, he issued a proclamation, in which, while he pronounced pardon to the nation, he declared vengeance to the guilty few, by whom it had been betrayed. Again he represented himself as a mediator between his people and hostile armies. "My government," said the monarch, "may have committed faults; perhaps it did. There are times when the purest intentions are incompetent to guide; when, even, they sometimes mislead. Experience alone could regulate them: it shall not be lost. I wish every thing that may save France." This was followed by a proposition which it might be expedient then to assert, but from which, as a political axiom, every enlightened reasoner must dissent. "My subjects have learned, by dreadful example, that the principle of the legitimacy of sovereigns, is one of the fundamental bases of social order."

The allied generals, meanwhile, continued their victorious march to Paris. Peronne was attacked on the 26th by the first brigade of Guards, under General Maitland, and the horn-work, which covered the suburb on the left of the Somme, being carried by storm, the town immediately surrendered. It was stipulated, that the garrison should lay down their arms, and be allowed to return to their homes. On the same day, Blucher had his head-quarters at Genvry, near Noyon, and on the 27th at Compeigne, where he crossed the Oise. His army was now again one day's march before the British, in consequence of the Duke of Wellington being obliged to halt at Cateau Cambresis for his pontoons and stores, besides the delay incident upon the capture of Cambray and Peronne. From the distracted state of their adversaries, however, there was no reason to apprehend any danger from this separation. On the 28th, General Ziethen fell in with the enemy, near Villers-Cotterets, forced them precipitately to retreat, and took fourteen pieces of cannon. It was afterwards known, from some prisoners, that they were Grouchy's corps, which had retreated from Namur, by Dinant and Givet, upon Soissons. His arrival in Paris increased the army there to 60,000 regular troops, including about 29,000 men from the depots on the banks of the Loire. On the 29th, Blucher was in front of the lines between St. Denis and Vincennes, (which the enemy had repaired, and occupied with their whole disposeable force) and Wellington at Orvillé.

It was on this day that Bonaparte quitted Paris—for ever, if the hopes of

Europe may be made the language of prophecy. Continuing his disgraceful flight with undiminished expedition, he alighted at the *Palais de l'Élysée* towards night fall, on the 20th of June, accompanied by his brother Jerome, General Drouet, and other officers.\* Consultations were immediately held with his principal partisans, but the stupendous disasters which his presence unfolded, disconcerted their fidelity, and some who began to think of their heads, now turned patriots, talked of the country, and hinted at a second abdication. The night was partly consumed in preparing that *bulletin*, which on the following day exhibited to France so terrific a picture of her calamities. An interview with his ministers followed, but what could the wisest counsels effect? France, by a single battle, was laid bare and defenceless at the feet of her enemies. The ruin was so sudden, and so complete, that the most vigorous mind could not grapple with it. There was no proceeding, which ingenuity could devise, or zeal could execute, that presented the slightest chance of success. Submission, unreserved and absolute submission, was all the conquerors had left them. In vain did Napoleon demand men and money. Where were they to be had? The people would not rally round the fugitive, and the greater part of his rebel army was annihilated. With 60,000 disciplined troops, he was now to meet the shock of confederated Europe, for at Waterloo he had encountered little more than its advanced guard. In the madness of his rage, goaded too by the graspings of his ambition, he might be willing to allure destruction upon that devoted land; but his will was no longer final; he was in the hands of those who did not always calculate upon their own escape from whatever perils they might create to others. Had there existed a probability, nay, a possibility, of repelling invasion, he might have reckoned upon the alacrity of guilt to protect itself. But now, when he could no longer be their shield, they were determined he should not be their executioner.

It would be superfluous to narrate the altercations and absurdities which took

\* The reader who wishes to peruse a very theatrical account of what Napoleon did and said upon his return, may consult a pamphlet, entitled "*Nuits de L'Abdication de L'Empereur Napoleon*," by M. St. Didier. The first scene opens with an harangue from General Drouet to M. St. Didier himself, in which the causes of Napoleon's defeat are most luminously expounded. After expatiating upon the negative virtue of patience which we so laudably exercised at the battle of Waterloo, and which General Drouet considered as one cause of our success, he adds, "the prudent victor of Salamanca, of Toulouse, of Vittoria, by a manœuvre worthy of his temporising genius, (for it cost him the *élite* of his army,) compelled the fiery conqueror of the Pyramids, of Marengo, of Austerlitz, of Friedland, of Jena, to bow, before those whom he had so often subdued, his humbled laurels." No doubt it was very mortifying, both to Napoleon and General Drouet, that the Duke of Wellington *prudently* determined to win the battle.



place in the two legislative bodies. Factions reviled factions, and traitors accused traitors. Such an absence of all dignity, consistency, and decorum, never before existed in assemblies calling themselves deliberative, if the turmoil and vulgarity of the National Convention be excepted. Some were agitated by their fears, some impelled by their audacity, and others by their ignorance. The most ridiculous, and the most flagitious propositions, were alternately propounded. All were eager to do something; none knew what to do. A few insisted that the dynasty of Napoleon should be upheld; but they were precisely the individuals who saw the scaffold, when they lost sight of the imperial throne. The majority demanded his abdication; and their demand was conceded. Napoleon preferred a seemingly voluntary act, to that less grateful deposition which he knew awaited him. But there was yet time for subterfuge, and he tried it. He abdicated in favour of his son, whom he proclaimed under the title of Napoleon the Second,\* declaring, however, that his own "political life was terminated." This was on the 22d of June. On the 23d, a commission of government was appointed, consisting of five individuals, Fouché, Carnot, Caulincourt, General Grenier, and M. Quinette. The following day they issued a proclamation, announcing that plenipotentiaries had set off from Paris to treat with the allies for peace.† They also adopted measures to provide for the defence of the capital.

In the Chamber of Peers, meanwhile, an angry discussion took place upon the recognition of Napoleon II. Lucien Bonaparte warmly advocated it, but was reminded by Count Pontecoulant that he was not a Frenchman, and therefore had no right to address the assembly. Labedoyere was another who vehemently insisted, that unless they proclaimed Napoleon II., the abdication of the father was null and void. He contended that the abdication of Napoleon was indivisibly connected with the succession of his son. "We have abandoned him once," said this infatuated rebel, "shall we abandon him a second time? We have sworn to defend him, even in his misfortunes. If we declare that every Frenchman who quits his standard shall be covered with infamy—shall have his house rased—and his

\* See Appendix, No. XIII.

† These plenipotentiaries were, Count Sebastiani, Count de la Foret, La Fayette, Benjamin Constant, and M. D'Argenson. They arrived at Laon on the 25th, and transmitted to the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher, a notification of the powers with which they were invested. Neither the English nor the Prussian General, however, having inclination or authority to treat with them, they were permitted to proceed in the direction of the grand allied head-quarters at Mannheim. But their mission was soon rendered nugatory by the capitulation of Paris.

family proscribed, we shall then have no more traitors; no more of those manœuvres which have occasioned the late catastrophes, and some of the authors of which perhaps sit here." The concluding insinuation of this sanguinary speech, produced much disorder, and a peremptory appeal from Ney, who conceived himself alluded to. At length, after a tumultuous debate, the Chamber separated, without adopting the proposition of Lucien, that Napoleon II. should be proclaimed. Bonaparte was violently incensed at the contumacy of his peers, and threatened not only to revoke his abdication, but to place himself at the head of the Parisian federates, and resolve the question by force of arms. He was restrained, however, by his friends, and persuaded to await the proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies. They, indeed, nominally recognised the terms of Napoleon's abdication, by proclaiming his son; but they knew it was a mere mockery, for the allies had declared that no branch of Napoleon's family should reign in France. Napoleon himself must have been equally convinced of this, unless, as Lucien Bonaparte is reported to have said, "the smoke of Mont St. Jean had turned his head."

He lingered in the capital to the last moment that was compatible with his personal safety, still hoping for events which would supersede the necessity of his departure. Perhaps he flattered himself, that when Napoleon II. was proclaimed, Napoleon I. would be wanted to defend the precarious rights of the baby monarch; and if the war could have been protracted, for the assertion of those rights, to whose direction could it be more properly confided? But this delusion was soon dispelled, and the commission of government deputed Fouché to acquaint the abdicated Emperor, that even his presence in Paris was an impediment to any pacific arrangements with the allies, besides the effect which it had in promoting the projects of his partisans among the rabble. Ever obedient, where necessity veiled itself in persuasion, he consented to withdraw, and, after issuing an address to his soldiers, exhorting them to provoke a civil war, he departed, on the 29th of June, for Rochefort.\* Fouché immediately communicated the important fact to the Chamber of Peers, observing, "that the commission of government had authorised the Minister of Marine to arm two frigates for conveying

\* An attempt had previously been made (on the 25th,) to obtain from the Duke of Wellington a passport for his safe conveyance to America. This request, his Grace did not feel himself authorised to grant, observing, in his letter to Count Bignon, that he was not empowered by his government "to give any sort of answer whatever to that demand." It would, indeed, have been most unwise to comply with it. Experience had sufficiently proved, that Napoleon was unworthy of confidence, and that the only security against his future perfidy was the permanent security of his person.



Napoleon to the United States," and "that General Becker was entrusted with the safety of his person, during his journey."

Ineffectual preparations continued to be made for the defence of Paris.\*— Marshal Davoust was appointed to the command of the army, which he divided into two corps. With one he occupied Mont Martre, and the lines between St. Denis and Vincennes; with the other, under the direction of Vandamme, he occupied Montrouge. Although the former position was already strong, from the canal, he ordered it to be covered with all the heavy iron ordnance which could be found in the capital. This array of war, however, did not prevent attempts at negotiation. The Duke of Otranto addressed a very complimentary letter to the Duke of Wellington, which admitted of no reply, and Davoust also wrote to his Grace and Blucher, which the latter answered in a blunt, uncere- monious manner.† The allies still advanced, and on the 1st of July, the British took up a position with their right on the height of Rochebourg, and their left upon the Bois de Bondy; while the Prussian army had its 3d corps near St. Germain, on the left bank of the Seine, and its 1st on the right. The 4th also arrived during the night, in the neighbourhood of St. Germain. Blucher was strongly opposed by the enemy, particularly on the heights of St. Cloud and Meudon; but the gallantry of the Prussian troops surmounted every obstacle, and they finally established themselves, not only upon the heights of Meudon, but in the village of Issy. On the 3d of July, at three o'clock in the morning, the French made a desperate attack upon Issy, with about 10,000 infantry, which lasted for several hours; but in the end they were repulsed, and now finding that Paris was open on its vulnerable side, that a communication was established between the two armies by a bridge, which the Duke of Wellington had erected at Argenteuil, and that a British corps was moving towards the Pont de Neuilly, they sent a flag of truce, to desire the firing might cease on both sides of the Seine, with a view to the conclusion of a military convention. This proposition was instantly acceded to, and St. Cloud being named, commissioners from the

\* Dumoriez, in his Memoirs, pronounces any project for the defence of Paris, "absurd and impracticable." The campaign of 1814 had sufficiently proved this; and Carnot was evidently of the same opinion. (See p. 199, of this Volume.)

† See Appendix, No. XIV. for this characteristic epistle. The Prussian veteran had not forgotten Davoust's atrocities at Hamburgh.

respective armies met, there, the three individuals appointed by the provisional government to adjust this important transaction.

The terms of the convention\* were soon agreed upon, as it merely "decided all the military questions at that moment existing" with regard to Paris, and "touched nothing of a political nature.†" The great objects which it had in view, were to place the French army in such a position, as to be no longer dangerous to the allies, and to contract no engagements which could embarrass the confederated sovereigns in any ultimate measures they might deem it expedient to adopt. Accordingly, the troops then in Paris were to withdraw and cross the Loire, and the capital was to be surrendered to the conquerors. Public and private property were to be equally respected, and as far as the contracting parties were concerned, no persons were to be questioned or molested for any political conduct which they had pursued. These stipulations of the 12th article, became subsequently the ground of much controversy and invective, when the traitor Ney appealed to them as a protection against the punishment due to his crimes. That subject, however, has already been discussed in a preceding part of this volume, and it will only be necessary to observe here, that the conditions granted by the victors to the vanquished, were not only honourable to their spirit of moderation and forbearance, but remarkably contrasted with the penal and confiscatory capitulations, commonly forced upon their enemies by Napoleon and his generals.—An attempt was made, by the French commissioners, to render this convention binding upon all the allied armies, but neither the Duke of Wellington nor Marshal Blucher having competent powers to do so, the 16th article declared "that it should be common to all the allied armies, provided it was ratified by the powers on which those armies were dependent." On the 7th of July, Paris was entirely evacuated by the rebel troops, and surrendered to the British and Prussians. On the 8th, Louis XVIII. once more entered it, and was received with every demonstration of popular joy, which, no doubt, was just as sincere, as the acclamations which lackeyed the heels of Napoleon three months before.

The menacing attitude which the army of the Loire assumed for some time towards the restored government, the consequent negotiations with its chiefs, its final dissolution, the diplomatic discussions which terminated in a treaty of peace

\* See Appendix, No. XV.

† Despatch of the Duke of Wellington, dated Gonasse, July 4, 1815.



on the 20th of November,\* the restitution of the plunder which France had pilaged from almost every country in Europe, during her wars of robbery and extortion, and the occupation of that kingdom by such a military force under the Duke of Wellington, as might prevent a repetition of any treacherous designs by the rebels, are topics that belong to the history of the age, rather than to an account of that single transaction by which they were produced. Many of them, if argued at all, would embrace a wide field of political reasoning ; but it may be observed, with regard to the two principal, that retributive justice demanded the inculcation of that " great moral lesson" which France would learn from being compelled to disgorge her unrighteous wealth, and that the safety of Europe required a measure which should coerce a people, ambitious, faithless, and oppressive, even to a proverb. The acrimony of faction, the exasperated sensibility of overtaken guilt, the blighted hopes of daring, active conspiracy, the gloomy rancour of despair, have arraigned the wisdom of this policy ; but let the moment of perturbation, of disappointed treason, of humiliated feeling, and angry invective pass away, and posterity will pronounce its solemn approbation of a system which crushed the very elements of discord, which asserted the eternal principles of social order, which enforced the means of peace, and which secured the world from a renewal of miseries, unexampled in the history of civilised nations.

It now only remains to follow the instructive fortunes of Napoleon to their ignoble close. He arrived at Rochefort on the 3d of July, the very day when Paris capitulated. His avowed design was to effect his escape to the United States, which, however, the vigilance of British cruisers happily baffled. Various schemes were projected for the accomplishment of this enterprise, and it was even meditated to cross the Atlantic in two small one-masted vessels, which were procured. A week was thus consumed, and he still deferred his departure, not without hope that some explosion of civil discord would protract the struggle for his abdicated crown. When, at length, he heard that Paris had capitulated, that the provisional government was dissolved, and that the King had resumed his authority, he became more anxious for his personal safety. Flight to America

\* In the interval between the 27th of June and the conclusion of peace, that part of the Duke of Wellington's army commanded by Prince Frederick of Holland, took the fortress of Le Quesnoy, and made conventions with the other fortresses of the north, by which they acknowledged the authority of Louis XVIII. The Prussian army, also, with the assistance of the British battering train took the fortresses of Maubeuge, Landrecy, Rocroy, Marienburg, Phillipville, and Givet. The German corps, under Lieutenant-General Hacke, captured Mezieres, Sedan, and Montmedy, while the garrison of Longwy surrendered to the Prince of Hesse-Homburg.

was encompassed with more danger than he wished to encounter, and more obstacles than he could expect to overcome. He applied to the commander of the British squadron, for permission to pass, giving a solemn assurance that he intended to retire to the United States. This request was refused, and the refusal accompanied with a declaration, that if the Emperor attempted to put to sea, his ships would be attacked. There was then no alternative but to surrender, (which he called throwing himself upon the generosity of England,) or to remain till the agents of Louis conveyed him to some prison. With that nice distinction between possible and positive evils which he had so frequently manifested, he determined upon the former, and persons of his suite were despatched to Captain Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*, to arrange the mode of his reception. It was endeavoured to inveigle Captain Maitland, into a recognition of Napoleon's right to choose his place of residence, and the condition of his future existence. But the attempt failed, and he was informed that no other terms could be conceded, than simply to convey him to England, leaving his ultimate destiny at the discretion of the Prince Regent.

To these proposals he reluctantly yielded, but consoled himself with dictating the following letter to his Royal Highness, which he imagined would inspire every exalted sentiment that he could wish to find in the arbiters of his fate :—

“ Rochefort, 13 Juillet, 1815.

“ Altesse Royale,

“ EN butte aux factions qui divisent mon pays, et à l'inimitié des plus grandes puissances de l'Europe, j'ai terminé ma carrière politique; et je viens, comme Themistocle, m'asseoir sur les foyers du peuple Britannique. Je me mets sous la protection de ses lois, que je reclame de votre Altesse Royale, comme le plus puissant, le plus constant, et le plus généreux de mes ennemis.

“ NAPOLEON.”

This scrap of ancient lore, fit to point the moral of a school-boy's theme, preceded Napoleon's arrival on the English coast. Whom did it captivate? The worshippers of a fallen tyrant, who, as they had extolled his despotism, applauded his pedantry. The majority, not misled by vulgar or insidious admiration, duly appreciated the value of that magnanimity, which, driven from all its shifts and evasions, selected England in its last necessity, as the least of those perils by which it was beset. The patriotism of a criminal, who, having his choice, prefers the navy to Newgate, ranks precisely in the same scale of moral excellence with the elevation



of Napoleon, who, when he could not fly to America, sublimely resolved to accept the protection of Great Britain. On the 15th of July, he performed this illustrious act, and was received with his suite on board the *Bellerophon*,\* which immediately set sail, and arrived at Torbay on the 24th. The most urgent solicitations were employed, to obtain permission for him to reside in this country, but in vain; and it was at length resolved that he should be conveyed to St. Helena. Against this decision, which precluded him from all hope of ever again disturbing the tranquillity of mankind, he vehemently remonstrated, and entered a solemn protest "in the face of heaven." He wished to be considered as the "guest" of England; but England, undesirous of his company, preferred to regard him as her prisoner; a prisoner whom she held for the safety and happiness of the world. In concurrence, therefore, with her allies, she undertook to provide him with an asylum, where at least he would preserve what he most prized, his life.† There he arrived, having been removed to the Northumberland, on the 18th of October, 1815, and there he remains, in the possession of every personal comfort consistent with his safe custody.‡

\* It has been remarked, as a curious coincidence, that an Englishman, Sir Sidney Smith, first foiled his enterprises in Egypt; that an Irishman, the Duke of Wellington, struck the final blow to his ambitious career, and that a Scotsman, Captain Maitland, received him into captivity.

† See Appendix, No. XVI. for the instructions given to Sir George Cockburn, concerning the treatment of Napoleon.

‡ While this sheet was passing through the press, the following Memorial, addressed by Bonaparte, through the Count de Montholon, to Sir Hudson Lowe, the Governor of St. Helena, appeared in the public papers, and excited much attention. The arguments of the first part may be left to the decision of jurists; the complaints of the latter, can be explained by any gaoler in Europe. They amount to this:— Napoleon is so securely watched, that no artifice of himself or his attendants can mature a scheme for his escape, and what prisoner does not endure a similar grievance? That he should become impatient of such vigilance, is natural; but that his petulant remonstrances ought to create any relaxation, implies an absurdity. Why was he banished to St. Helena? That the custody of his person might be complete, and the intercourse with his partisans utterly destroyed. Unnecessary and wanton rigour, even to such a man, would be inconsistent with the mild spirit of British legislation; while confidence in his honour would betray a consummate ignorance of his character. His whole career was one uniform violation of moral and social duty. If, then, in his adversity, he finds the cup dashed with a bitterness, extracted from his own example, let him not be disgusted with the remedy, but remember the malignity of the disease.

" .....In these cases,  
We still have judgment here; that we but teach  
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return  
To plague the inventor; this even-handed justice  
Commends the ingredients of our poison'd chalice  
To our own lips....."

In this inglorious exile, he may probably linger many years, a memorable example of the vicissitudes of human greatness. He carries with him no sympathy, no commiseration, except from those who in his fall find their own ruin, or those whom political prejudice has taught to venerate the instrument of their

It would be idle to waste one moment upon the contemptible fabrications of Santini; but it may be further observed, with respect to the subsequent Memorial, that when Lord Holland brought it before the House of Lords, it received a complete refutation from Earl Bathurst;† so complete, that (though unsupported by documents) they alone will be disposed to question it, who consider the unimpeached veracity of a British minister less credible than the angry invectives of a man, whose recorded falsehoods probably outnumber the days he has lived.

“ MEMORIAL.

“ General,

“ I HAVE received the Treaty of the 2nd of August, 1815, concluded between his Britannic Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, which accompanied your letter of the 23d of July.

“ The Emperor Napoleon protests against the contents of that Treaty. He is not the prisoner of England. After having placed his abdication in the hands of the Representatives of the Nation, for the *advantage of the Constitution adopted by the French People, and in favour of his Son*, he repaired voluntarily and freely to England, with the view of living there, as a private individual, under the protection of the British laws. The violation of every law cannot constitute a right. The person of the Emperor Napoleon is actually in the power of England; but he neither has been, nor is, in the power of Austria, Russia, and Prussia; either in fact or of right, even according to the laws and customs of England, which never included, in the exchange of prisoners, Russians, Prussians, Austrians, Spaniards, or Portuguese, though united to these powers by treaties of alliance, and making war conjointly with them.

“ The Convention of the 2d of August, concluded fifteen days after the Emperor was in England, cannot have of right any effect. It exhibits only a spectacle of the coalition of the four greatest Powers of Europe for the oppression of *a single man*!—a coalition which the opinion of every nation and all the principles of sound morality equally disavow.

“ The Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, having neither in fact or in right any claim over the person of the Emperor Napoleon, could decide nothing respecting him.

“ Had the Emperor Napoleon been in the power of the Emperor of Austria, that Prince would have recollected the relations which religion and nature have formed *between a father and a son*—relations which are never violated with impunity. He would have recollected that Napoleon had *four times* restored to him his throne; viz. at Leoben in 1797—at Luneville in 1804, when his armies were under the walls of Vienna—at Presburg in 1806—and at Vienna in 1809, when his armies had possession of the capital and three-fourths of the monarchy! That Prince would have recollected the protestations he made to Napoleon at the *bivouac* in Moravia in 1806—and at the interview in Dresden in 1812.

† See Appendix, No. XVII.



designs, the artificer of their wishes. Execrated by millions whom he has oppressed, followed by the malediction of all who survive his tyranny, despised by those who imagined the hero blended with the victor,—living, only to himself,—dead, to the world, his name already begins to gather those honours with which it will descend

“ Had the person of the Emperor Napoleon been in the power of the Emperor Alexander, he would have recollected the ties of friendship contracted at Tilsit, at Erfurth, and during *twelve years of daily correspondence*. He would have recollected the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon the day after the battle of Austerlitz, when, though he could have made him, with the wreck of his army, *prisoner*, contented himself, with taking his parole, and allowed him to operate his retreat. He would have recollected the dangers to which the Emperor Napoleon personally exposed himself in order to extinguish the fire at Moscow, and to preserve that capital for him; assuredly, that Prince would never have violated the duties of friendship and gratitude towards a friend in misfortune.

“ Had the person of the Emperor Napoleon been in the power of the King of Prussia, that sovereign could not have forgotten that it depended on the Emperor, after the battle of Friedland, to place another Prince on the throne of Berlin. He would not have forgotten, in the presence of a *disarmed* enemy, the protestations of attachment, and the sentiments of gratitude, which he testified to him in 1812, at the interview in Dresden.

“ It accordingly appears, from Articles II. and V. of the Treaty of the 2d of August, that these Princes, being incapable of exercising any influence over the disposal of the Emperor, who was not in their power, accede to what may be done thereon by his Britannic Majesty, who takes upon himself the charge of fulfilling every obligation. These Princes have reproached the Emperor Napoleon with having preferred the protection of the English laws to their's. The false ideas which the Emperor Napoleon had formed of the liberality of the laws of England, and of the *influence of the opinion of a great, generous, and free people over their government*, decided him to prefer the protection of *these* laws to that of a *father-in-law*, or an old friend.

“ The Emperor Napoleon had it in his power to secure, by a diplomatic treaty, whatever was personal to himself, by putting himself either at the head of the army of the Loire, or at the head of the army of the Gironde, commanded by General Clausel; but wishing, henceforth, for nothing but retirement, and the protection of the laws of a free state, either English or American, all stipulations appeared to him unnecessary. He conceived that the English people were more bound by a conduct which was, on his part, frank, noble, and full of confidence, than they would have been by the most solemn treaties. *He has been deceived*: but this error will for ever cause *true* Britons to blush; and will, in the present, as well as the future generations, be a *proof of the bad faith of the English administration*.

“ Austrian and Prussian Commissioners are arrived at St. Helena. If the object of their mission be the fulfilment of a part of the duties which the Emperors of Austria and Russia have contracted by the Treaty of the 2d of August, and to take care that the English Agents, in a small colony in the midst of the ocean, do not fail in the respect due to a Prince connected with these Sovereigns by the bonds of *relationship* and so many other ties, proofs of the character which belong to these two Monarchs will be recognized in this proceeding; but you, Sir, have declared that these Commissioners have neither *the right nor the power of giving any opinion on what may be passing on this rock!*

to posterity. In him, the lust of ambition, the rage of conquest; was unredeemed by a single virtue upon which the mind can repose, when fatigued by the contemplation of his guilt. In prosperity, he was insolent and unrelenting; in adversity, servile and pusillanimous:—in war, he was cruel; in peace, perfidious.

“ The English Ministers have caused the Emperor Napoleon to be transported to St. Helena, at the distance of 2000 leagues from Europe! This Rock, situated within the tropics, and 500 leagues from any continent, is subject to the devouring heats of these latitudes. It is covered with clouds and fogs during three-fourths of the year, and is at once the most arid and the most humid country in the world. Such a climate is most inimical to the health of the Emperor, and hatred must have dictated the choice of this residence, as well as the instructions given by the English Ministry to the officers commanding in the Island.

“ They have even been ordered to call the Emperor Napoleon *General*, as if it were wished to oblige him to consider himself as never having reigned in France.

“ The reason which determined him not to assume an *incognito* name, as he might have resolved to do on leaving France, were these: First Magistrate for life of the Republic under the title of First Consul, he concluded the preliminaries of London, and the treaty of Amiens, with the King of Great Britain; and received, as ambassadors, Lord Cornwallis, Mr. Merry, and Lord Whitworth, who resided in that quality at his court. He accredited to the King of England Count Otto and General Andreossi, who resided as ambassadors at the court of Windsor. When, after an exchange of letters between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two Monarchies, Lord Lauderdale came to Paris invested with full powers from the King of England, he treated with the Plenipotentiaries possessing full powers from the Emperor Napoleon, and remained for several months at the court of the Tuilleries. When Lord Castlereagh afterwards signed, at Chatillon, the *ultimatum*, which the Allied Powers presented to the Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor Napoleon, he recognised by that the fourth dynasty. This *ultimatum* was more advantageous than the treaty of Paris; but, in exacting that France should renounce Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, it exacted what was contrary to the propositions of Frankfort, and the proclamations of the Allied Powers—what was contrary to the oath, by which, at his coronation, the Emperor swore to maintain the integrity of the Empire. The Emperor, besides, thought that these natural limits were necessary, both for the security of France, and to preserve the equilibrium of Europe; he thought that the French nation, in the situation in which it was, ought rather to run the hazard of all the chances of war than to depart from that policy: France had obtained this integrity, and would have preserved it with honour, if treason had not arrayed itself in aid of the allies.

“ The Treaty of the 2d of August, and the Act of the British Parliament called the Emperor Napoleon, Bonaparte, and gave him only the title of General. The title of General Bonaparte is doubtless eminently glorious; the Emperor bore it at Lodi, at Castiglione, at Rivoli, at Arcole, at Leoben, at the Pyramids, at Aboukir: but for seventeen years he has borne that of First Consul and Emperor, which proves that he has been both First Magistrate of the Republic, and Sovereign of the fourth Dynasty. Those who think that nations are flocks which belong, of divine right, to certain families, do not belong to the age; nor do they participate in the spirit of the English legislature, which has several times changed the order of its Dynasty, because great changes had taken place in public opinion, in which the reigning Princes not participating, they became enemies to the welfare of the great majority of the nation: for kings are only hereditary Magistrates, who exist for the welfare of nations, and not nations for the satisfaction of Kings.



His projects were great, but criminal ; his means vast, but afflictive. Justice, honour, faith, were baubles that he played with to ensnare his prey, but sophisms

“ It is in the same hateful spirit that orders have been given that the Emperor Napoleon shall not be allowed to write or receive any letters, unless they are opened and read by the English Ministers and the officers at St. Helena. They have interdicted to him the possibility of receiving intelligence from his wife, his mother, his son, or his brothers ; and when, in order to avoid the inconvenience of having his letters read by subaltern officers, he wished to send letters sealed to the Prince Regent, he was told that the order could not be departed from, and that the letters must pass open, such being the instructions of the Ministry. This conduct needs no observation ; it gives rise, however, to strange ideas as to the spirit of the Administration which could dictate what would be disavowed even at Algiers. Letters have arrived at St. Helena, for the Officers in the suite of the Emperor ; they were broke open and transmitted to you, but you have not communicated them, because they did not come through the channel of the English Ministry. Thus they had to go back 4000 leagues ; and these Officers had the grief of knowing, that there was intelligence on the Rock from their wives, their mothers, their children, and that they could not know the nature of it for six months :—the heart must solace itself.

“ They could not obtain either *The Morning Chronicle*, *The Morning Post*, or any French Journals. Now and then a few stray numbers of *The Times* reached Longwood. In consequence of a request made on board the *Northumberland*, some books were sent ; but all those relative to the affairs of late years have been carefully kept back. He wished to correspond with a bookseller in London, in order to have direct the books which he wanted, and those relative to the events of the day : this was prevented. An English author, having made a tour in France, and having published an account of it in London, he took the trouble to transmit it to you, in order that it might be presented to the Emperor ; you thought proper not to transmit it because it was not sent to you by the express desire of your Government. It is said also, that other books sent by their authors have not been transmitted, because some of them were inscribed to the Emperor Napoleon, and others to Napoleon the Great. The English Ministry is not authorized to order any of these vexations ; the law, although unique, by which the British Parliament regards the Emperor Napoleon as a prisoner of war, has never prohibited prisoners of war from subscribing to journals or receiving printed books : such a prohibition only takes place in the dungeons of the Inquisition.

“ The island of St. Helena is ten leagues in circumference ; it is inaccessible every where ; brigs surround the coast ; posts are stationed on the shore within sight of each other, which renders impracticable any communication with the sea. There is only one small town (James Town), where there is an anchorage, and where vessels touch. To prevent an individual from quitting the island, it is sufficient to guard the shore by land and sea. To lay an interdict on the interior of the island can therefore have no other object than to deprive him of a promenade of from eight to ten miles, which it would be possible to make on horseback, and the privation of which will shorten the life of the Emperor. The Emperor has been established at Longwood, exposed to every wind, and where the land is sterile and uninhabitable, without water, and not susceptible of any cultivation. There is a circuit marked out of about 1200 toises ; at about 11 or 1200 distance a camp is established on a hill, and another camp in an opposite position at the same distance ; in short, in the midst of the heat of the tropic there is nothing to be seen but camps. Admiral Malcolm, having learnt the utility which the Emperor would derive from a tent in that situation, caused one to be set up by his sailors, at twenty paces distance, in front of the house ; it was the only place in which a shade could be found. The Emperor had as much reason to be satisfied with the spirit that

to be discarded, when he grasped it. The refinement of his policy was to laugh at the dupes of his artifice. With the power to do good, he had the will only to

animated the officers and soldiers of the brave 53d regiment, as he had been with the crew of the Northumberland.

“ The house at Longwood was built to serve as a barn for the Company’s farm; the Deputy Governor of the Island had since built some chambers; it served him for a country-house, but it was not in a proper habitable state: workmen have been employed at it for a year, and the Emperor has been continually subjected to the inconvenience and insalubrity of inhabiting a house in the progress of building. The chamber in which he sleeps is too small to contain a bed of ordinary dimensions; but every alteration at Longwood prolongs the inconvenience of having workmen there. There are, however, in this miserable territory, beautiful situations, presenting fine trees, gardens, and good houses. There is, besides, Plantation House; but the positive instructions of Government forbid you from giving up this house, although much expence would thereby have been saved to your Government—an expence incurred in fitting up at Longwood a hut, covered with paper, which is already unserviceable.

“ You have interdicted all correspondence between us and the inhabitants of the island—you have, in fact, placed the house at Longwood *au secret*—you have even prevented any communication with the officers of the garrison;—it seems, therefore, to be your study to deprive us of the little resource which this miserable territory affords, and we are here just as we should be on the insulated and uninhabited rock of Ascension. During the four months that you have been at St. Helena, you have, Sir, rendered the situation of the Emperor much worse. Count Bertrand has observed to you, that you violate even the laws of your Legislature, and that you trample under foot the rights of General Officers, prisoners of war. You have replied, that you act according to the letter of your instructions, and that your conduct to us is not worse than is dictated by them.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

“ The GENERAL COUNT DE MONTHOLON.

“ After I had signed this letter, I received your’s of the 17th August, in which you subjoin the account of an annual sum of £20,000 sterling, which you consider indispensable for the support of the expences of the establishment at Longwood, after having made all the reductions which you thought possible. We do not think we have any thing to do with the discussion of this point; the table of the Emperor is scarcely provided with strict necessities, and all the provisions are of the worst quality. You ask of the Emperor a fund of £12,000 sterling, as your Government will only allow £8000 for all the expences. I have already had the honour of informing you that the Emperor had no funds, that for a year past he had neither written nor received any letter, and that he is altogether ignorant of what has passed, or is passing, in Europe. Transported by force to this rock, without being able to write or to receive any answer, the Emperor is now entirely at the mercy of English agents. The Emperor has always desired, and is still desirous, to provide himself for all his expences, of whatever nature, and he will do it as soon as you render it possible by taking off the interdiction laid upon the merchants of the Island with regard to his correspondence, and directing that it should not be subjected to any inquisition on your part, or by any of your agents. Thenceforth the wants of the Emperor would be known in Europe, and those persons who interested themselves in his behalf might send him the funds necessary to provide for them.

“ The letter of Lord Bathurst, which you have communicated to me, gives birth to strange ideas. Are



inflict evil. Subtle and malignant, wherever treachery could betray, mischief inevitably followed. His dominion, like a pestilence, blighted the energies of nature, and his footsteps were tracked by desolation, silence, and despair. Thought alone was free, but action moved in the unvarying circle which his despotism had traced. Frightful was that solitude of the mind, shrinking from the perilous interchange of sentiment to which his vassals were reduced. None dared to speak, who did not dare to encounter dungeons, exile, or death. The blandishments of social intercourse were destroyed, and innocence was no longer the shield of private life. Such was the man, such was the system, such were the calamities, which found their grave on the field of Waterloo; and while we exult in the victory, as a proud addition to our national glory, let us also rejoice for mankind, who that day received their deliverance from our hands.


your Ministers, then, ignorant that the spectacle of a great man in captivity and adversity is a most sublime spectacle? Are they ignorant that Napoleon at St. Helena, in the midst of persecutions of every description, to which he opposes nothing but serenity, is greater, more sacred, and more venerable, than when seated upon the first throne in the world, where for so long a time he was the arbiter of Kings? Those who in such a situation are wanting to Napoleon, are blind to their own character, and that of the nation which they represent.

“MONTOLON.”

















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




















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













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


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













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


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
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













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












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




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From map by H. Colburn del.





# APPENDIX.

## No. I.

Au Golfe-Juan le 1<sup>er</sup> Mars 1815.

Napoleon, par la Grâce de Dieu et les Constitutions de L'Etat, Empereur des Français, &c. &c. &c.

### A L'ARMÉE.

Soldats!

*Nous n'avons pas été vaincus.* Deux hommes sortis de nos rangs ont trahi nos lauriers, leur pays, leur prince, leur bienfaiteur.

Ceux que nous avons vu pendant vingt-cinq ans parcourir toute l'Europe pour nous susciter des ennemis, qui ont passé leur vie à combattre contre nous dans les rangs des armées étrangères, en maudissant notre belle France, prétendraient-ils commander et enchaîner nos aigles, eux qui n'ont jamais pu en soutenir les regards? Souffrirons-nous qu'ils héritent du fruit de nos glorieux travaux? qu'ils s'emparent de nos honneurs, de nos biens; qu'ils calomnient notre gloire? Si leur règne durait, tout serait perdu, même le souvenir de ces immortelles journées.

Avec quel acharnement ils les dénaturent! ils cherchent à empoisonner ce que le monde admire; et s'il reste encore des défenseurs de notre gloire, c'est parmi ces mêmes ennemis que nous avons combattus sur le champ de bataille.

Soldats! dans mon exil j'ai entendu votre voix; je suis arrivé à travers tous les obstacles et tous les périls.

Votre général, appelé au trône par le choix du peuple, et élevé sur vos pavois, vous est rendu: venez le joindre.

Arrachez ces couleurs que la nation a prosrites, et qui, pendant vingt-cinq ans, servirent de ralliement à tous les ennemis de la France; arborez cette cocarde tricolore: vous la portiez dans nos grandes journées!

Nous devons oublier que nous avons été les maîtres des nations; mais nous ne devons pas souffrir qu'aucune se mêle de nos affaires. Qui prétendrait être maître chez nous? Qui en aurait le pouvoir? Reprenez ces aigles que vous aviez à Ulm, à Austerlitz, à Jena, à Eylau, à Friedland, à Tudella, à Eckmühl, à Essling, à Wagram, à Smolensk, à la Moscowa, à Lutzen, à Vurtchen, à Montmirail. Pensez-vous que cette poignée de Français, aujourd'hui si arrogans, puissent en soutenir la vue? Ils retourneront, d'où ils viennent, et là, s'ils le veulent, ils régneront comme ils prétendent avoir régné depuis dix-neuf ans.

Vos biens, vos rangs, votre gloire, les biens, les rangs et la gloire de vos enfans, n'ont pas de plus grands ennemis que ces princes que les étrangers nous ont imposés; ils sont les ennemis de notre gloire, puisque le récit de tant d'actions héroïques, qui ont illustré le peuple français combattant contre eux pour se soustraire à leur joug, est leur condamnation.

Les vétérans des armées de Sambre et Meuse, du Rhin, d'Italie, d'Egypte, de l'Ouest, de la Grande-Armée, sont humiliés; leurs honorables cicatrices sont flétries; leurs succès seraient des crimes; ces braves seraient des rebelles, si, comme le prétendent les ennemis du peuple, des souverains légitimes étaient au milieu des armées étrangères. Les honneurs, les récompenses, les affections sont pour ceux qui les ont servis contre la patrie et nous.

Soldats! venez vous ranger sous les drapeaux de votre chef. Son existence ne se compose que de la vôtre; ses droits ne sont que ceux du peuple et les vôtres; son intérêt, son honneur, sa gloire, ne sont autres que votre intérêt, votre honneur et votre gloire. La victoire marchera au pas de charge; l'aigle avec les couleurs nationales volera de clocher en clocher jusqu'aux tours de Notre-Dame: alors vous pourrez montrer avec honneur vos cicatrices; alors vous pourrez vous vanter de ce que vous aurez fait; vous serez les libérateurs de la patrie.

Dans votre vieillesse, entourés et considérés de vos concitoyens, ils vous entendront avec respect raconter vos hauts faits; vous pourrez dire avec orgueil: *Et moi aussi je faisais partie de cette grande armée* qui est entrée deux fois dans les murs de Vienne, dans ceux de Rome, de Berlin, de Madrid, de



oscou, qui a délivré Paris de la souillure que la trahison et la présence de l'ennemi y ont empreinte. honneur à ces braves soldats, la gloire de la patrie ! et honte éternelle aux Français criminels, dans quelque ig que la fortune les ait fait naître, qui combattirent vingt-cinq ans avec l'étranger pour déchirer le sein la patrie !

(Signé)                      NAPOLEON.

Au Golfe-Juan le 1<sup>er</sup> Mars, 1815.

Napoleon, par la Grace de Dieu et les Constitutions de L'Etat, Empereur des Français, &c. &c. &c.

PROCLAMATION AU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS.

Français !

La défection du duc de Castiglione livra Lyon sans défense à nos ennemis ; l'armée dont je lui avais confié le commandement était, par le nombre de ses bataillons, la bravoure et le patriotisme des troupes qui la composaient, à même de battre le corps d'armée autrichien qui lui était opposé, et d'arriver sur les derrières du flanc gauche de l'armée ennemie qui menaçait Paris.

Les victoires de Champ-Aubert, de Montmirail, de Château-Thierry, de Vauchamp, de Mormans, de Montebello, de Craone, de Reims, d'Arcis-sur-Aube et de Saint-Dizier, l'insurrection des braves paysans de la Lorraine, de la Champagne, de l'Alsace, de la Franche-Comté et de la Bourgogne, et la position que j'avais prise sur les derrières de l'armée ennemie en la séparant de ses magasins, de ses parcs de réserve, de ses convois et de tous ses équipages, l'avaient placée dans une situation désespérée. Les Français ne furent pas mais sûr le point d'être plus puissans, et l'élite de l'armée ennemie était perdue sans ressource ; elle eût trouvé son tombeau dans ces vastes contrées qu'elle avait si impitoyablement saccagées, lorsque la trahison du duc de Raguse livra la capitale et désorganisa l'armée. La conduite inattendue de ces deux généraux, qui adhèrent à la fois leur patrie, leur prince et leur bienfaiteur, changea le destin de la guerre. La situation désastreuse de l'ennemi était telle, qu'à la fin de l'affaire qui eut lieu devant Paris, il était sans munitions, et la séparation de ses parcs de réserve.

Dans ces nouvelles et grandes circonstances, mon cœur fut déchiré, mais mon âme resta inébranlable. Je ne consultai que l'intérêt de la patrie ; je m'exilai sur un rocher au milieu des mers : ma vie vous était dévouée ; elle devait encore vous être utile ; je ne permis pas que le grand nombre de citoyens qui voulaient m'accompagner partageassent mon sort ; je crus leur présence utile à la France, et je n'emmenai avec moi qu'une poignée de braves, nécessaires à ma garde.

Elevé au trône par votre choix, tout ce qui a été fait sans vous est illégitime. Depuis vingt-cinq ans la France a de nouveaux intérêts, de nouvelles institutions, une nouvelle gloire qui ne peuvent être garantis que par un gouvernement national et par une dynastie née dans ces nouvelles circonstances. Un prince qui régnerait sur vous, qui serait assis sur mon trône par la force des mêmes armées qui ont ravagé notre territoire, chercherait en vain à s'étayer des principes du droit féodal ; il ne pourrait assurer l'honneur et les droits que d'un petit nombre d'individus ennemis du peuple, qui, depuis vingt-cinq ans les a condamnés dans toutes nos assemblées nationales. Votre tranquillité intérieure et votre considération extérieure seraient éternellement perdues à jamais.

Français ! dans mon exil, j'ai entendu vos plaintes et vos vœux ; vous réclamez ce gouvernement de votre choix qui seul est légitime. Vous accusez mon long sommeil, vous me reprochiez de sacrifier à mon repos les grands intérêts de la patrie.

J'ai traversé les mers au milieu des périls de toute espèce ; j'arrive parmi vous reprendre mes droits qui sont les vôtres. Tout ce que des individus ont fait, écrit ou dit depuis la prise de Paris, je l'ignore ; cela n'influera en rien sur le souvenir que je conserve des services importants qu'ils ont rendus, car il est des événemens d'une telle nature qu'ils sont au-dessus de l'organisation humaine.

Français ! il n'est aucune nation, quelque petite qu'elle soit, qui n'ait eu le droit de se soustraire et qui ne se soit soustraite au déshonneur d'obéir à un prince imposé par un ennemi momentanément victorieux. Lorsque Charles VII. rentra à Paris et renversa le trône éphémère de Henri VI, il reconnut tenir son trône de la vaillance de ses braves et non d'un prince régent d'Angleterre.

C'est aussi à vous seuls, et aux braves de l'armée, que je fais et ferai toujours gloire de tout devoir.

(Signé)                      NAPOLEON.

The official account of Napoleon's progress from Cannes is too curious to be omitted. It is inserted as an *authentic* commentary upon the text of this Volume.

*Relation officielle de la Marche de Buonaparte de L'île d'Elbe à Paris, publiée par lui, le 22 Mars.*

L'EMPEREUR, instruit que le peuple en France avoit perdu tous ses droits acquis pendant vingt-cinq années de combats et de victoires, et que l'armée étoit attaquée dans sa gloire, résolut de fair changer cet état de choses, de rétablir le trône impérial, qui seul pouvoit garantir les droits de la nation, et de faire disparaître ce trône royal que le peuple avoit proscrit comme ne garantissant que les intérêts d'un petit nombre d'individus.

Le 26 Février, à cinq heures du soir, il s'embarqua sur un brick portant vingt-six canons avec quatre cents hommes de sa garde. Trois autres bâtimens qui se trouvoient dans le port, et qui furent saisis, reçurent deux cents hommes d'infanterie, cent cheveau-légers polonais, et le bataillon des flanquers, de deux cents hommes. Le vent étoit du sud, et paroissoit favorable. Le capitaine, Chautard, avoit espoir qu'avant la pointe du jour, l'île de Capraïa seroit doublée, et qu'on seroit hors des croisières françaises et anglaises, qui observoient de ce côté. Cet espoir fut déçu. On avoit à peine doublé le cap Saint-André de l'île d'Elbe, que le vent mollit, la mer devint calme ; à la pointe du jour on n'avoit fait que six lieues, et l'on étoit encore entre l'île de Capraïa et l'île d'Elbe, en vue des croisières.

Le péril paroissoit imminent. Plusieurs marins étoient d'opinion de retourner à Porto-Ferraio. L'empereur ordonna qu'on continuât la navigation, ayant pour ressource, en dernier événement de s'emparer de la croisière Française. Elle se composoit de deux frégates et d'un brick ; mais tout ce qu'on savoit de l'attachement des équipages à la gloire nationale, ne permettoit pas de douter qu'ils arboreroient le pavillon tricolore, et se rangeroient de notre côté. Vers midi, le vent fraîchit un peu. A quatre heures après midi, on se trouva à la hauteur de Livourne. Une frégate paroissoit à cinq lieues sous le vent, une autre étoit sur les côtes de Corse, et de loin, un bâtiment de guerre venoit droit vent arrière à la rencontre du brick. A six heures du soir, le brick que montoit l'empereur se croisa avec un brick qu'on reconnut être le *Zéphir*, monté par le capitaine Andrieux, officier distingué autant par ses talens, que par son véritable patriotisme. On proposa d'abord de parler au brick, et de lui faire arborer le pavillon tricolore. Cependant l'empereur donna ordre aux soldats de la garde d'ôter leurs bonnets, et de se cacher sur le pont, préférant passer à côté du brick sans se laisser reconnoître, et se réservant le parti de le faire changer de pavillon si on étoit obligé d'y recourir. Les deux bricks passèrent bord à bord. Le lieutenant de vaisseau, Taillade, officier de la marine française, étoit très connu du capitaine Andrieux, et dès qu'on fut à portée on parla. On demanda au capitaine Andrieux s'il avoit des commissions pour Gênes ; on se fit quelques honnêtetés, et les deux bricks, allant en sens contraire, furent bientôt hors de vue, sans que le capitaine Andrieux se doutât de ce que portoit ce frêle bâtiment !

Dans la nuit du 27 au 28, le vent continua de fraîchir. A la pointe du jour, on reconnut un bâtiment de soixante-quatorze, qui avoit l'air de se diriger ou sur Saint-Florent, ou sur la Sardaigne. On ne tarda pas à s'apercevoir que ce bâtiment ne s'occupoit pas du brick.

Le 28, à sept heures du matin, on découvrit les côtes de Noli ; à midi, Antibes. A trois heures, le 1<sup>er</sup> Mars, on entra dans le golfe de Juan.

L'empereur ordonna qu'un capitaine de la garde, avec vingt-cinq hommes, débarquât avant le garnison du brick, pour s'assurer de la batterie de côte, s'il en existoit une. Ce capitaine conçut, de son chef, l'idée de faire changer de cocarde au bataillon qui étoit dans Antibes. Il se jeta imprudemment dans la place ; l'officier qui y commandoit pour le Roi, fit lever les ponts-levis et fermer les portes : sa troupe prit les armes ; mais elle eut respect pour ces vieux soldats et pour leur cocarde qu'elle chérissoit. Cependant l'opération du capitaine échoua, et ses hommes restèrent prisonniers dans Antibes.

A cinq heures après midi, le débarquement au golfe Juan étoit achevé. On établit un bivouac au bord de la mer jusqu'au lever de la lune.

A onze heures du soir, l'empereur se mit à la tête de cette poignée de braves, au sort de laquelle étoient attachées de si grandes destinées. Il se rendit à Cannes, de là à Grasse, et, par Saint-Vallier, il arriva dans la soirée du 2 au village de *Cérénon*, ayant fait vingt lieues dans cette première journée. Le peuple de Cannes reçut l'empereur avec des sentimens qui furent le premier présage du succès de l'entreprise.

Le 3, l'empereur coucha à Barème ; le 4, il dina à Digne. De Castellane à Digne, et dans tout le département des Basses-Alpes, les paysans, instruits de la marche de l'empereur, accouroient de tous côtés sur la routes, et manifestoient leurs sentimens avec une énergie qui ne laissoit plus de doutes.

Le 5, le général Cambronne, avec une avant-garde de quarante grenadiers, s'empara du pont et de la forteresse de Sisteron.

Le même jour, l'empereur coucha à Gap avec dix hommes à cheval, et quarante grenadiers.



L'enthousiasme qu'inspiroit la présence de l'empereur aux habitans des Basses-Alpes, la haine qu'ils portoient à la noblesse, faisoient assez comprendre quel étoit le vœu général de la province du Dauphiné.

A deux heures après midi, le 6, l'empereur partit de Gap, et la population de la ville tout entière étoit sur son passage.

A *Saint-Bonnet*, les habitans, voyant le petit nombre de sa troupe, eurent des craintes, et proposèrent à l'empereur de sonner le tocsin pour réunir les villages, et l'accompagner en masse. "Non, dit l'empereur; vos sentimens me font connoître que je ne me suis pas trompé. Ils sont pour moi un sûr garant des sentimens de mes soldats. Ceux que je rencontrerai se rangeront de mon côté; plus ils seront, plus mon succès sera assuré. Restez donc tranquilles chez vous!"

On avoit imprimé à Gap plusieurs milliers de proclamations adressées par l'empereur à l'armée et au peuple et de celles des soldats de la garde à leurs camarades. Ces proclamations se répandirent avec la rapidité de l'éclair dans tout le Dauphiné.

Le même jour, l'empereur vint coucher à Gorp. Les quarante hommes d'avant-garde du général Cambronne, allèrent coucher jusqu'à la *Mûre*. Ils se rencontrèrent avec l'avant-garde d'une division de six mille hommes de troupes de ligne qui venoit de Grenoble pour arrêter leur marche. Le général Cambronne voulut parlementer avec les avant-postes. On lui répondit qu'il y avoit défense de communiquer. Cependant cette avant-garde de la division de Grenoble recula de trois lieues, et vint prendre position entre les lacs au village de —

L'empereur, instruit de cette circonstance, se porta sur les lieux; il trouva sur la ligne opposée,

Un bataillon du 5<sup>e</sup> de ligne,

Une compagnie de sapeurs,

Une compagnie de mineurs, en tout sept à huit cents hommes; il envoya son officier d'ordonnance, le chef d'escadron Raoul, pour faire connoître à ces troupes la nouvelle de son arrivée; mais cet officier ne pouvoit se faire entendre: un lui opposoit toujours la défense qui avoit été faite de communiquer. L'empereur mit pied à terre, et alla droit au bataillon, suivi de la garde portant l'arme sous le bras. Il se fit reconnoître, et dit que le premier soldat qui voudroit tuer son empereur le pouvoit; le cri unanime de *Vive l'Empereur!* fut leur réponse. Ce brave régiment avoit été sous les ordres de l'empereur dès ses premières campagnes d'Italie. La garde et les soldats s'embrassèrent. Les soldats du 5<sup>e</sup> arrachèrent sur-le-champ leur cocarde, et prirent, avec enthousiasme et la larme à l'œil, la cocarde tricolore. Lorsqu'ils furent rangés en bataille, l'empereur leur dit: "Je viens avec une poignée de braves, parce que je compte sur le peuple et sur vous. Le trône des Bourbons est illégitime, puisqu'il n'a pas été élevé par la nation; il est contraire à la volonté nationale, puisqu'il est contraire aux intérêts de notre pays, et qu'il n'existe que dans l'intérêt de quelques familles. Demandez à vos pères; interrogez tous ces habitans qui arrivent ici des environs: vous apprendrez de leur propre bouche la véritable situation des choses. Ils sont menacés du retour des dîmes, des privilèges, des droits féodaux, et de tous les abus dont vos succès les avoient délivrés; n'est-il pas vrai, paysans?"—"Oui, Sire," répondent-ils tous d'un cri unanime: "on vouloit nous attacher à la terre. Vous venez, comme l'ange du Seigneur, pour nous sauver!"

Les braves du bataillon du 5<sup>e</sup> demandèrent à marcher des premiers sur la division qui couvroit Grenoble. On se mit en marche au milieu de la foule d'habitans qui s'augmentoient à chaque instant. Vizille se distingua par son enthousiasme.

"C'est ici qu'est née la révolution! disoient ces braves gens; c'est nous qui les premiers avons osé réclamer les privilèges des hommes: c'est encore ici que ressuscite la liberté Française, et que la France recouvre son honneur et son indépendance!"

Quelque fatigué que fût l'empereur, il voulut entrer le soir même dans Grenoble. Entre Vizille et Grenoble, le jeune adjudant-major du 7<sup>e</sup> de ligne vint annoncer que le colonel Labedoyere, profondément navré du déshonneur qui couvroit la France, et déterminé par les plus nobles sentimens, s'étoit détaché de la division de Grenoble, et venoit avec le régiment, au pas accéléré, à la rencontre de l'empereur. Une demi-heure après, ce brave régiment vint doubler la force des troupes impériales; à neuf heures du soir, l'empereur fit son entrée dans le Faubourg de —

On avoit fait rentrer les troupes dans Grenoble, et les portes de la ville étoient fermées. Les remparts qui devoient défendre cette ville étoient couverts par le 3<sup>e</sup> régiment du génie, composé de deux mille sapeurs, tous vieux soldats couverts d'honorables blessures; par le 4<sup>e</sup> d'artillerie de ligne, ce même régiment où vingt-cinq ans auparavant l'empereur avoit été fait capitaine; par les deux autres bataillons du 5<sup>e</sup> de ligne, par le 11<sup>e</sup> de ligne et les fidèles hussards du 4<sup>e</sup>.

La garde nationale et la populace entière de Grenoble étoient placées derrière la garnison, et tous faisoient retentir l'air des cris de *vive l'empereur!* On enfonça les portes; et, à dix heures du soir, l'empereur entra dans Grenoble au milieu d'une armée et d'un peuple animés du plus vif enthousiasme.

Le lendemain, l'empereur fut harangué par la municipalité et par toutes les autorités départementales. Les discours des chefs militaires et ceux des magistrats étoient unanimes. Tous disoient que des princes, imposés par une force étrangère, n'étoient pas des princes légitimes, et qu'on n'étoit tenu à aucun engagement envers des princes dont la nation ne vouloit pas.

A deux heures, l'empereur passa la revue de ces troupes au milieu de la population de tout le département, aux cris : *A bas les Bourbons! à bas les ennemis du peuple! vive l'empereur, et un gouvernement de notre choix!* La garnison de Grenoble, immédiatement après, se mit en marche forcée pour se porter sur Lyon.

Une remarque qui n'a pas échappé aux observateurs, c'est qu'en un clin-d'œil, ces six mille hommes se trouvèrent parés de la cocarde nationale, et chacun d'une cocarde vieille et usée; car, en quittant leur cocarde tricolore, ils l'avoient cachée au fond de leur sac. Pas une ne fut achetée au petit Grenoble. C'est la même, disoient-ils en passant devant l'empereur, c'est la même que nous portions à Austerlitz! Celle-ci, disoient d'autres, nous l'avions à Marengo!

Le 9, l'empereur coucha à Bourgoin. La foule et l'enthousiasme alloient, s'il est possible, en augmentant. "Il y a long-temps que nous vous attendions, disoient tous ces braves gens à l'empereur. Vous voilà enfin arrivé pour délivrer la France de l'insolence de la noblesse, des prétentions des prêtres, et de la honte du joug de l'étranger!" De Grenoble à Lyon, la marche de l'empereur ne fut qu'un triomphe. L'empereur, fatigué, étoit dans sa calèche, allant toujours au pas, environné d'une foule de paysans chantant des chansons qui exprimoient toute la noblesse des sentimens des braves Dauphinois. "Ah! dit l'empereur, je retrouve ici les sentimens qui, il y a vingt ans, me firent saluer la France du nom de la *grande nation!* Oui, vous êtes encore la grande nation, et vous le serez toujours!"

Cependant le comte d'Artois, le duc d'Orléans et plusieurs maréchaux étoient arrivés à Lyon. L'argent avoit été prodigué aux troupes, les promesses aux officiers. On vouloit couper le pont de la Guillotière et le pont Morand. L'empereur rioit de ces ridicules préparatifs; il ne pouvoit avoir des doutes sur les dispositions des Lyonnais, encore moins sur les dispositions des soldats. Cependant, il avoit donné ordre au général Bertrand de réunir des bateaux à Mirbel, dans l'intention de passer dans la nuit, et d'intercepter les routes de Moulins et de Mâcon au prince qui vouloit lui interdire le passage du Rhône. A quatre heures, une reconnaissance du 4<sup>e</sup> de hussards arriva à la Guillotière, et fut accueillie aux cris de *vive l'empereur!* par cette immense population d'un faubourg qui toujours s'est distingué par son attachement à la patrie. Le passage de Mirbel fut contremandé, et l'empereur se porta au galop sur Lyon, à la tête des troupes qui devoient lui en défendre l'entrée.

Le comte d'Artois avoit tout fait pour s'assurer les troupes. Il ignoroit que rien n'est possible en France quand on y est l'agent de l'étranger, et qu'on n'est pas du côté de l'honneur national et de la cause du peuple! Passant devant le 13<sup>e</sup> régiment de dragons, il dit à un brave que des cicatrices et trois chevrons décoroient, allons, camarade, crie donc *vive le Roi!* "Non, Monsieur, répond ce brave dragon, aucun soldat ne combattra contre son père! Je ne puis vous répondre qu'en criant *vive l'empereur!*" Le comte d'Artois monta en voiture, et quitta Lyon escorté d'un seul gendarme.

A neuf heures du soir, l'empereur traversa la Guillotière presque seul, mais environné d'une immense population.

Le lendemain 11, il passa la revue de toute la division de Lyon, et le brave général Brayer à la tête se mit en marche pour marcher sur la capitale.

Les sentimens que, pendant deux jours, les habitans de cette grande ville et les paysans des environs, témoignèrent à l'empereur, le touchèrent tellement, qu'il ne put leur exprimer ce qu'il sentoit, qu'en disant : *Lyonnais! je vous aime.* C'est pour la seconde fois que les acclamations de cette ville avoient été le présage des nouvelles destinées réservées à la France.

Le 13, à trois heures après midi, l'empereur arriva à Villefranche, petite ville de quatre mille âmes, qui en renfermoit en ce moment plus de soixante mille. Il s'arrêta à l'Hotel-de-Ville. Un grand nombre de militaires blessés lui furent présentés.

Il entra à Mâcon à sept heures du soir, toujours environné du peuple des cantons voisins. Il témoigna son étonnement aux Mâconnais du peu d'efforts qu'ils avoient faits dans la dernière guerre, pour se défendre contre l'ennemi, et soutenir l'honneur des Bourguignons. "Sire, pourquoi aviez-vous nommé un mauvais maire?"

A Tournus, l'empereur n'eut que des éloges à donner aux habitans pour la belle conduite et le patriotisme qui, dans ces mêmes circonstances, ont distingué Tournus, Châlons et Saint-Jean-de-Lône. A Châlons, qui, pendant quarante jours, a résisté aux forces de l'ennemi et défendu le passage de la Saône, l'empereur s'est fait rendre compte de tous les traits de bravoure, et ne pouvant se rendre à Saint-Jean-de-Lône, il a du moins envoyé la décoration de la Légion-d'Honneur au digne maire de cette ville. A cette occasion, l'empereur s'écria : "C'est pour vous, braves gens, que j'ai institué la Légion-d'Honneur, et non pour les émigrés pensionnés de nos ennemis!"

L'empereur reçut à Châlons la députation de la ville de Dijon, qui venoit de chasser de son sein le préfet et le mauvais maire, dont la conduite, dans la dernière campagne, a déshonoré Dijon et les Dijonnais! L'empereur destitua ce maire, en nomma un autre, et confia le commandement de la division au brave général Devaux.

Le 15, l'empereur vint coucher à Autun, et d'Autun il alla coucher, le 16, à Avallon. Il trouva sur



cette route les mêmes sentimens que dans les montagnes du Dauphiné. Il rétablit dans leurs places tous les fonctionnaires qui avoient été destitués pour avoir concouru à la défense de la patrie contre l'étranger. Les habitans de Chiffey étoient spécialement l'objet des persécutions d'un freluquet, sous préfet à Semur, pour avoir pris les armes contre les ennemis de notre pays. L'empereur a donné ordre à un brigadier de gendarmerie d'arrêter ce sous-préfet, et de le conduire dans les prisons d'Avallon.

L'empereur déjeuna le 17 à Vermanton, et vint à Auxerre, où le préfet Gamot étoit resté fidèle à son poste. Le brave 14<sup>e</sup> avoit foulé aux pieds la cocarde blanche. L'empereur apprit que le 6<sup>e</sup> de lanciers avoit également arboré la cocarde tricolore, et se parotoit sur Montereau pour garder ce pont contre un détachement des gardes du corps qui vouloit le faire sauter. Les jeunes gardes-du-corps, n'étant pas encore accoutumés aux coups de lance, prirent la fuite à l'aspect de ce corps, et on leur fit deux prisonniers.

À Auxerre, le comte Bertrand, major-général, donna ordre qu'on réunit tous les bateaux pour embarquer l'armée, qui étoit déjà forte de quatre divisions, et la porter le soir même à Fossard, de manière à pouvoir arriver à une heure du matin à Fontainebleau.

Avant de partir d'Auxerre, l'empereur fut rejoint par le prince de la Moskowa. Ce maréchal avoit fait arborer la cocarde tricolore dans tout son gouvernement.

L'empereur arriva à Fontainebleau le 20, à quatre heures du matin; à sept heures, il apprit que les Bourbons étoient partis de Paris, et que la capitale étoit libre. Il partit sur-le-champ pour s'y rendre; il est entré aux Tuileries à neuf heures du soir, au moment où on l'attendoit le moins.

Ainsi s'est terminée, sans répandre une goutte de sang, sans trouver aucun obstacle, cette légitime entreprise, qui a rétabli la nation dans ses droits; dans sa gloire, et a effacé la souillure que la trahison et la présence de l'étranger avoient répandue sur la capitale; ainsi s'est vérifié ce passage de l'adresse de l'empereur aux soldats: *que l'aigle, avec les couleurs nationales, voleroit de clocher en clocher jusqu'aux tours de Notre-Dame.*

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## No. II.

### DECLARATION of CONGRESS, MARCH 13th, 1815.

LES puissances qui ont signé le Traité de Paris, réunies en congrès à Vienne, informées de l'évasion de Napoléon Bonaparte et de son entrée à main armée en France, doivent à leur propre dignité et à l'intérêt de l'ordre social une déclaration solennelle des sentimens que cet événement leur a fait éprouver.

En rompant ainsi la convention qui l'avait établi à l'île d'Elbe, Bonaparte détruit le seul titre légal auquel son existence se trouvait attachée. En reparaissant en France, avec des projets de troubles et de bouleversemens, il s'est privé lui-même de la protection des lois, et a manifesté, à la face de l'univers, qu'il ne saurait y avoir ni paix ni trêve avec lui.

Les puissances déclarent, en conséquence, que Napoléon Bonaparte s'est placé hors des relations civiles et sociales, et que, comme ennemi et perturbateur du repos du monde, il s'est livré à la vindicte publique.

Elles déclarent en même tems, que fermement résolues de maintenir intact le Traité de Paris du 30 Mai 1814 et les dispositions sanctionnées par ce Traité, et celles qu'elles ont arrêtées ou qu'elles arrêteront encore pour le compléter et le consolider, elles emploieront tous leurs moyens et réuniront tous leurs efforts pour que la paix générale, objet des vœux de l'Europe et but constant de leurs travaux, ne soit pas troublée de nouveau, et pour la garantir de tout attentat qui menacerait de replonger les peuples dans les désordres et les malheurs des révolutions.

Et quoiqu'intimement persuadés que la France entière, se raillant autour de son souverain légitime, fera incessamment rentrer dans le néant cette dernière tentative d'un délire criminel et impuissant, tous les souverains de l'Europe, animés des mêmes sentimens et guidés par les mêmes principes, déclarent, que si, contre tout calcul, il pouvait résulter de cet événement un danger réel quelconque, ils seraient prêts à donner au Roi de France et à la nation Française, ou à tout autre gouvernement attaqué, dès que la demande en serait formée, les secours nécessaires pour rétablir la tranquillité publique, et à faire cause commune contre tous ceux qui entreprendraient de la compromettre.

La présente déclaration insérée au protocole du congrès réuni à Vienne dans sa séance du 13 Mars 1815, sera rendue publique.

Fait et certifié véritable par les plénipotentiaires des huit puissances signataires du Traité de Paris.  
A Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815.

Suivent les signatures dans l'ordre alphabétique des cours :

<i>Autriche.</i>	{ Le Prince de METTERNICH. Le Baron de WESSENBERG.
<i>Espagne.</i>	P. GOMEZ LABRADOR.
<i>France.</i>	{ Le Prince de TALLEYRAND. Le Duc de DALBERG. LATOUR-DU-PIN. Le Cte. ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
<i>Grande-Bretagne.</i>	{ WELLINGTON. CLANCARTY. CATHCART. STEWART.
<i>Portugal.</i>	{ Le Cte. de PALMELLA. SALDANHA. LOBO.
<i>Prusse.</i>	{ Le Prince de HARDENBERG. Le Baron de HUMBOLDT.
<i>Russie.</i>	{ Le Cte. de RASOUMOWSKI. Le Cte. de STACKELBERG. Le Cte. de NESSELRODE.
<i>Suède.</i>	LOEWENHIELM.

### No. III.

PROCLAMATION of LOUIS XVIII. upon leaving PARIS.

Paris, le 19 Mars.

Louis, par la grâce de Dieu, Roi de France et de Navarre, à nos amis et frères, les pairs de France et les députés des départemens :

LA Divine Providence, qui nous a rappelés au trône de nos pères, permet aujourd'hui que ce trône soit ébranlé par la défection d'une partie de la force armée qui avait juré de le défendre ; nous pourrions profiter des dispositions fidèles et patriotiques de l'immense majorité des habitans de Paris pour en disputer l'entrée aux rebelles ; mais nous frémissons des malheurs de tous genres qu'un combat dans ses murs attirerait sur les habitans.

Nous nous retirons avec quelques braves que l'intrigue et la perfidie ne parviendront point à détacher de leurs devoirs, et puisque nous ne pouvons point défendre notre capitale, nous irons plus loin rassembler des forces et chercher sur un autre point du royaume, non pas des sujets plus aimans et plus fidèles que nos bons Parisiens, mais des Français plus avantageusement placés pour se déclarer pour la bonne cause.

La crise actuelle s'apaisera ; nous avons le doux pressentiment que les soldats égarés dont la défection livre nos sujets à tant de dangers, ne tarderont pas à reconnaître leurs torts, et trouveront dans notre indulgence et dans nos bontés la récompense de leur retour.

Nous reviendrons bientôt au milieu de ce bon peuple à qui nous ramènerons encore une fois la paix et le bonheur.

A ces causes, nous avons déclaré et déclarons, ordonné et ordonnons ce qui suit :

Art. 1<sup>er</sup>. Aux termes de l'article 50 de la Charte constitutionnelle, et de l'article 4 du titre 2 de la loi du 14 Août 1814, la session de la chambre des pairs, et celle de la chambre des députés des départemens pour 1814, sont déclarés closes. Les pairs et les députés qui les composent se sépareront à l'instant.

2. Nous convoquons une nouvelle session de la chambre des pairs et la session de 1815 de la chambre des députés.



Les pairs et les députés des départemens se reuniront le plus tôt possible au lieu que nous indiquerons pour le siège provisoire de notre Gouvernement.

Toute assemblée de l'une ou de l'autre chambre qui aurait lieu ailleurs, sans notre autorisation, est dès-à-présent déclarée nulle et illicite.

3. Notre chancelier et nos ministres, chacun dans ce qui le concerne, sont chargés de l'exécution de la présente proclamation qui sera portée aux deux chambres, publiée et affichée, tant à Paris que dans les départemens, et envoyée à tous les préfets, cours et tribunaux du royaume.

Donné à Paris, le 19 Mars de l'an de grâce 1815, et de notre règne le vingtième.

Par le Roi, le Chancelier of France, (Signé)

LOUIS.  
DAMBRAY. (Signé)

## No. IV.

*TREATY signed between the ALLIED POWERS on the 25th of MARCH, 1815.*

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, having taken into consideration the consequences which the invasion of France by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the actual situation of that kingdom may produce with respect to the safety of Europe, have resolved, in conjunction with their Majesties the Emperors of Russia and Austria, to apply to that important circumstance the principles consecrated by the treaty of Chaumont.

They have consequently resolved to renew by a solemn treaty, signed separately by each of the four powers with each of the three others, the engagement to preserve against every attack the order of things so happily established in Europe, and to determine upon the most effectual means of fulfilling that engagement, as well as giving it all the extension which the present circumstances so imperiously call for.

Art. I. The high contracting parties above-mentioned solemnly engage to unite the resources of their respective states, for the purpose of maintaining entire the conditions of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris, the 30th of May, 1814, as also the stipulations determined upon and signed at the congress of Vienna, with the view to complete the dispositions of that treaty, to preserve them against all infringement, and particularly against the designs of Napoleon Bonaparte. For this purpose they engage, in the spirit of the declaration of the 13th March last, to direct in common, and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against him, and against all those who may already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it, in order to force him to desist from his projects, and to render him unable to disturb in future the tranquillity of Europe and the general peace, under the protection of which, the rights, the liberty, and the independence of nations had been recently placed and secured.

II. Although the means destined for the attainment of so great and salutary an object, ought not to be subjected to limitation, and although the high contracting parties are resolved to devote thereto all those means which in their respective situations they are enabled to dispose of; they have, nevertheless, agreed to keep constantly in the field each a force of one hundred and fifty thousand men complete, including cavalry in the proportion of at least one-tenth, and a just proportion of artillery, not reckoning garrisons, and to employ the same actively and conjointly against the common enemy.

III. The high contracting parties reciprocally engage, not to lay down their arms but by common consent, nor before the object of the war, designated in the first article of the present treaty, shall have been attained, nor until Bonaparte shall have been rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew his attempts to possess himself of the supreme power in France.

IV. The present treaty being principally applicable to the present circumstances, the stipulations of the treaty of Chaumont, and particularly those contained in the sixteenth article of the same, shall be again in force as soon as the object actually in view shall have been attained.

V. Whatever relates to the command of the combined armies, to supplies, &c., shall be regulated by a particular convention.

VI. The high contracting parties shall be allowed respectively to accredit to the generals commanding their armies, officers who shall have the liberty of corresponding with their governments, for the purpose of giving information of military events, and of every thing relating to the operations of the armies.

VII. The engagements entered into by the present treaty having for their object the maintenance of the general peace, the high contracting parties agree to invite all the powers of Europe to accede to the same.

VIII. The present treaty having no other end in view but to support France, or any other country which may be invaded, against the enterprises of Bonaparte and his adherents, his Most Christian Majesty shall be specially invited to accede hereunto; and in the event of his Majesty requiring the forces stipulated in the second article, to make known what assistance circumstances will allow him to bring forward in furtherance of the object of the present treaty.

Separate Article. As circumstances might prevent his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from keeping constantly in the field the number of troops specified in the second Article, it is agreed that his Britannic Majesty shall have the option, either of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying at the rate of thirty pounds sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and twenty pounds per annum for each infantry soldier that may be wanting to complete the number stipulated in the second Article.

In testimony whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed the same.

## MEMORANDUM.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1815.

The treaty, of which the substance is given above, has been ordered to be ratified, and it has been notified on the part of the Prince Regent to the high contracting parties, that it is his Royal Highness's determination, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, to direct the said ratifications to be exchanged in due course, against similar acts on the part of the respective powers, under an explanatory declaration of the following tenour, as to Article VIII. of the said treaty :—

## DECLARATION.

THE Undersigned, on the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of the 25th of March last, on the part of his Court, is hereby commanded to declare, that the 8th Article of the said Treaty, wherein his Most Christian Majesty is invited to accede under certain stipulations, is to be understood as binding the contracting parties upon principles of mutual security, to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Bonaparte, in pursuance of the 3d Article of the said Treaty, but is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war, with a view of imposing upon France any particular government.

However solicitous the Prince Regent must be to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his Allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this declaration, on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his Most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British government has invariably regulated its conduct.

## STATE PAPER, referring to the preceding DECLARATION.

THE undersigned Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, having informed his august master of the communication made to him by Lord Castlereagh, respecting the 8th Article of the Treaty of the 25th of March last, has received orders to declare, that the interpretation given to that article by the British Government is entirely conformable to the principles by which his Imperial Majesty proposes to regulate his policy during the present war. The Emperor, although irrevocably resolved to direct all his efforts against the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte, as that object is expressed in the 3d Article, and to act in that respect in the most perfect concert with his allies, is nevertheless convinced, that the duty imposed upon him by the interest of his subjects, as well as the principles by which he is guided, would not permit him to engage to prosecute the war for the purpose of imposing a form of government on France.

Whatever wishes his Majesty the Emperor may form, to see his Most Christian Majesty replaced upon the throne, and whatever may be his constant solicitude, to contribute, conjointly with his allies, to the attainment of so desirable an object; his Majesty has nevertheless thought it right to answer by this explanation, the declaration which his Excellency Lord Castlereagh has transmitted on the exchange of the ratification, and which the undersigned on his part is fully authorised to accept.

Vienna, May 9, 1815.

METTERNICH.



## No. V.

## LETTRE AUTOGRAPHE DE S. M. L'EMPEREUR AUX SOUVERAINS.

Monsieur mon frère,

Vous aurez appris, dans le cours du mois dernier, mon retour sur les côtes de France, mon entrée à Paris, et le départ de la famille des Bourbons. La véritable nature de ces événemens doit maintenant être connue de Votre Majesté. Ils sont l'ouvrage d'une irrésistible puissance, l'ouvrage de la volonté unanime d'une grande nation qui connoît ses devoirs et ses droits. La dynastie que la force avoit rendue au peuple Français n'étoit plus faite pour lui : les Bourbons n'ont voulu s'associer ni à ses sentimens ni à ses mœurs ; la France a dû se séparer d'eux. Sa voix appeloit un libérateur : l'attente qui m'avoit décidé au plus grand des sacrifices avoit été trompée. Je suis venu, et du point où j'ai touché le rivage, l'amour de mes peuples m'a porté jusqu'au sein de ma capitale. Le premier besoin de mon cœur est de payer tant d'affection par le maintien d'une honorable tranquillité. Le rétablissement du trône impérial étoit nécessaire au bonheur des Français. Ma plus douce pensée est de le rendre en même temps utile au repos de l'Europe. Assez de gloire a illustré tour à tour les drapeaux de diverses nations ; les vicissitudes du sort ont assez fait succéder de grands revers à de grands succès. Une plus belle arène est aujourd'hui ouvert aux souverains, et je suis le premier à y descendre. Après avoir [présenté au Monde le spectacle de grands combats, il sera plus doux de ne connoître désormais d'autre rivalité que celles des avantages de la paix, d'autre lutte que *la lutte sainte de la félicité des peuples*. La France se plaît à proclamer avec franchise ce noble but de tous ces vœux. Jalouse de son indépendance, le principe invariable de sa politique sera le respect le plus absolu pour l'indépendance des autres nations. Si tels sont, comme j'en ai l'heureuse confiance, les sentimens personnels de Votre Majesté, le calme général est assuré pour long-temps ; et la Justice, assise aux confins des divers Etats, suffira seule pour en garder les frontières.

Je saisis avec empressement, etc. etc.

Paris, le 4 Avril, 1815.

## No. VI.

## ADRESSE DU CHAMP-DE-MAI.

Sire,

Le peuple Français vous avoit décerné la couronne, vous l'avez déposée sans son aveu ; ses suffrages viennent de vous imposer le devoir de la reprendre. Un contrat nouveau s'est formé entre la nation et V. M. *Rassemblés de tous les points de l'empire autour des tables de la loi, où nous venons inscrire le vœu du peuple, ce vœu, seule source légitime du pouvoir, il nous est impossible de ne pas faire retentir la voix de la France, dont nous sommes les organes immédiats, de ne pas dire, en présence de l'Europe, au chef auguste de la nation, ce qu'elle attend de lui, ce qu'il doit attendre d'elle.*

*Nos paroles seront graves comme les circonstances qui les inspirent.*

*Que veut la ligue des Rois alliés, avec cet appareil de guerre dont elle épouvante l'Europe et afflige l'humanité ?*

Par quel acte, par quelle violation avons-nous provoqué leur vengeance, motivé leur agression ?

Avons-nous, depuis la paix, essayé de leur donner des lois ? Nous voulons seulement faire suivre celles qui s'adaptent à nos mœurs.

Nous ne voulons point du chef que veulent pour nous nos ennemis, et nous voulons celui dont ils ne veulent pas.

Ils osent vous proscrire personnellement, vous, Sire, qui, maître tant de fois de leurs capitales, les avez raffermis généreusement sur leurs trônes ébranlés !..... Cette haine de nos ennemis ajoute à notre amour pour vous. On proscriroit le moins connu de nos citoyens, que nous devrions le défendre avec la même énergie. Il seroit comme vous sous l'égide de la loi et de la puissance Française, défendu des atteintes de l'étranger.

On nous menace d'une invasion ! et cependant, resserrés dans des frontières que la nature ne nous a point imposées, que long-temps et avant votre règne la victoire et la paix même avoient reculées, nous n'avons point franchi cette étroite enceinte, par respect pour des traités que vous n'avez point signés, et que vous avez offert de respecter.

Ne craint-on pas de nous rappeler des temps, un état de choses naguère si différens, et qui pourroient encore se reproduire? Ne demande-t-on que des garanties? elles sont toutes dans nos institutions et dans la volonté du peuple Français, unie désormais à la vôtre.

Ce ne seroit point la première fois que nous aurions vaincu l'Europe entière armée contre nous.

Ces droits sacrés, imprescriptibles, que la moindre peuplade n'a jamais réclamés en vain au tribunal de la justice et de l'histoire, c'est à la nation Française qu'on ose les disputer une seconde fois, au dix-neuvième siècle, à la face du monde civilisé!

Parce que la France veut être la France, faut-il qu'elle soit dégradée, ou du moins déchirée, démembrée! et nous réserve-t-on le sort de la Pologne!

Vainement veut-on cacher des funestes desseins sous le dessein unique de vous séparer de nous, pour nous donner des maîtres avec qui nous n'avons plus rien de commun, que nous n'entendons plus, et qui ne peuvent plus nous entendre; qui ne semblent appartenir ni au siècle, ni à la nation qui ne les a reçus un moment dans son sein que pour voir proscrire et avilir par eux ses plus généreux citoyens.

Leur présence a détruit toutes les illusions qui s'attachoient encore à leur nom.

Ils ne pourroient plus croire à nos sermens, nous ne pourrions plus croire à leurs promesses. La dîme, la féodalité, les privilèges, tout ce qui nous est odieux, étoit trop évidemment le but et le fond de leur pensée, quand l'un d'eux, pour consoler l'impatience du présent, assuroit à ses confidens qu'il leur repondoit de l'avenir.

Ce que chacun de nous avoit regardé pendant vingt-cinq ans comme titre de gloire, comme services dignes de récompense, a été pour eux un titre de proscription, un sceau de réprobation.

Des milliers de fonctionnaires, des magistrats, qui, depuis vingt-cinq ans, suivent les mêmes maximes, et parmi lesquels nous venons de choisir nos représentans; cinq cent mille guerriers, notre force et notre gloire; six millions de propriétaires investis par la révolution; un plus grand nombre encore de citoyens éclairés, qui font une profession réfléchie de ces idées devenues parmi nous des dogmes politiques: tous ces dignes Français n'étoient point les Français des Bourbons; ils ne vouloient régner que pour une poignée de privilèges depuis vingt-cinq ans punis ou pardonnés.

L'opinion même, cette propriété sacrée de l'homme, ils l'ont poursuivie, persécutée jusque dans le paisable sanctuaire des lettres et des arts.

*Sire, un trône fondé par les armes étrangères, et environné d'erreurs incurables, s'est écroulé en un instant devant vous, parce que vous nous rapportiez de la retraite, qui n'est féconde en grandes pensées que pour les grands hommes, tous les élémens de notre véritable gloire, et toutes les espérances de notre véritable prospérité.*

Comment votre marche triomphale de Cannes à Paris n'a-t-elle pas dessillé tous les yeux? Dans l'histoire de tous les peuples et de tous les siècles, est-il une scène plus nationale, plus héroïque, plus imposante? Ce triomphe, que n'a point coûté de sang, ne suffit pas pour détromper nos ennemis.....En veulent-ils de plus sanglans? Eh bien! Sire, attendez de nous tout ce qu'un héros fondateur est en droit d'attendre d'une nation fidèle, énergique, généreuse, inébranlable dans ses principes, invariable dans le but de ses efforts, l'indépendance à l'extérieur, et la liberté au dedans.

Les trois branches de la législature vont se mettre en action; un seul sentiment les animera. Confians dans les promesses de V. M., nous lui remettons, nous remettons à nos représentans et à la chambre des pairs, le soin de revoir, de consolider, de perfectionner, de concert, sans précipitation, sans secousse, avec maturité, avec sagesse, notre système constitutionnel et les institutions qui doivent en être la garantie.

Et cependant, si nous sommes forcés de combattre, qu'un seul cri retentisse dans tous les cœurs:—  
“Marchons à l'ennemi qui veut nous traiter comme la dernière des nations! Serrons-nous tous autour du trône où siège le père et le chef du peuple et de l'armée.”

Sire, rien n'est impossible, rien ne sera épargné pour nous assurer l'honneur et l'indépendance, ces biens plus chers que la vie. Tout sera tenté, tout sera exécuté pour repousser un joug ignominieux; nous le disons aux nations: puissent leurs chefs nous entendre! S'ils acceptent vos offres de paix, le peuple Français attendra de votre administration forte, libérale, paternelle, des motifs de se consoler des sacrifices que lui a coûtés la paix. Mais si l'on ne nous laisse que le choix entre la guerre et la honte, la nation tout entière se lève pour la guerre; elle est prête à vous dégager des offres trop modérées, peut-être, que vous avez faites pour épargner à l'Europe un nouveau bouleversement: tout Français est soldat; la victoire suivra vos aigles; et nos ennemis qui comptoient sur nos divisions, regretteront bientôt de nous avoir provoqués.



## No. VII.

## MANIFESTE DU ROI DE FRANCE,

*Adressé à la Nation Française.\**

LE Roi étoit impatient de parler à ses peuples. Il lui tarδοit de leur témoigner tout ce qu'avoient fait éprouver à son cœur ces marques de fidélité, ces consolations inexprimables qui lui ont été prodiguées dans toutes les villes, dans tous les villages, sur toutes les routes qu'il a traversées, lorsqu'il cherchoit un point de réunion pour les fidèles défenseurs " [de sa personne]" et de son Etat, lorsqu'il demandoit, sans pouvoir le trouver, un rempart derrière lequel ils eussent le temps de s'armer avec lui contre une trahison trop noire, trop basse, pour n'avoir pas été imprévue.

Mais plus le Roi se sentoit profondément ému de la fidélité de cette immense population Française, et plus il se disoit à lui-même que son premier soin devoit être d'empêcher que, parmi les nations étrangères, la France ne fût calomniée, déshonorée, exposée à un mépris injuste, à une indignation non méritée, peut-être même à des dangers, et à un genre d'attaque qui auroient pu paroître un châtiment juste d'une déloyauté supposée.

" [Ce premier soin est rempli. Il l'a été avec un succès digne de la sollicitude de S. M., du zèle de ses ministres, et de la magnanimité de ses alliés.

" Les ambassadeurs et envoyés du Roi près des diverses cours Européennes, ses représentans au congrès de Vienne ont, d'après les instructions directes de S. M., établi partout la vérité des faits, et prévenu jusqu'à leur exagération.]"

Toutes les puissances de l'Europe savent aujourd'hui que le Roi de France et la nation Française, plus unis que jamais par tout ce qui peut resserrer les liens d'un bon Roi et d'un bon peuple, ont été subitement trahis par une armée infidèle à son prince et à sa patrie, à l'honneur et à ses sermens; que cependant, parmi les premiers généraux de cette armée, ceux dont les noms en faisoient la gloire, ou se sont raillés aux drapeaux du Roi, ou du moins ont abandonné ceux de l'usurpateur; que des chefs de corps et des officiers de tout grade suivent journellement cet exemple; que même, parmi cette multitude de soldats, entraînés à une defection inconnue dans les fastes militaires, il en est un grand nombre que l'inexpérience a livré à la séduction, que la réflexion a déjà ramené au repentir, et dont l'égarement doit être mis tout entier à la charge de leurs corrupteurs. L'Europe sait enfin, "[qu'excepté cette portion]" d'armée devenue indigne de sa gloire passée, "[et qui a cessé d'appartenir à la nation Française,]" excepté une poignée de complices volontaires, qu'ont fournie à l'usurpateur des ambitieux sans mérite, des gens sans aveu, et des criminels sans remords, la nation Française tout entière, les bons citoyens des villes, les bons habitans des campagnes, les corps et les individus, tous les sexes et tous les âges, ont suivi et rappelé le Roi de tous leurs vœux, ont empreint sur chacun de ses pas un nouvel hommage de reconnaissance, et un nouveau serment de fidélité. L'Europe sait que dans Paris, "[dans Beauvais,]" dans Abbeville, dans cette grande et glorieuse cité de Lille, dont la trahison occupoit les portes, et menaçoit d'ensanglanter les murs, à la face et sous le glaive même des traîtres, tous les bras se sont étendus vers le Roi, tous les yeux lui ont offert le tribut de leurs larmes, toutes les voix lui ont crié: *Revenez à nous!* "[revenez délivrer vos sujets.]"

L'Europe sait et continue d'apprendre que ces invocations n'ont pas cessé de se renouveler; que chaque jour elles arrivent au Roi non pas seulement de tous les points de cette frontière si éminemment loyale, mais de toutes les parties de son royaume les plus éloignées. Ainsi, les mêmes cris qui avoient retenti dans Lille, se sont fait entendre dans Bordeaux, où la fille de Louis XVI. a laissé le souvenir puissant (joint à tant d'autres!) *de son courage*, "[héroïque.]" Ainsi les mêmes contrées qui ont vu la première defection, ont vu aussi la première réunion de braves restés fidèles se rallier au panache de Henri IV. Un neveu du Roi, le gendre de Louis XVI., a marché à leur tête sans compter leur nombre; il a couru combattre la tyrannie et la rébellion; déjà *plusieurs succès brillans* lui en promettoient un qui eût été décisif: si des traîtres se sont encore trouvés là pour tromper son courage, le signal et l'exemple qu'il a donné n'ont pas été perdus.

" [On a vu qu'un héritier du trône ne craignoit pas de mourir pour la défense de son pays: et les acclamations des peuples, le jour où il avoit été vainqueur, leurs signes d'affliction où il a été trahi, ne sont pas seulement la consolation du présent, mais l'espoir de l'avenir.

" Eh! (qu'il soit permis au Roi de le dire, et d'adoucir au moins sa douleur, dans une si triste épreuve, par le témoignage que lui rend la pureté de sa conscience) comment les sentimens dont son cœur est animé pour ses sujets, ne lui eussent-ils pas assuré de leur part un pareil retour? Qui osera démentir le Roi, lorsqu'il jurera devant Dieu, devant son peuple, que depuis le jour où la Providence l'a replacé sur le trône de ses pères, l'objet constant de ses desirs, de ses pensées, de ses travaux, a été le bonheur de tous les Français, la restauration de son trône, le rétablissement de la paix extérieure et intérieure, celui de la religion,

\* The passages within inverted commas are those which Napoleon suppressed, when he found it necessary to permit the publication of this document in the Parisian journals.

de la justice, des lois, des mœurs, du crédit, du commerce, des arts ; l'inviolabilité de toutes les propriétés existantes, sans aucune exception ; l'emploi de toutes les vertus et de tous les talents, sans autre distinction ; la diminution présente des impôts les plus onéreux, en attendant leur prochaine suppression ; enfin, la fondation de la liberté publique et individuelle, l'institution et la perpétuité d'une charte qui garantit pour jamais à la nation Française ces biens inappréciables ?

“ Que, si dans des circonstances d'une telle difficulté, à la suite d'orages si violents et si longs, parmi tant de maux à réparer, tant de pièges à découvrir, et des intérêts si contraires à concilier, on n'a pas pu franchir tous les obstacles, échapper à toutes les surprises, se préserver même de toutes les fautes, le Roi pourroit encore se flatter de l'assentiment de toutes les bonnes consciences, s'il disoit que sa plus grande erreur a été de celles qui ne sortent que du cœur des bons princes, et que ne commettent jamais les tyrans : c'est à leur pouvoir qu'ils ne veulent point de bornes ; c'est à sa clémence que le Roi n'en a pas voulu.”

Ainsi éclairées sur les vraies dispositions de la France, d'autant plus fidèles à la noble tâche qu'elles s'étoient imposée le 13 Mars dernier, mais d'autant plus averties de ne pas confondre la loyauté opprimée avec la perfidie triomphante, les puissances réunies au congrès de Vienne ont signé le 25 du même mois un nouveau traité par lequel, avant tout, elles se sont engagées, “ [A respecter religieusement l'intégrité du territoire et l'indépendance du caractère Français ; à ne se présenter que comme les amies, les libératrices, ou plutôt les auxiliaires de la nation Française ; à ne connoître d'ennemi que celui-là seul qu'elles ont déclaré l'ennemi du monde, qu'elles ont placé hors des relations civiles et sociales, et livré à la vindicte publique ; enfin, à ne poser les armes qu'après l'irrévocable destruction de son pouvoir malaisant, après la dispersion des factieux et des traîtres qui, se plaçant par une irruption soudaine entre un souverain légitime et des sujets loyaux, ont arraché le Roi d'avec son peuple, et le peuple d'avec son Roi, pour le malheur de la France et du monde,] ” à ne connoître d'ennemi que celui-là seul qu'elles ont déclaré *l'ennemi du monde*, qu'elles ont *placé hors des relations civiles et sociales*, et *livré à la vindicte publique* ; enfin, à ne poser les armes qu'après *l'irrévocable destruction* de son pouvoir, après *la dispersion des factieux et des traîtres qui, se plaçant par une irruption soudaine entre un souverain légitime et des sujets loyaux, ont arraché le Roi d'avec son peuple*.

Les puissances réunies en congrès ont fait plus encore. Certes, leur caractère et leur magnanimité, connus et admirés de tout l'univers, n'eussent pas permis de concevoir un garant plus sacré de leur parole, que leur parole même : et cependant elles ont cru qu'à ce garant il falloit encore en ajouter un autre : qu'elles ne pouvoient jamais ni assez tranquilliser le Roi sur la destinée de ses peuples, ni trop honorer la loyauté Française dans la douleur qui l'accable et dans l'inactivité désespérante à laquelle on l'a réduite.

“ [Les puissances ont arrêté que l'accession du Roi seroit demandée particulièrement pour le nouveau pacte qu'elles venoient de conclure. Leurs ambassadeurs sont venus apporter toutes ces communications à S. M. ; ils lui ont présenté les nouvelles lettres de créance de leurs souverains respectifs pour résider partout auprès du seul souverain légitime de la France ; et leurs pouvoirs reconnus, ils ont offert le nouveau traité des puissances à la délibération et à la signature du Roi.”

“ Français, le Roi a délibéré et il a signé.

“ Dans ce mot seul est votre sécurité toute entière.

“ Vous en êtes bien sûrs, Français, votre Roi n'a pu rien signer qui fût contre vous ; votre Roi ne cessera jamais de veiller sur vous et pour vous : vous l'avez lu dans tous ses actes publics ; vous l'avez entendu au milieu de vos représentants, de vos municipaux, de vos gardes nationales ; vous savez qu'il n'a pas tenu à lui d'éloigner cette dure nécessité de reconquérir vos droits.”

Français, le Roi vous sacrifieroit aujourd'hui ses droits, que son sacrifice, au lieu de vous assurer la paix, vous laisseroit exposés à une guerre plus terrible. Une invasion étrangère prendroit la place d'un *appui étranger*. L'Europe a résolu la destruction d'un pouvoir incompatible avec la société Européenne. Eh ! comment, dans un tel conflit, des étrangers livrés à eux-mêmes distingueroient-ils parmi vous *les victimes de la tyrannie d'avec ses complices* ? Comment la nation, dont l'usurpateur forceroit toutes les facultés à le servir, ne paroît-elle pas à ceux qui la combattoient une nation entièrement et uniquement ennemie ? Victorieuse ou vaincue, que deviendrait la “ [malheureuse] ” France ?

Mais, que la France le veuille, et la France n'a plus que des amis dans une ligue où son Roi est prié d'intervenir, et intervient. “ [La nécessité qu'il n'a pu conjurer, il est sûr au moins de l'adoucir lorsqu'il est là.” Il est là pour rallier sa nation autour de lui pour détourner d'elle des coups qui ne doivent frapper que les oppresseurs.

“ [Leurs communs oppresseurs ; il est là pour observer, avertir, contenir, arrêter, pour garder non seulement vos propriétés publiques et individuelles, mais encore votre dignité nationale, dont il est aussi jaloux que vous l'êtes sûrement vous-mêmes de sa majesté royale. L'une et l'autre restent et resteront intactes. Les Français gardent leur place parmi les nations, comme le Roi de France garde la sienne parmi les potentats. Avec la restauration de l'antique monarchie Française, une ère nouvelle s'est annoncée l'année dernière à toute l'Europe. Tous les souverains, par leurs conventions, se sont garanti le repos et la liberté de leurs peuples, comme par leurs vœux tous les peuples se sont garanti la légitimité et le maintien du pouvoir de leur chef. On s'est uni pour la paix, on s'est ligé pour l'ordre, et dans cette ligue *bienfaisante* ainsi que



le congrès l'a justement appelée, tous les états sont en même temps protecteurs et protégés, garantis et garans.]"

Cependant, c'est le monarque et le peuple Français qui, les premiers, ont eu besoin d'être secourus : c'est au monarque et au peuple Français, une fois réunis par la présence de leurs alliés, à se secourir eux-mêmes, de manière à n'avoir pas, s'il est possible, d'autre assistance à leur demander. Que ces dispositions générales de la nation fidèle, favorisées désormais par des amis au lieu d'être entravées par des traîtres, soient mises partout en action ; que *l'armée Française régénérée*, reprenne l'éclat qui appartient à son nom ; que toutes les gardes nationales, délivrées des pièges de la perfidie et rendues à l'élan de leurs cœurs, hâtent le rétablissement de l'ordre politique et civil dans tout le royaume. Qu'on se dise, enfin, et qu'on se répète sans cesse, que plus les Français feront pour sauver leur patrie, moins ils laisseront à faire aux étrangers ; que plus les Français pacifieront, moins leurs auxiliaires auront à soumettre ; et surtout qu'une fois la rébellion soumise, une fois l'usurpateur *détruit*, aucun pouvoir étranger ne se placera entre le prince légitime et le peuple fidèle, pour s'immiscer dans aucune des institutions politiques, dont la proposition, la délibération, et la décision n'appartiennent qu'à eux.

Français, le Roi qui a toujours été près de vous, sera bientôt avec vous. "[S. M., le jour où elle posera le pied sur son territoire et le vôtre, vous fera connoître en détail ses intentions salutaires et toutes ses dispositions d'ordre, de justice et de sagesse. Vous verrez que le temps de sa retraite n'a pas été un temps perdu pour vos intérêts.]" Vous verrez que le Roi a régné par les soins de sa prévoyance, lors même qu'il ne régnoit pas par l'exercice de son autorité.

"[Aujourd'hui, S. M. n'a voulu qu'annoncer aux bons Français ce qui devoit satisfaire leur honneur, calmer leur inquiétude, payer leur amour et seconder leur zèle ; c'est déjà sans doute avoir rempli un grand but.

"S. M. a pensé aussi que cette communication adressée à ses fidèles sujets parviendrait à ceux qui sont encore rebelles, et pourroit, en les éclairant sur leurs dangers, comme en les détrompant de leurs erreurs, en ramener beaucoup à leur devoir.]"

Le Roi a trop pardonné peut-être, et cependant il est aussi impossible à Louis XVIII. de ne pas faire grâce que de ne pas faire justice. Que l'innocence elle-même accueille donc encore le repentir ; que la fidélité persuade et ramène ; que les bons ouvrent leurs rangs à tous ceux qui peuvent être dignes d'y rentrer, et d'un autre côté, que les complices du grand coupable *profitent du temps qui reste au repentir pour avoir quelque chose de méritoire*, "[que les victimes de la nécessité soient sûres qu'elle ne leur sera pas imputée.]" Que tout le monde sache et reconnoisse qu'il est des temps où la persévérance du crime en est le seul caractère irrémissible.

Français, que Louis XVIII. vient de réconcilier pour la seconde fois avec l'Europe ; habitants de ces bonnes villes dont les vœux touchans arrivent chaque jour au Roi, et l'encouragent à les remplir ; Parisiens, qui pâlissez aujourd'hui à la vue de ce même palais dont les murs seuls répandoient naguère la sécurité sur vos visages, "[Qui tous les matins, pendant une année, êtes venus y saluer Louis XVIII. du nom de père, non pas avec une voix dominée par la terreur ou vendue au mensonge, mais avec le cri de vos cœurs et de vos consciences ; gardes nationales qui, le 12 mars, lui juriez avec tant d'ardeur de vivre et de mourir pour lui et pour la constitution, vous qui l'avez gardé dans vos cœurs,]" vous qui l'eussiez vu dans vos rangs si la trahison eût permis à ces rangs de se former, et s'ils n'eussent pas été désunis par ceux qui veulent les souiller aujourd'hui, préparez-vous tous pour le jour où la voix de votre prince et celle de votre patrie vous rappelleront au devoir d'aider l'un, à sauver l'autre.

Méfiez-vous cependant, et des pièges qu'on veut vous tendre, et des rôles qu'on voudroit vous assigner dans la parodie de ces assemblées qui jadis attestèrent la liberté sauvage de vos ancêtres, mais dont le spectacle dérisoire n'a pour but aujourd'hui que de vous rendre la proie du plus vil ou du plus odieux esclavage, entre le despotisme anarchique, et la tyrannie militaire. Sans doute, ci c'étoit un chose possible que les élections fussent nationales, les scrutateurs fidèles, les voix libres, le nouveau Champ-de-Mai feroit disparaître l'illégalité de son principe dans la loyauté de son vœu. Son premier cri seroit une nouvelle consécration de cette alliance jurée, il y a neuf siècles entre la nation des Francs et la maison royale de France, perpétuée pendant neuf siècles entre la postérité de ses Francs, et la postérité de leurs Rois : la vraie nation Française ne voudra jamais ni parjurer ses ancêtres, ni se parjurer elle-même. Mais Bonaparte a déjà écarté les nationaux en appelant ses satellites. Il a déjà compté les votes quand aucun vote n'est encore émis.

"[Eh ! que pourriez vous attendre de celui ou de ceux qui ont ensanglanté et souillé tout ce qu'ils ont touché ; qui ont su faire un objet de dérision et d'horreur de tout ce qui doit être un objet de vénération et d'amour ; qui auroient flétri, s'il étoit possible, jusqu'aux noms de patrie, de liberté, de constitution, de lois, d'honneur et de vertu. Français, n'avez-vous donc pas désormais votre *Grande Charte* qui a réhabilité tous ces noms sacrés, et les a remis en possession du respect qui leur appartient ? N'avez-vous pas enfin une constitution ? Pure dans son principe, elle a été réglée entre votre Roi et vos représentans ; douce dans son exécution, l'expérience d'une session entière vous l'a prouvée ; portant en elle-même le germe de toutes ses améliorations, il n'en est pas une que ne puisse créer à l'instant l'autorité royale avec l'assentiment des deux chambres, pas une qui ne puisse être proposée par vos représentans, provoquée par vos pétitions.

"Croyez que là est le fondement le plus solide, le seul garant sûr de la prérogative, des privilèges et des droits de tous.

"Croyez surtout que, par son droit, son titre, et son cœur, votre Roi est et sera toujours votre meilleur ami, votre plus constant, votre plus loyal ami. Unissez vos vœux aux siens, en attendant que vous puissiez agir de concert; et cette Providence à laquelle il rend compte de l'accomplissement de ses devoirs envers elle et envers vous, cette Providence qui a reçu ses sermens et les vôtres, priez-la, en commun avec lui, de bénir sa juste entreprise et vos nobles efforts.]"

Délibéré au conseil d'Etat du Roi, présidé par S. M. sur le rapport du sieur Comte de Lally-Tollendal.

A Gand, le 24 Avril, 1815.

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## No. VIII.

THE following document, as already observed, derives all its interest from the celebrity now attached to the village of Waterloo. On the 15th of August, 1705, "the Duke of Marlborough moved from Moidert to Corbais, and next day continued his march to Genap; from whence he advanced to Frischermont. On the 17th, General Auverquerque took the post of Waterloo, and next day after the confederate army was drawn up in order of battle before the enemy, who extended from Overysche, near the wood of Soignes, to Neerysche, with the little river Ysche in front, so as to cover Brussels and Lovain. The Duke of Marlborough proposed to attack them immediately, and Auverquerque approved of the design. But it was opposed by General Sclangenburgh, and other Dutch officers, who represented it in such a light to the deputies of the states, who attended the army, that they refused to concur in the execution. The Duke being obliged to relinquish the scheme, wrote an expostulatory letter to the States-General, complaining of their having withdrawn that confidence which they had reposed in him while he acted in Germany."—(See "British Biography,"—Life of Marlborough.)

The following is the letter alluded to:—

"High and Mighty Lords,

"According to what I had the honour to write to your High Mightinesses the 13th instant, the army marched Saturday last, and encamped that day at Corbais and St. Martin, and the next day at Genappe. On Monday we came to Fishermont, and yesterday we were in motion before break of day, and having passed several defiles, we came into a pretty large plain, having found the enemy, as we expected them, between Ober-Ysche and Neer-Ysche (about six miles E. E. N. from Waterloo,) with the little river Ysch, before them. At noon, or a little after, our own army was drawn up in order of battle, and having viewed, with Mons. D'Auverquerque, the posts which I designed to attack, I flattered myself already, considering the goodness and superiority of our troops, that I might soon have congratulated your High Mightinesses upon a glorious victory. But at last, when the attack was to begin, it was not thought fit to engage the enemy. I am confident that Messieurs the Deputies of your High Mightinesses, will acquaint you with the reasons that were alleged to them pro and con; and that they will at the same time do Mons. D'Auverquerque justice, by informing you that he was of the same opinion with me, that the opportunity was too fair to be let slip: however, I submitted, though with much reluctance.

"I shall speak this day to Messieurs the Deputies, and to Mons. D'Auverquerque, that they may give orders for the attack of Leuve, and for carrying on, at the same time, the levelling of the lines.

"I am, with all manner of respect,

"Your High Mightinesses, &c.

"MARLBOROUGH.

"P. S. My heart is so full, that I cannot forbear representing to your High Mightinesses, on this occasion, that I find my authority here to be much less than when I had the honour of commanding your troops last year in Germany."



## No. IX.

ORGANIZATION of the BRITISH, KING'S GERMAN, and HANOVERIAN ARTILLERY,  
previous to the 16th, 17th, and 18th June, 1815.

Colonel Sir G. A. Wood, commanding Artillery.

Staff { Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John May, Assistant Adjutant-General.  
Captain H. Baines, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, commanding whole of R. H. Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Julius Hentman, commanding King's Ger. and Han. Artil.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Dickson, attached to the Staff Artillery.

Field Officers.	Troops and Brigades.	Ordnance.	N. C. Offc. and Men.	To what attached.	
COMMANDED BY	Major Bull's troop.....	6 hy. 5½ in. how...	About 175	To the cavalry.	
Lieut. Col. Macdonald .....	Lieut. Col. Smith's do.....	5 do. 6 pr. 1 hy. do.	175		
	Lieut. Col. Sir R. Gardiner's....	5 do. 6 pr. 1 do....	175		
	Captain Whinyate's .....	6 do. 6 pr. & rock.	175		
	Captain Mercer's .....	5 nine pr. 1 hy. how.	175		
Lieut. Col. Adye.....	Major Ramsay's.....	5 do.....do.....	175	1st division infantry.	
	Capt. Sandham's brigader B.A....	5 do.....do.....	200		
Lieut. Col. Gold.....	Major Kuhlman's troop K.G.H.A.	5 do.....do.....	175		2d do.
	Capt. Bolton's brigade R.B.A.	5 do.....do.....	200		
Lieut. Col. Williamson .....	Major Symphen's troop K.G.H.A.	5 do.....do.....	175		3d do.
	Major Lloyd's brigade R.B.A....	5 do.....do.....	200		
Lieut. Col. Hawker.....	Major Cleeve's do. K.G.A.....	5 do.....do.....	200	4th do.	
	Major Brome's do. R.B.A.....	5 do.....do.....	200		
Major Hiese, H. Artillery....	Capt. de Rettberg do. H.A.....	5 do.....do.....	200	5th do.	
	Major Rogers do. R.B.A.....	5 do.....do.....	200		
Major Drummond.....	Capt. Braun do. H.A.....	5 do.....do.....	200	6th do.	
	Major Anett's do. R.B.A .....	5 do.....do.....	200		
	Lt. Col. Sir H. Ross's trp. R.B.H.A.	5 do.....do.....	175		In reserve.
	Major Beane's do.....do....	5 light six pr. 1 do.	175		
	Capt. Sinclair's brigade R.B.A....	5 nine pr. 1 do....	200		
			3,750		
RECAPITULATION OF ORDNANCE.		9 Pounder.	Lt. 6 Pound.	Hy. Howitz.	Total.
B. Horse Artillery.....	3 nine pounders, troops.....	15	...	3	18
	4 six do. light troops.....	...	20	4	24
	1 howitzer, troops.....	...	...	6	6
K. G. H. Artillery.....	2 nine pounders, do.....	10	...	2	12
British Artillery.....	7 do. brigades.....	35	...	7	42
K. German Artillery.....	1 do. do.....	5	...	1	6
Hanoverian do.....	2 do. do.....	10	...	2	12
Total.....		75	20	25	120